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Abstract 
The thesis focuses on the historical sociology of the Turkish state. It 
seeks to compare the development of the Ottoman/Turkish state 
with similar processes of large-scale historical change in Europe 
identified by Michael Mann in his two-volume text The Sources of Social 
Power. In these and in a series of shorter works, he develops an 
historiographic model based on four overlapping power networks 
(political, ideological, economic and military). Having spent the first 
two chapters giving an account of Mann's analysis and locating it with 
the spectrum of approaches to the study of the state as a socio- 
historical phenomenon, the thesis relates each of these networks to 
developmental patterns apparent in Turkey before concluding with an 
explication of the main areas of continuity and change and a critical 
consideration of Mann's rubric. 
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This study looks closely at how the method of governance apparent 
in Turkey came into being by applying, and expanding upon, the 
historical and comparative sociological theory of Michael Mann. In 
doing so, the Turkish government's relations with dominant groups in 
civil society, the nature and extent of its autonomy and its changing 
approach to representation and sovereignty are examined in historical 
perspective. This illuminates questions of constitutional and social 
reform, the re-distributive role of the state and the changing centre- 
periphery balance with particular reference to the devolution of 
centralised powers. The study sets out the changing way in which 
Turkish governance has represented the interests of, and arbitrated 
between, various elements of the civil elite, its development of 
independent regulatory regimes, both economic and judicial, and its 
search for greater democratic accountability. Mann's conceptual 
model of the sources of social power is used to analyse the differing 
ways that these have been institutionalised in Turkey and how state 
power has been organised in relation to economic and civil networks 
and associations 
The first chapter aims to offer an impression of the vast amount of 
academic material informing the current debate over social power and 
the role of the state. Within the opening section, Michael Mann's work 
will be considered in relation to these different approaches and the 
focus of this thesis positioned therein. The second part of the chapter 
will then give an account of the historical development of the 
Ottoman/Turkish state based on the wide range of analyses available. 
A number of issues and questions arising from both the theoretical and 
historical material will then be put forward. These will be addressed in 
the succeeding chapters. 
Chapter Two aims to give an account of Michael Mann's application 
of his theoretical model. In doing so, it will show how his largely 
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abstract characterisation of social power is employed to explain both 
the emergence and necessity of the state and the permutable nature of 
its relationship with civil society. A central element of this is the 
essentially unilinear thread that Mann traces from Mesopotamian 
development to the refinement of imperial rule under Rome and its 
eventual subsidence in favour of the north-western European `leading 
edge' of socio-economic change during the medieval period and on to 
the appearance of modern bureaucratic nation-state. These key 
periods of power development make up the primary framework 
through which Mann's theoretical composition is applied. Having set 
out this model and broadly outlined the historiographic line which 
Mann traces, the final section of this chapter will then highlight the 
critical debate that has surrounded his work since the publication of 
the first volume of The Sources of Social Power in 1986. 
Chapter Three deploys Mann's reworking of Herbert Spencer's model 
of `compulsory co-operation' to illuminate the large-scale political 
changes that became apparent in the Ottoman Empire following its 
failure to expand during and after the sixteenth century. I argue that 
while this system was initially highly effective, representing in many 
ways a much more sophisticated method of imperial rule than the 
Roman legionary economy discussed by Mann, it was unable to 
function effectively during territorial contraction. In Chapter Four, 
the ideological impact of this is traced with a particular focus on the 
role of the ulema. Here I argue that the intrinsically multi-national 
orientation of the theocracy was at odds with the centrist modernism 
of the `Turkish' state elite -a quite different process from the 
Western European nation-state/Church relationship presented by 
Mann. 
Chapter Five outlines the tussle for power in Turkey between the 
state bureaucracy and the capitalist classes (represented by the 
Menderes government of the 1950s) and compares it to Mann's 
account of the emergence of class-consciousness in Western Europe. 
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Chapter Six continues this theme by looking at the role of the military 
in Turkey since the 1960 coup. It argues that during this period the 
interests of the bourgeoisie and those of the military began to 
conflate. The effects that this had on the levels of domestic repression 
and geopolitical militarism in Turkey are compared to Mann's regime 
categories with particular reference to the conflict in south-east 
Anatolia. The concluding chapter then reiterates and ties together the 
main points of the narrative by retracing each of the four power 
networks in Turkey and reflecting upon the validity of Mann's model. 
By re-examining Mann's model for adequacy and fruitfulness in light 
of Turkish social development, the thesis also makes methodological 
progress. It considers extensions and adaptations of Mann's work as a 
means of understanding governance and social power more generally 
and explores the basis and development of Turkish state power as 
well as connected social phenomena such as territoriality, 
accountability, nationalism and secularism. In deploying Mann's 
analysis of four irreducible networks of social power to a non- 
Western case study, their inherent and varying capabilities to instigate 
social institutions can be critically approached. In this way, the thesis 
assesses the extent to which Mann's four-part rubric constitutes a 
viable means of considering elite behaviour and illuminating 
alternative organisational means of social control. While the study 
concludes that this framework is indeed a useful tool in the analysis of 
large-scale social change, numerous revisions and counterpoints are 
highlighted. As such, each network's organisational significance is 
clarified in light of its application from power-holder to power- 
subject and the social space in which each has been contested. In 
doing so, an historical account of the autonomous power of the 
Turkish state is narrated which uses Mann's sociological position and 
thus gives a clearer understanding of both. 
In all, the study analyses the process of state-building which has 
occurred in Turkey from the changes developed during the Ottoman 
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Empire to the organisation of the modern day government. It focuses 
on issues concerning the state's relationship with civil society, 
particularly those that arise from the way in which governance and 
the state is conceived by both the Turkish majority and non-Turkish 
minorities. It looks at the peculiarities of Turkey's process of 
modernisation and democratisation with the intention of furthering 
our understanding of state-development in countries on the global 
economic periphery, particularly those attempting to effect closer 
relations with Northern markets. It also highlights issues of social 
changes pertinent to states grappling with the issues surrounding 
secularisation and political Islam and to states with substantial social 
minorities that are struggling for national unity amid irredentism and 
periods of instability. 
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Chapter One: Power, The State and Turkey 
Essentially this thesis proposes to develop an historical case study of 
the evolution of the state in Turkey by focusing on Michael Mann's 
construction of the nature and the distribution of social power. In 
considering power and its distribution there are three broad schools of 
thought; the elitist, the Marxist and the pluralist. Given the lack of 
agreed definitions and parameters, categorical positions are few and 
much of the research overlaps. The first part of this chapter therefore 
aims to offer only an impression of the vast amount of academic 
material informing the current debate over social power and the role of 
the state. Michael Mann's work will be considered in relation to these 
different approaches and the focus of this thesis positioned therein. 
The second part of the chapter will give an account of the historical 
development of the Ottoman/Turkish state through the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries based on the wide range of analysis available. A 
number of issues and questions arising from both the theoretical and 
historical material will then be put forward. These will be addressed in 
the succeeding chapters. 
Theories of Social Power 
Fundamental to the existing literature are the basic theoretical 
questions: who exercises political power; how is it exercised; and to 
what end is it exercised? Further to these are: to what extent is power 
centralised or diffused in social groups; and to what extent does it 
operate hierarchically? Elite theorists argue that an identifiable social 
group within a given collective exercises power based on rational, 
value-maximising self-interest. In part, this was a response to the 
Marxist analytical framework which holds that an historically specific 
economic class maintains political power by controlling the means of 
production. Pluralism emerged predominantly during the 1960s as a 
reworking of the liberal internationalism of the early 1920s with 
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theorists such as Robert Dahl and David Mitrany arguing that power is 
not concentrated in the hands of any particular group, but dispersed, 
varying from issue to issue, throughout society. ' 
In his study of the decision-making process in New Haven, Dahl 
argued that access to power is dependent on the matter to be decided 
upon. He distinguishes between `social' and `economic' notables and 
the holders of political office, describing the structure as a 
"polyarchy" 2 He constructs the state as an arena in which competing 
elites (within their own decision-making spheres) negotiate over 
different options and where a virtual consensus exists about the 
arrangement of political structures and opportunities for 
representation. Evidence for this was cited in the success of interest 
groups in the American political system and criticism of the theory 
initially centred around its transferability - particularly after much of 
New Haven was subsequently affected by civil unrest 3 Bachrach and 
Baratz continued the critique by arguing that pluralists, in focusing only 
on what was contained within the political agenda and not access to 
agenda-setting mechanisms, were ignoring wider aspects of 
contention. 4 A third criticism, prevalent in Marxist discourse, was based 
on the idea of a `false consciousness' in which individuals, made 
unaware of their interests by the structure of power into which they are 
unwittingly embedded, mistakenly adopt a course of political inactivity. 5 
Integral to this notion is the distinction between subjective interests, 
what individuals believe that they want, and objective interests, what 
individuals would chose if they were fully aware of all the options 
available. This, in keeping with much of the general Marxist position, 
takes power as a given, implicit as it is in the concept of a ruling or 
dominant class. Writers such as Antonio Gramsci have tended to 
' Dahl, R A. (1961) passim. Mitrany, D. (1966) passim. 
2 Dahl, R A. (1961) passim. 
For example, Presthus, R (1964) passim. 
4 Bachrach, P. & Baratz M. (1962) passim. 
'Exemplified by Lukes' (1974) identification of this as "the third dimension of power" 
pasrim. 
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conceive of an elite's position as less determined by force than by an 
hegemonic ability to represent its own interests as that of society's. " In 
other words, or as the structuralist argument of Nicos Poulantzas puts 
it, power is "the capacity of a social class to realise its specific objective 
interests". ' As such, values and norms, for analysts like Louis 
Althusser, become embedded in the ideological apparatus of the state 
and, through socialisation, lead to the evolution of peculiar political 
cultures. 8 
The economic elitist approach, particularly James Burnham's, comes 
very close to this construction of society. " It accepts that the control of 
the means of production is vital to the maintenance of the power- 
holder's position, but predicts that this is likely to strengthen as the 
managerial elite continues to centralise bureaucratic controls. This is 
built on the work of earlier elite theorists, such as Michels and Mosca, 
who emphasised the importance of organisation in exercising power 
over the less organised. The former looked at power structures in the 
German Social Democratic Party and concluded that social 
organisation inevitably leads to oligarchic rule and the development of 
an apathetic majority. 10 For Mosca, an elite consists of a small group of 
decision-makers who manipulate society for its own good, supported 
by a larger pool of more compartmentalised leaders who supply 
personnel for the higher echelon. Authority may flow from this 
dichotomy to the masses, as in the autocratic ideal type, or from the 
masses towards the elite within a liberal polity - or, more commonly, 
both act simultaneously. " Pareto concurs with Mosca in his 
identification of the dual nature of the elite, describing them as 
governing and non-governing, but goes on to argue that it is not socio- 
economic forces that determine this structure. Rather, it is the inherent 
characteristics of the human psyche. He proposes that individuals tend 
6 Gramsci, A. (1971) passim. 
' Poulantzas, N. (1973) p. 104. 
e Althusser, L. (1977) passim. 
9 Burnham, J. (1942) passim. 
10 Michels, R. (1911) p. 418. 
11 Mosca, G. (1939) passim. 
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to conform to one of two classes (manipulative foxes or over-bearing 
lions) and that, rather than adhering to a common direction, the elite is 
internally divided through constant conflict and competition. 12 
In C. Wright Mills' institutional model of social power, conflict also 
exists between elements of the ruling elite. At the top level of his three- 
tier structure those in command of institutional hierarchies exercise a 
considerable degree of autonomy within their political, military and 
economic spheres of influence. The middle level is where the pluralist 
model of competing interests applies and the bottom level consists of 
the politically disparate masses. Despite acknowledging the increasing 
influence of economically-determined interests in political processes, 
Wright Mills argued that it is mistaken "to believe that the political 
apparatus is merely an extension of the corporate world, or that it has 
been taken over by the by the representatives of the corporate rich". " 
This, too, is the position of statist elite theories for whom the state is 
held to be an autonomous actor operating independently of the 
dominant elements of civil society. By highlighting "instances in which 
non-constitutionally ruling officials attempt to use the state as a whole 
to direct and restructure society and politics"" this "relatively recent 
discursive development has represented a far more cogent challenge to 
pluralism than its predecessors". " It is this theoretical area, particularly 
the work of Michael Mann as one of the foremost exponents of the 
statist argument, which will form the focus of the following section. 
Michael Mann's Theory of Social Power 
Bertrand Russell put forward the idea that just as energy is the 
fundamental concept of physics, so power is the fundamental concept 
of the social sciences. Like physical energy, he argued, social power 
comes in many forms of which none is supreme nor derivative of 
'Z Pareto, (1916) Vol. IV pp 2178-2275. 
" Mills, C. W. (1956) p. 170. 
'a Skocpol, T. (1985) p. 11. 
f5 Evans, M. (1994) p. 26. 
8 
Chapter One: Power, The State and Turkey 
another. Regarding one as ultimately determinant, such as the Marxist 
emphasis on economic dynamics or the nineteenth century military 
historical rubric, can, he suggested, only generate partial accounts of 
social phenomena. Instead, social power, like its physical counterpart, 
should be regarded as continually moving from one form to another, 
the interaction of which structure all social inter-relations. 16 
This is also the starting point for Michael Mann who treats the 
organisation of social power as the primary motor of history. 
Accordingly, it is mistaken to assume that conformity is solely the 
result of an internalisation of the norms of society. Human beings, 
Mann suggests, interact according to socio-spatial spheres, based not 
on the shared values of a unitary society or nation-state, but on agreed 
or conflicting goals within overlapping power networks. As people seek 
sexual fulfilment families emerge which then interact with other 
families from which partners may be found and so on. These families 
may also develop economic relationships which may overlap with 
existing family or sexual relations, but are unlikely to be identical. 
Similarly as they defend their property or take others' they may form 
armed organisations which require relations with non-combatants in 
order to ensure supplies. They may also organise a judiciary to settle 
disputes without resorting to arms or seek meaning in shared rituals of 
worship. For Mann, there is no reason to presume that these social 
requirements should produce the same patterns of interaction and 
therefore a unitary society; "Human beings need to enter into social 
power relations, but they do not need social totalities. They are social, 
not societal, animals". 17 
Russell identified these relations as taking the form of "wealth, 
armaments, civil authority, influence on opinion" which, he continues, 
are essentially quantitative in character. 18 For example, if A possesses 
more wealth, armaments, civil authority or influence on opinion than 
16 Russell, B. (1938) passim. 
" Mann, M. (1986) p. 14. 
18 Russell, B. (1938) pp 10-11. 
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B, then A will be able to achieve goals that B will not; so A can be said 
to be more `powerful' than B. 19 Mann starts from a similar point 
identifying the "sources" of power as ideological, economic, military 
and political and describing them as "overlapping networks of social 
interaction". " For Mann, though, these are not simply quantitative 
measures of an actor's capability, but the arena of all human interaction 
which, when organised into social institutions, become generalised 
means of achieving goals and therefore sought for their own sake. 
He suggests that, "Meir primacy comes not from the strength of 
human desires for ideological, economic, military or political 
satisfaction, but from the particular organisational means each 
possesses to attain human goals, whatever these may be". " Social 
power can therefore be considered in terms of its organisational 
capacity to create and maintain social institutions and it is this tendency 
that has led to the illusion of a unitary society. As human interaction 
has developed, institutionalisation also developed as, what Mann 
describes as, an emergent need in order to monitor production and 
transaction, to standardise rituals of worship, regulate conflict and so 
on. It is thus the extent to which the institutionalisation of these 
interrelations overlap with each other that determines conformity and 
produces the appearance of a unitary society. ' Mann points out, 
however, that since these institutions are further removed from human 
needs than the power networks themselves, goal-directed behaviour 
often runs contrary to, or seeks to establish alternatives to, the 
prevailing organisational arrangements. This can be unintentional or, in 
the case of value conflicts, a direct challenge. ' 
" Ibid. p. 35. 
20 Mann, M. (1986) p. 2. 
21 Ibid. 
'The internalisation of the norms of `society' is simply an effect of this primary dynamic 
and does not contribute, in itself, to the development of shared goals. 
'A conflict of value can be distinguished from other less fundamental forms of conflict 
and is defined by Chris Mitchell as where "parties differ fundamentally about the nature 
of desirable end states or social and political structures" (1981) p. 37. 
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For Mann, the process of institutionalisation can occur through 
conflict or co-operation. The former, he describes as essentially 
distributive in that for one actor to gain the other must lose 24 The latter, 
he describes as collective. Talcott Parsons identified this as primarily a 
means of achieving social goals, whereby actors employ their joint 
power over other actors or nature, such as within a polity. " In Dennis 
Wrong's view, though, most institutions are not instigated by one or 
the other aspect of social power, but by a combination of the two. He 
writes; 
"Only the most doctrinaire anarchist or proponent 
of direct democracy would maintain that authorising 
some men to authorise the activities of others is so 
corrupting and conflict-producing for all concerned 
that it should never be considered as a means of 
achieving collective goals. And only the most naive 
believer in the malleability of men, in their almost 
infinite capacity to be socialised to serve larger 
collective ends in a heterogeneous society in which 
many resources are unequally distributed, would 
deny that power is peculiarly susceptible to being 
diverted into use for self-interested purposes by 
individuals and groups". " 
Mann agrees, regarding the institutionalised division of labour, for 
instance, as a clear example of collective power organisation with 
specialised functions at all levels. Simultaneously, though, it also 
maintains a minority in organisational control of the implementation of 
collective goals and ensures, by enshrining their supervisory positions 
in the norms of the social group, that there is not the necessary 
organisational means for the majority, free to rebel though they are, to 
implement those goals themselves. Thus, "the masses comply because 
they lack collective organisation to do otherwise, because they are 
embedded in collective and distributive power organisations controlled 
by others". " 
24 Max Weber defined this process as "the probability that one actor within a social 
relationship will be in a position to carry out his will despite resistance" (1968, p. 53). 
Parsons, T. (1958) pp 207-208. 
Wrong, D. H. (1979) p. 247. 
ý' Mann, M. (1986) p. 7. 
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In order to compare various power interrelations Bertrand de Jouvenel 
distinguishes three general attributes of the overall 
distributive/collective dialectic which distinguish separable aspects of 
compliance or, what he describes as "an efficient imperative". 8 Power, 
he argues, "is extensive if the complying Bs [power subjects] are many; it 
is comprehensive if the variety of actions to which A [power holder] can 
move the Bs is considerable; finally it is intensive if the bidding of A can 
be pushed far without loss of compliance". 9 Mann, however, while 
accepting and extending de Jouvenel's work, identifies two facets of 
this comprehensive power relationship. It may be authoritative if 
deliberate and consciously applied by groups or individuals or d used if 
more spontaneous and de-centred "resulting in similar social practices 
that embody power relations, but are not explicitly commanded... [and 
based on] an understanding that these practices are natural or moral or 
result from self-evident common interest". " Each, he notes, may be 
applied in a collective or a distributive manner, or, more commonly, a 
blend of both. 
Robert Dahl similarly builds on the notion of comprehensiveness 
which, he suggests, refers to the number of scopes, or choice areas, that 
is subject to control. " He concluded that only in extreme cases of 
dependence, such as the almost completely comprehensive control of 
parent over infant, could a power-holder expect to be influential across 
numerous scopes. More usual, Dahl suggests, is power exercised within 
highly specialised roles, such as aircraft controllers or university 
lecturers, where power-holders could not expect to be influential over 
their subjects outside the boundaries of their legitimised field. Thus the 
intensity of a relationship can be considered to be the range of options 
available to a power-holder within a given scope. This, as de Jouvenel 
points out, is self limiting as there will always be a point, variable 
' De Jouvenel, B. (1958) p. 160. 
Ibid. My parentheses. 
30 Mann, M. (1986) p. 8. My parenthesis. 
31 Dahl, R. A. (1963) p. 46. 
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according to the nature of the structure and the power-subjects, where 
compliance breaks down. 32 
Comprehensive and extensive power is, as Dennis Wrong, notes, also 
limited 33 This is often in the form of statutory constraints upon power- 
holders aimed at excluding their influence from certain scopes, such as 
assembly, worship and expression, and restraining it within others, such 
as the ban on the `closed shop' in organised labour movements or the 
regulations imposed on magistrates when sentencing. The 
extensiveness of a power relationship, he argues, may, according to the 
number of hands sovereignty is held by, range from kingship to 
oligarchy to democracy and is best considered as "the ratio of the 
number of persons who hold power to the number of the powerless". 34 
Wrong also notes that a fundamental problem for power-holders is that 
as the extensiveness of their power increases, comprehensiveness and 
intensity tends to decrease. This, he argues, is for three main reasons; 
firstly, the more power-subjects the more supervision becomes 
problematic. Secondly, the more power-subjects the more links in the 
chain of command needed to control them and the more the risk of an 
organised challenge, and thirdly, the more power-subjects the wider the 
variation of attitudes to the power-holder. 35 
In Robert David Sack's analysis, power-holders can reduce the 
decentralising effects of expansion by reinforcing territorial uses of 
space. This can be employed to circumscribe access to knowledge and 
responsibility, monitor the "span of control" or level of supervision 
and convey possession, exclusion or simply the visibility of power 
itself. Moreover, territoriality's classificatory emphasis on area rather 
than type can be used to conceal the social nature of the relationship 
between power-holder and subject or exert a diffused comprehensive 
influence. As Sack points out, territoriality may also increase the rigidity 
32 De Jouvenel, B. (1958) p. 160. 
"Wrong, D. H. (1979) p. 16. 
" Ibid. p. 15. 
35 Ibid. p. 20. 
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of a social hierarchy and the value of a centralised bureaucracy by 
"helping to enforce differential access to things... [which] become 
institutionalised in rank, privilege and class... [and] by being used as a 
general means of dividing and conquering". " In occupying and 
designating space, an educational institution, for instance, tends to 
reinforce the position of teachers over taught. Classrooms, offices, 
common rooms, car parks and so on are all designed to facilitate the 
supervisory role of the organised minority over the unorganised 
majority. As "the means by which space and society are interrelated" 
and "the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence or 
control people, phenomena, and relationships by delimiting and 
asserting control over a geographic area", territoriality may be regarded 
as an important conceptual link between the organisation of social 
power and the autonomy of state action. 37 
Mann and Macro-Historical Sociology 
Since the publication of Barrington Moore's The Social Origins of 
Democracy and Dictatorship in 1966, there has been a revival in what may 
be called the `macro-historical' sociology of Durkheim, Marx and 
Weber. In the United Kingdom, this has been particularly apparent 
during the last fifteen or so years. Writers such as John Hall (Powers and 
Liberties, 1985) and Anthony Giddens (The Nation-State and Violence, 
1985) have turned to the analysis of large-scale historical 
transformations in order to better understand the character of 
contemporary social phenomena such as stratification, nationalism and 
statehood. This section aims to locate Mann's work within the 
discipline of macro-historical sociology by critically outlining a range of 
approaches broadly encompassed by the term macro-historical 
sociology. 
' Sack, R. D. (1986) p. 39. My parentheses. 
31 Ibid. p. 5&p. 19. 
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Macro-historical sociology can be considered to have been born of 
three intertwined objectives; 
"An historical-causal analysis of origins considers the 
conditions which give rise to modem institutions 
relevant to understanding their present nature and 
likely persistence... A quest for variation seeks to 
understand modern institutions like capitalism or the 
nation-state or particularly by comparing them with 
social groups with other types of economic, political 
or gender institutions... A more abstract-comparative 
macro-sociology, less tied to understanding the 
present, analyses the past to test more general 
propositions about human communities". " 
These three components have structured the current body of macro- 
historical literature. The first relates to the linearity of the narrative. In 
other words, the extent to which elements of the historiography link 
together to form a discernible whole. The second relates to the 
narrative's laterality, or the breadth of social phenomena encompassed 
and compared. The third relates to the epistemological consistency of 
the narrative, or the certainty with which claims regarding the past's 
relationship with the present are advanced. 
Of the spectrum of approaches which have appeared in pursuit of 
these objectives, Theda Skocpol's and Barrington Moore's represent 
arguably the most firmly comparative. Both attempt to use JS Mill's 
methods of agreement and difference as their primary research tool. In 
the Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Moore identifies three 
alternative routes to modernity and seeks to explain areas of similarity 
and contrast through comparison. As Skocpol has pointed out, within 
these routes Moore primarily relies on establishing causal 
commonalties 39 Across the three routes, however, he focuses on their 
contrasting developmental patterns to help validate each. The 
38 Mann, M. (1994) p. 39. 
Skocpol, T. (1994) pp 79-80. 
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conclusion reached is that `modern' states can be categorised as having 
followed `communist', `capitalist-reactionary' or `bourgeois' courses of 
development. Skocpol also employs a combination of Mill's 
approaches. In States and Social Revolutions, she argues that Bourbon 
France, late imperial China and Tsarist Russia all possessed some 
similar causal features while introducing negative cases from Britain, 
Japan and Germany to strengthen her assertions of shared specificity. 
Her conclusion is that the causes of the Chinese, French and Russian 
revolutions can be reduced to two components: political crisis and 
peasant revolt. 
For Skocpol, then, causal explanations are inferred from existent 
historical data through a Millian process of induction. How, she asks, 
'are we ever to arrive at new theoretical insights if we do not let 
historical patterns speak to us, rather than always viewing them through 
the blinders, or heavily tinted lenses, of pre-existing theories"? ' Is this 
tenable, though? Surely some theoretical endeavour is necessary in 
order to select the cases to include. The result of this reluctance to 
offer an explicit historiographic model is that method tends to replace 
theory. 41 Consequently, Skocpol is able to describe the factors that lead to 
revolutions, but she cannot explain their causer. 42 Moore, on the other 
hand, is more frank about his ideological perspective. Writing within 
the Marxist tradition, his narrative is simultaneously moralising and 
analytical. While his emphasis on economic determinacy strengthens 
his construction of causality, his arbitrary rejection of cultural factors as 
possible explanations of his cases' progress along their allotted routes 
significantly damages his claims of generality. 43 Furthermore, neither 
the criterion for selecting cases nor the basis upon which his moral 
cost/benefit analysis proceeds are elucidated with sufficient clarity. " 
Why, for instance, is much of Africa, parts of Asia and the almost the 
whole of the Middle-East excluded? The reader is left to conclude that 
' Skocpol, T. (1986) p. 190. 
41 Burawoy, M. (1986) p. 769. 
42 Stinchcombe, J. (1983) pp 12-15. 
" Rothman, S. (1970) pp 61-64. 
44 Smith, D. (1984) pp 168-169. 
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countries have been chosen simply on the grounds of which best 
concur with the pre-existent determining features of each route. In the 
case of both Moore and Skocpol, then, their reluctance to establish a 
theoretical position which explains precisely why cases were either 
selected or ignored appreciably impairs what Mann terms the abstract- 
comparative facet of their macro-social inquiry. 
By contrast, WG Runciman's three-volume Treatise on Social Theory 
(1983,1989 and 1997) combines both an explicit theory of social 
interaction - drawn from Weber's tripartite classification of power as 
class, status and party - and an encyclopaedic sweep of global history. 
As such, this taxonomy of societal change is underpinned by 
irreducible networks of economic, ideological and political power 
organised as a means of `domination' or co-operation'. In this sense, 
Runciman's model represents, on the one hand, an attempt to form a 
bridge between Marxian notions of economic primacy and a more 
comprehensive theorisation of social power and, on the other, a middle 
road between elitist and pluralist conceptions of political organisation. 
It is, in fact, a reworking of Skocpol's "reified collective wills". " Rather 
than acting on behalf of the dominant economic group in civil society, 
state elites, for Skocpol, behave as arbiters of a structure determined by 
organised coercion. Drawing upon Otto Hintze's two-dimensional view 
of state organisation, ' she argues that this may either be in order to 
secure their position in relation to other states or to domestic society 
from which resources are coercively extracted. 47 These views are 
opposed to Moore's contention that the evolution of states towards 
either the liberal or the authoritarian model can be explained in terms 
of the kinds of relationships that landed upper classes make with the 
commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. Instead the state is seen as an 
autonomous player capable of acting either in, or against, the interests 
of dominant groups within civil society. 
Skocpol, T. (1994) p. 8. 
Hintze, 0. (1975) p. 183. 
See Skocpol, T. (1979) pp 29-31. 
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Runciman's application of this schema is, however, deficient in two 
ways " Firstly, the `co-operative' organisation of social power makes 
few appearances in his narrative outside its function as a means of 
collectively increasing a society's capacity to dominate nature. Little 
mention is made of its role in the construction of collective social 
identities. Secondly, ideological power is given only a minimal part 
outside its use as a way of instilling deference. To identify the power of 
world religions as primarily grounded on the authority of clerics is not 
plausible and undermines Runciman's commitment to generality. 
Indeed, the discrepancy between theoretical potentiality and empirical 
restriction becomes more apparent in his conclusion that, despite 
having identified over 450 possible kinds of society, history has, he 
concludes, only produced ten. His failure to explain precisely why this 
has proven to be the case means that his theoretical typology lacks an 
historiographic dynamic. 49 While he ostensibly avoids the threat to 
causal coherence that this weakness entails by a retreat from claims of 
`explanation' to `description', 50 his concession to socio-biological 
evolutionism only exacerbates the disjuncture between theory and data. 
Since his neo-Darwinian motif of `selection' as the motor which 
underpins social change is left unexplained and unconnected to his 
broader theorisation of power, the elucidation of historical cases 
appears to be isolated and `pointillist'. 
More firmly evolutionist writers are, on the other hand, less burdened 
with the demands of comparativism. Favouring greater methodological 
linearity, they generally proceed on the basis that the evolution of 
human life can be quantified as moving towards ever-greater 
complexity and differentiation. In this way, `directional laws' are 
elaborated in which historical transformations occur as a result of 
inherent potentialities. " In epistemological, or abstract-comparative, 
terms change is held to be universally immanent, necessary and 
Anderson, P. (1992) pp 152-153. 
"Anderson, P. (1992a) p. 223. 
50 Runciman, W. G. (1983) p. 41. 
s' See Mandelbaum, M. (1 971) pas im. 
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embedded in the generic processes of nature. 52 Thus a narrative 
emerges in which biological linear causality is adopted as mechanistic 
means of explaining human history. 53 It is clear, for example, that 
Talcott Parsons based his later accounts of societal development on the 
teleological premise that evolution occurs in order to produce a pattern 
of advancement based assessed by a biological criterion. In 1966, he 
wrote that "intermediate societies are more advanced than primitive 
societies and modern societies... are more advanced than intermediate 
societies" where `advanced' means those "systems that display greater 
generalised adaptive capacity". "' Lenski offers a comparably grounded 
narrative in which technological progression is the prime motor of 
human advance. " As with Parsons' `differentiation', however, no basis, 
outside the process of change itself, is suggested as a means of 
evaluating the impact of the evolutionary developments which he is 
describing. The result in both cases is an arbitrary and ethnocentric 
conclusion that modernity contains improvements over the past. 
For some evolutionists, though, presenting scientific generalities need 
not produce a narrative which assumes progression. Stephen 
Sanderson, for instance, rejects Parsons' tendency to analyse past 
events not "for their own sake, but only in terms of their ultimate 
contribution to modernity" concluding that "word-historical 
transformations, whether parallel, convergent, or divergent evolution, 
are not the unfolding of predetermined patterns. ... Instead they 
represent the grand aggregation and multiplication of the actions of 
individuals and groups... responding to a multiplicity of biological, 
psychological and social needs". " As such, his narrative, entitled 
`evolutionary materialism', abandons the conflation of `change' and 
`advance' and concedes that "it cannot automatically be assumed that 
later social forms will be associated with higher levels of human 
52See Nisbet, R (1969) passim. 
S3 See Giddens, A. (1984) pp 231-233. 
'Parsons, T. (1966) pp 109-110. 
ss See Lenski, G. (1970) passim. 
Sanderson, S. (1992) p. 118 & (1995) p. 5. 
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adaptedness" 57 He also modifies Lenski's and Parsons scientism by 
dismissing many key elements of the biological method. Such caution 
means, however, that his narrative both lacks theoretical coherence and 
an explicit means of joining the past with the present. 58 As a 
consequence, Sanderson's explanatory power is significantly reduced. 
In the introduction to the first of his two volumes of The Sources of Social 
Power, Michael Mann claims to take a middle path between evolutionary 
narrativism and the problematic laterality of Skcopol, Moore and 
Runciman. His narrative incorporates a comparative and a linear 
component pre-structured by a complex theoretical consideration of 
social power which also claims to represent a compromise; this time 
between materialist and idealist understandings of the past. His 
composition is built around key periods of power development based 
on overlapping networks of political, military, ideological and economic 
interaction. As the primary organisational form of political power in 
society, the state has the leading role in this narrative. Since political 
power networks are distinguishable by their centralised location and 
their tendency, in both domestic and geopolitical terms, to reinforce 
rather than transcend territorial boundaries distinguishes states possess 
"an independence from civil society which, though not absolute, is no 
less absolute in principle than the power of any other major group" 59 
Economic power groupings are likely to be more diffused and 
decentred. They tend to operate in competition with other groupings in 
any given territorial delimitation. Ideological power movements are 
similarly "interstitial" often crossing state boundaries and stressing the 
artificial and ephemeral nature of such divides. Although Mann 
concedes that military power, is more analogous to the state's 
monopoly of organised violence over its territory than other more 
clearly separable networks of social power, he resists Weber's reduction 
of military and political power into "party". He suggests that states with 
limited infra-structural reach were rarely able to claim such a 
Sanderson, S. (1995) p. 397. 
sa Ibid. p. 381. 
s' Mann, M. (1984) p. 200. 
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monopoly, that militarily organised social groups are often 
institutionally separate from the state and quite capable of acting 
independently of it and that, in the international arena, political 
influence is, such as in the cases of modern Germany and Japan, not 
determined by military power. " 
While he broadly concurs with Skocpol's assertion "that state 
organisations and elites might under certain circumstances act against 
the long-run economic interests of a dominant class", Mann seeks to 
forge a compromise between essentially pluralist accounts of state 
evolution and more structuralist perspectives. " He does so by 
combining two theoretical strands. The first is what he calls the "true 
elitist" argument. This holds that the state is a fully independent actor, 
invasive and ultimately concerned only with pursuing its own 
interests; ' Margaret Levi's `predatory' theory of rule is an example 63 
This form of analysis, Mann argues, is based more on `distributive' 
power organisation and tends to emphasise war and sovereignty. The 
second strand is particularly prevalent in M. Weir et al's (including 
Skocpol) account of the restraining influence of American federalism 
on the power of the state. 64 Here, the autonomous effects exerted by 
social institutions are emphasised in what Mann terms "institutional 
statism". He equates this with `collective' power, arguing that "it affects 
more the forms in which politicised actors collaborate than who has 
power over whom". " 
Thus, for Mann, the state, in organising the various networks of social 
interaction, on the one hand joins with other actors to employ their 
joint power over the polity or nature, and on the other, maintains itself 
in control of the implementation of these collective goals and ensures 
that there is not the necessary organisational means for the majority to 
'Mann, M. (1986) pp 10-11. 
a' Skocpol, T. (1994) p. 37. 
62 Mann, M. (1993) p. 48. 
as Levi, M. (1981) passim. 
Weir, M. et al. (1988) passim. 
65 Mann, M. (1993) p. 52 
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rebel and implement their own goals. This application of social power 
as an imposition over, and as a means of facilitating co-operation 
through, state-bound territory corresponds to E. H. Carr's dialectical 
government of the people and over the people and is also strongly 
reminiscent of Runciman's dialectic of domination and co-operation. " 
Or, put another way, it relates to an organised political elite's 
simultaneously collective and distributive capacity to instigate social 
change through networks of infra-structural and despotic state power. 
Despotic power concerns "the range of actions which the [state] elite is 
empowered to undertake without routine institutionalised negotiation 
with civil society groups". Infra-structural power, in contrast, "is the 
capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society and to implement 
logistically political decisions throughout the realm". 67 The way in 
which these have acted together in different ideal-types is shown in 
Table One. 
Table One: Two Dimensions of State Power" 
Infra-structural Power 
Low High 
Despotic Low Feudal [Liberal] Bureaucratic 
Power 
High Imperial Authoritarian 
In applying his theoretical model to the development of the European 
nation-state, Mann argues that feudal governments - reliant on the 
intensive, but non-comprehensive and non-extensive, might of the 
military and governing through an often autonomous sub-structure of 
clerics and burghers - tended to be low on both infra-structural and 
" Carr, E. H. (1939) p. 96. 
67 Mann, M. (1984) pp 188-189, my parenthesis. He later expands upon this thus: "state 
infra-structural power derives from the social utility in any particular time and place of 
forms of territorial-centralisation which cannot be provided by civil society forces 
themselves... The extent of despotic power derives from the inability of civil society 
forces to control those forms of territorial centralisation, once set up" (ibid., pp 201-202). 
" Adapted from ibid. p. 191. 
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despotic power. 69 Imperial states, by contrast, generally wielded high 
levels of often divinely legitimised despotic power through their own 
patrimonial government bodies, but, similarly constrained by the 
shortcomings of military force, had only a limited capacity to penetrate 
a frequently large and disparate territory and thus remained infra- 
structurally weak. The despotic power of modern bureaucratic 
democracies, on the other hand, is restricted within certain institutions 
such as the media, the market and the judiciary and thus usually have 
low despotic power. Through their information systems, however, they 
possess immense infra-structural power. Authoritarian regimes have 
similar levels of infra-structural reach, but are less encumbered by 
institutional restriction. 
Mann's historical sociology of the state is thus, in essence, an attempt 
to account for these ideal-types. Arguing that, in order to understand 
centralised political power, one must focus on the evolution of the 
most powerful states, Mann concentrates on the specificity of modern 
European development. What is presented is an essentially linear thread 
from Mesopotamian and Roman imperial development to the 
appearance of modern bureaucratic nation-states. In attempting to 
forge a path which is, at heart, non-evolutionary as well as a rejection 
of the comparative method, Mann brings upon himself a number of 
methodological and textual difficulties. It is the aim of this thesis to 
resolve some of these problems by using the development of the 
Ottoman/Turkish state as a comparative case study. While the 
methodological implications of this are discussed more fully in the next 
chapter, here, in the following section, a brief synoptic sketch of the 
historical areas to be focussed upon in Chapters Three to Six. I will, in 
the vein of Mann's work, concentrate on particular areas of Turkish 
history which, in my view, were periods when major shifts in social 
power occurred. Below, then, is a survey of some of the common 
themes from the literature on Ottoman and Turkish political 
69 Outside the immediate area of contact, Mann argues that a civilian population alters 
its behaviour little (apart from to offer tribute and recognise a leader's suzerainty) in 
response to a military presence (Mann, M., 1986, passim). 
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development. It identifies a range of key points and offers an indication 
of the topics, within the overall historical perspective, to be addressed 
during the body of the thesis. 
Historical Perspective 
"There are certain periods when political reform in Turkey took on a 
new elan, or became concentrated and comparatively rapid, and we 
might inquire what... stimuli were present on each occasion". " For 
Roderic Davison writing in 1964 these periods were the Ottoman 
reforms culminating in the Young Turk revolution of 1908, the period 
of the establishment of the Turkish Republic from 1919 to 1926 and 
the half decade in which multi-party politics was born from 1945 to 
1950. This section will roughly follow this structure with the addition 
of the period of military rule, 1980-1983. In looking into the various 
stimuli which contributed to these developments, it will concentrate on 
outlining the literature regarding the Turkish state and its changing 
relationship with civil society. 
According to Halil Inalcik, traditional Ottoman society consisted of 
two classes whose status was rigidly controlled by the divinely- 
legitimised role of the Sultan-Caliph. The first of these is described as 
the asked - defined as "those to whom the Sultan had delegated 
religious or executive power through an imperial diploma, namely 
officers of the court and the army, civil servants and ulema". " The 
second class, the reqya, was all other subjects who paid varying amounts 
of tax, but, as "it was a fundamental rule of the Empire to exclude its 
subjects from the privileges of the military", took no part in 
government" Thus, as Ergun Özbudun notes, "with no feudalism 
comparable to that of Western Europe, no hereditary aristocracy, no 
70 Davison, R. (1964) p. 94. 
" Inalclk, H. (1964) p. 44. Here, the term ulema will be used to denote any religiously- 
legitimated, state affiliated role. 
72 Ibid. The author continues, "Only those among them who were actual fighters on the 
frontiers and those who had entered the ulema class after a regular course of study in a 
religious seminary could obtain the Sultan's diploma and thus become a member of the 
`military' class". 
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independent church hierarchy, no strong and independent merchant 
class, no self-governing cities, and with a ruling institution (i. e., the 
administration and the army) staffed with slaves, the Ottoman Empire 
represented a close approximation of an Oriental despotism, 73 For 
Dodd, however, this absolutism was mitigated by the influence of the 
ulema, whose leader, the ceyhülislam, "had the great reserve power to 
issue a legal ruling that could sanction the deposition of the Sultan 
himself". " Frank Tachau supports this, pointing to Sultan-Caliph's 
immutable obligation to "ensure justice and promote welfare" 
enshrined within the tenets of the shariah. 7s Concurring with 
Ilkay 
Sunar's contention that the Ottoman government was not so much 
ruled by force as by the "reciprocal tie of patronage", 76 he concludes 
that "the concept of governmental responsibility for material welfare 
(or economic development in present day terms) was well established 
in the Ottoman tradition". " This arrangement was central to the 
strongly status-orientated social organisation of the Empire. According 
to Serif Mardin, "not only did the state protect the guilds against 
monopolistic practices by merchants, but, more importantly, by 
denying corporate personality and independent government to towns, 
it blocked the formation of oligarchies of merchant capitalists". " 
Faced with foreign encroachment upon its territorial periphery, the 
imperial government, requiring more and more funds to support its 
huge standing army of janissaries, replaced the traditional timar system 
with one of tax-farming whereby the right to collect taxes from the 
local agricultural community was delegated to the highest bidder and 
paid to the state in advance of harvest79 Caglar Keyder writes that by 
"extract[ing] the agricultural surplus from the independent peasantry", 8° 
Özbudun, E. (1976) p. 28. His parenthesis. 
"Dodd, C. H. (1969) p. 6. 
75 Tachau, F. (1984) p. 16. 
76 Sunar, I. (1974) p. S. 
T' Tachau, F. (1984) p. 17. 
7e Mardin, ý. (1969) p. 261. 
7' Kemal Karpat state that the binar system was based on the principle that the title of 
much of the empire's arable land "belonged in perpetuity to the state" while the right 
to farm was possessed by the tenant (1974, p. 88). 
10 Keyder, Cr. (1987) p. 15. My parenthesis. 
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local notables and guild-leaders, or ayan, 81 used this new system to 
become, in Ergun Özbudun's view, "an intermediary group between 
the rulers and the ruled". " In other words a third class of tax-exempt 
public servants was added to the askeri/reaya dichotomy. This became 
particularly apparent during the acceleration of, what All Kazancigil 
calls, the process of "incorporation-peripheralisation" into the 
European economic system. 83 The Turkish state, dominated by 
Tanzimat reformers, 84 were increasingly concerned with the cyan classes 
as important elements of the economic periphery. As Josep 
LaPalombara and Myron Weiner point out, the state became absorbed 
in bringing these "discrete elements into meaningful participation in the 
political system" rather than pursuing the large-scale economic reforms 
apparent in Europe during the period. " According to Mardin, this was 
attempted by "imposing new obligations - taxes, military service, 
various registration procedures - as well as by offering new benefits - 
roads, the regulation of justice, land registration... [so that] by the end 
of the century, the aspects of Ottoman bureaucracy that could be called 
`patrimonial' or `sultanic' were giving way to a `rational' bureaucracy". "' 
Metin Heper argues that, "not unlike the rationalist tradition of 
eighteenth-century Western Europe, the political conception underlying 
the TanZimat was a direct relationship between the state and each of its 
subjects". ' This, as Albert Hourani has observed, was compatible with 
neither the privileges of the cyan nor with their role as intermediaries. " 
81 Used henceforth to include various other landed statuses and roles such as a'a, derebey, 
4craf etc. 
" Özbudun, E. (1976) p. 30. 
83 Ibid. passim. 
84 Literally renovation or re-ordering, the term Tan jmat refers to the period following the 
death of Sultan Mahmud II in 1839 to the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78 and 
culminating in the constitution a year earlier (Sugar, P., 1964, pp 152-153). 
ss LaPalombara, J. & Weiner, M. (1966) p. 413. "Even among the second generation of 
Tanzimat men we cannot find a single one who really had a clear understanding of 
economic issues or a sincere interest in them. Economic affairs did not enter into the 
traditional education of the Ottoman and were entrusted mainly to the Christian and 
Jewish subjects of the state" (Sugar, P., 1964, p. 153). For an alternative position see 
Karpat, K (1973a) panim. 
86Mardin, ý. (1973) pp 178-179. My parenthesis. 
Heper, M. (1985) p. 39. 
Hourani, A. (1968) pauim. 
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Thus the ajan's social position remained status rather than market 
determined, or what Kazancigil terms "prebendal", and "failed to 
develop beyond the local sphere a broader power base, autonomous 
from the state and the ruling elite". " serif Mardin argues that each of 
these cyan households became, in effect, small replicas of the Ottoman 
state itself. He comments that "the most remarkable feature about this 
entire process is that an incipient market-orientated group could have 
been drawn to reproduce in miniature the lineaments of the state, 
instead of launching itself in new directions". ' Put another way, the 
cyan, as Caglar Keyder suggests, represented, in their economic, but not 
political, mobility, "a failed attempt towards the formation of a feudal- 
aristocratic class". " Although commentators such as Ziya Gökalp (one 
of the foremost architects of the Kemalist revolution) point to cyan 
provincial resistance as the first real change in the prevailing power 
relationship between Ottoman state and subject, 92 the failure of the 
notables to institutionalise a capitalist class meant that Ottoman 
commerce remained at a disadvantage relative to the mercantile 
dominance of western Europe. 93 This helped to accelerate the 
periphery's economic incorporation into the West which, aided by the 
millet system, 94 fomented further separatist irredentism. It also, as 
Özbudun contends, defined "the cleavage between the centre and 
periphery... [as] one between the political ins and outs, between the 
political elite and the rest of society"; " or, as Engin Akarli puts it, "the 
incumbents of the Ottoman institutions... [and the] people who were 
excluded from the state" . 96 
'' Kazancigil, A. (1981 ) p. 51 
90 Mardin, 5. (1969) p. 267. 
91 Keyder, Cr. (1987) pp 15-16. 
92 Cited in Karpat, K. (1968) p. 79. 
" See Mardin, 5. (1969) p. 268. 
'a Walter Weiker states that the millet system "divided the population into religious 
communities, each of which had a great deal of autonomy in education, law and internal 
social, political and economic organisation... In most cities and towns the occupations 
which most exposed persons to the modern world, commerce and industry, were 
predominantly in the hands of non-Muslim minorities" (1981, p. 50). 
9s Özbudun, E. (1976) p. 29. My parenthesis. 
Akarh, E. (1975) p. 139. My parenthesis 
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Opposition to the centralising autocratic forces of the Tan#Mat was 
not, however, reserved to the provinces. Frederick Frey describes "the 
development of severe intra-elite conflict between modernising sectors 
of the military and bureaucracy together with the new intelligentsia on 
the one hand, and a conservative coalition of the religious institution 
and other sectors of the military and bureaucracy on the other". 97 
Indeed, to quote Kazancigil, "the introduction of Westernised higher 
education institutions of the 1820 and 1830s and the establishment of 
secular public instruction led to... new professional groups [which] 
became dissatisfied with the inner circles of power, mostly staffed with 
traditional Ottoman state elites". " These so-called Young Ottomans 
advocated the establishment of a representative parliament, but this, as 
Özbudun observes, "put them in a dilemma, one that was to be faced 
by many generations of future modernisers". "' For, once this was 
convened, under a new constitution, in 1876, it "did not, " according to 
Akar11, "increase the power of the modernising officials vis-a-vis the 
Sultan, but... it rather increased the power of notables against state 
officials". 10° This was not an effect the Sultan nor either camp of 
reformers wished to promote and prompted the new system's almost 
instant dissolution. 
Frank Tachau takes the view that, "at this point, the interests of the 
periphery coincided with the traditionalist group at the centre... [as] it 
became ever more clear that they [the Young Ottomans] intended to use 
their ideas and techniques to reinforce the power of the centre". 101 serif 
Mardin supports this arguing that "the notables thus established a 
symbiotic relationship with officials, and bribing acquired a new 
dimension". 102 This had some influence on the modernist movement 
who were, as Dodd notes, increasingly divided with "one group 
advocat[ing] a programme of Ottoman liberalism and decentralisation, 
Frey, F. (1978) p. 46. 
98 Kazancigil, A. (1981) p. 46. My parenthesis. 
Özbudun, E. (1976) p. 36. 
10° Akarh, E. (1975) p. 143. 
Tachau, F. (1984) p. 21. My parentheses. 
102 Mardin, ý. (1973) p. 178. 
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whilst the other inclined strongly towards Turkish nationalism and 
centralisation... [and] which organised and carried out the Young Turk 
revolution of 1908". 103 Once in government the latter, known as the 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), advocated an etatist policy 
of Turkification "exclud[ing] the laissez faire in favour of a more 
government-controlled `national' or `welfare' economy". 104 
With the outbreak of World War One securing the periphery took on a 
new significance and the CUP reversed their previously strongly secular 
rhetoric in favour of a call for Islamic unity. For, as Feroz Ahmad 
notes, it firstly "helped protect their flank from the right and facilitated 
the legitimisation of their policies; and second, Islamic solidarity 
became much more important after the loss of the mainly Christian 
Balkans in 1912-13". l0s David McDowall agrees noting that, "the CUP 
revived the Hamidian [Sultan Abdul Hamid, in power from 1876 to 
1909] pan-Islamic policys106 and, as Kemal Kiriýci and Gareth Winrow 
continue, "established the protection of the Sultan and Caliph and a 
commitment to the independence of Ottoman territories [as] the basic 
elements of Ottoman patriotism". 107 While this was clearly an effective 
rallying point, many, as Tachau records, believed that "the Young Turk 
regime had forsaken traditional Islamic values, ways and principles in 
favour of infidel, Western ways" and, with defeat and capitulation, it 
was hard for the remnants of the CUP, operating from an occupied 
Istanbul, to remain credible. "' Military failure, and the subsequent 
territorial losses under the punitive Treaty of Sevres, also prevented any 
return of popular support for the decentralisation movement. As 
Dankwart Rustow points out, "with the Turks left as the major ethnic 
element loyal to the Empire, the federalists demand for a `unity of 
elements' had become hollow and illusory". 109 The centralist cause was 
again furthered by the Allied-supported Greek invasion at Izmir and 
103 Dodd, C. H. (1969) p. 14. My parentheses. 
'o' Özbudun, E. (1976) p. 39. My parenthesis, his emphasis. 
ios Ahmad, F. (1991) p. 5. 
106 McDowall, D. (1992) p. 127. My parenthesis. 
107 Kiri§ci, K& Winrow, G. M. (1997) p. 91. My parenthesis. 
ioe Tachau, F. (1984) p. 25. My emphasis. 
109 Rustow, D. (1966) p. 117. 
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Italian landings at Antalya in May 1919, significantly adding to fears of 
Christian domination. 
Mustafa Kemal, the hero of the Dardanelles and former commander of 
the Ninth Army, emerged as leader of a movement which the Grand 
Vizier, tzzet Pasha, described as being "made up for the most part of 
military commanders and their staffs, country notables and of 
intellectuals". "' This, according to Mardin, was something of an 
uncomfortable alliance largely based on the forced recognition that 
"the religious and non-religious notables together made up local power 
in the Ottoman provincial cities" and it was therefore essential to co- 
opt their support for any populist endeavour to succeed. "' Kemal was 
careful, as McDowall notes, "to launch his war of independence by 
appealing to all Muslims to rally to the cause of the Sultan-Caliph, who 
was imprisoned at Constantinople by the infidel allies", rather than by 
promoting any longer-term objectives. "Z Initially then, it was perhaps 
the Kemalists' willingness and ability to support the call to jihad with 
military action that promoted their appeal to the provincial nobility. 113 
Moreover, following the establishment of his National Assembly in 
Ankara in April 1920, Kemal not only offered to protect these sheikhs 
and agas, but, as Michael Van Bruinessen notes, he also "had power 
that he might delegate to them, whereas the [peripheral] nationalist 
organisations did not". 14 
The Ankara government, however, became increasingly concerned that 
the `de-Islamisation' of politics under the CUP had not gone far 
enough and that the inherently diffuse, a-national ideological basis of 
the Sultan-Caliph had to be replaced "with a modern secular ideology 
and the values of republican nationalism". "' Kiriýci and Winrow argue 
"'Quoted in ibid. p. 119. 
"' Mardin, ý. (1971) p. 208. 
12 McDowall, D. (1992) p. 127 
It is perhaps unsurprising that they opted for the security of their ancient position as 
the subjects of the Porte, enshrined as it was in the office of the Caliph, rather than the 
tenuous promises of Wilson's new world order and the Sykes-Picot arrangements 
(revealed by the Bolsheviks in 1918). 
14 Van Bruinessen, M. (1992) p. 279. My parenthesis. 
Tapper, R. (1991) p. 6. 
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that, as the Ottoman empire continued to disintegrate, "Mustafa Kemal 
and his supporters were confronted with the need to build a new order. 
For them Turkishness' would become the basis for a new national 
identity" and the ideology that would replace Islam as the unifying 
bond in a modern political community. "' The Ankara government saw 
the nation as "not a racial, ethnic, geographical, political, or voluntary 
group or association", but rather a social group who simply inhabited 
the same land, were bound by the same laws, shared a common 
morality and language and possessed the will to live together. "' Closely 
tied to this concept of nationalism was the notion of etatism defined by 
Kemal as "the intervention of the state in all spheres, whenever the 
general interests of the nation are involved". "' According to titer 
Turan, the Ottoman bureaucracy was further strengthened and 
centralised as the state began to judge "its extensions on the periphery 
in terms of how well they carried out westernisation policies". "" 
This, for Kiriýci and Winrow, resulted from "the absence of a 
democratic tradition in the Ottoman and then the Turkish polity... 
[which made] it exceedingly difficult for decision-makers in Ankara to 
pursue a policy based on real civic integration as opposed to ethnic 
nationalism". 120 Instead, as Ellen Kay Trimberger contends, "because 
military and civil bureaucrats did not stage a coup, but rather 
established a counter-government in the process of overthrowing the 
old regime, they were able to initiate rapid change after taking 
power". "' For instance, Article One of January 1921's Law on 
Fundamental Organisation declared that "sovereignty, without any 
preconditions, belongs to the nation" and Article Three stated that the 
national executive would be "the governing body of the state of 
Turkey". " Both of which represent a significant departure from the 
multi-national ideology of the Ottoman empire. Moreover, Kemal 
"I Kiri, ci, K. & Winrow, G. M. (1997) p. 94. 
"' Z. Gökalp in Berkes N. (1959) p. 137. 
118 Quoted in Dumont, P. (1984) p. 39. 
1'9 Turan, I. (1984) p. 108. 
120 Kiri§ci, K& Winrow, G. M. (1997) p. 97. My parenthesis. 
Trimberger, E. K (1978) p. 18. 
Translated and cited by Kiri§ci, K& Winrow, G. M. (1997) p. 93. 
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increasingly emphasised the 1500-year-old history of the Turks as 
opposed to the 700-year-old Ottoman empire and in November 1922 
he announced the abolition of the Sultanate and the creation of the 
Turkish Republic. 
Having solidified the borders and status of the new Turkish state at 
Lausanne in July 1923, Kemal turned towards the ulema and, the 
following March, abolished the Caliphate. This was followed by the de- 
legitimisation of religious instruction in favour of a centralised and 
secular Ministry of Education" and the replacement of the Arabic 
script with öötürkFe. 124 In what, for Metin Heper, "was to resemble the 
Protestant tradition that placed emphasis on the absolute privacy of 
individual conscience... all public displays of religious observation were 
discouraged" and the clergy was incorporated into the civil 
bureaucracy. 'ZS According to Bülent Daver these were ostensibly 
carried out "to `purify' Islam and to open the gate for a reformist 
Islamic thought..., to liberate society from the hold of Islam and to 
bring about a new type of free individual" and, as Sunar contends, to 
replace state with society as "the ultimate basis of authority". "' This 
concept of sovereignty residing within the citizenry was part of Kemal's 
efforts "to suppress the class or strata differences and to replace them 
with a social structure composed of occupational groups". 127 Paul 
Dumont suggests that these views were strongly influenced by notions 
of corporatism and the narodnik socialism of Tsarist emigres within the 
periphery. 12' Furthermore, it was "also politically utilitarian in that it 
helped to legitimate the single party as the sole representative of all 
elements of society". 129 
'2' "The building of the nation-state was thus accompanied by the centralisation of 
education and the formation of its nationalist elites" (Gö1e, N., 1997, p. 49) 
124 `Pure Turkish'. Foreign languages, including Kurdish and the Arabic call to prayer, 
were also banned. 
izs Heper, M. (1981) p. 351. 
Daver, B. (1967) p. 55 & p. 62 and Sunar, 1. (1974) p. 54. 
Gökalp quoted by Dumont, P. (1984) p. 32 
Ibid. 
129 Weiker, W. (1981) p. 6. 
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Mardin argues that "Atatürk thus chose to strike at the foundations of 
official religion, making... republican laicism... a legitimating 
framework for the religion of the lower classes". "' Nilufer Gö1e, 
however, points out that "although Turkish secularism is inspired by 
the French `laicite' or separation of church and state, religious affairs in 
Turkey are regulated by the state... Hence, secularisation itself became 
part of that process of social engineering rather than an outcome of the 
process of modernisation and societal development". "' Paul Dumont 
supports this, writing "Mustafa Kemal and his associates were far too 
aware of the power of religion to put it entirely into private hands. 
They could not allow the development of fully independent religious 
institutions which sooner or later might oppose the regime". "' Instead, 
as Count Ostorog, the French Ambassador, put it, "religion was merely 
caused to recede from the halls of human conflict. It was to ascend to 
the stronghold of conscience to dwell there in much greater dignity and 
security". "' 
However, despite Mustafa Kemal's authoritarian organisation of many 
previously de-centralised aspects of social interaction, his 
administration "also kept its own stable of notables, ones who would 
serve the regime against its enemies... not for any ideological reason, 
but to acquire material advantage or to worst a local rival". "' During 
the 1920s and 30s these rural elites extended their position by building 
corporatist linkages with both emergent urban capitalists and the state 
bureaucracy. Having profited heavily from these connections and from 
the increases in agricultural produce during of the Second World War, 
they began to pressure the state for greater political representation and 
an end to the one-party system which finally came about in 1946. This 
was for two distinct reasons. Firstly, as Ahmet Samim argues, "with the 
lure of American aid and the threat of Soviet demands for war-rights 
over the Straits and eastern territories, it [Turkey] turned sharply 
10 Mardin, ý. (1971) p. 208. 
Gö1e, N. (1997) p. 48. 
1z Dumont, P. (1984) p. 38. 
"' Quoted in Smith, W. C. (1957) pp 193-4. 
131 McDowall, D. (1992) p. 397. 
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toward the United States" and its emphasis on multi-party 
democracies. 135 William Hale comments that "although [President] 
Inönü was reluctant to admit it, the need to win friends in the West was 
almost certainly an important factor in determining his attachment to 
liberalism) '. 136 Secondly, following the death of Kemal in 1938 his party, 
the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican Peoples' Party - RPP), was 
challenged from within by a rising generation of bourgeois, liberal- 
educated industrialists and large-estate farmers who were tired of the 
state bureaucracy's interventionist economic policies. Dissent polarised 
around the RPP's attempts to slow the ascendancy of the economic 
elite through the Land Reform Bill of January 1945. Thus, as Turan 
notes, the Kemalist "alliance between the bureaucratic elite, the 
economic middle class and local notables was irreparably shattered". "' 
Within a year, an opposition Demokrat Partisi (DP) led by Adnan 
Menderes, a wealthy landowner and farmer from the western Aegean 
region, was established. Karpat argues that the competition for votes 
quickly "forced both the Republicans and the Democrats to establish 
thousands of party organisations throughout the villages and towns of 
Turkey, which became centres of political education and social 
mobilisation". "' In the ensuing scramble for constituents McDowall 
notes that "the Democrats presented themselves as the party of private 
property, and made agriculture the cornerstone of their electoral 
appeal, arguing that large estates would be most productive and 
profitable". 139 The RPP, in contrast, found it difficult to escape the 
unpopularity of the pre-war policies in the periphery. As Özbudun 
observes, "the Turkish rural masses were further alienated by the 
economic hardships of the World War II years and the authoritarian 
methods of the bureaucracy... [which] came to be identified with the 
gendarmerie and the tax collector". " In the view of serif Mardin, "the 
135 Samim, A. (1987) p. 152. My parenthesis. 
"4 Hale, W. (1994) p. 90. My parenthesis. tnönü had taken over the presidency following 
Kemal's death in 1938. 
"' Turan, I. (1984) p. 113. 
1e Karpat, K. (1964) p. 58. 
"' McDowall, D. (1992) p. 398. 
140 Özbudun, E. (1976) p. 45. My parenthesis. 
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new party promised it would bring services to the peasants, ... de- 
bureaucratise Turkey and liberalise religious practices. Finally, private 
enterprise, equally hampered by bureaucratic controls and angered by 
its dependence on political influence, was also promised greater 
freedom". 141 These were the issues which "had their roots in the 
alienation from the centre" and which won the DP 81 per cent of the 
seats in the 1950 elections. 142 
In pursuit of economic development, the Minister of Management, 
Muhlis Ete, argued that "the state should not be involved in enterprises 
which are not of a public character. It should begin, gradually and 
according to a programme, to turn over all other enterprises ... to 
private enterprise and co-operative groups". 143 However, "by 
philosophy and temperament the Democrats were alien to bureaucratic 
procedures" which, coupled with the fact, that they "found that the 
social class which embodies the values of the private entrepreneur was 
very small and underdeveloped" meant that their primary objective of 
capitalist development was only partly met. '" In many ways, they were 
subject to the vicious circle in which countries such as Turkey "have to 
create a larger middle class before they can effectively draw talent from 
it... [but] development is necessary to a create a larger pool of middle- 
class entrepreneurial talent which makes development possible". 145 
Caglar Keyder concurs commenting that "in addition to the 
impoverishment of the institutions which might have provided the 
basis for a civil society, the dominant tendency in economic policy also 
worked toward inducing the bourgeoisie to passivity"' Since, he 
continues, "the parliament was both younger and more provincial" and 
American aid arrived with sectoral tags attached, "it was understandable 
Mardin, 5. (1973) p. 184. 
"Z Ibid. "Almost 90 per cent of the registered voters came to the polls and gave the 
Democrats 53.35 per cent of the vote and 408 seats, while the RPP won 38.38 per cent 
of the vote but only 39 seats in the new Assembly". Ahmad, F. (1993) p. 109. 
Quoted in Ahmad, F. (1977) p. 126. 
Ibid. pp 127-128. 
us McClelland, D. (1967) p. 262. My parenthesis. 
"ý Keyder, c. (1987) p. 199. 
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that the DP leaders would shift their attention to agricultural 
development". 147 Their reliance on the market as the principal 
mechanism to allocate economic resources proved initially successful. 
GNP rose from 38,506 million TL in 1950 to 70,869 million TL in 
1960 and the proportion of land-less village families declined from 16 
to 10 per cent over the same period. ' Nevertheless, Walter Weiker 
argues that "much of the increase in agricultural production was a 
result merely of an increase in cultivated area" and does not represent 
any degree of land reform. 149David McDowall agrees, pointing out that 
this was particularly apparent in the south-east of Anatolia where, 
"many small farmers and landholders ended up selling off their land to 
the tractor owning magnates and being put out of work. 'so 
The economic elite, well represented in parliament and profiting from 
the reduction of state intervention, fared well from, what Karpat calls, 
"the growing association of politics with economic interests' . "s' For 
instance, according to Ahmad, "the Democrats encouraged 
production... by instituting an agricultural price policy unduly 
favourable to the producer. At the same time, agricultural incomes 
were not taxed, with the result that the landowners prospered and 
accumulated considerable wealth". "' As Mann points out, "If the state 
upholds given relations of production then the dominant economic 
class will have an interest in efficient state centralisation" and civil 
society groups will tend to endorse state power. 1S' For much of the 
periphery then "the developing bourgeoisie was, " Keyder concludes, 
"an exceptionally `national' one in its practical orientation". '54 In other 
Ibid. p. 127. 
'^s See ibid. p. 131 & Keyder, C. (1987a) p. 295. 
149 Weiker, W. (1981) p. 196. Feroz Ahmad writes in support of this that "the 
government did distribute about 1.8 million hectares to about 360,000 families between 
1947 and 1962, but only 8,600 hectares were taken from private land. Almost all the land 
distributed belonged to the state and was already in use as grazing" (Ahmad, F., 1977, p. 
134). 
150 According to Atkan (1957, p. 276) the numbers of tractors in Turkey increased from 
1,756 in 1948 to 43,727 in 1956. He also notes comparable expansion in other types of 
mechanisation. 
's' Karpat, K (1973) passim. 
ux Abamd, F. (1981) p. 136. 
Mann, M. (1984) p. 204. 
's' Keyder, Cr. (1987) p. 199. 
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words the DP simply took the place of the RPP while leaving the 
organisational structure of the peripheral economy infra-structurally 
undisturbed; Diyarbakir province was, for example, electorally 
controlled by less than twenty landlords throughout this period. 
Indeed, as Weiker contends, "farm mechanisation tended to 
disproportionately benefit the larger farmers... and would soon be one 
cause of dislocating large numbers of peasants and generating severe 
`push' pressures toward rapid urbanisation". 'ss 
Another was the economic down-turn in the mid to late 1950s which 
significantly worsened the conditions of seasonal and tied farmers 
forcing hundreds of thousands off the land to join the industrial 
proletariat of the main urban centres. This, of course, "meant that an 
even larger area of cultivable land came under the control of the big 
landowners". " Singer has noted that as the construction industry 
boomed and the number of workers in urban plants with more than 
ten employees rose from 163,000 to 324,000 in the latter half of the 
1950s and shanty towns, or gecekondu, began to appear in most Turkish 
cities. 75' As McDowall records, the majority of migrants were Kurdish 
speakers, "' many of whom "established permanent strongholds of 
Kurdish identity across the republic... mak[ing] the Kurdish question a 
visible reality for the citizens of Istanbul 800 miles away from 
Kurdistan"! " Thus, in Keyder's view, "social lines came to be drawn 
along geographical differences... [which] reinforced solidarities in the 
labour market and political rivalries were inevitably superimposed on 
such divisions". 160 
This polarisation and radicalisation of Turkish politics during the 1970s 
provoked a reassertion of military power. The 1960s had been what 
iss Weiker, W. (1981) p. 268. 
Berberoglu, B. (1982) p. 71. He continues "... large sums of money and credits were 
channelled directly to the big landowners... increas [ing] from 3 million TL during 1945- 
50 to 9.7 million TL during 1950-56". My parenthesis. 
11 Singer, M. (1977) p. 242 and p. 295. 
"They went to Istanbul (41%), Ankara (18%), Adana (15%) and Izmir (4%) (McDowall, 
D., 1992, p. 401). 
's9 Ibid. p. 402. My parenthesis. 
160 Keyder, c. (1987) p. 206. My parenthesis. 
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Berberoglu describes as, "a decade of intense struggles16' which had 
seen the annual number of workdays lost to strikes rise from 19,739 to 
476,116.162 The 1970s continued this trend in "a rising tide of political 
violence", which, as Frank Tachau observes, "reached its climax in 
1980, culminating in the military coup of 12 September". 163 titer Turan 
argues that partly to blame was an "instability of political parties at the 
local, national and parliamentary level owing to the ineffective 
operation of intra-democracy... [and] political parties function[ing] as 
clientelistic networks through which benefits deriving from being in 
government would be distributed". 164 Indeed, Ahmet Evin concurs, 
contending that "government patronage to reward party supporters 
through civil service appointments became a frequent and widespread 
practice in the wake of constantly changing coalition governments". '65 
This, according to John McFadden, was exacerbated by "a proportional 
representational system of distributing seats in the Grand National 
Assembly [which] had encouraged a surfeit of political parties. Lowered 
restraints on the variety of political philosophies that would be 
tolerated", he continues, meant that "no party was able to obtain a 
majority and the legislative process [became] bogged down". 166 
As a result of what Tachau and Heper describe as "a lack of decisive 
authority on the part of the government, polarisation came to 
characterise not only the parties, but was insinuated into other 
important social sectors as well, including organised labour, the 
teaching profession, the civil bureaucracy, and even the polices 16' 
According to George Harris this materialised into three broad 
categories of violence; ideological, sectarian and ethnic. 16' Leftist 
groups fought against the `Grey Wolves' of Alparslan Türke' National 
Action Party (Milliyet Hareket Parlrsi - NAP), Sunni against Alevi and 
16' Berberoglu, B. (1982) p101. 
162 Reported in I5tkh, A. (1987) p. 316 and p. 325. 
163 Tachau, F. (1984a) p. 71. 
164 Turan, I. (1988) p. 65. 
'65 Evin, A. (1988) p. 206. 
'66 McFadden, J. (1985) p. 69. My parentheses. 
167 Tachau, F. & Heper, M. (1983) p. 24. 
f68 Harris, G. (1980) pp 36-38. 
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Kurd against Turk. 169 In 1978 alone there were more than 4,000 
separate acts of political violence and by the summer of 1980 an 
average of 183 lives were being lost each month. 1° In response, and 
increasingly fearful following the fall of the Shah in Iran in February 
1979, the government imposed martial law in nineteen provinces, most 
of which were in the south and south-east, thus "becoming ever more 
dependent on the armed forces". "' Harris, however, argues that even 
"this ineffectual effort to promote law and order took place against the 
backdrop of bickering among the politicians who continued to dispute 
over the duration and scope of martial law and other issues important 
to the armed forces". 172 
More generally, the population of the country had risen from eighteen 
million in 1940 to forty-four million by 1977 with forty-four per cent 
under the age of fifteen and 360,000 students competing for 60,000 
university places. "' As noted, huge numbers of people came to the 
major cities producing what serif Mardin describes as the `ruralisation' 
of urban life. 174 The twofold result of this, he argues was, "on the one 
hand, village problems, now not even resolved at the village level, were 
let loose in a much wider social field. On the other, the Kemalist 
ideology which would have re-shaped world-views for candidates to 
elite status was also eroded". 15 Kemal Karpat contends that these 
burgeoning gecekondu changed in significance from functional 
transitional communities facilitating integration into urban industry to 
focal points of alienation and disaffected identification for the children 
of the first generation of migrants. 17' His conclusions are supported by 
Dogu Ergil's empirical study of 287 terrorist prisoners in Ankara jail 
169 The term Alevi is is used here to mean "the mixture of Shi'i Islam, Persian Mazdeism, 
Christianity and possibly Central Asian ideas adopted by the Turkomen and Kurdish 
tribes inhabiting an area in Eastern Anatolia at the beginning of the sixteenth century" 
(McDowall, D., 1989, pp 8-9). 
"o Mi11iyet, December 31", 1978, p. 9 and Cumburyet, April 6th, 1981 respectively. 
"' Harris, G. (1985) p. 166. 
12 Ibid. 
"' Mardin, $. (1978) p. 244 and p. 250. 
174 Ibid. p. 244. 
Ibid. p. 246. 
16 Karpat, K. (1976) passim and (1981) pp 18-19. 
39 
Chapter One: Power, The State and Turkey 
which identified a high positive correlation between political activism, 
rural-urban migration and the failure to prosper within the educational 
and economic systems. "' 
William Hale suggests that, "although a majority of gecekondu dwellers 
maintained their independence, many of the youth fell under the 
domination of violent radical political organisations, of both left and 
right, which seemed to offer a crude way out of their social and 
economic failures and frustrations". "' According to Kiri§ci and 
Winrow, many of the former, such as Dev Genc, 179 argued that "the 
pursuit of capitalist and imperialist policies had led to the denial of 
Kurdish identity and the lack of economic development in eastern 
Anatolia". 150 By the mid-70s, however, leading Kurds among these 
groups had begun to call for Kurdistan to be recognised as a separate 
nation capable of organising its own proletarian revolution. "' As Van 
Bruinessen has contended this succeeded in "changing the self- 
perception of a considerable section of the Kurds. People who had 
long called themselves Turks started re-defining themselves as 
Kurds". ` 
Founded in 1974 by Abdullah Öcalan, the Kurdish Workers' Party 
(Partiya Karkareni Kurdistan - PKK) was, according to Nicole and Hugh 
Pope, "among the most virulent of the armed groups ... on Turkey's 
Marxist fringe""'. Their manifesto "depicted the Kurdish populated 
areas as a colony and argued that the Kurdish feudalists and 
bourgeoisie had chosen to collaborate with the Turkish ruling classes to 
exploit the Kurdish peasantry and working class". "' Although the 
'n Ergil, D. (1980) pp 129-137. 
18 Hale, W. (1994) p. 227. 
"' Also known as The Federation of Turkish Revolutionary Youth, it was notoriously 
violent in its "struggle against fascism and imperialism, for ideological independence and 
the liberation of peoples". Landau, J. (1974) p. 86. 
180 Kiri, §ci, K& Winrow, G. M. (1997) p. 109. 
Gunter, M. (1990) pp 63-68. 
Van Bruinessen (1989) p. 621. 
Pope, N. & Pope H. (1997) p. 259. 
114 Kirigci, K& Winnow, G. M. (1997) p. 110. 
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battleground was, and has remained, the stubbornly rural south-east, 'es 
the essence of the PKK, including its support, was in the gecekondu of 
the larger urban centres. Its leaders came from the political science 
classes of prestigious universities and its resources from Syria and 
smuggling. "' Rather than exclusively assaulting the state, the PKK's 
primary targets were statist land-owners involved local politics. 18' 
Indeed, according to Kiriýci and Winrow's findings, the PKK have 
consistently targeted a higher number of non-combatants than 
members of the security forces. '88 
It is perhaps, as Tachau and Heper remark, "to be wondered why the 
military did not intervene much earlier than September 12,1980". 189 
The 1960 military intervention had, after all, strengthened their position 
originally enshrined within Kemal's 1924 constitution which had 
charged them with the "definition, determination and application of a 
national security policy" in order to protect "the indivisible unity of the 
state's people and its territory". '90 Under Article 11 of the 1961 
Constitution a `National Security Council' (NSC), made up of selected 
cabinet members, the Chief-of-Staff and serving force commanders, 
had, in Muller's words, "established the military's profound influence 
over all state institutions". 191 This influence is quantified by Ihsan Dagi 
as being born of two conflicting political traditions; firstly, "the self- 
ascribed guardian role of the military which is legitimised by the role of 
military elites in forming the republic and a national security ideology, 
. ss In many south-eastern towns and a day's salary for an adult male labourer was 
reported by Le Monde on June 16' 1983 as US$2. 
'' James Brown argues that Syria's support for the PKK stems from concerns over 
proposed hydro-electric schemes that may affect water flows on the Euphrates river, as 
well as historical claims on the territory of Hatay which was incorporated into Turkey by 
popular referendum in 1939 (1995, p. 125). The Popes stress the revenue generated by 
the processing and sale of opiates claiming that up to 80 per cent of Britain's heroin goes 
through south-east Turkey (1997, p. 277). 
's7 For instance, in August 1979 Öcalan's men attempted to assassinate Mehmet Celal 
Bucak, landlord and justice Party deputy of twenty villages around and including the 
town of Siverek. It is unclear if this was due to his political allegiances, his allegedly 
exploitative economic practices or at the behest of a rival (Financial Times 21"January and 
October 1" 1980). 
188 Kiri§ci, K& Winrow G. M. (1997) p. 126. 
'' Tachau, F. & Heper, M. (1983) p. 25. 
10 Cited in Gürbey, G. (1996) pp 12-13. 
19' Muller, M. (1996) p. 177. 
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gives rise to interventionist and authoritarian tendencies. Secondly, 
... [its role] as a modernising force since the nineteenth century". 
"' 
This appears to be largely coterminous with Eric Nordlinger's 
`guardian' type of military regime in that they "intend[ed] to correct 
what [we]re seen to be the malpractices and deficiencies of the previous 
governments193 or, as Tachau and Heper put it, "to remove corrupt and 
squabbling politicians, revamp the machinery of government and 
redistribute some political power and economic rewards". 194 
Ahmet Evin, however, takes the view that as "the military were the last 
homogenous group left, defined along institutional lines, it is not 
surprising that they acted as the sole representatives of the state" and 
concludes that "the 1980 regime was guided more by the objective of 
establishing military authority over the state than restoring the authority 
of the state". 195 To this end some 18,000 civil servants received 
administrative or penal punishments, 1,700 elected mayors were 
dismissed19' and the new President, General Kenan Evren, was, as 
Heper writes, "granted extensive legislative and executive powers". 197 
By doing this, the military "aimed at close hierarchical control of the 
civil bureaucracy". "' Kemal Karpat agrees, noting that "the wide 
approval of the military by the people was particularly necessary in 
1980 because, unlike the interventions of 1960 and 1971, this one did 
not have the organised support of a political party or social group". 199 
This was forthcoming in the constitutional referendum of November 
1982 in which voter participation was 91.27 per cent of which 91.37 
per cent were in favour of the regime's new powers. Although Kiriýci 
12 Dagi, I. (1996) p. 124. My parenthesis. 
19' Nordlinger, E. (1977) p. 25. My parentheses. He also identifies the moderator and ruler 
type as less and more interventionist respectively. 
194 Tachau, F. & Heper, M. (1983) p. 28. 
'95 Evin, A. (1988) p. 211. A priority connected to this was "the need to preserve unity 
and the command hierarchy within the army" (Hale, W., 1988, p. 163). 
Figures reported in Hürnyet, January 6t, 1981. Lucille Pevsner records that between 
September 1980 and February 1983 over 60,000 people suspected of illegal political 
activities were arrested (1984, p. 88). 
" Heper, M. (1985) p. 141. This "extends the junta's desire to give the president effective 
control over other institutions in order to guard against what was perceived as excessive 
politicisation of these organisations" (Tachau, F. & Heper, M., 1983, p. 29). 
198 Heper, M. (1990) p. 220. 
"' Karpat, K. (1988) p. 150. 
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and Winrow argue that "little public debate was permitted... and the 
stark yes or no options gave people little room for choice", 200 Karpat 
takes the view that the military's reassertion of power, "conform[s] to 
the traditional Turkish patterns of government and are to a large extent 
outside the citizen's immediate concern' . 201 
The 1982 Constitution, in which the "military regime sought to buttress 
its role in the successor civilian government", 202 reduced the civilian 
members of the NSC to a minority and led many commentators, such 
as G. Gürbey, to argue that their presence "in the political system 
impedes and hinders the pluralisation, democratisation and 
development of a civilised society". "' Indeed, as Binnaz Toprak 
concludes, "the new constitution rejected a major premise of pluralist 
democracy, namely the representation of interests through links with 
political parties and interest groups. It also rejected the principle... that 
institutions of civil society are, by definition autonomous from the 
states204 This was underpinned by new laws in April 1983 which, while 
removing the previously complete ban on political parties, gave the 
NSC the power to "investigate and declare unsuitables205 party 
members or candidates and insisted on manifestos remaining "attached 
to the principles and reforms of Atatürk" 206 Aimed at institutionalising 
a two-party system, the new laws also decreed that each party was 
obliged to establish organisations in at least half of Turkey's provinces. 
These were augmented with further legislation in June of the same year 
which required parties to win at least 10 per cent of the national vote to 
gain any seats and segmented the most populous electoral districts into 
smaller, less gecekondu-influenced boroughs. According to Ergüder and 
Hofferbert, the new system was successful in "further reducing the 
m0 Kiri§ci, K. & Winnow G. M. (1997) pp 111-112. 
m' Karpat, K (1988) p. 154. My parenthesis. 
m2 Hale, W. (1994) p. 290. 
m' Gürbey, G. (1996) p. 13. He continues by arguing that the NSC still "plays an active 
and determining role in the definition and application of policy aims, ... is in no way 
responsible to Parliament [and] ... is the primary decision-maker in the Kurdish issue". 
My parenthesis. 
m` Toprak, B. (1988) p. 127. 
205 Cumhuriyet, April 26', 1983. 
m6 Cited in Hale, W. (1988) p. 170. 
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tendency of a proportional system to reward minor parties and to 
fragment the party system". m' 
It also meant, however, that political groups representing Kurdish 
issues were unable to operate, even if they complied with Article 68 of 
the Constitution preventing activities "in conflict with the indivisible 
integrity of the state". " As "the generals seized power determined to 
solve the Kurdish question by force just as they intended to solve all 
other issues", 1 it is, for commentators such as Fcroz Ahmad, hardly 
surprising that Article 26 of the Constitution, which had decreed that 
"no language prohibited by the state shall be used in the expression and 
dissemination of thought", was, in October 1983, qualified with a ban 
on the use of Kurdish. "' Kiri§ci and Winrow argue that, "the political 
discourse derived from these policies put clear emphasis on the 
Turkishness of Turkey', the unity of the nation and its territorial 
integrity. There was a major backlash against the conspicuous growth 
of expressions of Kurdish nationalist ideas"! " This was particularly 
apparent in the south-cast itself where, according to Chris Kutschern, 
"the extent and ferocity of the repression decimated the Kurdish 
parties... The regime thus cleared the way for the PKK" who launched 
their first large-scale armed attack on the villages of Eruh and $cmdinli 
on the 15' of August 1984.212 
Condos nn 
From this account of the theoretical literature regarding social power 
and the state and from the historical analysis of Ottoman/Turkish state 
Ergilder, Ü. &I lofferbert, R. (1988) p. 83, 
General Evren elaborated on his government's position by stating that "what lies at 
the basis of the Turkish Republic... is the sublime philosophy of Atatürk which says 
'I lappy is he who calls himself a Turk'. This philosophy includes every citizen who 
considers himself a Turk, regardless of creed, race or religion" (quoted in Iieper, 
M., 1985, p. 132). In imposing this he later announced that "tens of thousands of persons 
belonging to Leftist organisations are daily being shot or wounded or captured and 
handed over to the judiciary" (quoted in Ahmad, F., 1993, p. 184). 
" Ahmad, F., (1993) p. 218. 
210 T. C. R,:, wi Gatirir, October 22e1,1983. 
Mri§ci, K. & %Xinrow G. M. (1997) pp 110-111. 
312 Kutschera, C. (1994) p. 13. 
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development a number of questions emerge. While these will be looked 
at in more detail, and critically analysed, in the coming chapters, it is 
worth setting them down at this stage. This will serve to highlight some 
of the more important aspects of debate and areas of contention, as 
well as issues yet to receive sufficient study, which this thesis will later 
address in a more systematic way. 
Having set out an account of Mann's theoretical and historiographic 
position in the next chapter, Chapter Three will use his framework to 
consider issues relating to the politics of Ottoman change. Not least 
among these, is the question of who ran the Ottoman empire? Is 
Michael Mann's assertion that the state is essentially territorially 
determined and socio-spatially centralised a helpful means of analysing 
Ottoman policy? Is he correct to assert that all pre-modern empire's 
were structured by a `three-way power stand-off' between state, ruling 
class and the masses? How was social power organised by the Ottoman 
state and what level of autonomy did it possess? Is Mann's notion of 
the duality of state power, as simultaneously infra-structural and 
despotic, an expedient method of conceptualising the Ottoman state's 
relationship with civil society and the ayan? Who are the ayan? How 
were they related to the askeri and reaya classes? What was the basis of 
their economic mobility and why was it not convertible into political 
influence? Were the ayan classes coterminous with the `periphery'? 
What level of autonomy from the state did they enjoy and how did 
changes in state administration affect their status and role? Can this 
shift in state-subject power relations be regarded as the beginning of 
the end of the Ottoman Empire? How was the evolution of the state 
subject to the changing international system in the nineteenth century? 
What factors, internal to the Empire, contributed to changes in the 
organisation of social power by the state? Can Mann's model of state 
power be workably employed to account for these changes? 
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Chapter Four will use Mann's analysis of ideological change in Europe 
to examine issues connected to late Ottoman and early republican 
`modernism'. A key question will be how the appeal of faith was 
organised by the state as a means of securing unity. What role did Islam 
have in the creation of an assimilated nation state? How did the ulema's 
influence and authority relate to Kemal's homogenous and secular 
vision of a modern Turkey? What was the process of ideological re- 
ordering that took place? Was it, in Mann's terms, able to "intensify the 
cohesion, the confidence, and, therefore, the power of an already- 
established social group". "' To what extent was the transcendental 
ideology of the Sultan-Caliph replaced by a Durkheimian doctrine of 
positivist progress? How did this relate to the state's attempts to bring 
the cyan classes under their infra-structural influence? What forms did 
the political conflict between the forces of centralisation and federalism 
take? How did this relate to the gradual disintegration of the Empire? 
Is it useful to regard the end of the Ottoman empire as a process of 
`modernisation'? 
Chapter Five will again deploy Mann's model to assess changes in the 
relationship between the economic elite and the Turkish state during 
the 1930s and following the Second World War. Significant issues to be 
addressed will include how this relationship was influenced by 
industrial development, increased urbanisation and the relaxation of 
Kemal's authoritarian state apparatus? What was the role of agricultural 
mechanisation? What factors brought about the end of the single-party 
state and how did this affect the role of the periphery? In what ways 
was social stratification altered? Why did the concept of a non- 
Turanian peripheral identity re-emerge in the gecekondu of the industrial 
cities? How did it become fused to the politics of the left? What forms 
did collective consciousness take? Did coherent classes emerge and, if 
so, how did they relate to the state? How relevant is Mann's account of 
class formation and perpetuation to the political economy of Turkey 
213 Mann, M. (1986) p. 24. 
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during this period? Did growing regional and social wealth disparities, 
facilitate both the incentive and the social space for disaffection to be 
expressed outside the centralised control of the state? 
Chapter Six will apply Mann's account of the relationship between 
domestic repression and political representation in order to analyse the 
rise of the Turkish military following the coup of 1960? How did the 
generals relate to the economic elite during the 1960s? What prompted 
the coup of 1971? How and why did organised social networks became 
increasingly militarised throughout the 1970s? Was the NSC's 
assumption of state control in 1980 a culmination of, or a response to, 
this process? How did the NSC attempt to institutionalise its position 
and how did the 1982 Constitution affect the state's relationship with 
civil society? Can Mann's elucidation of Western regime types help to 
better understand the system of government which has emerged in 
Turkey since the 1960 intervention? What was the nature of the link 
between the military and the state and what changes did this 
partnership go through during this period? What methods did 
decentralised groups, such as the PKK, employ to institutionalise their 
position in the periphery? How have they sought to establish 
alternatives to the state's organisational maxim and to what extent are 
such organisations representative of non-statist opinion in civil society? 
It will be seen from the sources cited in this chapter that the present 
state of knowledge and understanding regarding the development of 
the state in the Ottoman Empire/Turkish Republic is far from 
complete. These questions represent significant areas of disagreement 
within the current literature addressing both the theoretical and 
historical debate. The main body of this thesis will therefore focus on 
employing Michael Mann's methodology, the application of which to 
the specifics of historical analysis will be explored further in the 
following chapter, in order to resolve the issues outlined above. In 
doing so, this thesis will compare the Ottoman social trajectory to 
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elements of Mann's elucidation of Western development - also 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Two: Mann's Brief History of Time 
This chapter aims to give an account of Michael Mann's application 
of his theoretical model. In doing so, it will show how his largely 
abstract characterisation of social power, briefly set out in the 
previous chapter, is employed to explain both the emergence and 
necessity of the state and the permutable nature of its relationship 
with civil society. A central element of this is the essentially unilinear 
thread that Mann traces from Mesopotamian development to the 
refinement of imperial rule under Rome and its eventual subsidence 
in favour of the north-western European `leading edge' of socio- 
economic change during the medieval period and on to the 
appearance of modern bureaucratic nation-states. These key periods 
of power development make up the primary framework through 
which Mann's theoretical composition is applied. Having set out a 
rather condensed form of this encyclopaedic undertaking, the final 
section of this chapter will then highlight the critical debate that has 
surrounded Mann's work since the publication of the first volume of 
The Sources of Social Power in 1986. Particularly focused upon has been 
his treatment of the historical material, especially the role of 
Christianity in the development of feudal Europe, and both the 
diachronic approach that Mann favours and the overall validity of the 
macro-historical methodology. 
The Sources of Social Power 
In the two volumes of The Sources of Social Power Mann applies an 
historical perspective to his four-dimensional account of social power 
taking the reader from what he calls the `beginning' to 1914. ' He 
argues that feudal states, reliant on the intensive, but non- 
I Numerous shorter works which have accompanied the development of Mann's 
theoretical model will also be drawn upon. 
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comprehensive and non-extensive, might of the military2 and 
governing through an often autonomous sub-structure of clerics and 
burghers tend to be low on both infra-structural and despotic power. 
An imperial state tends to wield high levels of often divinely 
legitimised despotic power through its own patrimonial government 
bodies, but, similarly constrained by the shortcomings of military 
force, it has a limited capacity to penetrate a frequently large and 
disparate territory and thus remains infra-structurally deficient. In 
contrast, modern bureaucratic democracies, in which the state's 
power is limited within certain institutions such as the media, the 
market and judiciary, usually have low despotic power and, through 
their information systems, immense infra-structural power. 
For Mann, ideological power emerges from the need to impose 
categories of meaning onto our sensory perceptions, to formulate 
norms and understandings of how to interact and co-operate with 
other individuals and to develop, what he calls, "aesthetic/ritual 
practices" which cannot be fully tested by human experience. Thus, 
according to Mann's rubric, collective and distributive power can be 
exercised by organised minorities which institutionalise claims to 
meaning, or those that facilitate greater mutual trust within a social 
group or those that exploit the functionality of non-materialist 
practices such as poetry, dance and the plastic arts. Through universal 
infrastructures (such as markets, coinage and communications media), 
this may either transcend existing institutions of economic, military and 
political power by reinforcing/generating a `sacred' form of authority 
or, alternatively, they may serve to "intensify the cohesion, the 
confidence, and, therefore, the [immanent] power of an already- 
2 Outside the immediate area of contact, Mann argues that a civilian population 
alters its behaviour little (apart from to offer tribute and recognise a leader's 
suzerainty) in response to a military presence (Mann, M., 1986, passim). 
3 Mann, M. (1986) p. 22. Mann further clarifies his terms by writing, "in some 
formulations the terms `ideology' and ideological power' contain two additional 
elements, that the knowledge purveyed is false and/or that it is a mere mask for 
material domination. I imply neither. Knowledge purveyed by an ideological power 
movement necessarily `surpasses experience' (as Parsons puts it). It cannot be fully 
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established social group" .° 
Figure One: The Four Sources of Social Powers 





Extensive Intensive Comprehensive 
Diffused Authoritative 
"Economic power derives from the satisfaction of subsistence needs 
through the social organisation of the extraction, transformation, 
distribution and consumption of the objects of nature". ' Each of 
these tasks has its own blend of collective and distributive 
tested by experience, and therein lies its distinctive power to persuade and 
dominate. But it need not be false; if it is, it is less likely to spread" (p. 23). 
4 Ibid. pp. 23-24. My parenthesis. 
5 This model, an adaptation of Mann (1986) passim, does not mean to suggest that 
the application of social power necessarily involves all elements shown above. It is 
doubtful that a social elite could, even in the most heavily authoritarian nation-state, 
employ such total power over its territory - see D. H. Wrong's comment on the 
nature of the concentration camp (1979) p. 28. 
6 Ibid. p. 24. 
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organisational characteristics and varying degrees of extensive, 
intensive and comprehensive power. Groupings around which, be 
they holders or subjects, are described by Mann as classes. For the 
`ruling' class economic power can, in the case of internally organised 
landed classes for instance, be simply a question of "who shall be 
allowed to stand upon a given piece of land and to put things into it 
and take things from it". 7 Mann, however, argues that "in those cases 
where economic institutions have been authoritative, centralised and 
territorial they have either been subject to a higher level of territorial, 
central control by the state or they have acquired political function... 
and so become themselves 'mini-states"'. ' As outlined earlier, a 
despotic state without infra-structural reach can claim territoriality, 
but cannot enforce it. Therefore even the most authoritarian form of 
government must receive the endorsement of at least a section of its 
citizens. Central to this is the maintenance of the given relations of 
extraction, transformation, distribution and consumption of objects 
of nature through the support of the `ruling' economic class. 
For Mann, military power "derives from the necessity of organised 
physical defence and its usefulness for aggression". 9 On the one hand 
it is "the bluntest instrument of human power", intensive and direct, 
on the other it has "a more extensive reach, of a negative, terroristic 
form" over large geographical and social spaces. 1° The former relates 
to the militaristic control of everyday life and "requires such a high 
level of coercion, logistical back-up and surplus extraction that it is 
only practical within close communications to the armed forces". " 
Therefore it tends to remain in intensive pockets along logistical 
routes with little extensive penetration facilitating limited infra- 
structural reach and minimal territorial control. This is surrounded by 
a second radius of organised military power, "an extensive penumbra 
7 Russell, B. (1938) p. 123. 
8 Mann, M. (1984) p. 199. 
9 Mann, M. (1986) p. 25. 
10 Ibid. p. 26. 
11 Mann, M. (1984) p. 200. 
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in which terrorised populations will not normally step beyond certain 
niceties of compliance, but whose behaviour cannot be positively 
controlled". " The state can therefore utilise military power networks 
to impose its centralised authority over delimited territories and assert 
its institutionalised monopoly of the means of physical violence. 
As outlined in the previous chapter, Mann's position is that the 
autonomy and power of a state, as the primary organisational form of 
political power in society, "derives from the usefulness of centralised, 
institutionalised, territorialised regulation of many aspects of social 
relations". " The three alternative bases for social order, force, custom 
and exchange are more limited. Force cannot positively govern 
interaction for long, similarly customs cannot offer regulation in 
response to increasing complexity and to bargain over everything 
eventually becomes inefficient. " Thus, social groups have, upon 
reaching various levels of complexity, established, as a generalised 
means of attaining goals, a set of normative rules of conduct 
representing the group as a whole or interest groups within it. As 
such, these can be institutionalised in a collective or distributive (or, 
more commonly, both simultaneously) manner by an organised 
minority or elite. In doing so "the state does not posses a distinctive 
means of power independent of, and analogous to, economic, military 
and ideological power. The means used by states are only a 
combination of these which are also the means of power used in all 
social relationships". " 
From this necessity the autonomous power of the state has 
developed. Mann argues that, when organised by the state, political 
power networks are distinguishable by their centralised location, from 
which both collective and distributive power is exercised outwards, 
and their tendency, in domestic terms, to reinforce rather than 
12 Mann, M. (1986) p. 26. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Mann, M. (1984) p. 195. 
15 Ibid. p. 198. 
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transcend territorial boundaries. In other words, "states can thus 
attain greater autonomous power when social life generates emergent 
possibilities for enhanced co-operation and exploitation of a 
centralised form over a delimited territorial area". 16 When this occurs 
in neighbouring regions a multi-state system develops giving rise to a 
second organisational form of political power, `geopolitical 
diplomacy'. Although no state has been able to completely control all 
social interaction across its boundaries, thus leaving some social 
power diffused and decentralised, an increase in territorial 
centralisation tends to precipitate additional "geopolitical activity, 
both peaceful and warlike". " 
For Mann, this process "emerged as a result of the impetus given by 
alluvial agriculture to diverse, overlapping networks of social 
interaction present in the region surrounding it" and generated a 
greater need for authoritative regulation eventually "embodying 
permanent coercive power". 18 In other words, the social need for 
flood prevention and control in hydraulic agricultural areas of the 
Euphrates basin during the third millennium BC provided a more 
"powerful impetus toward larger political units than the kin group or 
village". 19 In this region, in contrast to the Nile Valley where, as Mann 
puts it, people were entirely "caged" by an "absolute boundary" of 
the desert or in Europe where a more even ecology led to a more 
continuous distribution of population, a "two-level, segmental, semi- 
caged" pattern of settlement emerged 2° As alluvial agriculture 
bettered the yield of rain-watered systems, economic power also 
became centralised and structured the relationship between the settled 
urban core and the pastoralists of the periphery. "It enabled those 
who controlled the land to mobilise a disproportionate amount of 
collective social power and to turn it into distributive power used 
16 Mann, M. (1986) p. 31. 
17 Ibid. p. 522. 
18 Mann, M. (1986) p. 77 
19 Ibid. p. 86. 
20 Ibid. p. 81. 
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against others". 1 Thus, for Mann, neither the state nor social 
stratification originated from within existing societies, but rather 
because "(1) out of the loose, overlapping social networks of 
prehistory emerged one network, alluvial agriculture, that was 
unusually caged and (2) in its interactions with several peripheral 
networks, further caging mechanisms appeared that constrained them 
all toward greater involvement on two levels of power relations, those 
within the local state and those within the broader civilisation". ' 
From City-State to Empire 
According to T Jacobsen, these early administrative requirements 
were first vested in Sumerian temple legislatures probably made up of 
large oligarchies of patriarchal family representatives in around 3000 
BC 2' P Wheatley, cited by Mann, supports this, arguing that it was the 
ceremonial temple complex, not the market or the fortress, that 
emerged first as an urban institution. Each city-state is thought to 
have possessed its own deity providing the city with a "focus of 
loyalty" and connecting it to a broader pantheon of common 
Sumerian gods 24 In their studies of state evolution in the New World, 
Coe and Keatinge draw attention to the importance of this shared 
identity as a means of integrating a territory broader than that which a 
purely politically-organised state could manage thereby adding 
credence to Mann's assertion that the `transcendent' organisation of 
ideological power was likely to have regulated the city-states both 
religiously and diplomatically. 25 Thus these temples simultaneously 
exerted a diffused, extensive and collective power over the contact 
between both alluvial and peripheral society offering ideologically- 
legitimised approaches to a diverse range of issues aimed at 
21 Ibid. p. 83. 
22 Ibid. p. 127. 
23 Jacobsen, T. (1970) Ch. 9. 
24 Mann, M (1986) p. 91. 
25 Coe, M. (1982) passim & Keatinge, R. (1982) passim, cited in ibid. p. 76. 
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maintaining order and unity over a large and disparate region 26 
In contrast, Mann suggests that economic power groupings were 
`caged' by the ecological differences of managed alluvial flooding and 
rain-watering and by the natural resources available to settled and 
pastoral populations. This led to greater economic surpluses in some 
parts of the region than others offering increased employment 
opportunities, urbanisation and the growth of centralisation. Trade 
between the alluvial `core' and the wider region centred on particular 
communication routes, such as rivers and provincial market towns, 
possession of which, usually by groups associated with the core, 
offered enhanced economic opportunities. These routes also served 
as re-exportation lines for the manufactured goods predominantly 
produced in the core which were increasingly traded for labour and 
raw materials, such as minerals and hide. In this way the core, Mann 
writes, gained a disproportionate level of "control over a relatively 
generalised means of exchange, over `prestige goods' for displaying 
status, and over the production of tools and weapons". " 
As the exchange of a growing agricultural and manufacturing surplus 
increased, defence of these trade routes became more important, 
particularly for the dominant economic groups of the core. Although 
Mann resists the emphasis on militarism favoured by some writers, 
arguing that it was the development of political-economic differences 
supported by ideological organisation and ecological accident rather 
than the conquest of one kin-group by another that led to the 
beginnings of social stratification, he does acknowledge that the 
organisation of military power helps to explain "further state 
development". ' City-states constructed fortified walls and kings with 
despotic pretensions emerged who, as both Jacobsen and Mann 
conjecture, may have been elected by the temple oligarchy for 
26 Mann estimates that up to half a million people may have described themselves as 
`Sumerian'. 
27 Mann, M. (1986) p. 125. 
28 Ibid. p. 99. 
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combatant functions in time of war. Thus the organisation of 
expensive military formations such as fortifications, infantry and 
animal haulage favoured the king over the temple and the centralising 
state. As a result, and because defeated social elements could not 
escape their environmental cage and so became a subjugated class in 
an enlarged society, authoritative, despotic power increased and 
broader, diffused influences weakened. 
As Mann notes, however, in the absence of a standing army or 
military elite it was difficult to convert this temporary authority into 
permanent coercive force. Although a few kings did institutionalise 
their position by founding dynasties, most were not able to keep the 
state's resources to themselves as increased economic centralisation 
tended to favour the leading families of the core, many of whom also 
employed large mercenary armies. The economic elite's legitimacy 
increased in the temple oligarchy as trade developed and this enabled 
them to compete with the kings (none of whom claimed divinity) and 
the pantheon's priests. The territory the temple needed to militarily 
and diplomatically regulate, in the absence of an international 
currency ascribing an agreed commodity value, also increased 
necessitating the devolution of infra-structural power to provincial 
merchant families. Mann suggests that through this mechanism, their 
superior military resources and their greater agricultural and 
manufacturing efficiency, city-states were initially able to repress 
opportunist challenges to their supply lines and protect their colonies 
and staging posts. As these became more extended, however, it 
became impossible to maintain political power over any length of 
time. Soldiers and merchants sent out to maintain these outposts 
soon merged with local people and developed autonomous networks 
of interaction culminating in Sargon of Akkad's successful rebellion in 
around 2310 BC and the establishment of what Mann calls "the first 
empire of domination". " The dynamics of this new system of 
governance remained, as Mann continues, "one of the dominant 
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social forms for three thousand years in the Near East and Europe, 
and even longer in East Asia". " 
Sargon probably came from the Semitic people of northern Sumeria, 
an area of mixed agriculture and pasture lands. From this marcher 
base he conquered all of the Sumerian states in thirty-four campaigns, 
stretching from the Persian Gulf to Anatolia. Generally these took the 
form of an approach to a city-state and, possibly following a skirmish 
in which his forces' clear superiority was demonstrated, making the 
inhabitants an offer they could not refuse. This method of "coercive 
negotiation" was, Mann states, often supported by the encouragement 
of "piecemeal treachery" on the part of disaffected elements of the 
city's defence administration. " Surrender, settled quickly so that 
Sargon's forces could move on to the next source of surplies, was far 
more common than full-scale confrontation and generally resulted in 
a loss of stored property and the city walls (and perhaps a change of 
leadership) rather than complete annihilation. Thus the marchers 
relied as much on their diplomatic acumen as their military strength. 
That said, it is probably true that, with the decline of the oligarchic 
polity of Sumer, there was an increase in the despotic power of the 
state, later institutionalised by Sargon's grandson, Naram-Sin, whose 
claim to divinity provided a decentralised aristocracy with a 
legitimising genealogical connection. 
Nevertheless, having subjugated an extended territory, Sargon's forces 
found that political power, necessary to administer their conquests, 
involved dispersing some of their coercive force and thus jeopardising 
their military advantage. Mann, building on Owen Lattimore's triadic 
model of imperial power, 32 identifies four possible "strategies for 
29 Mann, M. (1986) Ch. 5. 
30 Ibid. p. 131. As such, the Akkadian system, later refined through Rome's 
legionary economy, will provide the analytical basis for the study of imperial power 
in this thesis. 
31 Ibid. p. 141. 
32 Lattimore, 0. (1962) passim. 
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ameliorating this and for developing genuine imperial domination". " 
The first of which was to rule through clients, whom Mann calls 
"conquered native elites". 34 This was particularly effective with 
subjects possessing minimal material and organisational resources 
especially when supported by increased tribute, elite re-organisation 
and occasional punitive raids. Diffused political and ideological power 
could also be applied by encouraging or forcing the elite to surrender 
children to be `educated' within the imperial core and then returning 
them to act as peripheral agents. Sargon, according to Mann, 
employed this relatively low-cost method, despite its disadvantage of 
leaving an autonomous local elite to develop its own resources or be 
seduced by an internal or external challenge, by appointing Akkadians, 
of various lineage, to the courts of local kings. 
A second strategy identified by Mann was to administer conquests 
directly through the army. Although it involved the greater expense of 
eliminating more of the indigent elite and extracting a greater tribute 
from local agriculturists to support such an infra-structural presence, 
as well as higher salary costs for the professional soldiers employed to 
oversee these policies, it was used to secure key areas of the core and 
parts of the periphery thought to be of high geopolitical value. The 
authority of the commander could be institutionalised by his access to 
the spoils of the recent conflict, but the distribution of such 
resources, particularly land, among his lieutenants was inclined to 
decentralise military power "embedding the soldiers in `civil society' 
and giving them material resources whose enjoyment was now 
independent of the army or the state" 35 This tended to develop an 
autonomous, hereditary and land-owning class united only by a 
shared fear of the subjugated masses rebelling. 
Indeed, Mann suggests that these early empires of domination, like 
33 Mann, M. (1986) p. 143. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. p. 144. 
59 
Chapter Two: Mann's Brief History of Time 
the city-states before them, often relied entirely on local aristocrats 
for what little infra-structure they did posses. "So in practice, " he 
continues, "empires were territorially federal... looser, more 
decentralised, more prone to fission than the state's own ideology 
usually claimed". 36 For Weber this form of patrimonial organisation, 
stubbornly imbued in Eastern civilisation, explains why these regions 
did not follow the rational and activist spirit of acquisition and 
production apparent in the developmental patterns that eventually 
emerged in Europe 37 Mann essentially agrees with this account, but 
adds, after Eisenstadt, " that "a state cannot be merely aristocratic. 
Genealogical claims are inherently particularistic; they are the 
antithesis of centrality and of the state" 39 Thus, in contrast to 
Weber's claim that decentralised structures must be in place before 
dynamism can occur, change is determined by a dialectic between the 
centralising tendencies of the state and the decentralising effects 
inherent in political rule; a tension evident, for Mann, in the history of 
Near-Eastern, Mediterranean and Western societies. The first empires 
of domination, low on infrastructure and high on despotism, were 
therefore essentially systems "of federal domination by a king or 
emperor through provincial, marcher, and even `foreign' rulers and 
elites" and, as such, were reliant more upon leadership qualities than 
any institutionalised political structures. 40 
Figure Two: Strategies of Imperial Domination 
1. Rule Through 2. Compulsory 3. Direct Army 4. Common Ruling 
Clients Co-operation Rule Class Culture 
Military The Military Authority and The Intensification Coerced 
Pacification Multiplier Economic Value of Labour Diffusion 
36 Ibid. p. 170. 
37 Weber, M. (1968) pp 1006-1069. 
38 Eisenstadt, S. (1969) passim. 
39 Mann, M. (1986) p. 170. 
40 Ibid. p. 174, his italics. 
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The third of Mann's strategies of imperial domination is what Herbert 
Spencer calls "compulsory co-operation". As such, social stratification 
and the mode of production tend to be subservient to the military. 
"The industrial part of the society", Spencer argued, "continues to be 
essentially a permanent commissariat existing solely to supply the 
needs of the governmental-military structures, and having left over 
for itself only enough for bare maintenance". 41 For Mann, this 
`militant society' has five aspects. 42 Military pacification is necessitated 
by the need to regulate ownership and value and to repel banditry as 
specialisation within the Akkadian empire produced less self- 
sufficiency and greater trade-dependency. It is also required when 
famine, disease etc produce desperate masses who must be quelled 
through a combination of force and economic redistribution. 
Secondly, the military multiplier ensures that the army's consumption 
need for staples maintains demand, stimulated production and 
improved economic infrastructures such as road and river transport 
networks. Thirdly, in correlating authority and economic value, "the 
redistributive state could often, perhaps even usually, assign exchange 
value more speedily, efficiently, and apparently justly than could a 
process based on reciprocity, that is, a market". 43 Fourthly, the 
intensUicatzon of labour reflects the usefulness of coercion in increasing 
productivity from indentured or, in the relatively few areas where 
social stratification and private property were stable, hired labour. 
Fifthly, and in contrast to the first four, which are based on the 
authoritative bridging of local differences, coerced diffusion, Mann 
contends, tends to break down these "particularisms" through 
collective power. Most notable in the Akkadian-Sumerian example 
was the fusion of pictographic and syllabic literacy into an 
41 Spencer, H. (1969) p. 121. 
42 These are discussed in Mann, M. (1986) pp 146-155. 
43 Ibid. p. 150. 
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international language of trade and diplomacy which extended the 
diffused ideological power of the empire and reduced local identities 
in favour of the broader influence of the state. "Literacy was 
restricted to the bureaucracy, stabilised its systems of justice and 
communications and so provided infra-structural support to a state 
despotism". " So, for Mann, the economic development which 
compulsory co-operation facilitated "did not depend on the direct 
interdependence or exchanges of the mass of the producers or of the 
middlemen, but on the provision of certain uniform and repressive 
services by a military state". " It also led to greater social stratification 
as the relatively small (Mann estimates that, with direct beneficiaries, 
they may have amounted to no more than 5-10 per cent of the 
population) elite increased their standard of living. Economically, 
however, they were not independent of the state's centralising 
`repression as benevolence'. "In other words, " Mann writes, "the 
ruling elite, created by military organisation, but whose political 
tendency was to fragment into decentralised landowners, depended 
on a central state through the economy" 
Ideologically too, the state increased its power by bringing 
Mesopotamian religion closer to its centralised control. Mann points 
to evidence which suggests that there was a decline in the Sumerian 
emphases on transcendentalism in favour of a new pragmatism. As 
such, "it was immanent, grappling intellectually, morally, and 
aesthetically with given power relations, and in its success 
strengthening them" 47 This state-determined religion aimed to 
persuade the aristocracy and military elite that they were participants 
in a common culture governed by universally normative regulations. 
In Mesopotamian imperial history, the alliance between state and 
religion culminated in the dominance of the Assyrians around 1200- 
1000 BC where, despite occasional eruptions of unofficial 
44 Mann, M. (1984) p. 193. 
45 Mann, M. (1986) p. 153 
46 Ibid. p. 154. 
47 Ibid. p. 157. 
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transcendentalist organisation, it was instrumental in the creation and 
sustainability of a "common ruling class culture", the fourth of 
Mann's strategies of imperial domination. It was, however, in Rome's 
700 year administration of much of Europe that the promotion of 
this perceived commonality reached authoritative levels leading to the 
empire of domination becoming what Mann describes as "a true 
territorial empire". " Ideological integration was facilitated by infra- 
structural improvements in communication leading to the prevalence 
of Latin literacy throughout the upper echelons of society. Although 
it was taught to other classes as well, it did not enter common verbal 
usage and thus remained a lingua franca restricted to the generals, 
judges, landed nobles, priests and senators. As it prevailed over all the 
western provinces and, mixed with some Greek, over much of the 
east, this cultural cohesion allowed the process of imperial accession 
to include provincial governors from all parts of the empire. "Thus 
there emerged a universal ruling class - extensive, monopolising land 
and the labour of others, politically organised and culturally conscious 
of itself'. 49 
From Feudal-State to Nation-State 
Perhaps already weakened by internal degeneration and population 
decline, the Roman empire was severely shaken by barbarian 
encroachment across its frontiers in the late second century AD. 
Emperor Diocletian's reforms (AD 284-305) doubled the size of the 
army and greatly increased the burden of taxation which the ruling 
classes attempted to pass onto the peasantry. Under such pressure, in 
an already near-subsistence economy, land went out of cultivation and 
previously free families placed themselves under the protection of 
local land-owners in order to avoid the imperial tax-collector. Thus 
"the emergence of the `semi-free' feudal serf (the colonus) holding his 
48 Ibid. p. 250, his italics. 
49 Ibid. p. 270, his italics. Mann continues by commenting that "a century after 
conquest, local ruling elites were almost indistinguishable from each other in their 
languages, beliefs and customs" (ibid. p. 311). 
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land as a favour from his lord began to create a `universal class' within 
the territories of the western empire even before its collapse" so 
Moreover, as insurgent incursions made trade routes more insecure 
inter-provincial trade declined and the landed classes began to 
increase their independence by improving their self-sufficiency. This 
led to what Mann identifies as a "three-way power stand-off" between 
the state, the ruling classes and the people at a time when only a 
closing of this social gap could have protected the empire against the 
invaders. " 
So, as the influence of Rome declined, particularly from the late 
fourth century onwards, its ability to maintain ideological links with 
this ruling class lessened. As a result, the elites, particularly on the 
imperial periphery, further decentralised relying on separate 
agreements with the barbarian invaders rather than the no-longer 
unquestionable power of Rome and what Mann calls its "legionary 
economy' ). 52 Thus in many regions political structures took on the 
character of the small, loosely federated kingdoms and warrior 
aristocracies typical of the invaders, while retaining adapted forms of 
Roman ideological and economic networks - "spheres of continuity" 
as Mann puts it. " These revolved around Christianity which had 
spread rapidly through the empire's strongly developed literacy links 
as a means of further securing institutionalised elite loyalty providing, 
in Mann's terms, an ecumene or a universal fellowship. In other words, 
"giving morale to the ruling classes of the empire, giving them 
common access to the stock of cultural knowledge and reinforcing 
their cultural solidarity". 54 Once Roman military and economic 
hegemony had weakened, however, proselytising Christianity, often as 
a means of maintaining social statuses in the new European order, 
became, like other functions of the ruling classes, increasingly 
so Mann, M. (1977) p. 282, his parenthesis. 
51 Mann, M. (1986) p. 295 
52 Ibid. Ch. 9. 
53 Ibid. p. 336. 
54 Ibid. p. 314. His italics. 
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decentralised. The long-established monastic schools were invigorated 
by the provincial senator turned bishop, important leaders such as 
Charlemagne and Alfred allied their causes with the Church's mission 
and Christendom became, in Mann's view, "the leading agent of 
translocal extensive social organisation". 55 For the empire's new 
barbarian settlers, mainly confined within intensive local relationships, 
the Church offered an extensive literacy network beyond their oral 
traditions, a system of morality that could regulate trade and a 
"monastic-episcopal economy" of feudal manors modelled on the late 
Roman villa. 56 In this way, an embryonic perception of group identity 
emerged - or, what Mann calls, the beginnings of `religious proto- 
nationalism'. 
Like the Roman state, however, the papal infra-structure was 
extremely extensive, covering over a million square kilometres by the 
year 1000, and thus limited in its intensity. The bishop was one of a 
number of ruling titles tied to vassals and subordinates through 
military contract. The political unit remained comparatively small as 
any larger consolidated groups tended to fragment once a territorial 
objective had been secured by the knight and fortress combination. 
This form of political organisation, structured by what Mann 
describes as "an agglomeration of largely autonomous households", 
offered the ruler only indirect access, apart from those labourers 
directly tied to his land, to his citizens. 7 The state's infra-structural 
powers were particularly limited in systems in which vassals owed 
allegiance to a number of competing superiors such as neighbouring 
princes, parishes or landed families. In many cases political function 
was, according to Mann, so decentralised and short on territoriality 
that it was only during times of war that any influence could be 
ss Ibid. p. 337. 
56 Ibid. He continues "in its retreat from the Roman world, it [the church] had 
created a monastic microcosm of Roman extensivity -a network of monasteries, 
each with its own economy, but not self-sufficient, trading with other monasteries, 
with the estates of bishops, and with secular estates and manors" (ibid. ). My 
parenthesis. 
57 Ibid. p. 391. 
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exerted over the populace by the ruler and a 'state' be said to exist. 
Even then, though, this did not extend across authoritative scopes 
such as the divide between Church and manorial court processes. 
For Mann, the need for organised defence and the superiority of the 
fortress cavalryman over peasant infantry, even during peace time, led 
to a more pronounced level of social stratification. In addition, 
economic stimulation resulted from an increased demand for status- 
related goods, to denote the position of the owner, and a large-scale 
castle building programme. Consequent population rises during the 
thirteenth century increased agricultural production which, in turn, led 
to greater pressures on arable land bettering the lords' managerial 
position. This allowed them to bring the peasantry closer to the 
power of the manor and become, in Marx's words "the master of the 
process of production and of the entire process of social life"; in 
effect, striving towards an exclusivity of land possession and the 
beginnings of a capitalist economy. 58 Famines and plagues during the 
fourteenth century, however, which made labour scarce and land 
more plentiful brought possibilities of capital accumulation for the 
peasantry as they began to acquire surpluses and use them as payment 
in place of further service. Some were able to hire the labour of 
others as commodities to work their land leading, Mann argues, to a 
parallel route to exclusive private property and capitalism. 
As what Mann calls these `circuits of praxis' developed, they tended 
to generate "technical problems involving more complex economic 
relations between strangers to which the church was more 
marginal". 59 No longer could Christendom's normative and pacifying 
effects be relied upon to regulate trade with north Africa and beyond. 
Instead innovations such as contractual regulations, insurance loans, 
58 Cited in ibid. p. 410. Mann continues, "For example, the water mill... tended to 
be exploited as a feudal monopoly. Peasants were forced to take their grain to the 
lord's mill, as they were to use his ovens, draw his water, bum his wood, and use his 
winepress" (ibid. ). 
59 Ibid. p. 437. 
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exchange bills and maritime law emerged through a rediscovery of 
Roman legislation and served to further reduce transaction costs and 
increase the efficiency of production. This, Mann suggests, was 
matched by a rise in the state's use of literacy, evident in Henry II's 
use of writs to his provincial agents and written guidance on estate 
management. Developments in communication became 
institutionalised in the early universities in Oxford, Paris and Bologna 
and increasingly diffused by technical innovations such as the use of 
paper, which was cheaper and lighter than parchment, in the early 
fourteenth century. Thus, originally confined within the state as a 
means of solidifying imperial despotism, literacy had now spread and 
was largely being used collectively by groups in civil society as a basis 
for, what Mann terms, `commercial-statist proto-nationalism'. 
Infra-structurally, too, the state was, for Mann, also able to benefit 
from these developments. Although feudal states lacked the formal 
despotic powers of the Roman rulers, few monarchs claimed divinity 
or legislated by entirely independent decree, their infra-structural 
challenges were less daunting. The English Exchequer, for instance, 
regulating an area less than a twentieth that of Rome's, was able to 
insist on county sheriffs delivering their accounts for scrutiny twice a 
year and even had the administrative control and communications 
infra-structure to move from Westminster to York in 1322. As 
collective power was vested in a monarch and council, later a 
monarch in parliament, government was enacted "by the consent and, 
through the co-ordination of the involved power groupings; ... it 
also] presupposed a settled, `universal', territorial state more than it 
did the particularistic feudal relations of vassals to their lords". 60 Since 
within this political structure local notables had limited powers of 
interpretation and little contact with each other, state agents could, by 
holding regular policy meetings at a local level, territorially co-ordinate 
these provincial power holders and solidify their loyalty to the crown 
with dynastic ties. Mann does not claim, however, that tensions did 
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not remain between monarch and eminent locals, but rather that the 
system "was strong in historical terms in co-ordinating its territories 
and subjects and in concentrating the resources of its core `home 
counties', even if it was weak in powers over them". " Thus the 
monarchic state, having formed a co-ordinated and extensive alliance 
with the capitalist magnate, remained on two levels of territory or, in 
other words, territorially federal. 
According to Mann, a number of factors brought this "segmentation" 
of state function to an end and led to what he calls the "co-ordinating 
state" being replaced by the "organic state". " Foremost, as part of the 
state's geopolitical function, was the increase in the cost of warfare. 
Garrison and equipment expenditure, particularly keeping up with 
fire-arm technology, had been rising throughout the medieval period, 
occasionally exacerbated by labour shortages. From around 1540 
onwards, however, it was the development of new defensive 
formations, such as the reintroduction of infantry lines now armed 
with muskets and protected by land-workings, which prolonged 
campaigns and necessitated greater investment. Furthermore, these 
methods required more training than mobile battalions and more men 
to dig defences further increasing the expense. Naval costs also rose 
exponentially as developments in cannonry obliged monarchs to refit 
and retrain their fleets. Mann estimates that English state revenue, for 
instance, was increased from L126,500 per annum in 1505 to £2,066 
900 in 1688, much of which was due to the costs of warfare 63 "All 
these changes", he concludes, "led to a greater role for capital- 
intensive supplies and, therefore, for centralised, orderly 
administration and capital accounting which could concentrate the 
resources of a territory. The changes enhanced territorially centralised 
power (the state) but also enhanced the diffusion of commodity 
60 Mann, M. (1986) p. 445. My parenthesis. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. Ch. 12 & 13. 
63 Ibid. p 451. Before this, from 1166 to 1452, revenue had only increased from 
£12,200 to £54,400 (ibid. p. 425). 
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forms within that territory (i. e. capitalism). ... The link between 
capitalism and the state was growing". " 
Although these developments did not include any change to the 
limitations on mobility and supply logistics of army movement 
(ground forces were still reliant on three days of plunder for every 
nine days of marching), they did mean, Mann argues, that smaller 
states, who could not finance large-scale siege warfare, would tend to 
give way to bigger, more centralised administrations. Now that 
monarchs could batter down the fortresses of their recalcitrant gentry, 
greater infra-structural reach into civil society was possible. States did, 
however, continue to require ever-increasing amounts of their 
nobility's wealth and this was reflected in the gradual shift towards 
broader representation of these peripheral interests as the conciliar 
system of governance slowly gave way to constitutional 
parliamentarianism. So that their still considerable ability to resist state 
intrusion, particularly tax-collection, could be better managed, these 
burghers and nobles were drawn closer into both military and civil 
state offices. The `court' thus became a mechanism for distributing 
state duties and royal favours through a system of client-patron 
relationships. "As a collectivity, a class, extensive and political, not 
any longer a set of family lineages", the bishops, lords, merchants, 
county gentleman and others now began, in Mann's view, to "control 
the nation's administration, army, polity, judiciary, and church. 
... The[ir] ideology was universal and organic. 
The interdependence of 
crown and propertied classes was now so close that ideology could 
soon also be reality" . 
's 
The hitherto extensive and unifying Christian ecumene was, according 
to Mann, also undergoing change. The church's emphasis on 
doctrinal cosmology, far removed from Christ's original message had, 
by the fifteenth century, become an essential part of its authority. 
64 Ibid. p. 454. His parentheses. 
65 Ibid. 463. My parenthesis. 
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Having been unintentionally challenged by Galileo and others, this 
was broken down in favour of a revived interest in humanist learning 
and individual rationality which, Mann asserts, was too diffused for 
Rome to influence. Similarly, the new market systems of commercial 
statism further conflicted with, and exerted a decentralising influence 
over, the extensiveness and authority of papal power by legitimising 
status according to the value of labour and property and highlighting 
the tension between Christian duty and the capitalist imperative of re- 
investment. Thus neither the transcendental sense of meaning nor the 
use of Latin was of much help to the entrepreneurial and artisan 
classes, making them, in Mann's view, likely to "seek a new modus 
vivendi within the church or break out in the direction of a more 
individual form of salvation". " The rise in power of the more 
economically developed European north-west also threatened the 
ecumene stretching Rome's geopolitical links as its military capacity 
developed. In all, Mann concludes, it was no surprise that Luther's 
1517 petition was immediately taken up by the Saxon rulers, 
important opponents of the Austrian court, making Protestantism a 
political as well as a theological dispute from the outset. 
As a result, in several of the Protestant countries and, to a lesser 
extent, in some Catholic ones, religion became absorbed into "the 
organic unity of the national state". 7 The state used previously 
ecumenical networks to spread their vernacular horizontally through 
the gentry and vertically as far as the artisan classes. In contrast to 
Chaucer and his contemporaries, Shakespeare, for example, only 
needed to write in one language leaving others (Gaelic for instance) to 
the periphery. Once divided and polarised by the bloodshed of the 
Wars of Religion the extensiveness of the Church's ecumene, although 
still essentially trans-national, became demarcated by geopolitical 
diplomacy based on shared capitalist goals normatively regulated by 
states. Christianity, remaining strongly influential in individual, family 
66 Ibid. pp 465-466. 
67 Ibid. p. 468. 
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and neighbourly relations, thus became, by the end of the seventeenth 
century, primarily a decentralising force of the periphery, as 
"commercial capitalism and military states displaced churches as the 
principal communicator of messages between the intensive and the 
most extensive levels of power". " 
For Mann an example of the rise in the extensiveness of this capitalist 
and national state is the increase in value of foreign trade during the 
eighteenth century. He estimates that, in Britain for instance, this 
grew from 12 million pounds out of an overall national income of 50 
million pounds in 1700 (England and Wales) to 70 million pounds out 
of national income of 232 million in 1801 (Great Britain). 69 Initially 
wool and cloth made up a significant proportion of this, but, by the 
end of the century, this was giving way to re-exports of colonial 
products such as sugar and tobacco. Although the trading patterns of 
different states varied greatly, "the general trend was that most of the 
growth of foreign trade was confined within its own sphere of 
influence, albeit now crossing the globe". 70 Within these national 
economies few restrictions impeded trade, coins identifying the 
sphere of influence's monarch were exchanged without significant 
class or status barriers and became the method of `commoditising' 
property as technical innovations and the `invisible hand' of 
entrepreneurial investment gained force. 
In most states these forces did not combine to empower one single 
capitalist class, instead Mann uses the term nation ("meaning those 
who had a stake (i. e., property) in the emerging national state") to 
denote three "broadly capitalist class actors" as ideal types. " Firstly, 
the `old regime', consisting of the monarch, court, state-recognised 
church and various aristocratic and merchant oligarchies, possessed 
substantial amounts of property, acted `capitalistically' and, although 
68 Ibid. p. 228. 
69 Mann, M. (1986) p. 492. 
70 Ibid. p. 493. 
7 Mann, M. (1993) p. 96. His parenthesis. 
71 
Chapter Two: Mann's Brief History of Time 
as a group they were by no means homogenous, exerted extensive 
influence over functionaries and broader civil groups alike. Secondly, 
the rising `petite bourgeoisie' of urban capitalists including artisans, 
teachers and journalists who, mostly non-enfranchised, were largely 
excluded from the state and often opposed to its illiberal tendencies. 
Thirdly, `peasant farmers' who owned, or possessed a secure tenancy 
over, their farms and used predominantly family labour. By around 
1830, however, Mann claims that a `capitalist class' had begun to 
emerge from the amalgamation of the old regime and the upper petite 
bourgeoisie and by 1870 "the powers of the `invisible hand', court, 
church, landed aristocracy, financial institutions, industrial 
corporations, and the national state were", he submits, "largely 
centred in its hands". '' The remaining petite bourgeoisie, along with 
the professional classes and careerists, formed what he terms a 
`middle class' while the artisans became proletarianised and the 
peasant farmers retained their class identity and their social 
immobility. 
A part of the differentiation of these ideal types, for Mann, lay in the 
spread of literacy and its associated ideological power. The sale of 
newspapers and periodicals had grown tenfold during the eighteenth 
century with virtually all social gathering points, from wig-makers to 
waiting-rooms, stocking a selection. Indeed, these networks became 
centres of bourgeois resistance to the growth in state militarism. The 
increasing levels of state extraction which early nineteenth century 
geopolitical competition brought reinforced civil identities in, what 
Mann terms, the beginnings of the "militarist phase of modem 
nationalism'. Nevertheless, the greater `national' identity of most 
nineteenth century states tended to feature alongside a range of class- 
orientated, or religious, dissent in the majority of publications. While 
commonly promoting alternative, `transcendental' images of social 
organisation, few, in Britain for instance, challenged what Mann calls 
72 Ibid. p. 97. 
72 
Chapter Two: Mann's Brief History of Time 
the "Protestant constitution" of the old regime. 73 The petite 
bourgeoisie, he argues, generally demanded change (an expansion of 
suffrage, a reduction in political patronage, etc. ) from within the 
confines of state institutions, such as parliament and the courts, and 
in a proliferation of critical, but essentially statist, publications. So, in 
essence, Mann concludes, the national state continued to be 
"simultaneously centralised actors and places where civil society 
relations are co-ordinated". 74 
Military power during the nineteenth century was, Mann asserts, 
similarly dual in nature. Relations between officers and men were 
increasingly a reflection of the narrowing social stratification of 
society generally. By 1804, Mann notes, only three of Napoleon's 
eighteen marshals were from the nobility and over half the officers 
recruited from the ranks; a situation the restored Bourbon monarchy 
later found impossible to fully reverse. 75 The bourgeois nature of 
European armies, supported by campaigns which had demonstrated 
the improved morale of men and officers who share the same 
privations, rationalised coercive discipline into an even-handed book 
of regulation making it more humanitarian and less based on corporal 
punishment. The enlisting of mercenaries declined as the armed 
forces were imbued with the concept of national statehood. As such, 
welfare provisions for soldiers (both officers and men), intended to 
buy their loyalty, were introduced, wages (now paid on time) were 
kept abreast of civilian occupations and long-service military 
professionals at all levels were used to train the expanding ranks of 
short-term conscript reservists. 
Nevertheless, in keeping with his dialectical characterisation of social 
power, Mann argues that improvements in the upper echelon's infra- 
structural capacity were simultaneously "tightening military 
7; Ibid. p. 106. 
74 Ibid. p. 109, his italics. 
75 Ibid. p. 426. 
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organisation over their soldiers, reducing their ability to identify 
themselves as citizens or as members of classes". 76 Administrative 
innovations in the handling of maps, communications and timetables, 
particularly by the Germans, enabled commanders to co-ordinate 
soldiers' lives much more thoroughly and to nurture great 
camaraderie in their units. " This was further supported by ensuring 
that recruitment was predominantly centred around the least 
developed and most conservative agrarian regions of the state. 
Territorially organised, already accustomed to authoritative power and 
motivated by agricultural labour surpluses, these units were, in Mann's 
view, `segmentally' organised into the military hierarchy in a way that 
restricted their contact with other units and denied both men and 
their officers access to command strategy. Thus, despite high levels of 
hardship, as evidenced by the First World War, any organised 
alternatives to compliance were made extremely problematic. 
More broadly, states, requiring greater social discipline to improve 
industrial efficiency and output, were able to use short-term 
conscription to enshrine in the minds of their people, what William 
McNeill describes as, the "primacy of the command principle". 78 This 
collaboration between old regime, capital and state did not, however, 
alter what Mann considers to be the military's proclivity for 
conservative self-absorption. He suggests that its focus on 
technocratic outcomes, fuelled by the innovations of the industrial 
revolution, ensured that, despite being recruited from the same social 
backgrounds as the diplomatic corps, the military high command 
remained resistant to alliance building and non-combatant solutions 
generally. Industrial output and infra-structure, in facilitating the rapid 
deployment of very large quantities of resources at the battlefield, also 
necessitated greater logistical secrecy and blurred the distinction 
76 Ibid. p. 428. 
77 Mann points to declining desertion rates, exemplified by the Confederate Army in 
the American Civil War (ibid. p. 429). 
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between aggression and preparedness, further enhancing military 
insularity and autonomy. 
The increasing reliance on reservist conscripts during the nineteenth 
century saw a decline in the proportion of professional soldiers 
employed by the state. In Austria-Hungary, for instance, the figure, 
cited by Mann, dropped from 2.38 per cent of the population as a 
whole in 1810 to 0.86 per cent in 1910 with comparable figures 
recorded in Prussia-Germany, Great Britain and France. 79 It was, 
however, quite the opposite in the case of civilian employees. Again in 
Austria-Hungary, Mann finds that the proportion of the population 
employed at all state levels rose from 0.12 to 3.15 over the same 
period. SO Much of this expansion included the petite bourgeoisie and, 
as the state institutionalised citizenship, was accompanied by national 
bureaucratisation. Industrialisation, Mann argues, enhanced nations' 
economic integration and developed corporate models of meritocracy 
leading to a coalition of the professional classes and liberal capitalists 
aimed at promoting notions of `national efficiency'. Embracing the 
new administrative and organisational sciences the state increased its 
infra-structure and extensiveness and provided some degree of 
internal cohesion to its managerial hierarchy. Following Weber, Mann 
defines this new bureaucracy as a system, involving "insulation from 
the wider society's struggles over values", in which officials are 
"separated from ownership of office by an 
employed, salaried status, ... appointed, promoted 
and dismissed according to impersonal criteria of 
competence, [and]... organised within departments, 
each of which is centralised and embodies a 
functional division of labour... [and] integrated into 
a single overall administration". " 
78 Cited in Ibid. pp 429-430. Mann estimates that, "by 1910 perhaps 20 per cent of 
adult males in most countries had been so disciplined", a figure that was surely to 
rise much higher as a result of the World Wars (ibid). 
79 Ibid. p. 393. 
80 Ibid. Mann notes that these must be taken with a considerable conservative bias 
as the numbers of casual workers, particularly women, are very difficult to quantify 
accurately and have therefore either been excluded from the data or likely to be 
severely under-counted (p. 391). 
81 Ibid. p. 444. My parentheses. 
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Supported by the ideologues of middle-class liberalism, civil 
administration was thoroughly institutionalised by 1914 and providing 
"the most important way state elites penetrated civil society". ' So, 
although patronage remained, ensuring that the top posts went to 
class and party loyalists, the state, for Mann, "was no longer an 
instrument of patriarchal household authority... Its `civil servants' 
were avowedly neutral, entrusted with the best interests of national 
civil society". " 
Thus the state was rationalised and, under pressure from 
decentralised networks of industrial-capitalist nationalism (the fourth 
of Mann's phase of nationalist development), forced into adopting a 
greater civilian function. Legislation became more systematic and, 
from the 1860s, was presented to parliament by ministers not private 
members, commissions of enquiry were championed to investigate 
the conditions of civil society and government took a more direct 
interest in issues of public morality. The state's infra-structural powers 
grew enormously as financial concerns regarding a wider state role 
diminished in the face of even greater economic growth. For the 
rapidly expanding middle classes a more technocratic and 
interventionist state, necessitating greater centralisation, was, Mann 
contends, a means of dividing and reducing the influence of the 
provincially-based old regime. It was also in keeping with the concept 
of national efficiency determined by a healthy family, a basic level of 
education for all and an economy unburdened by class conflict. When 
reforms initiated by the philanthropic bourgeoisie successfully entered 
the statute book, they simultaneously tended to extend the state's 
capacity to distribute power and, through its collective organisation, 
such as Edwin Chadwick's sanitation schemes, enhance the power of 
civil society at all levels. 
82 Ibid. p. 473. 
83 Ibid. p. 470. 
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As the `freedom' from state intervention versus the `modernity' of a 
bureaucratised nation-state dichotomy condensed into party politics, 
enfranchisement was extended and elites were institutionalised, 
paradoxically in the case of federalists, into centralised political 
organisations away from the locally-rooted issues of the provinces. By 
1900 Mann writes that these "were appealing to a mass electorate 
sometimes over the heads of local notables, reducing their autonomy 
and moderating their preference for federalism". " The decline of 
provincialism was also carried through a great increase in letter- 
writing and easier mobility through more extensive transportation 
infra-structure, both of which tended to diffuse the fashions and 
lifestyles of the centre. Wage levels began to even out across the 
different regions, as did property prices and demographic indices, 
leading to much greater national integration, symbolised by the 
monarch's photograph on the wall or the local newspaper's interest in 
the processes of state. So, Mann concludes, as "the national 
organisation of civil society, and of capitalism and its classes 
increased", the international discourse of labour and religious 
ideologies was organisationally outflanked as "the infra-structural 
state nourished the nation-state". " 
Regional differences diminished further as state-financed education 
developed and spread the linguistic style of the centre intensifying and 
reinforcing what Mann calls "the state's national crystallisation" 86 As 
school enrolment increased dramatically, ranging from 74 per cent in 
Austria to 88 per cent in France in the industrial nations by the turn 
of the century, the secular, centralising state developed its educational 
infra-structure by assuming control of the majority of private sector 
schools and enlarging their own institutions bringing local, regional or 
central governmental bodies into conflict with regional and minority 
religious interests. " While partly a function of industrial-capitalist 
84 Ibid. p. 484. 
85 Ibid. p. 489, his italics. 
86 Ibid. p. 575. 
87 Ibid. p. 488. 
77 
Chapter Two: Mann's Brief History of Time 
requirements, this exponential expansion of educational provision 
"also reflected dominant class desires for social control and 
subordinate class desires for `ideological citizenship"'. " Indeed, Mann 
claims that "the `credentialism' often identified as central to middle- 
class life was itself shaped by these". " Elementary schools, the 
maximum most could afford, provided the student with just enough 
to gain employment as a clerk and emphasised the qualities of 
reliability and discipline as much as academic achievement. For those 
with means there was the option of the `modern', which filled the 
ranks of lower white-collar posts, or the `classical' secondary school 
which controlled university admissions. Although in the northern 
United States such segregation was not so apparent (in southern 
states it was determined by race), in Europe the expansion of 
education along what Mann describes as segmented lines enabled 
"middle-class families to share in the cultural life of the nation and to 
distinguish themselves from workers and peasants below" 90 
"State education was officially nationalistic. Schools were supposed to 
encourage a rather military sense of nationhood". 91 This conceived 
sense of national belonging, Mann argues, became, amongst certain 
social groups, equated with what he terms `aggressive modernist 
nationalism . 92 While perceptions of national identity had long since 
been accompanied by racism and intolerance, it had generally been 
institutionalised to legitimise European violence against the non- 
whites of the colonies, or potential colonies. With the expansion of 
state infra-structure, nationalism became more territorially defined 
amongst social groups closely associated with the state, but not at its 
core. State-employed careerists, university graduates and military 
reservists, rather than the petite bourgeoisie, were thus inclined to 
became "super-loyalists or nation-statists with an exaggerated loyalty 
88 Ibid. p. 572. 
89 Ibid. 
9° Ibid. p. 573. 
91 Ibid. p. 586. 
92 Mann, M. (1995) p. 55. 
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to what they conceived to be the ideals of their nation-state". " This 
tendency, which Mann characterises as `state-reinforcing', was a 
feature of industrialised countries where the nation and state were 
increasingly perceived as coterminous. Similarly the initially 'state- 
creating' pan-nationalism of Prussia and Piedmont became `state- 
reinforcing' as state and nation coalesced. In Austria, however, 
nationalism was eventually to take a different route as the nation, 
supported by the diplomats of Paris in 1919, was conceived as smaller 
than the overall state and was therefore, in Mann's terms, `state- 
subsuming'. While popularity and rhetoric varied greatly from country 
to country, `super-loyalism's' exponents did not generally represent 
the bulk of early-nineteenth century society and the First World War 
(a conflict not remembered for its toll of ideologically-driven 
atrocities) quickly accounted for the early volunteers of which they 
were a part. 
Critical Appraisal 
Mann's work has certainly not passed without considerable critical 
debate. As Gary Runciman has noted, in placing his work in the mid- 
ground between narratives based on preconceived notions of 
historical significance on the one hand and studies seeking to apply 
general theories to the overall human condition on the other "he risks 
being simultaneously attacked by one set of readers for writing potted 
history at a safe distance from the sources, and by another for 
theorising at an insufficiently high and abstract level". " This has 
indeed proved to be the case as both historians and empiricists have 
criticised Mann's approach to the material set out above and 
questioned the overall methodological foundation of his investigation. 
Furthermore, damaging criticisms have been raised from within the 
discipline of macro-sociology over a number of issues relating to 
Mann's historical discourse as well as his theoretical basis. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Runciman, W. (1987) p. 7. 
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Prominent amongst these, has been Mann's lack of comparative 
breadth. However, this is not, as some have argued, an oversight on 
the author's part. In following Talcott Parsons' definition of society as 
possessing only a limited degree of interactive patterning to 
differentiate it from broader social totalities95 and concluding that 
they are therefore "not self-contained units to be compared across 
time and space", Mann consciously rejects the use of the comparative 
method as his primary analytical tool96 He states that, having been 
"confronted by the empirical reality" of finding an inadequate supply 
of autonomous, analogical cases upon which to base a comparative 
enquiry, he turned "pragmatically to the second method, of careful 
historical narrative... to see if it has the feel of a pattern, a process or 
a series of accidents and contingencies' 97 Such an approach, Mann 
suggests, not only has the benefit of alleviating the problem of the 
small N, or too few cases with which to compare an often great 
number of variables, " but also allows him to pursue contextualised 
lines of inquiry determined by the socio-historical uniqueness of the 
subject matter. His narrative is thus quite different from those 
grounded on the kind of inductive ystem of logic devised by John Stuart 
Mill and espoused by writers such as Theda Skocpo199 He does not, 
then, attempt the large-scale synchronic comparisons which 
characterise the work of Weber, preferring instead to focus his study 
on European power development stating that "the most appropriate 
history" with which to analyse power "is that of the most powerful 
human society, modern Western civilisation". 10° 
Nevertheless, in order to establish that the course of history in one 
95 Parons, T. (1960) p. 9. 
96 Mann, M. (1986) p. 30. 
97 Ibid. p. 503. 
98 Indeed, Mill considered the problem of finding sufficient comparable cases within 
the social sciences so severe that he described any attempt to do so as a "gross 
misconception of the mode of investigation proper" (Mill, J. S., 1843, Book VI, Ch. 
7). 
99 See her study of France, China and Russia (1979) p. 36. 
100 Mann, M. (1986) p. 31. 
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society is different from that of another, some comparison is 
unavoidable, particularly if the nature of social power and the sources 
of social change are, as Mann suggests, to be regarded as inherently 
`interstitial' and territorially unbounded. This is not only essential to 
demonstrate Western specificity, but also inevitably exists as an 
intrinsic relational element between one narrative sequence and 
another. For instance, Mann's identification of the ecological 
peculiarities fundamental to the origins of political administration in 
Mesopotamia cannot be established without excursions into other 
regional landscapes and processes. His methodological emphasis on 
historicity, however, means that his narrative has difficulty absorbing 
the more deviant variables of the topologically dissimilar Nile system, 
for instance, or, for that matter, the utterly different geography of 
Mayan development. The implications of these contradictions are 
hurriedly passed by for, as Perry Anderson notes, "only a comparative 
analysis - more firmly inductive in spirit - could offer a hope of 
coherent explanation". 101 
This problem becomes compounded as Mann approaches what 
Weber described as the `old question' - that of why such exponential 
development occurred only in the European north-west. Here, he is 
forced into a brief perusal of other world religions in order to support 
his characterisation of Christianity as uniquely influential. After a 
superficial theological survey he concludes that Confucianism was too 
ethnically-orientated, Hinduism too hierarchical and Islam overly 
tribally determined. In contrast, Mann argues, Christianity's greater 
spiritual sophistication and social inclusiveness proved, once it had 
spread through the Roman world, "so far superior to the others that 
all had to adapt to its encroachments" becoming the `track-layer' for 
the European 'miracle'. "' So rather than the logistical difficulties of a 
101 Anderson, P. (1986) p. 1405. In Volume Two of the Sources of Social Power, Mann 
does, in fact, pursue a more comparative line. While he does not revise his earlier 
assertions regarding the methodological difficulties of such an approach, Mann 
explicitly seeks to compare different Western regime strategies. 
102 Mann, M. (1986) p. 341. 
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battleground so far from home, the Muslim armies, for instance, were 
defeated at Tours and Poitiers in 732 because of the superior ideology 
underpinning Christian military morale. 103 Here, Mann's comparative 
discourse is particularly thin demonstrating, in my view, his reluctance 
to digress from his central thesis of north-western European 
progression and severely weakening his empirical control over many 
of his hypotheses. 
To take Mann's treatment of Islam as an example, he fails to 
demonstrate its lack of sophistication and social inclusiveness in 
relation to Christianity. Mann argues, in contradiction to his earlier 
assertions regarding tribalism, that loyalty to the ummab superseded 
local and intensive networks and embedded the adherent into a quasi- 
egalitarian federation similar to that of the Christian ecumene. This may 
well be so, but the economic differences between the Muslims' 
theocractically governed, and often heavily circumscribed, trading 
system and an ecumene dominated by the merchant classes without 
such comprehensive ideological regulation go unexplored. "' Instead, 
shared rituals, the spread of Arabic as the language of education and 
administration and the comprehensiveness of Shariah jurisprudence 
are emphasised as providing, despite the lack of a hierarchical clergy, a 
social basis broadly akin to European Christendom. In common, he 
continues, was "a diffuse and extensive sense of cultural community, 
a precise infra-structure centred on a monopoly of literacy, a fairly 
high level of intensive penetration of everyday life, and a relatively 
weak social cosmology". 'os These comparisons are too broad to be 
very instructive and do not account for the way in which the Arab, 
and then the Ottoman, imperial state organised ideological power and 
maintained their economic position. The failure to discuss the social 
position of non-Muslim dhimmis/millets or contrast their mercantile 
103 Ibid. p. 346. 
104 As Perry Anderson comments, "there was a good deal more enforcement of it 
[normative pacification] in Abbasid or Tang lands than in the world of Charles the 
Bald" (1986, p. 1406). My parenthesis. 
105 Mann, M. (1986) pp 347-348. 
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and jurisprudential role with that of the Muslim majority is, for 
example, a notable omission. 106 
This is also true of his continual reference to Christendom to mean 
only its Roman, as opposed to Orthodox form. Aside from providing 
a useful basis for analysing interaction with its Muslim neighbours to 
the south and east, Mann's reluctance to discuss the peculiarities of 
the Eastern Church, which certainly did not lack a social role in 
Byzantium, leaves the question of why no similar development 
occurred in Anatolia or Rumelia unanswered. As Perry Anderson 
comments, "by recasting a Weberian claim for the catalytic role of 
religion in generic Durkheimian form, Mann deprives himself of any 
reasonable basis for claiming special privileges for Christianity". 107 In 
other words, the specificity of the Protestant ethic's relationship with 
the spirit of capitalism as a causative element in north-western 
European development is replaced by the more general notion of 
religion as a broadly cohesive social force. Nevertheless, Mann has 
elsewhere argued that, rather than stemming from the existence of a 
value consensus, social compliance in modern liberal democracies 
might be more convincingly explained by the "pragmatic acceptance 
of specific roles than by any positive normative commitment to 
society". "' This is a surprising contradiction, particularly in the light 
of his introductory assertion that societies tend not to be bounded by 
any one (in this case ideological) power network. It may, perhaps, 
derive from the logical constraints imposed by his subsequent 
characterisation of social power as primarily concerned with exerting 
a controlling or co-operative influence over others rather than its 
capacity to resolve human tensions with the natural world. As 
Anderson puts it, "theology is, so to speak, over-socialised". 109 
106 See Karpat, K (1973) for a fuller discussion of the position of non-Muslims 
under the Ottomans. 
107 Anderson, P. (1986) p. 1406. 
108 Mann, M. (1970) p. 435. 
109 Anderson, P. (1990) p. 61. 
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Furthermore, Mann's characterisation of Christianity as the first 
ideological organisation to gain independence from the state and 
posses its own causal force has also attracted considerable critical 
attention. Chris Wickham, for example, argues that, rather than 
providing a new method of linkage between the state, ruling classes 
and the masses, Christianity "merely put a new veneer over several 
interlocking (and conflicting) sets of traditional classical values. ""o 
Methods of ruling class dominance, including restrictions on literacy 
and religious education, were not, he asserts, significantly affected by 
the victory of Christianity which simply served to legitimise existing 
economically-determined relations. While Mann acknowledges this, 
writing that "the church enhanced the class morale of lords, clothing 
their exploitation with sacred qualities", "' he continues to stress 
Christianity's role in normalising property rights and extending trade 
over greater areas than was possible under the disparate and predatory 
European court system that had replaced Roman extensiveness. 
Wickham disagrees, however, arguing that a more likely reason for the 
increase in long-distance trade during the twelfth century was that 
travelling merchants were protected by the pacifying influence of the 
Merovingian and Carolingian Franks' political and military network. It 
was, he continues, the material value of this ideological allegiance, in a 
cultural rather than religious sense, which supported and legitimised 
the nascent feudal economy and not the normative extensiveness of 
Christianity. Non-Christian traders within Europe, such as Vikings or 
Arab Spain, Wickham contends, were not significantly disadvantaged 
by their religious affiliation providing they did not question the 
supremacy of the Frankish courts. Thus, it may well be stretching the 
idea of social cohesion too far to claim, as Mann suggests, that it was 
the ideological power of Christianity's social networks which pre- 
structured the basis for capitalist exchange in early medieval Europe. 
110 Wickham, C. (1988) p. 70. His parenthesis. 
11I Mann, M. (1986) p. 384. 
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Undeterred, however, he concludes that, even by the mid-twelfth 
century, north-western Europe, "bound loosely together by the 
normative pacification of Christendom... was already the most 
agriculturally inventive civilisation since the Iron Age had begun". 12 
This is rather too broad. Chinese agriculture of the day was every bit 
as advanced producing generally higher yields, involving equally 
complex social organisation and supported by a sophisticated 
mercantile credit system. "' In defending his refusal to confront the 
question of why China did not emerge from the Sung dynasty in the 
way that north-western Europe did from early medieval feudalism, 
Mann points to four differences: "Europe's economy was not rice 
dominated, and it was extremely varied; its states were weak; it was a 
multi-state civilisation; and its religion and culture expressed the spirit 
of rational restlessness ". "a In the absence of concomitant variations, 
he continues, the comparative method cannot be applied. 
Such an uncritical justification of narrativism is, for many 
commentators, particularly unsatisfying. It is not, however, based 
upon epistemological concerns, for Mann's work, as discussed, is 
unavoidably comparative in other areas. Rather, Mann claims, it is 
simply grounded on the practical difficulties of drawing out such 
comparisons. It may be, though, that the Eurocentrism of Mann's 
pursuit of the `leading edge' of civilisation has its foundations on 
textual rather than theoretical concerns, or, as Perry Anderson puts it, 
"this restriction may have been less the intellectual impossibility of 
creating a wider framework than the compositional gain of a narrower 
one". 15 In this sense, Mann's aim in constructing `the rise of the 
West' is to set out a virtually unilinear `macropattern' of history 
linking Sumer with the First World War in a diachronic discourse 
deliberately simplified to provide maximum contextual depth and 
explanatory value. Such a voyage is bound to have a teleological feel 
112 Ibid. p. 500. 
113 Wickham, C. (1988) p. 74. 
114 Mann, M. (1986) p. 502. 
115 Anderson, P. (1986) p. 1406. 
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to it, particularly the condensed version set out in the earlier sections 
of this chapter, but Mann is consistent in stressing that "there has 
been nothing `necessary' about it - it just happened that way". 
16 
Having constructed the ideological impetus for Europe's `leading 
edge', Mann's abiding emphasis on power as an intra-social function 
rather than a method of interacting with nature leads him to focus on 
military and political processes in preference to more orthodox 
economic interpretations. "' As a result, his account of feudal relations 
of production, particularly the landlord-peasant connection and the 
extent of the state's economic expropriations are, as Wickham notes, 
insufficiently theorised leaving the actual forces of extraction and 
circulation unexplored. "' Moreover, in refusing to attribute ultimate 
causality to any of his four sources of power, John Haldon argues that 
Mann is guilty of specifying an `aprioristic' framework of analysis. "' 
While this, which may be taken to mean arbitrarily establishing the 
level of discourse, is no less true of Haldon's own historical 
materialist approach, it may well be the case that "if Mann had looked 
more at peasants, besides his well-described and well-documented 
interest in structures of domination over peasants, the material base of 
that domination would have become clearer". 120 Indeed, Mann frankly 
admits that his chapter titled International Capitalism and Organic Nation- 
States 1477-1760 "lacks what perhaps it should ideally possess, a 
sustained explanation of the various stages of economic growth 
toward the Industrial Revolution ". 12' He justifies his uneven treatment 
of history by arguing that power also develops unevenly in `jumps". 22 
In omitting to illustrate fully the culturally-specific trajectory of 
economic power distribution, however, not only does Mann miss the 
116 Mann, M. (1986) p. 31. 
117 For a discussion of the degree to which Mann succeeds in taking a middle line 
between characterisations of the state as the instrument of class relations on one 
hand and rational actors on the other, see Terry Mulhall's review of Volume II of 
The Sources of Social Power in the British Journal of Sociology. 
118 Wickham, C. (1988) p. 77. 
119 Haldon, J. (1991) p. 42. 
120 Wickham, C. (1988) p. 77. His emphases. 
121 Mann, M. (1986) p. 450. 
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opportunity to establish his model of change more firmly, he also 
leaves the controversy surrounding the universality of feudalism 
unobserved. Clearly not wishing to digress from the north-west 
European `leading edge', no mention is made, for example, of the 
concept of the tributary mode of production despite its obvious 
relevance to the state autonomy debate. 
Even within the parameters of his exposition, however, there exists a 
paradox in Mann's formulation of the state's position vis-a-vis civil 
society's pre-eminent economic class. As military power is often to be 
found in civil organisations, it is the state's political centrality rather 
than its monopoly of coercive force which underpins its autonomy. 
Yet since, as Anderson observes, "political regulation is scarcely 
conceivable without the resources of armed coercion, fiscal revenue 
and ideal legitimisation", this source of power "enjoys least autonomy 
of all". "' Furthermore, as the state's extensive and comprehensive 
infra-structural capacity to penetrate its territory develops, society as a 
`bounded totality', which Mann's theory initially denies, appears to 
emerge. As a result, critics have argued that "Mann's explanation of 
variations in state autonomy... is too incomplete and vague to yield 
precise empirical implications". 124 His treatment of war initiation, for 
example, is sometimes grounded on assumptions of material interests 
and at other times on normative constraints. In the view of Kiser and 
Hechter, this inconsistency prevents him from developing a general 
association between monarchic autonomy, the state's possession of 
independent resources and conflict instigation which other, more 
empirically rigorous studies, have uncovered. 125 
Indeed, this perceived lack of empirical potency has led some 
commentators, such as Gerhard Lenski, to dismiss the macro- 
122 Ibid. p. 31. 
123 Anderson, P. (1990) p. 61. 
124 Kiser, E. & Hechter, M. (1991) p. 19. 
125 Ibid. p. 22. 
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sociological approach altogether. 126 It lacks, he writes, "substantive 
conceptual links to established theories in other scientific disciplines" 
and is "not falsifiable in the same unambiguous manner as theories in 
the natural sciences". 127 Despite scientists from other fields having no 
immediately obvious qualifications to legislate in the social sciences, 
Lenski continues by asserting that these "critical flaws" have led to a 
plague of competing theories generally unconnected to empirically 
generated data the substantiation of which is "more an art form than 
a science". " Undeterred by several hundred years of unsuccessful 
endeavours in pursuit of general social laws as convincing as those in 
the natural sciences, Lenski and fellow `neopositivists', declaim, by 
way of a remedy, the value of adopting mathematical and probabilistic 
formulations of theories and hypotheses in order to minimise 
ambiguity and replace "vague and indefinite terms" with precise 
values. 129 Quite how simplified formalism more accurately represents 
the complexities of reality is unclear, as is the superior explanatory 
value of elaborate and convoluted causal matrices. 
For Wassily Leontief, it is deliberately obscurantist tending to 
"conceal the ephemeral substantive content of the argument behind 
the formidable front of algebraic signs". "' Moreover, as Bernd Baldus 
points out, this `dataphilia' is quite contrary to the predominantly 
theory-led neopositivism of Popper, Hempel and others. 131 Stemming 
from the failure of its core epistemological construction (that of linear 
determinism) and the professional value of working in a `hard' science 
freed from the constraints of theoretical evaluation, he argues that, 
126 Mann summarises macro-sociologists' approach in three ways. "An historical- 
causal analysis of origins considers the conditions which give rise to modem 
institutions relevant to understanding their present nature and likely persistence... 
A quest for variation seeks to understand modem institutions like capitalism or the 
nation-state or particularly by comparing them with social groups with other types 
of economic, political or gender institutions... A more abstract-comparative macro- 
sociology, less tied to understanding the present, analyses the past to test more 
general propositions about human communities" (1994, p 39). His emphases. 
127 Lenski, G. (1988) p. 163. 
128 Ibid. p. 166. 
129 Lenski, G. (1991) p. 188. 
130 Leontief, W. (1971) p. 2. 
131 Baldus, B. (1991) p. 196. 
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modern positivism has, in Abraham Kaplan's words, "contributed to 
a `myth of methodology: that it does not matter what we do if only 
we do it right". 132 Indeed, any resistance to this monist programme is, 
in Hubert Blalock's view, to be considered an `anti-science attack' 
orchestrated by "the poets and artists among us". 133 In this way `facts' 
are aggregated from the data-set of history, stripped of their 
determinant contexts and processed by a mechanistic statistical 
analysis regardless of their intrinsic aptitude to such reductionism and 
in ignorance of their diachronic variance and cultural specificity. "' 
If theory and data are to remain separate in order to demonstrate that 
the former has general applicability, as positivists demand, where 
then, if not from a blend of the culturally-determined imagination of 
the researcher and the data itself, is theoretical innovation to come 
from? Nicky Hart argues that empirical material's "very form is 
dictated by theoretical concepts operationalised as variables using 
linguistic categories which may themselves impose specific cultural 
understandings". "' Mann too, follows this Kantian formulation. Data, 
he argues, enmesh with theories, each exerting an evaluative influence 
over the other, and can only be significantly employed through 
internally generated meaning systems. 1' In the same way as other 
scientists, macro-sociologists formulate hypotheses on the bases of 
theoretical inklings which are then illuminated by the systematic 
pursuit of data. Mann, for instance, supports his account of large- 
scale European change with an extensive exploration of English state 
finances from the twelfth century onwards based on biannual 
132 Kaplan, A. (1968) p. 394. 
t33 Blalock, H. (1984) p. 25. As Joseph Bryant insightfully notes, though, "the 
expediency of such rhetoric is of course readily apparent, for by consigning all 
opposition to an `anti-science' fringe, the proponent evades confrontation with 
those serious intellectual arguments which might expose his own untenable 
extremism" (Bryant, J., 1992, p. 38). For a broader discussion see the essay by Fritz 
Machcup, `Are the social sciences really inferior? ' (1963). 
134 See, for instance, Guy Swanson's ludicrous treatment of Yahweh and the 
Lengua's beetle-god. Despite being utterly different in time, space and cultural 
significance, these are formulated as statistical equivalents in explaining the origins 
of monotheism (1960, Ch. III). 
135 Hart, N. (1994) p. 22. 
136 Mann, M. (1994) p. 42. 
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Exchequer Rolls. In doing so, however, he had to rely on the 
translations and tabulations of specialist historians. While 
"unconcerned with their interpretations of the politics of the day, 
[and] unconcerned with their theories of kingship, Church-State 
relations or the rise of Parliament", he was also obliged "to accept 
some combination of their various methods of data 
categorisations". "' 
This reliance on secondary sources has led some sociologists to 
accuse Mann and others of not basing their methods on prima-facie 
evidence. John Goldthorpe, for instance, argues that the connection 
between macro-sociologists' claims about the past and what he terms 
the `relics' (historical material such as artefacts, documents and so on) 
has become "impossibly loose". "' What happens, he asks, when 
secondary accounts disagree? Without knowledge of the primary 
source, the macro-sociologist, he suggests, is unable to choose the 
most convincing interpretation so merely opts for the one that best 
suits his overall thesis. 13' History thereby becomes, in Froude's words, 
"a child's box of letters with which we can spell any word we 
please". " Part of this problem, for Goldthorpe, is that the `relics' 
upon which historians rely are limited and incomplete so without 
engaging in primary research which might challenge their validity 
macro-sociologists base their assumptions on a positivist acceptance 
of the evidence. He concludes that, rather than making up an integral 
part of the investigator's methodology, historical inferences should 
instead be used to provide the setting for sociological fieldwork over 
which there exists far greater empirical controls. '41 
137 Ibid. p. 44. My parenthesis. 
131 Goldthorpe, J. (1991) p. 223. 
139 See Goldthorpe, J. (1994) p. 69. 
14° Froude, J. (1884) p. 21. 
141 Here Goldthorpe points to "the very real advantages that are gained where the 
nature and extent of available evidence is not restricted by the mere accidents of 
physical survival; where, moreover, the collection of evidence can be 'designed' so 
as to meet the specific requirements of the inquiry in hand; and where questions of 
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While it is undoubtedly true that investigating the present has great 
advantages in terms of research design, it does not mean that 
sociology, in the form recommended by Goldthorpe, is 
methodologically superior. For, as Bryant inquires, "what sociologist 
would not be keen to view the present from the vantage point of the 
future, with retrospective knowledge of the trends that emerged 
triumphant and those that fell by the wayside"? 142 Indeed, the results 
would surely differ from both the subjective expectations of the 
participants in the present and from contemporary documentation 
limited as it is by the constraints of private property and official 
confidentiality. This is a particular problem for research where power 
prominence is a factor. The difficulties in gaining access to social 
elites, as primary evidential material, and to studies not based on 
samples containing a disproportionately high number of `ordinary' 
respondents often prevents the sociologist from generating suitable 
data. Such a "democratic bias", as Mann calls it, 143 does not typically 
constrain the historian whose empirical basis represents the `relics' of 
those individuals and institutions with sufficient resources to 
dominate the media of cultural expression. Furthermore, the residue 
of the past, as unsolicited and "authentic elements of past social 
worlds", "' brings the investigator just as close to the reality of the 
subject as the questionnaire or interviewer which intrude, as foreign 
elements, into the social setting they attempt to describe, conditioning 
attitudes and forcing responses into preordained categories 
determined by the subjective proclivities of the sociologist. In this 
sense then, extrapolating from what C. Wright Mills calls the "curious 
behaviourism""' of generated sociological data is every bit as 
inferential as employing the colligation of historical `relics'. 
That is not to say, however, that the `relics' of the past can, out of an 
the quality of evidence can always be addressed, as they arise, by generating yet 
further evidence through which to check and test the original" (1991, pp 214-215). 
142 Bryant, J. (1994) p. 7. 
143 Mann, M. (1994) p. 38. 
144 Bryant, J. (1994) p. 7. 
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intrinsically held significance, inform the inquirer. Rather than 
speaking for themselves, each can only be rendered meaningful when 
placed in a framework mediated by the current contours of 
conventional wisdom and scholarly debate. Macro-sociologists, like 
other sociologists and historians, order their findings to present a 
reasoned account of the phenomena they seek to describe. In the 
inevitable event of disagreement, the reader brings to bear other 
findings and interpretations, makes judgements concerning factuality 
and, as Mann concludes, rejects part of all the accounts on offer. 
Since, ultimately, both the generated evidence of empirical research 
and the `relics' of the historian are, as Nicos Mouzelis points out, 
"second order interpretations referring to the first order ones that 
individuals generate when they act and interact", " all evaluations of 
plausibility are informed, in part at least, by how well the evidence 
presented is accounted for by the internal cohesion of the analysis. 
The fact that human agency is "fundamentally time-referential, with 
the consequence that social actions are to be understood not as 
episodic events or discrete occurrences, but as complex durational 
processes", 147 means that the macro-sociologist must therefore fuse 
idiographic and nomothetic approaches in order to maintain a 
contextual logic in keeping with the observable complexities of the 
subject. 
Conclusion 
So, while based on sound methodological principals, Mann's work is 
weakened by its excessively linear approach. In failing to analyse both 
the differing imperial heritage of West and East and their contrasting 
institutionalisation of phenomena such as secularism, state 
centralisation and capitalism means that comparative aspects to his 
treatment of European social change are lost. Furthermore, he misses 
145 Wright Mills, C. (1959) p. 70. 
146 Mouzelis, N. (1994) p. 35. 
147 Bryant, J. (1994) p. 18. 
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the opportunity to vary his historiographical argument with examples 
which might have reinforced his thesis on the specificity of north- 
west European development. This is a pity as a greater degree of 
contact with non-Western cases would have brought greater 
explanatory value to Mann's more general account of the emergence 
of the early nation-states. It would also have further allowed him to 
test his theoretical rubric and thus strengthen his claim upon general 
applicability. 
What is required in order to resolve some of the problems highlighted 
above is, therefore, an extension of Mann's work which adopts a 
more firmly comparative approach. Such a study could cast further 
light on Mann's account and reduce the Euro-centrism of macro- 
historical sociology generally by seeking to comprehend more fully 
the variation between European and non-European social dynamics. 
An analysis of this kind could refine our understanding of large-scale 
change in Europe in three ways. Firstly, in focussing on the 
commonalties between points of development around the world, light 
can be cast on Europe's shared socio-historical heritage. To this 
effect, Mann's universal theory of power organisation and contention 
could be deployed to elucidate social `crystallisations' (such as 
nationalism, secularism, class, militarism and economic development) 
which are of general relevance. Secondly, by looking at the significant 
areas of difference between two evolutionary patterns, a greater 
understanding of European specificity could be obtained. Not least 
amongst these might be the rapidity of social change and the 
persistence of social cleavages built around ethnicity, religiosity and 
social status. Thirdly, in bringing a new case to Mann's account of 
historical continuity, a refined comprehension of social power can be 
sought which better explains a non-European pattern of 
organisational development. 
To this end, the following four chapters will apply Mann's model to 
the development of the Ottoman/Turkish state. Such an application 
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of a leading approach within macro-historical sociology will offer 
support for the discipline as a whole. For, as Arend Lijphart has 
stressed, an alternative case can contribute "to the establishment of 
general propositions and thus to theory-building". 148 This may simply 
be the utility of accumulated data presented as a non-theoretical 
descriptive study which can then be employed as a secondary 
source149 or, as in the case of this thesis, it may have further 
interpretative value. In applying Mann's approach, it will be possible 
to illuminate some of his more generalised propositions, suggest some 
revisions and consider the alternative case study in relation to his own 
supporting evidence. This more firmly comparative approach will 
address the deficiencies of Mann's analysis discussed above and 
highlight some of the more significant areas of theoretical importance 
for the general study of state development and social change. 
148 Lijphart, A. (1971) p. 691. 
149 For a discussion of the value and limitations of this, see Curtis, M. (1968) p. 7. 
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Chapter Three: The Politics of Empire 
This chapter seeks to explore the Ottoman state's methods of rule by 
applying Michael Mann's theoretical model of social power to its 
changing relationship with civil society. It will look at the mechanics 
of Ottoman political and ideological organisation and the ways these 
sustained the position of the state vis-ä-vis the military and civil 
society. Mann's identification of the `channels' of ideological 
communication and his construction of the methods of `compulsory 
co-operation' will both be examined as a possibly useful means of 
understanding the dynamics of imperial territorial conquest and social 
absorption. While Mann developed these in relation to the political 
administration of Mesopotamian and Classical rulers, here they will be 
applied to the Ottoman system of governance as a way of ascertaining 
the importance of these methods in the establishment and 
maintenance of centralised political power and the institutionalisation 
of ideological legitimacy. 1 Elements of continuity and change will be 
considered in order to illuminate social relations within the empire 
and to analyse Mann's account of imperial rule. The organisation of 
political centrality will be considered, particularly in relation to infra- 
structural networks of ideological power, as the state's supervisory 
pre-eminence crystallised before eventually beginning to falter as 
challenges to its ideological-political unity emerged. 
The Ideological/Military Complex 
A central feature of Ottoman social organisation from the early 
processes of imperial coalescence onwards was the unifying, or what 
Michael Mann would call the "pacifying normative", effects of Islam? 
Indeed, as Mann has noted, a fundamental problem for systems of 
I For the early centuries of Ottoman rule, this study will largely focus on the 
Rumelia and Anatolia from which the state social systems were gradually expanded 
(see Heper, M., 1980, pp 99-100, n. 3). 
2 Mann, M. (1986) Ch. 10. 
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imperial governance was that, in order to secure political control, 
military power had to be diluted. This was no less true of early 
conquests by the Ottoman empire. Unlike the more mercantile 
Mesopotamian empires, however, the partners of the generals (gaj. c) 
who administered the Ottoman frontier on behalf of the core were 
dervishes and religious scholars .3 The state's capacity to extend 
its 
infra-structural reach into what was rapidly becoming a large and 
socially diverse territory was reliant, from the outset, on this 
partnership's ability to `imperialise' Islam. It was not simply the 
material value of conquest or the superior might of cavalry, although 
these were of course major factors, which legitimised the position of 
the peripheral agent, but rather the horizontal character of an official 
state culture linking centre to frontier. As the nascent state's material 
requirements developed, however, the core took an increasing share 
of the gafs' spoils, provoking varying degrees of resistance and an 
endemic conflict between central and peripheral power. 4 Since 
"successful booty or conquest warfare tends to heighten the State 
versus society stratification", 5 imperial expansion also recast the 
horizontality of the centrist ruling group into a more hierarchical 
structure in turn necessitating greater political power and ideological 
legitimisation. To this end, Selim I's (1512-1520) assumption of the 
Caliphate in 1517 further enhanced the Ottomans' ideological 
extensiveness giving it greater infra-structural reach than that offered 
by the centrality of a merely political organisation structure and a 
more comprehensive level of collective power than the blunt 
application of military coercion .6 As Mann notes, a religiously centred 
culture provided "a sense of normative identity and an ability to co- 
operate... that was more extensive and diffuse than state, army, or 
3 See Togan, I. (1991) pp 195-196. 
4 Mardin, S. (1971) explains this process in greater detail, pp 618-622. 
5 Mann, M. (1977) p. 289. As Mann points out, this is for two reasons: "leadership in 
emergency situations (of which wars are the clearest examples) needs the speed of 
authoritarian decision-making, and thus, secondly, booty will normally be 
distributed by the military-state leadership" (ibid). His parenthesis. 
6 It is unclear if Selim claimed to be Caliph over the entire ummab, see tnalcik, H. 
(1968) for an alternative view. 
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mode of production provided". 7 To this end, state ideological 
ascendancy was institutionalised by imposing Sunni orthodoxy and by 
establishing a body of ulema "clearly integrated with the apparatus of 
the state". 8 
Through the close alliance between political power and the complex 
and comprehensive world view of Islam, as represented by the 
presence of the ulema, the Ottoman state was able to reinforce its 
links with the periphery to the detriment of the diffuse networks of 
ideological power already existent within the periphery. The ulema's 
highly centralised role controlling the education system, the judiciary 
and the administrative service positioned the upper echelons of the 
clergy at the very centre of the Ottoman state. 9 They ensured the 
state's control of a huge and disparate populace by establishing the 
legality of private ownership, protecting non-Muslim citizens, 
arbitrating between disputants and promoting urbanisation through 
their educational networks. In return the sultan respected the ulema, 
supported their judicial decisions and used their influence and edicts 
in virtually all matters of state. 10 The position of the ulema leadership 
at the heart of the Ottoman administration thus ensured that the 
realms of political and ideological power remained very strongly 
linked. 11 "Ms union of faith and state encouraged an especially 
strong form of statism.... Loyalty to the state, combining government 
and religion as it did, became the paramount concern for the ruling 
group" 12 
This ruling group, headed by the sultan, was the askeri which, in 
addition to the office of the monarch and the grand vizier, consisted 
7 Mann, M. (1986) p. 21. 
8 Mardin, $. (1981) p. 194. 
9 See ibid. 
10 A useful account of this mutuality is to be found in Hourani, A. (1974) 
11 For a broader analysis of Muslim society's tendency to unify ideology and politics, 
see Eisenstadt, S. (1984) pp 11-13. 
12 Frey, F. (1978) pp 47-48. 
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of three branches. 13 The first two, the kalemýyye, or scribal service, and 
the reyfiiyye, or military, were staffed by prisoners of war and `slaves' 
augmented by the devrirme system in which predominantly non- 
Muslim children were recruited from the periphery. 14 In separating a 
great number of state personnel from their social networks in civil 
society, the problem of power decentralisation endemic to the 
governance of empire was thereby considerably alleviated. Allocation 
of initial position within all elements of the askeri classes, from 
labourer to judge, was subject to merit and progress remained based 
on "ability and alacrity; the social status of the conscripts' families 
counted for nothing". 15 Moreover, as the inheritance of position or 
property was strictly prohibited, the de-centralising influences of 
patrimonialism was largely impeded thereby inhibiting the 
development of autonomous political organisations beyond the 
control of the state. Where "the emergence of such bodies could not 
be prevented, the state attempted to dominate them and use them to 
maintain or extend its own power". 16 
The ulema, as the third class of askeri, were instrumental in this 
process. Not subject to the same recruitment system, but generally 
working closely with local state officials, the huge hierarchy of clergy, 
stretching from the Sultan's council to the plethora of religious 
officials in every provincial community, provided the state with one 
of its major linkages to civil society. Since only by studying to join the 
ulema was it possible to obtain an appointment from the sultan's 
13 The ruled were the tax-paying masses, the traya. Eisenstadt claims such 
distinctions between rulers and ruled are common within imperial systems (1969, p. 
321). Compare, for instance, the shik and the min in imperial China (see Lattimore, 
0., 1962a, p. 49). 
14 Since in Islamic terms all are slaves of God, an Ottoman `slave' was not a person 
entirely devoid of status, but one whose status was rigidly controlled by her/his 
master, in this case the state. See Parry, V. (1969) pp 55-58. For a useful discussion 
of how the devpinne system fitted into the Ottoman polity as a whole, see 
Anderson, P. (1993) pp 366-368. It should also be noted that there were 
considerable benefits for a family to engage in this custom and was thus frequently 
entered into without the generally over-emphasised element of coercion. Indeed, 
Arnold Toynbee notes that "no pressure was put on the boys to become Muslim 
and none was needed" (1974, p. 26). 
is Toynbee, A. (1974) p. 26. 
M Findley, C. (1980) p. 19. 
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office and move from the reaja to the askeri, the Ottoman theocratic 
hierarchy represented "the real hinge between centre and 
periphery". 17 In the absence of any other intermediary agents between 
the askeri and the reaya, the ulema both influenced ideals of political 
legitimacy and integrated the Muslim masses into a Caliph-led and 
broadly coalescent ummah. 18 This was particularly important at the 
very fringes of imperial influence where, as long as military expansion 
continued, a kind of `frontier Islam', premised on notions of jihad and 
martyrdom, informed a strongly statist (as epitomised by the Sultan- 
Caliph unity of religion and politics) level of social organisation. In 
other words, it reinforced, what Mann calls, the immanent morale of 
the established order and the religious proto-nationalism of the 
ummah-state relationship. 
Like the Christian ecumene described in the previous chapter, the ulema 
confirmed social relations between civil society groups by providing 
access to educational and cultural services, by regulating property and 
family law and by embedding otherwise intensively organised social 
groups in an extensive ideological network. As Serif Mardin 
concludes "wherever the aloof state failed they [the ulema] moved 
in". 19 In contrast to Mann's analysis of Rome, however, there was not 
the distinction between what belongs to the monarch and what 
belongs to God. 20 This made the Ottoman clergy far less vulnerable 
to state challenges. Moreover, having inherited an immense and 
detailed tradition of texts and precedents, the ulema did not have the 
same leeway of interpretative analysis as the early Christian church 
and thus could not be politicised as easily. In a state largely orientated 
by its claim to Islamic legitimacy, there could be only be limited 
legislation and no divergence between jurisprudence and 
17 Mardin, ý. (1973) p. 174. 
18 For an account of the absence of a Turkish national identity in the pre-nineteenth 
century Ottoman empire, see Kushner, D. (1977). 
19 Mardin, 5. (1971) p. 203. My parenthesis. 
20 For a brief comparison of these two developmental patterns, see Heper, M. 
(1991) pp 42-46. 
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administration. 21 This synthesis of ideology and politics offered the 
Ottoman centre a means of intensifying its ties with the imperial 
periphery. Leadership on the grounds of Islam, once it had been 
fused with the politics of centralisation, gave the state a way of 
reducing the inevitable decentralisation of power which 
institutionalising its rule over conquered territory entailed. 
The closeness of the relationship between the ulema elite and the 
Sultan's council was of central importance in preventing autonomous 
power organisations arising within this heterogeneous, diffuse and 
socially mobile clerical network. As long as this was maintained, the 
ulema's grip on educational access and legal sanction meant that 
alternatively organised ideological power networks, both within the 
theocracy and the askeri as a whole, could have only a very limited 
capacity to provide what Mann calls the "the cement of class 
solidarity" 22 The unity of the askeri and their supervisory 
omnipresence also prevented horizontal ideological links between 
different civil groups within the reaya developing into decentralised 
organisations able to challenge the prevailing political regime. 
Ideological power's other facet, transcendentalism, which tends to "cut 
right across existing economic, military and political power 
networks", 22 was also circumscribed by the verticality of the ulema's 
Caliph-to-peasant infra-structural reach. Thus, the social networks 
organised around the ulema remained ideologically immanent and the 
state was able to maintain its supervisory position over, what Mann 
describes as, the "authoritative, official, political-communication 
channel" between ruler and ruled ensuring that fatwas and canons 
21 "God alone is the Great Legislator, since he has already given the Law (Sharia), 
divine, perfect, sufficient, unchangeable, written in the Koran for eternity in the last 
revelation necessary for humanity. Therefore, there is neither place nor need for a 
legislating state" (William Zartman cited in Özbudun, E., 1984, p. 44). His 
parenthesis. 
22 Mann, M. (1986) pp 269-270. 
23 Ibid. p. 301. 
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continued to be conveyed between clergy in a tightly regulated 
manner. 24 
The high level of state control over religious organisation meant that 
another of Mann's logistical channels of ideological power, that of 
"cultural traditions", remained more segmental and less diffused than 
in his characterisation of the homogenising influences of Roman 
cultural expansion. 25 This was apparent in the Ottoman notion of the 
millet which, although later to denote a specifically non-Muslim 
community, was used to refer to one of the great number of 
distinguishable `peoples' within the empire. While differences 
between the social organisation of the various ethnic, cultural and 
religious groups within the empire have been often over-emphasised, 
the point remains that the state made little attempt to impose a 
national ideology. 26 As a result the millets remained relatively atomised. 
Again in contrast to Mann's model of Rome, few Ottoman citizens, 
both non-Muslim and Muslim, perceived themselves to be members 
of an imperial totality. The little `Ottoman culture' which did develop 
was largely subsumed beneath self-perceptions of group identity 
based on religious difference 27 
This strongly vertical notion of group organisation is related to Abdul 
Rahman Ibn Khaldoun's (1332-1395) concept of group feeling that 
acts as the source of social cohesion, al asabýyya. 28 Ibn Khaldoun was 
widely read throughout the Ottoman elite (particularly the ulema); the 
concept of al asaba underpinned the ideological state's primary 
objective, to maintain the niZam, or social `order'. This was the 
balance between ruled and ruler, between the reaya and the askeri and 
24 Ibid. p. 311. 
25 Ibid. 
26 See Findley, C. (1980). 
27 See Karpat, K (1973a) p. 38. The state also took a hand in maintaining and 
organising this diversity. Members of the different millets were, for example, 
discouraged from wearing clothes characteristic of another millet or class (see 
Mardin, X5., 1967, pp 129-130). 
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between the various groups within each. 29 It was based on the so- 
called `circle of justice' in which there can be no state without wealth, 
no wealth without the people's well-being, no well-being without 
justice, no justice without the state, no state without wealth and so- 
on. Justice was determined by the state in the interest of niZam. This 
did not mean, however, that the approach to governance was, as 
some writers have argued, entirely static. The notion of inkilab or 
"changes effected legally through legislative, governmental or cultural 
means" came to be part of Ottoman political parlance as a means of 
forestalling the inevitable descent into anarchy that, according to the 
received Ibn Khaldounian wisdom, awaited all societies. 30 From this 
basis the &fi sultan (or örjJ emerged. It had echoes of the pre-Islamic 
concept of the law-bringing leader and allowed the sultan to issue 
decrees intended to safeguard the well-being of his community 
"regardless of his personal wishes" and subject to ratification by the 
leading ulema. 31 Ostensibly based on necessity and reason, the Sultan's 
legislative flexibility gave the Ottoman executive greater despotic 
power than an administration based purely on the shariah and ensured 
that the state remained the organisational centre for responding to 
issues of social change. 32 
"Developed in large part as a response to the relationship between 
the begs (local landowners] and central authority', these decrees, or 
kanuns, were particularly associated with Mehmed II's (1444-1446 & 
1451-1481) attempts to keep control of newly-conquered lands. 33 A 
28 In Al Mugaddimah this essentially nomadic quality, which becomes corrupted by 
the experiences of urbanisation leading to social chaos before eventual resurgence, 
is the basis for Ibn Khaldoun's cyclical account of human civilisation. 
29 See Berkes, N. (1974) p. 295. 
30 Berkes, N. (1974) p. 294. 
31 Shaw, S. (1976) p. 134. The ulemas' fatwas were, of course, not always acted upon 
by the Sultan and his advisers. If ignored, however, there was a significant risk of a 
Sultan losing some of the Caliph's all important legitimacy and fomenting resistance 
among the influential pious. 
32 Hahl Inalcik notes that this was augmented by the adoption of the Hanifi school 
of jurisprudence which, he argues, is "characterised by its broader principles to 
allow the state to introduce measures to cope with newly arising problems" (1968, p. 
22). 
33 Karpat, K (1973) p. 32. My emphasis and parenthesis. 
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controversially un-Islamic example of his confiscation of much of the 
empire's agricultural land from the old Selcuk landlord/military 
classes 34 These were redistributed as tcmars, providing "the 
government with a crucial means of maintaining some control over 
the most important economic resource, namely the land, and also 
over the largest segment of the population, the peasantry". 35 They 
were administered by seyfzyye cavalrymen, the sipahi, who collected 
taxes on the state's behalf, ensured that the land was continuously 
cultivated and, in time of war, supplied men and resources 
proportional to the estate's value and revenue. 36 In keeping with their 
status as `slave' to the sultan, the s0ahi were prohibited from marrying 
until retirement, not able to pass their land on to their children and 
could be removed from post at any time 37 As part of the vertically 
organised hierarchy of the askeri, they thus represented the central 
authority of the state at, as Table Two shows, a diffuse village level. 
Together with the ulema, the sipahis formed an administrative layer 
"locally reproducing the political and ideological functions of the 
state". 3ß This militarising aspect of the political-ideological contact 
between state and peasant, however, also provided a potentially 
decentralising means of interaction between reaya and asked. As Mann 
points out in illustrating the third of his channels of ideological 
power, this was a particular problem in Rome where "the army was 
the main means by which ordinary people, usually peasants, were 
removed from the cultural prison of their locality and brought into 
contact with the wider world" 39 By contrast, in the Ottoman empire 
the strongly pacifying and immanent effects of the state's ideological 
omnipresence prevented the temporary trmariot recruits from 
developing both the transcendental cults, such as Mithraism, and the 
34 The traditional teaching of Islam tends to emphasise strongly the rights of private 
property. 
35 Karpat, K (1974) p. 89. 
36 It has been estimated that by 1475 there were 22,000 . ripahir 
in Anatolia and 
17,000 in Rumelia . Each time a Sultan was enthroned these were reshuffled to 
prevent them merging with civil society and constituting a decentralised 
intermediary class (Anderson, P., 1993, pp 368-369). 
37 See Karpat, K (1973) pp 32-36. 
38 Islamoglu, H. & Keyder, Cr. (1987) p. 48. Their emphases. 
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tendency to merge with civil society which Mann identifies as features 
of the Roman legions. 
Table Two: Askeri 1545-165940 
Un- 







78.8 58 17.7 11 3.5 327 21.3 127 38.8 
77.4 129 19.6 19 3.0 657 43.9 158 24 
93.1 19 5.4 5 1.5 351 23.4 33 9.4 
87.1 6 10.5 1 1.8 57 3.7 23 40.3 
83.7 16 14.4 2 1.9 111 7.6 30 
Total 1,237 82.1 228 15.4 38 2.5 1,503 100 371 
This was supported by the state's interventionist approach in the 
economy. As such, artisans and peasants were assisted in favour of 
merchants and landlords in keeping with the Caliph's traditional 
obligation of bisba, the surveillance of public morals. The movement 
and sale of produce was closely controlled by the askeri, oligarchies 
were disbanded, sipahis and other landowners were restricted in what 
they could extract from their labourers, riba (usury) was punished in 
the shariah courts and any excessive wealth generated from trade 
investments could be seized by the state. As Halil Inalcik notes, 
"confiscation was employed particularly against the farmers and 
officials who had made their money through their connections with 
the Finance Department" 41 In this way, the state maintained an 
authoritative influence over its agents and, in intervening on the 
grounds of Islam to protect the predominantly peasant consumers, 
was able to minimise the possibility of an intermediary class 
39 Mann, M. (1986) p. 311. 
40 Source: Faroghi, S. (1994) p. 551, after 0. Barkan. 
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developing between the askeri and the reaya. Further restraints on 
wealth generation were imposed by a prohibitively high exportation 
tariff of 12 per cent aimed at ensuring that Ottoman traders, already 
constrained by the limitations of pre-modern transportation, did not 
develop extensive networks of economic power. 42 In this way, the 
pre-sixteenth century imperial economy consisted largely of self- 
sufficient production units (estates, farms, manors, etc. ) trading 
predominantly with the state. This lack of interdependence, imposed 
by institutionalised restrictions on social status and the infra-structural 
reach of the state's military-ideological power networks, constitutes 
what Mann (after Durkheim) identifies as a "segmental class system" in 
which no "societal-wide producing class capable of enforcing its 
interests politically" emerges 43 Unlike in Rome, where the economic 
might of the senatorial class, coupled with its extensive territorial and 
cultural unity, obliged the imperial state to rule through an 
intermediary body, the Ottoman system ensured that no such 
universal ruling class could develop. 44 
The close proximity of the askeri to the mechanics of economic 
production, distribution and consumption provided a carefully 
monitored extensiveness to this "cellular" system. It relates, in some 
ways, to Mann's reworking of Herbert Spencer's model of the 
`military society' which, he argues, was most apparent in Rome's 
"legionary economy". This employed an enhanced method of 
"compulsory co-operation" aimed at facilitating a more thoroughly 
institutionalised system of imperial domination. Of the five methods 
Mann outlines, described briefly in Chapter Two, the first, "military 
pacification" through the institutionalisation of "monopolistic rules 
conferring ownership and governing exchange established and 
42 Owen Lattimore estimates that animals used to transport food would have to eat 
the contents of their loads every 100 miles (1962, pp 476-485). Diocletian's price 
edict doubled the cost of a wagon-load of wheat every 300 miles making maritime 
transport the only economically viable method of long-distance transportation 
(Finley, M., 1973, p. 128). For further data, see Bailey, F. (1942) p. 79. 
43 Mann, M. (1977) pp 269-270. 
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maintained internally by an authoritative state", 45 was clearly in place 
through the s pah: 's influential position, both legitimising and 
enforcing regulation in the economy. With other members of the 
armed forces (the reyfiyye), they also subjugated challenges to 
peripheral trade routes, enforced the re-distributive decisions of the 
ulema's judiciary and played an important geo-political role in 
monitoring international trade with the other regional actors. The 
second, "the military multiplier" effect, can be seen operating in the 
Ottoman economy as agricultural production and supply, largely 
managed by the ripahi, became increasingly geared towards the needs 
of a permanent, professional army, the janissary corps. Apart from 
consumption, the aeyfiyye also stimulated . regional economies 
by 
initiating infra-structural projects such road and castle building and 
improving riverine networks. Indeed, Rhoads Murphey concludes his 
study of the construction of a fortress in Mosul in 1631 by noting 
that, 
"if one considers the economic stimulus provided locally 
in supplying the needs of the army in the provinces, not 
only in the provision of its daily needs such as grain or in 
the maintenance and repair of equipment giving 
employment to blacksmiths, leather-workers and a 
multitude of other trades, but also in larger terms by its 
acting as an employer of labour on a grand scale for the 
digging of trenches, building of roads and bridges, and 
the construction of fortresses, the army's economic 
impact was not inconsiderable". +6 
Thirdly, the fusion of "authority and economic value" was typified by 
the authoritative power of the askeri, particularly the ulema and their 
network of kadis (jjudges), in ascribing financial legitimacy based on 
the shariab and the örf. ' Here, the rigidity of the ideological-political 
union acted as a restraint upon the stimulatory effects of the 
militarised economy showing that the state and not the market 
remained the pre-eminent Ottoman organisational form. The 
44 Defined by Mann as "an economic class that has successfully monopolised other 
power sources to dominate a state-centred society at large" (Mann, M., 1986, p. 25). 
45 Ibid pp 148-149. 
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prohibition of riba and excessive profiteering, for example, 
demonstrate the viewpoint of the policeman rather than the 
entrepreneur and contrasts sharply with the liberalisation process 
occurring around this period in the West. There, the rise of capitalism 
involved multiple and cross-cutting cleavages between various social 
institutions as church competed with state, provincialism with 
nationalism and the proletariat with the bourgeoisie. In the Ottoman 
Empire, however, networks of social interaction "continued to be 
defined by a primary axis dividing the state from all social strata rather 
than by multiple axes dividing social strata from one another" 47 
The fourth element of Mann's model, the "intensification of labour", 
or the degree to which the militarised imperial state can increase 
labour productivity, can be seen on both sides of this state/subject 
divide. The state's ownership of much of the empire's arable land, 
coupled with the complex integration of religious and military agency, 
meant that the sipahi could, in most cases, easily be coerced into 
surrendering a greater tribute. The extent to which these pressures 
were passed on to the peasantry was carefully monitored through the 
empire's juridical infra-structure allowing the state to adjust the levels 
of surplus extraction and labour intensity according to its needs. In 
urban centres the artisan guilds were similarly closely affiliated to the 
supervisory apparatus of the central administration. 48 In controlling 
the supply of raw materials, restricting the sale of finished goods to 
authorised markets and suppressing independent competition, the 
state closely regulated the guilds' structure, both in terms of their 
output and capital accumulation. 49 "Trough the taxation of 
manufactures sold in the markets, and through its position as the 
chief purchaser of artisanal production", 50 the state was thus 
coercively and collectively able to maintain control over labour 
intensity as well as ensure that its agents, the askeri classes, constituted 
46 Murphey, R. (1980) p. 169. 
47 Bianchi, R. (1984) pp 87-88. 
48 See Stem, S. (1970) and Baer, G. (1970). For an alternative view, Lewis, B. (1937). 
49 See tnalcik, H. (1970) pp 216-217. 
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the only significant surplus-collecting social group. Supported by an 
immanent ideology centred upon "the beneficence and justness of the 
state which... owns all the land and redistributes the surplus in order 
to perpetuate the `eternal order"', 51 it also meant that the extensive 
links of the artisan classes, Mann's fourth channel of ideological 
power, 52 could not escape the organisational reach of the state's 
judicial and tax-collection system. 
Indeed, the taxation of the reaya by the askeri was one of the state's 
primary means of applying its own extensive power and extending 
infra-structural control across its territory. As Mann has pointed out, 
taxation, as a method of economic integration, gave imperial states 
much stronger vertical links with its citizens than a rental system 
(which tended to favour a de-centralising landlord class) or a trade- 
based economy implying greater horizontal integration and further 
de-centralisation. 53 In the absence of a banking system, wealth re- 
distribution was controlled exclusively by the state through its own 
mechanisms of disbursement. As such, coinage was not primarily 
regarded as a method of exchange between citizens, but rather as 
means of paying state expenses, particularly armed forces 
expenditure. In what Mann calls "military Keynesianism", 54 the state 
reduced the rural population's need for money by encouraging tax 
payment in kind and by administering revenues through the 
provincial timar system which minimised the need to transfer large 
sums of money to the centre. 55 Such constraints furthered the 
Ottoman state's supervisory position within the economy and 
maintained the social divide between potential economic success and 
political influence. While it was still expanding, there could be no 
Crassus in the Ottoman empire. Wealth and status could only "exist 
in isolation from power, as among the commercial and religious 
so Islamoglu, H. & Keyder, C,. (1981) p. 303. 
51 Keyder, Cf. (1976) pp 181. 
52 Mann, M. (1986) pp 312-313. 
53 Ibid. p. 271. 
S4 See Mann, M. (1984) p. 204. 
55 See Pamuk, ý. (1994) pp 952-953. 
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notables of the subject classes; or else they might be secondary 
attributes of power, distributed along with it to the more exalted of 
slave officials". 56 
Ottoman Change 
As has often been noted, the Ottoman state's systems of "military 
organisation, civil administration, taxation, and land tenure were all 
geared to the needs of a society expanding by conquest and 
colonisation". 57 When this came to a halt in Vienna in 1529, leading 
to a century and half of inconclusive warfare with the Habsburgs, it 
began a slow decline in both despotic and infra-structural power. 
Once the frontier became stationary, peripheral communities began 
trading across the border and developed decentralised networks of 
economic power thereby modifying their allegiance to the state. 58 The 
provincial seyfyye, deprived of the spoils of conquest required to 
legitimise their position, were unable to intervene, particularly in the 
predominantly non-Muslim northern and western periphery where 
the state's ideological reach was less comprehensive. 59 This became 
particularly acute following the collapse of the Ottoman silver-based 
currency under pressure from Spanish-American imports and the 
shift in trade routes from trans-Ottoman to maritime channels. 
Increasingly unable to pay their troops, the Ottoman state permitted 
the seyjjyye to work as artisans while barracked. As a result, 
decentralised economic networks of power came to replace the 
authority of the military hierarchy and troops merged with the 
merchant classes of garrison towns, particularly during the wheat 
shortages of the second half of the sixteenth century, while still 
benefiting from their tax-exempt status. 6° 
56 Findley, C. (1980) p. 15. 
57 Lewis, B. (1961) p. 27. 
51 See Owen Lattimore's research on imperial China (1962) p. 470. He writes, "Men 
of both border populations, working together in this way, become a `we' group to 
whom others of their nationality, and especially the authorities, are 'they"' (ibid. ). 
59 See Andreski, S. (1971) pp 20-74. 
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The reduction in the value of cavalry compared to musket-bearing 
infantry led to further substantial increases in the size of the seyfzjye, 
particularly the standing army (the janissary corps) which was 
enlarged from 7,886 men in 1527 to 37,627 in 1610 and re-deployed 
from their traditional barracks in Istanbul to "all sectors of the 
empire" G1 To support the more defensive, labour intensive infantry 
formations, 62 large numbers of mercenaries, sekban, were also 
recruited pushing up the total number of imperial troops from 21,519 
in 1528 to 88,382 in 1670 and increasing the cost from 58 million to 
237 million aspers over the same period G3 This militarisation of the 
periphery, coupled with the rapid spread of fire-arms, offered 
decentralised social networks a more intensive means of 
organisation. 64 It was exacerbated by the increasing competition 
between the ripahi and the janissaries, particularly over tzmar 
allocation, which, following the desertion of 30,000 stji ahis from the 
battlefield at Hacova in 1596,65 led to a proliferation of decentralised 
armed groups (celalz) and to great social instability. 66 The rigid divide 
between askeri and reaya was under threat. Military power networks, 
always extremely extensive, had burgeoned under the strategic 
imperatives of the state's geopolitical commitments and, through 
decentralised economic links, had begun to constitute an intermediary 
class between subject and state. The `three-way stand-off' n which 
neither arbitrary nor consultative relations structure the relationship 
between central and local levels, so apparent in Mann's 
characterisation of the decline of Rome, 67 was developing in the early 
60 See Inalcik, H. (1994) pp 182-185 and Coles, P. (1968) pp 168-169. 
61 tnalak, H. (1994) p. 24. Yücel Özkaya, however, puts the figure much higher; at 
40,000 in 1550 and 100,000 in 1600 (cited in Sunar, l., 1987, p. 71). See also Inalcik, 
H. (1964) p. 46. 
62 See Mann, M. (1986) pp 453-458. 
63 Karpat, K (1973) p. 35. 
64 See Inalck H. (1975) p. 211. 
65 See Karpat, K (1974) pp 89-90. 
66 These rebellions were not, as some have argued peasant revolts of the European 
feudal ilk. Although they included peasants who had fled the military/fiefdom or 
those that were loyal to a dispossessed ripahi, they were essentially the actions of 
organised groups of minor gentry whose target was not superior feudatories, but 
representatives of state authority. See Mardin, ý. (1967) pp 131-133, for a fuller 
account. 
67 Mann, M. (1986) p. 282. 
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seventeenth century Ottoman polity. Like Diocletian (284-305), who 
was similarly troubled by great rises in the cost of warfare, the 
Ottoman state attempted to increase its revenues 68 The timar system 
was thus largely replaced by a system of tax-farming. 69 
Under the new system, arable plots were leased for one or two years 
to the highest bidder who paid in advance for the right to exploit the 
land and sell the produce as he saw fit. Although this had the primary 
aim of enlarging the productivity, both in yield and tax revenue, of 
the arable estates, it was also intended to reduce the entrepreneurial 
influence of the increasingly propertied and irredentist sefi e. Crucial 
to this structure, however, was the state's infra-structural capacity to 
prevent the tax-farmer from forming, through collective organisation, 
tax-evasive and reciprocal economic links with the peasantry, a 
consideration hardly helped by the system of stipulatory advance 
payment which favoured those with considerable liquid assets and 
therefore established economic networks invisible to the state. The 
increasingly fragmented askeri hierarchy did not offer the state the 
necessary infra-structural reach to monitor the relationship between 
tax-farmer and peasant with sufficient rigour. Without this, the state 
was not able to keep control of civil society's economic power 
networks, nor did it succeed in preventing the `leakage' of both 
authoritative power and resources. Civil society's inherent tendency to 
wrest and decentralise infra-structural resources from the state, which, 
as Mann notes, is reinforced by the mutually beneficial developments 
of compulsory co-operation, 7° began to overtake the Ottoman state's 
despotic capacity to maintain its hierarchical system of control. For 
"while tax-farming provided the state with an immediate source of 
revenue, in the long-run it led to erosion of its tax base, since the flow 
of taxes upward to the centre became increasingly subject to the 
68 Ibid. pp 289-295. 
69 The 63,000 ttmars of 1475 were reduced to 7,000 by 1630. See Karpat, K (1973) 
p. 35, after Inalcik. 
70 Mann, M. (1984) pp 205-206. 
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interference of the tax-farmers"71 By handing the peasantry and the 
market over to the tax-farmer, the Ottoman state sacrificed a 
significant amount of its capacity to both intercede on behalf of the 
reaya and control economic exchange. In all, "a process of 
feudalisation and a rise in the strength of the local gentry" was the 
result 72 
These notables, around a thousand of which dominated the tax- 
farming auctions at Istanbul throughout the eighteenth century, 73 
emerged predominantly from reaya positions such as wealthier artisan- 
traders (esnaa, traditional community leaders (erraff, landed families 
(derebeey or forbaiir) and tribal chiefs (agas). They were, however, also 
joined by significant numbers of kadir, tax-collectors from different 
commercial fields, sipahis, janissaries and defterdars (local treasury 
officials). Both reap and askeri viewed tax-farming as a way of 
investing profits which otherwise might be seized by the state. As a 
result, the previously rigid social divide between them became blurred 
and to some extent fused in the form of the new intermediary 
economic class. This became known as the cyan once their roles 
became generally connected to tax-farming towards the end of the 
eighteenth century. While most remained embedded in state- 
determined structures of revenue acquisition, some cyan organised 
more extensive economic links and began to act as agents between 
the state and less consequential families (of whom, many were tax- 
farming on the estates, or Fiftliks, of the cyan elite themselves). 
The state, having been further strained by again failing to take Vienna 
in 1683, was powerless to prevent the development of an increasingly 
decentralised economy. The surrenders at Carlowitz and Passarovitz 
in 1699 and 1718 respectively, followed by the first major concessions 
of Muslim land in Kücük Kaynarca in 1774, severely weakened both 
7' Sunar, 1. (1987) p. 70. 
72 Mardin, $. (1967) p. 133. 
73 See McGowan, B. (1994) p. 662. 
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its fiscal and ideological position in relation to civil society. 74 No 
longer was the `normative pacification' of its ideological-political 
cohesiveness able to regulate the market and re-distribute wealth. The 
earlier shortages of specie which had assisted the state in maintaining 
a grip on currency transactions had been reversed by the influx of 
cheap silver form the New World. The treasury's devaluation 
measures were successful in lowering the price of domestic products, 
but failed to offset the lucrative incentives of surreptitious 
exportation created by the prohibitively high tariffs on international 
trade, from which the cyan elite profited significantly. 75 This led to 
stagnation in the crafts industries, great pressures on fixed income 
earners and further incorporation into the Western economic system. 
Indeed, the `Capitulations' system, which was initially aimed at simply 
conferring the autonomy of the millet upon foreign traders, had, by 
this time, burgeoned exponentially, constituting, once its privileges 
became hereditary, a huge tax-exempt class of foreign proteges 
impeding the development of an indigenous capitalist middle-class 76 
In all, "the combination of tax-farming and its resultant weakening of 
state controls on production, and the increasing concessions to 
foreign merchants and its resultant weakening of state controls on 
trade created a set of centrifugal forces that undermined the basic 
authority of the Porte" 77 Put another way, the state's capacity to 
correlate authority and economic value, the third of Mann's strategies of 
compulsory co-operation, was becoming increasingly impaired. 
These economic upheavals, the effects of which the state was now 
powerless to prevent being passed on to the reaya, added greatly to the 
instability within the Ottoman agricultural system. Sekban militia, 
often supported by groups of destitute countrymen removed from the 
74 See Karpat, K. (1972) pp 245-251. 
75 See Sunar, 1. (1987) pp 69-74 and Chandler, R (1971) p. 73. Salonika was, for 
instance, heavily involved in illegal exportation. There, external trade rose from 
900,000 piastres in 1700 to 9,500,000 piastres in 1786 (McGowan, B. , 1980, pp 
735- 
736). 
76 Peter Sugar reports that Austria alone certified 200,000 subjects in Moldavia and 
60,000 in Wallachia (1964, p. 154). 
113 
Chapter Three: The Politics of Empire 
land for non-payment of taxes, worked with provincial governors, a 
proportion of lesser cyan and the remnants of the sipabis to impose 
punitive and illegal levies on the peasantry. The state, heavily reliant 
on this alliance for the supply of revenue, could only look to effecting 
countervailing changes aimed at limiting the escalating recalcitrance 
of the fragmenting askeri. This was accentuated by the decline of the 
ulema's semi-independent political power base. Having been 
disastrously split by the faqib movement and the Sultan's increasingly 
despotic use of the örf, '8 they now lacked the horizontal links of the 
cyan to whom they turned for assistance. Eventually the cyan elite was 
largely able to absorb the office of provincial kadi thereby 
strengthening its position as an interjacent and politically influential 
body between state and subject 79 As tax intermediaries with impunity 
from the law, they were "able to shelter whole strings of villages from 
the fisc in return for near total control over village finances" 80 
Indeed, some were even elected by lesser tax-payers to represent their 
interests to the state and used this position to secure life-long tenure 
on their estates further weakening the state's capacity to correlate 
authority and economic value. 81 As a result, the kadis could no longer 
ascribe financial value with the authority of an agent of a unified 
askeri elite. The market now began to usurp the divided state as the 
primary method of determining economic worth. Riba and excessive 
profiteering became commonplace within the askeri as the bazaar 
took on the multiple and cross-cutting cleavages apparent in Europe. 
Particularly affected was the ulema. In fusing with the cyan elite, a 
small group of privileged families within the theocracy emerged who 
were able to monopolise positions of great influence and conceal 
77 Wallerstein, I., Decdeli, H. & Kasaba, R. (1987) p. 92. 
78 This movement vehemently opposed the increasing Western influences at work in 
the Ottoman empire arguing that much it constituted an illegal bidab (innovation). In 
attacking the European links and questionable lifestyles of some of the ukma elite, 
their leader, Mehmed Birgivi, attracted considerable support among the raga leading 
to a significant loss of ulema authority, unity and legitimacy (Inalcik, H., 1968, pp 25- 
26). 
79 For a more detailed account of this process, see tnalcik, H. (1977) pp 41-42. 
80 McGowan, B. (1994) p. 662. 
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huge wealth. 82 Consequently, their religious independence was greatly 
compromised "as a kind of ulema aristocracy developed and merged 
with the lay aristocracy, abandoning solidarity with the socially 
inferior ulema". 83 This was worsened by the recruitment of `official' 
clerics (ulema-resmiye) who had purchased their diplomas from the 
state and were therefore not qualified as an alim. 84 Religious students 
(softas) and low to medium ranking ulema, who saw their leaders' 
apparent corruption and support for the state's pro-European 
position as a threat to both their religious sensibilities and future 
employment opportunities, were joined by traditionalist elements of 
the armed forces in opposing the ulema elite's acceptance of increasing 
Westernisation. 85 Indeed, "leading ulema not only sanctioned and 
supported the innovations initiated by the sultans and their military 
and civil advisers, both Ottoman and European, some of them also 
played a major role in conceiving, suggesting and planning reforms on 
European lines". 86 Selim III's (1789-1807) chief judge, Tatarcik 
Abdullah, for instance, vehemently called for the adoption of Western 
battlefield techniques and equipment through the appointment of 
European advisers. 
This materialised in 1826 when the janissaries were replaced with a 
more disciplined and reliable standing army closely associated with 
Western influence. 87 Following its disastrous performance in the 
1828-1829 war with Russia, however, the new military struggled to 
gain the legitimacy of the reyßjye's traditional jihadi status. 88 Moreover, 
81 See Gibb, H. & Bowen, H. (1957) pp 193-194. 
82 Niyazi Berkes comments that during this period "the higher ulema were engaged 
in extra-curricular activities such as selling offices, degrees ranks and favours, 
usurious dealings, even in tax-farming and the expropriation of estates, and above 
all in controlling the pious foundations" (1964 [1998 edition]) pp 61-62. 
83 Levy, A. (1971) p. 14. 
84 See Chambers, R. (1972) p. 34. 
85 See Reed, H. (1980) pp 194-196. 
86 Heyd, U. (1961) p. 64. See also Shaw, S. (1965) p. 294. 
87 Hellmuth von Molte, later Prussian Chief of Staff, commented in 1835, while 
working for Mahmud II, that the Ottoman army had "Russian jackets, French 
regulations, Belgian weapons, Turkish caps, Hungarian saddles, English swords and 
instructors from all nations" (cited in Davison, R., 1963, p. 31). 
88 See Levy, A. (1971) pp 30-31. 
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with the incorporation of the empire into the world economic system, 
their role in the military pacification of trade routes (the first of Mann's 
strategies of compulsory co-operation) also declined. Maritime 
navigation did not require their presence and, although they remained 
capable of repressing sporadic civil disorders in the capital and 
disarming recalcitrant cyan, they proved consistently unable to prevent 
further imperial contraction. Their domestic influence was further 
diminished with the secularisation of the justice system during the 
TanZimat period (1839-1876) and the creation of a bureaucratic police 
department away from seyfiryye influence. 
Furthermore, the economic stimulus provided by their consumption 
needs (the military multiplier effect of Mann's second strategy of 
compulsory co-operation) became increasingly parasitical as overseas 
contractors, administered by the kaleme, undertook more and more 
of the empire's major construction projects. Moreover, these now 
predominantly involved wage labour thereby further diminishing the 
need for a coercive military presence in order to improve 
productivity. Similarly, since the dissolution of the trmar system, they 
neither had an active role in agricultural production nor in military 
recruitment, particularly after the introduction of conscription in 
1843. Indeed, the presence of non-Turkish conscripts within the 
professional army for the first time made the last of Mann's 
compulsory co-operation methods, coerced Busion, extremely 
problematic. Since barely one-third of the peasantry spoke Turkish, 
the language and culture of the centre could no longer be transmitted 
to the imperial periphery through the standing Xgfiyyye. 89 While the 
cultural extensiveness of the officer corps endured, their ability to 
socialise the peasant-infantry below them was curtailed. 90 This 
undermined the immanent legitimacy of the state and, without 
89 Rustow, D. (1964) pp 357-358. 
90 Quataert, D. (1994) pp 798-823. 
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offering an alternative structure, ruptured the cohesiveness of the 
seyfyye's ideological function. 91 
Indeed, the prior unity of ideological and political power which had 
proven so important to the maintenance and legitimacy of the state's 
coercive influence in the past had, by the beginning of the Tan#Mat 
period, significantly changed. Not only had the ulema and the seejfijye 
lost their vertical cohesion and much of their legitimacy, the political 
effects of changes to the kalemiyye, or scribal service, had further 
weakened the state's ideological infra-structure. Traditionally educated 
through the Palace School's broad and humanist curricula, 92 these 
civil servants were long associated with the `worldly' intellectual 
pursuits, or the adab. 93 During the eighteenth century the kalem jye 
became increasingly politically active providing the basis for six 
Grand Viziers between 1703 and 1774 and institutionalising 
considerable support for the pro-Western reformers. 94 Selim III 
further developed their influence by re-structuring the organisation 
along European bureaucratic lines and appointing civil servants to the 
newly-established embassies of the major European capitals 95 Closely 
associated with the centrality of state, the kalemýyye also gained a 
greater role in education provisions which were seen by the Ottoman 
elite as "the prime agent for accomplishing the aims of 
Westernisation". 96 To this end, the &f was used to remove 
responsibility for primary schooling from the offices of the , reyhülirlam 
in 1824 and to set up a ministry of education under bureaucratic 
91 As the contemporary statesmen Ahmed Cevdet observed, "In Europe, indeed, 
patriotism has taken the place of religious devotion, but this has happened at the 
end of their feudal period; their children hear the word `fatherland' while they are 
still small, and so years later the call of patriotism has become effective with their 
soldiers. But among us, if we say the word `fatherland' all that will come to the 
minds of the soldiers is their village squares. If we were to adopt the word 
'fatherland' now, and in the course of time, it were to acquire the power that it has 
in Europe, even then it would not be as potent as religious zeal, nor could it take its 
place". Cited in Lewis, B. (1961, p. 332). 
92 See Miller, B. (1941) Ch. 4. 
93 See Findley, C. (1980) pp 9-12. 
94 See Itzkowitz, N. (1962) p. 89. 
95 See Findley, C. (1970) p. 355. 
96 Kazamias, A. (1966) p. 52. 
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control in 1838. New secular schools, complemented by Western- 
orientated military colleges, were established to train an administrative 
elite and to provide the basis for a secular intelligentsia. 97 Graduates 
of these establishments did indeed became an influential clique who 
were able to dominate the legislative councils and key bureaucratic 
positions for much of the nineteenth century. 98 In all, the "civil- 
bureaucratic elite that assumed political pre-eminence in the era of 
reform took a leading role in altering, or even abandoning various 
elements of the traditional synthesis [of state and religion]". 99 
The Ottoman state, however, failed to make the bureaucracy 
subordinate to the political system and was thus unable to turn 
administrative modernisation into infra-structural power. Rather than 
avowedly neutral and entrusted with the best interests of civil society, 
the politicised kalemýyye came to dominate the askeri classes. As Peter 
Sugar puts it, "the expanding bureaucracy became increasingly 
centralised, its power being wielded by a steadily diminishing number 
of persons within it". 100 The process of structural and functional 
differentiation, strongly emphasised during the Tan! mat, was not 
accompanied by a flexible value system as the centralising state 
associated itself with secular modernity and civil society with Islamic 
traditionalism. 101 Instead, the centre's "preoccupation with saving the 
empire from destruction by its internal and external enemies led to a 
constant, and often exaggerated, fear of anarchy, rebellion and 
treason as a leitmotif of modernising Turkish statecraft". 102 The 
resultant attempts to establish a direct relationship between state and 
peasant through the Grilhane Rercript of 1839 and the Reform Edict of 
97 See Weiker, W. (1968) p. 460. New naval and infantry engineering schools had 
been set up in 1773 an 1793 respectively which, from 1827 onwards, started 
dispatching students to various European countries for further training. In 1831 the 
Imperial Music School, Mu! ika iHmayun Mektabi, was founded and in 1834 the 
School of Military Sciences, Mektebi Ulumi Herbiye. See Lewis, B. (1961) Chs. 3&4 
and Karpat, K. (1973) pp 44-45. 
98 See Shaw, S. (1970) passim. 
99 Findley, C. (1980) p. 11. My parenthesis. 
100 Sugar, P. (1964) p. 157. 
101 See Bellah, R. (1968) pp 188-189. 
102 Bianchi, R. (1984) p. 91. 
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1856 (which declared the equality of all Ottoman citizens) can 
therefore be seen as more an effort to appease the Western powers 
while organisationally outflanking the ayan in the niZam tradition than 
a recognition of the inalienable rights of man. 103 These re-centralising 
endeavours, supported by further efforts at land reform in 1858 (Land 
Code) and 1864 (Province Law), increased the powers of regional 
governors appointed from the kalemye and were widely regarded as 
reinforcing the bureaucratic state's own despotism. As a result, they 
provoked considerable opposition from the Turkish peasantry and 
outright rebellion amongst non-Turkish groups. 104 Such polarisation, 
coupled with the decentralised economic elite's enduring ability to 
resist the bureaucracy's interest in taxable agriculture, meant that the 
decline in provincialism, visible in much of Western Europe during 
this period, did not occur in the Ottoman empire. 
A fundamental cause of the state's inability to apply the reforms of 
the Tan mat was that the ideological channels it required to appeal to 
the peasantry over the heads of the class of provincial elites had, 
particularly in the periphery, fractured irrevocably. The previously 
ulema-controlled political communication channel of Caliph to 
peasant was now taken up by bureaucratic networks whose infra- 
structural capacity, while horizontally extensive within urban elite 
networks, was too limited to offer the state the same degree of 
vertical integration. This meant that unofficial transcendentalism, as 
an organisational alternative to the statist immanence of the centre, 
became increasingly significant as the nineteenth century wore on. 105 
As such, non-statist clerics, particularly those in the periphery, were 
able to utilise their long-established extensiveness to marshal what 
toi See Heper, M. (1985) pp 39-40 & Mardin, $. (1960) p. 425. 
104 Kemal Karpat argues that these measures proved more oppressive than the old 
cyan's control of the peasantry and so "people found it more congenial to follow 
their own communal leader" (1972, p. 263). 
105 For instance, the Kuleli incident of 1859 in which around forty theological 
professors and army officers conspired to overthrow the state on the grounds of its 
contravention of the rhariah. Roderic Davison notes that this event "provides a good 
index to widespread Turkish attitudes. It revealed... [a] condemnation of the 
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Eisenstadt describes as "free-floating resources" outside state 
control. 106 In contrast to the largely `Turkified' urban elite, the 
influence of these sheikhs, as leaders of the Sufi brotherhoods such as 
the enormous Qadiriya and Nagshbandiya, "began to extend far beyond 
the spiritual sphere" gaining acceptance not just from their own 
order, but also from the general public. 107 In 1880, for instance, the 
Naqsbbandi leader, Ubaidullah, was able to de-centralise enough 
political power to give him de facto control of the region of Nihri and a 
basis from which to launch a large-scale rebellion. 108 Significantly 
though, his target was not agents of the state, but local competitors 
which the recent Treaty of Berlin (1878) had appeared to favour. 109 In 
this sense, then, the ideological channel of cultural tradition, 
previously so rigorously controlled by the infra-structure of state, was 
now more representative of the growing competition between intra- 
peripheral groups. 110 In other words, the failure of the state to 
institutionalise new ideological methods of linking its apparatus to 
civil society reduced both its capacity to prevent political-ideological 
status being determined by decentralised civil forces and its ability to 
maintain ideological cohesion within its own political hierarchy. 
Alternative organisational forms thus began to emerge within the 
bureaucracy itself. The expanding education system, which trebled the 
government both for its reform edicts and its apparent submission to foreign 
influences" (1954, p. 861). My parenthesis. 
106 For the relationship of the ulema with the traditional periphery, particularly in 
south-east Anatolia, during this period, see Yegen, M. (1996) p. 219 and Eisenstadt, 
S. N. (1969) passim. 
107 Kreyenbroek, P. (1993) pp. 95. For a general account of Sufi heterodoxy, see 
Kissling, H. (1954) passim. 
tos Around 50,000 attacked the non-Sunni communities of the Urumiya plain, 
immediately displacing at least 10,000 people. The conflict was eventually 
suppressed amongst immense bloodshed by a combined Ottoman and Persian force 
after the majority of Ubaidullah's forces had gone home with their spoils. 
109 The Berlin Treaty offered protection to the Armenian community (Article 61) 
and was seen by many of the neighbouring social groups as "a stepping stone... 
towards the emergence of an independent Armenian state" (McDowall, D., 1992, p. 
56). 
110 Kemal Karpat supports this arguing that once the Tan#mat s legislation had 
replaced the protected status of millet with inapplicable notions of citizenship, "the 
relative position of the religious and ethnic groups within the Ottoman Empire 
began to be decided on the basis of their numerical strength" leading to "mutual 
interference and oppression" (1982, p. 163). 
120 
Chapter Three: The Politics of Empire 
literacy rate during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 111 had 
empowered both the state and civil society - offering each a means of 
autonomous infra-structural power. It also constituted what Mann 
terms a `potentially dislocating' ideological channel of communication 
through which a challenge to the state can be organised. As such, it 
was around the novel, the play and the newspaper that opposition to 
the Tanzimat reforms coalesced. 112 In contrast, the state failed to use 
the expanding paper media to explain its policies and defend its 
actions, preferring instead, particularly following Ali Pasha's decree of 
1867, to suspend and repress publications containing unfavourable 
comment, 113 a policy much extended under the reign of Abdul Hamid 
II (1876-1909). Through Namik Kemal's play Vatan (Fatherland), 
Ziya Pasha's novel Intzbah Yahut SergiZesti Ali By (Awakening or All 
Bey's Adventures) and the newspaper Basiret (Insight - published 
sporadically from 1869 to 1879), 114 the Young Ottomans, many of 
whom had been trained in the Mülkiye or other elite schools, called 
for restrictions on the despotic power of the state and a return to a 
romanticised vision of the empire's once-great glories. 115 
Namik Kemal, for instance, argued that the favourable position of 
non-Muslims through the millet and Capitulations systems was socially 
divisive and discriminatory and therefore un-Islamic and illiberal. 116 
The abolition of these would, he contended, lead to a rational and 
`modern' conception of group loyalty replacing the ancient idea of 
religious affiliation with the more immanent focus of the Ottoman 
vatan. In keeping with their close affiliation to the centre, the Young 
Ottomans were also strongly opposed to the enduring and, as they saw 
it, retrogressive influence of the provincial economic elites arguing 
III See Lewis, B. (1961) p. 455. 
112 See Mardin, 5. (1961). 
113 See Davison, R. (1987) pp 22-23. 
114 For a discussion of the role of this publication, see Mardin, 5. (1989) p. 123. For 
a broader account of the media during this period, see Karpat, K (1964a) pp 257- 
267. 
115 See Szyliowicz, J. (1971) and Kuran, E. (1962) p. 427. 
116 These points gained particular credence during the evacuation of Muslims from 
Belgrade and Crete in 1867. See Davison, R. (1954) pp 863-864. 
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that their support amongst the peasantry was due to the ongoing 
failure of the bureaucracy to fully modernise; in other words to 
represent civil society along Western infra-structural lines. 117 Herein, 
however, lay the problem for the Young Ottomans. The decline of the 
ulema as the primary medium of the state's `official' communication 
channel meant that the ideology of the centre could be imperialired no 
more. The Young Ottomans therefore failed to extend their vision of 
citizenship, despite the infra-structural potentials of the new literary 
media, outside their coterie of leisured ideologues. 
The Young Ottomans' inability to connect their self-contradictory 
pastiche of nationalism, pan-Islamism and Western liberalism to the 
provinces became apparent following the overthrow of Sultan Abdul 
Aziz in 1876.118 Although within the subsequent constitution, which 
Namik Kemal and Ziya Pasha helped to draft, a notional concept of 
Ottoman `citizenry' (without religious affiliation) was inscribed, 119 the 
monarchic prerogative, and therefore state absolutism, remained 
unrestricted. This was demonstrated immediately in the dismissal of 
the , reyhiilislam, 
Hayrullah Efendi (who had legitimised the 
dethronement of the Sultan) and the relegation of his office to the 
council of ministers. 120 Worse still for the reformers was the elections 
of 1877 which, with only members of provincial councils 
enfranchised, filled their long-requested parliament with influential 
provincial notables and middle-ranking ulema from the periphery. 121 
The elected deputies' did not, therefore, espouse the ideology of 
Young Ottomanism, but rather focused their criticism on the centrist 
bureaucracy which, it was claimed, caused backwardness in 
117 Writing in the newspaper Hürriyet (April 5th 1869) Ziya Pasha commented that 
"the [municipal] councils established after the Tan: mat in each town had as 
members the notables, that is to say, the old derebeys, who took the title of 
councilmen. While in the past it was possible to punish them [derebeys] severely... 
now the councilmen and clergy in each town have been oppressing the people 
several times worse than the old derebeyi' (cited in Karpat, K., 1972, p. 263, his 
parentheses, my emphases). 
us See Mardin, $. (1962a) p. 179. 
119 See Arai, M. (1991) p. 3. 
120 See Mardin, 5. (1989) pp 124-125 and Findley, C. (1980) pp 224-227. This decree 
in part provoked Ubaidullah's rebellion. 
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"agriculture, commerce, arts, science [and] all other matters of public 
interest". 122 So much so that Abdul Hamid abandoned the idea in 
February 1878 in favour of a programme of Islamically legitimised 
administrative reforms aimed at reinforcing state authority over the 
bureaucracy and "thus eliminating any form of political activity not 
directly under his control". 123 
However, despite greatly increasing the numbers of staff employed by 
the central bureaucracy, heaping honours on those deemed of 
influence and developing a sophisticated system of despotic terror, 124 
the kalemýyye continued to fragment. This was particularly 
compounded by substantial remuneration disparities between 
favoured and disfavoured bureaucratic offices and the commonplace 
use of summary dismissals, both of which significantly reduced 
morale and efficiency. As promotion and recognition became 
associated only with cronyism and titles sank in general esteem, the 
bureaucracy faltered and lost more of its cohesion. 125 This was 
worsened by the failure of the state to pay the interest on its debts of 
£200 million in 1881 leading to the establishment of the Public Debt 
Administration126 which institutionalised the position of European 
finance capital and limited the bureaucracy's control over the 
appropriation and utilisation of its revenues. 127 Thus it lost much of 
its authoritative control at both a horizontal state level and, as the 
social gap between ruler and ruled further widened, in terms of its 
121 See Devereux, R. (1963) Ch. 6. 
lu Cited in Karpat, K (1972) p. 269. For further analysis of parliamentary debate 
during its only two sessions, March 19 to June 28 1877 and December 13 1877 to 
February 14 1878, see Karpat, K (1969) passim. My parenthesis. Carter Findley 
comments that the parliament "displayed a level of independence, capability and 
procedural orderliness that astounded contemporary observers and subsequent 
historians - perhaps unduly, given the prominence among the deputies of the same 
sort of notables who had dominated the local assemblies created during the 
Tanfmaf' (1980, p. 226). 
223 Findley, C. (1980) p. 234. 
124 Such as the pro-Western sheikh Jamal al-Din Al Afghani who was highly 
decorated by the Sultan between 1894 and 1897 in an attempt to reinforce the 
palace's ideological legitimacy. See Deringil, S. (1991) for a more detailed account. 
125 This also affected the armed forces where student protests at even the most 
prestigious military schools became commonplace. 
126 The PDA is examined in detail in Blaisdell, D. (1929) passim. 
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ability to link state and civil society. In all, the state's attempts to 
strengthen its infra-structural reach over its agents and to outflank the 
emerging concert of interests between the provincial elites and 
disaffected elements within the civil service failed. 
Indeed, the decentralised power of this alliance was significantly aided 
by a considerable expansion in the export economy during Abdul 
Hamid's reign. 128 Provincial traders turned great profits (so much so 
that the officially bankrupt administration gained enough revenue to 
begin borrowing again) out of exports such as tobacco, opium, silk 
and wool leading to the appearance of a nascent Muslim middle- 
class. 129 Still largely deprived of political function by the omnipotently 
status-determining state superstructure, however, they were not, as 
Feroz Ahmad points out, "a bourgeois class that exercised any 
significant political influence on the state". 130 Thus the tension 
inherent in being an economic stake-holder denied of comparable 
political status, long a cause of separatist sentiment within the millets, 
became apparent within the emerging Muslim trading elite. Moreover, 
unlike the more segmental, or what Ilkay Sunar calls 
"disarticulated", 131 structure of non-Muslim export commodity 
production, this new entrepreneurial class was not disassociated from 
its broader socio-political context by intensive links with foreign 
powers. As the result, the expansion of the bureaucracy (which 
increasingly obliged the elite schools of the centre to enrol students 
from outside their traditional clique)132 offered these provincial elites 
an opportunity to establish a foothold in the political centre as well as 
to gain "a degree of professional specialisation [which] created the 
conditions for selectivity and stratification among the intelligentsia 
and produced eventually a political ideology and a leadership 
127 See Wallerstein, I., Decdeli, H. & Kasaba, R. (1987) p. 94. 
128 See Clark, E. (1974) passim. For an account of this seemingly paradoxical 
situation of boom and bankruptcy, see Keyder, C,. (1980) passim. 
129 See Pamuk $ (1987) pp 150-151. 
130 Ahmad, F. (1980) p. 329. 
131 Sunar, I. (1987) p. 83. 
132 See Kazancigil, A. (1981) p. 46. 
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group". 133 By the 1880s, opposition to bureaucratic centrism 
ye coalesced around five students of the Mekte`ýi Tibbiyeri Arkeri 
(Military Medical School) all of whom originated 'from the imperial 
periphery. 134 Thus the leadership of the Ottoman Society of Union 
and Progress (0smank Imbat ve Tarakks Cemiyetti), or so-called Young 
Turks as they became known, represented, from the outset, provincial 
opposition to the imperial state. In many ways, the emergence of this 
organisation, which will be examined in more detail in the following 
chapter, marked the beginnings of more than fifty years of intensive 
ideological power contention which was ultimately to result in the end 
of the Ottoman empire and the institutionalisation of a republican 
nation-state. 
Conclusion 
The extensive power of the Ottoman state's territorial claim was 
based on the unity between ideology and politics and, as such, was the 
primary mechanism through which newly acquired conquests were 
assimilated and governed. It provided the structure and the means to 
join the periphery to the centre. Embellished by the örf, ' it maintained 
a polity of sufficient adaptability to systematise highly diverse indigent 
groups as well as directly linking them to the state thereby staying 
organisationally ahead of civil society's inherent tendency to de- 
centralise power and spawn a ruling or intermediary class. In this 
sense, Islam provided the state with a more comprehensive and 
intensive socialisation mechanism than the Roman method of 
governing through a local ruling elite imbued with the cultural values 
of the centre. The combination of örf and shariah offered the Ottoman 
state a more socially inclusive structure of governance than the 
Roman ruling class society, in which Mann argues "only the elites 
were admitted into real membership". 135 The original 
133 Karpat, K. (1972) p. 277. My parenthesis. 
134 A Circassian, an Albanian, two Kurds, and an Azeri. See Shaw, S. & Shaw, E. 
(1977) pp 255-259. 
135 Ibid. p. 296. 
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transcendentalism of Islam's message was transformed by the military 
success and political symbolism of the Ottoman Caliph into an 
immanent ideological infra-structure flexible enough to absorb, or at 
least administer, the socially heterogeneous periphery. Structured by 
the omnipresent askeri hierarchy, the Ottomans' political-ideological 
monism thus gave the imperial state a level of territoriality hitherto 
unattained. 
This calls into question Mann's assertions regarding the exceptionally 
high levels of pre-modern infra-structural power the Roman empire 
possessed Indeed, if, as Mann contends, state power consists of the 
"centralised, institutionalised, territorialised regulation of many 
aspects of social relations", then the presence of a "partly 
decentralised" social group within the legionary economy would seem 
to limit significantly Rome's claim to territoriality. 136 In a dialectic not 
apparent within the Ottoman administration, the Roman state was, on 
the one hand, unable to gain centralised control of the intermediary 
class's socio-economic networks of power, but, on the other, such a 
decentralised structure could not flourish without the state's military 
role in the legionary economy. So, while the institutionalisation of a 
common ruling class culture was key to Rome's functional longevity, 
it proved too territorially limited to control the appropriation of social 
status within civil society. In other words, by allowing local elites to 
develop a political capability beyond their economic power base, the 
state was forced to govern through a senate of provincial aristocrats. 
Table Three: The Contradictions of Imperial Rule 
1 Universalism versus Particularism 
2 Decentralisation versus Centralisation 
3 Civilisation versus Militarism 
4 Equality versus Hierarchy 
5 Cosmopolitanism versus Uniformity 
136 Ibid. p. 26 & p. 280. 
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Since state function was so uni-dimensionally military in character and 
fundamentally reliant on decentralised social networks, the Roman 
empire was not, it seems, a territorial empire in the Ottoman sense. 
The ideological channels which Mann identifies within the Roman 
imperial polity, bound the ruling class together through a secular 
culture transmitted by a combination of Latin and Greek literary links, 
but were largely beyond the reach of the state. Without an integrated 
ideological function, and an economy controlled by an independent 
intermediary class, Mann's portrayal of the Roman's state's political 
claim to territoriality is largely based around a military role within the 
framework of compulsory co-operation. In contrast, the Ottoman 
state's organisation of social power was more multifaceted. 
Unencumbered by such a decentralised challenge, it owned the empire. 
Neither within the manufacturing economy nor as part of agricultural 
production was there the "three-way power standoff" between the 
state, its agents and an established intermediary class. 137 While these 
decentralising tendencies are an inherent factor in imperial rule and 
one that is crucial to an understanding of the decline of Rome, as it is 
to the decline of the Ottoman empire, its manifestation is not made 
inevitable by the weakness of imperial infra-structural power. So long 
as it continued to expand, the Ottoman state was able to allocate 
sufficient resources to its military-ideological-political super-structure 
to prevent such challenges emerging, even within its periphery. This 
gave it a political function and a despotic, autonomous territoriality 
not simply based on a monopoly of coercive force. Its extensive 
network of clerical, military and commercial agents added a 
comprehensive and statist political-ideological dimension to civil 
society's social networks at a very intensive level. Moreover, unlike 
Mann's depiction of a horizontally unified ruling class in Rome, the 
asken's strongly vertical organisational nature was continually 
reinforced by comprehensive systems of state intervention. Few 
within the Ottoman administration could read, no empire-wide lingua 
franca existed and, apart from fiscal records undertaken by treasury 
137 Ibid. pp 280-282. 
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officials, written communication was rare. In all, the multi-ethnic, 
poly-lingual and non-stratified askeri could not be considered a 
universal ruling class in the form that Mann sees as a feature of 
Roman social organisation. 
Of the four ideological channels which Mann identifies within the 
Roman imperial polity, three - the authoritative/official, the armed 
forces and the artisan - were heavily circumscribed by the Ottoman 
state's networks of ideological power. These provided a means of 
resolving the contradictions of imperial rule, set out in Table Three, 
which, Mann argues, the Romans had been unable to do. 138 So long 
as the Ottoman state maintained control over these, channels, 
particularism was weak as no hereditary aristocracy could challenge 
the universalism of the Caliph's ummah. 139 Nor could it develop 
organisational alternatives to the centralised position to the state 
which, unlike Rome, did not lack `real' infra-structural power. The 
complexity and comprehesiveness of these networks ensured that 
civilisation and militarism were kept apart. State-controlled normative 
structures could absorb and govern newly-conquered communities 
through economic and ideological linkages without the need for 
perpetual military coercion. By the sixteenth century, this had 
established a system of vassal states, never fully subjugated, covering 
extensive areas of central Europe, the Hijaz and the Caucuses. In 
both the periphery and the core, social status was too heavily 
controlled by the state to permit a political challenge to the 
ideologically `natural' hierarchy of Sultan to peasant thereby 
organisationally outflanking claims to egalitarian citizenship. This 
verticality obviated the need for an official uniformity thus the fourth 
channel of ideological power, the cultural traditions of localised 
networks such as regional languages and shared beliefs, which, as 
Mann points out, "could communicate unaided only over small 
138 Ibid. pp 306-307. 
139 By political extension this fellowship also included, administratively at least, Jews 
and Christians as the Qur'anically defined ah! -xl kitab (people(s) of the book). 
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spaces", 140 was either ignored or tacitly promoted by the Ottoman 
state as a means of strengthening the cosmopolitan `segmentalism' of 
the reaya. 141 
Figure Three: Changes in Ottoman Ideological Channels of 
Communication 
Mercantile Embedded in Decentralised by cyan 
state 
Gradually absorbed by, 
Controlled and then challenged from Official by ulema within, the bureaucracy 
Cultural Localised Politicised in intra- 
traditions segments periphery polarisation 
Military Embedded in Decentralised by 
ideological conscription and 
state fratnentation of askeri 
Once the Ottoman state's capacity to infra-structurally support its 
position as the only arbiter of ideological legitimacy and political 
function diminished during the nineteenth century, however, 
contradictory interstitial trends similar to those in Rome emerged 
within these channels. As Figure Three illustrates, particularist 
patrimonialism became commonplace within state agencies as the 
traditional divide between askeri and reaya gave way to more 
decentralised socio-economic groups. Utilising the official channel of 
the state bureaucracy and the nascent literacy networks existent 
within sections of civil society, the Young Ottomans and then the Young 
Turks institutionalised, firstly, an elite and, secondly, a provincial 
challenge to further centralisation. This diminished the religious 
proto-nationalist efficacy of the ulema without institutionalising a 
140 Ibid. p. 311 
141 For example in the millet system. 
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viable alternative. As a result and in contrast to Western patterns of 
social change, the state's infra-structural reach diminished. 
Concurrently, the cyan were able to increase their influence over 
mercantile channels of ideological communication within the 
periphery eventually decentralising a limited amount of political 
power and thus, by the early nineteenth century, taking on many of 
the characteristics of a semi-extensive intermediary `class'. As a result 
of the expansion of the state's bureaucracy, they were able to build on 
these provincial network to gain a foothold in the educational 
establishments of the core. 
Figure Four: Changes in Ottoman Compulsory Co-operation 
Military Seyfijye's 
Overseas contracts 
Multiplier Stimulus administered 
by 
kalemiyve 
I Military Safir yds pacification social 
position 
Authority and The state's 




of labour position of 
IsYfYeI 
Shift in trade routes and 
domestic policing 
controlled by kalemiyye 
Replaced by 
market forces 
End of timar system 
and fragmentation of 
ulema 
Coerced Resisted by Partially attempted 
diffusion the state through standing 
armies 
Now more marginal to the state's centralised control, the military's 
ideological channel also became increasingly subject to decentralising 
influence. Previously embedded in the ulema's immanent organisation 
of state power, Western-style bureaucratisation and successive defeats 
weakened their ability to transmit the ideology of the centre to the 
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periphery. Overlapping with the military's communication channel, 
was the state's capacity to regulate the cultural traditions of the 
provinces. While expanding, the imperial centre was generally able to 
ensure that these intra-peripheral networks remained localised and 
intensive. Increases in the standing army, coupled with the growing 
power of both local elites and foreign agents, however, eventually 
brought about an intensification of these cultural channels and a rise 
in intra-peripheral conflicts largely beyond state control. In all, despite 
lacking the horizontal extensiveness necessary to challenge the 
systemic position of the state, such decentralising networks within the 
empire's ideological channels of communication were able to exploit 
wider social changes occurring during this period and establish 
organisational alternatives to the imperial super-structure. They 
provided the basis, or in Mann's terms `laid the tracks', for the 
disassembly of segmental cosmopolitanism in favour of a national- 
state Gesellschaft. 
The decline of the state's supervisory position, the rising influence of 
the West and the growing strength of decentralised market forces also 
meant that compulsory co-operation, as a method of imperial 
domination, could no longer form the basis of Ottoman territoriality. 
As Figure Four illustrates, the military multiplier effect was reduced as 
the state bureaucracy, and then overseas contractors, increasingly 
administered centrally-planned infra-structural enterprises. The 
military's pacifying function was also reduced as trade linkages shifted 
away from trans-imperial routes and towards the greater cost 
effectiveness of maritime transportation. Bureaucratisation also 
diminished their role in the domestic repression of the reaya as 
`modern' police systems acquired civil authority. Within the bazaar, 
the state's military function similarly changed. The ulema/seyfiryye's 
military/ideological complex was no longer required to correlate 
authority and economic value as the decentralised market forces of 
international capitalism gradually became the empire's primary 
economic organisational form. With the end of the trmar system, 
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neither was the state's military input into state extraction necessary. 
The emergence of the ayan as a semi-extensive, decntralised economic 
class prevented military agents of the state from gaining direct access 
to the peasantry. As a result, the exploitation of the reaya was more 
dependent on local elites and international economic forces than on 
the `repression as benevolence' of compulsory co-operation. 
Elements of coerced diffusion were, in response, used by the state as 
an attempt to re-impose their authority. Within the standing armies 
which replaced the ripahi system, for instance, technological advances 
were extending to provincial outposts, but without sufficient 
restrictions on their agents status and wealth accumulation (plus the 
ideological fragmentation brought by conscription), the state was 
unable to prevent these from merging with elite groups within the 
reaya. In all, the collapse in the Ottoman version of compulsory co- 
operation meant that, while the state's emphasis on political change in 
the inkilab tradition ensured that most decentralised power networks 
generally remained segmental and disarticulate, the three-way stand- 
off, which according to Mann's was inherent in all pre-modern 
empires, began to appear. 
While much of this analysis represents a new, and occasionally 
contradictory, addition to Mann's general theoretical framework, his 
model remains illuminating. Having highlighted many of these 
contradistinctions, it is important to emphasise that the 
institutionalisation of social power within the Ottoman empire 
constitutes, in many ways, a refinement of Mann's construction of the 
methods of imperial domination and ideological organisation rather 
than a refutation. This is particularly the case as the Ottoman state's 
capacity to support its position declined and the empire took on the 
more decentralised characteristics apparent in Mann's treatment of 
earlier empires. In all, this account of Ottoman continuity and change 
suggests that Mann's macro-historical approach provides an 
appropriate and profitable means of analysing and comparing patterns 
of large-scale social reorganisation. Thus both Mann's theoretical 
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composition and his diachronic exposition will be used to look at the 
end of the empire and the establishment of the Turkish republic in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four: The Ideology of Modernism 
This chapter looks at the ideological basis of Turkish nationalism. It 
will focus on three key areas of Mann's historiographic model, namely 
ideological power's inherent characteristics, the development of non- 
religious modes of social explication and what he terms the rise of 
`proto-nationalism' in north-western Europe. Considered first, will be 
the social origins and growth of modernism in the late Ottoman 
empire and its effects following the First World War. Important areas 
of development here are the importation of Western concepts of 
post-Enlightenment rationalism, language reform and changes in 
educational provisions. Secondly, the origins of `Turkism' will be 
traced and compared to Pan-Islamic and Pan-Ottoman alternatives 
current in the thinking of the bureaucratic and military elites of the 
late Ottoman period. Thirdly, the post-imperial emergence of 
ethnocentrism will be looked at in relation to policies pursued during 
the 1914-18 war and in the early years of the Turkish republic. The 
extent to which these were successful in the narrowing of the 
Ottoman centre/periphery divide will be examined with particular 
reference to legislation enacted during the 1920s. 
Mann's Model of Ideological Power 
Mann outlines seven generally applicable reorganising, or `tracklaying', 
achievements of ideological power. ' As Table Three illustrates, the 
first was the resolution of the contradictions of Roman imperial rule 
in favour of univeralism, egalitarianism, decentralisation, 
cosmopolitanism and civilisation. The Ottoman Empire was, 
however, not so prone to these contradictions as Rome. Its 
organisation of ideological power, particularly through its control of 
literacy (a second tracklaying achievement), generally provided civil 
society with an infra-structure that was universalist, cosmopolitan and 
I Mann, M. (1986) pp 363-371. 
134 
Chapter Four: The Ideology of Modernism 
normatively civilising. The empowering effects of compulsory co- 
operation and the spread of a `two-step structure of literacy' (in which 
written messages were carried by key individuals within each locality 
and then passed on verbally) during the nineteenth century, however, 
led to an increase in decentralised and egalitarian ideological power 
networks in opposition to the Ottoman state. In this sense, then, 
power contention in the latter part of the nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century was focused more on the state's highly centralised 
and hierarchical social infra-structure than on networks of 
particularism, enforced uniformity and militarism. 
Table Four: Tracklaying Achievements of Ideological Power 
1 The Resolution of the Contradictions of Imperial Rule 
2 The Control of Literacy 
3 The Extension of Social Identity 
4 The Narrowing of the State-Subject Divide 
5 The Capacity to Supersede Existing Structures 
6 The Control of Core Social Spheres 
7 The Development of Milita Morale 
A third tracklaying achievement was ideological power's capacity to 
transcend existing social structures by extending personal and social 
identity across gender, ethnic, class and state boundaries. Its emphasis 
on what Mann calls `the fundamental questions of existence', of inter- 
personal ethics and of familial relations expanded the collective power 
of diffused mutualised belief systems. Operating with other power 
networks, this tended to break down localised social structures, such 
as the `cultural traditions' of the millets, and, in ideology's fourth 
tracklaying achievement, to bring the masses closer to state. The 
inherent transcendency of ideological power could, in other words, be 
immanently employed to mobilise support for new or established 
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social structures. Where ultimate meaning was located outside the 
existing economic, military and political structures, such support 
intensified specifically ideological networks of power. This fifth 
tracklaying achievement was important to the Ottoman state as a 
means of both conquering and absorbing new territory. 
Ideological power is not autonomous, however. Its sixth tracklaying 
achievement, the near-monopoly of control over `core social spheres' 
such as cosmology, ethics, familial relationships and the life cycle, 
remained intensive and reliant on alternative power networks for 
territorial extensiveness. Islam, for example, was not only diffused by 
clerics, but also by traders and soldiers. Indeed, the relationship 
between ideological networks and military morale, a seventh 
tracklaying achievement, has been an enduring organisational 
connection and fundamental to the success of Ottoman expansion. 
For Mann, though, its legitimatisation of violence tended to reduce 
the universalism of the third achievement. Ideological networks have, 
moreover, largely failed to impose universalist notions upon other 
macro-power structures such as gender and class dominance further 
reducing their power autonomy. In Europe, Christianity 
simultaneously provided a transcendent classless ideology which was 
extensive and pacifying enough to stimulate trade and a social 
immanence reinforcing the existing production relations of the 
Roman hierarchy it had inherited. As Mann concludes, "religions did 
not so much transcend existing power organisations as parallel 
them". 2 During the early medieval period, these consisted of two 
authoritative hierarchies of bishopric and monastic social networks 
administered by their own judiciaries and supported by a revenue 
systems coexistent with those of secular institutions. Like the ummah- 
Caliph relationship, it afforded a basis for social identity broader than 
that of any other power source and provided a framework for other 
divisions such as class and literacy. Pilgrimage to the Levant or the 
Hijaz broke down intensive, localised power relations and broadened 
Ibid. p. 367. 
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integrative ideological and trading links. This was instrumental in 
extending the `normative pacification' of the Christian and Muslim 
ethic which, with its greater complexity and efficiency than simple 
coercion, became "the main guardian of civilisation" for both the 
ecumene and the ummah. 3 
For Mann, such extensiveness was obvious at four levels. Firstly, at a 
regional level the Church co-ordinated campaigns against banditry 
and overly exploitative agricultural and trading practices. In a similar 
process to the Ottoman ulema's administration of the Caliph's 
obligation of hisba (the guardianship of public morals), the Church's 
organisation of legitimacy was both more intensive and infra- 
structurally more extensive than that of political, economic and 
military units. Secondly, at a political level the bishops and abbots 
supported the rule of the monarch with sacral authority and literate 
clerics in a structure comparable to that of the Ottoman theocracy. 
Thirdly, the papacy, like the Caliph, was an important arbiter of inter- 
state relations. Few monarchs would resist their influence and risk 
excommunication from Rome or a condemnatory fatwa from the 
, reyhülislam. 
Fourthly, on an inter-continental level the Church co- 
ordinated the defence of Christendom and the victory in the Holy 
Lands. Later, Istanbul, too, was able to raise armies in defence of the 
ummab and as guardian of Al-Kaba, Al-Madina and Al-Aqsar. 
How then did the tracklaying extensiveness of the Christian 
fellowship and the Caliph-led ummab come to an end? In approaching 
the European question, Mann suggests four forces based around 
economic growth which, in a movement assisted by the literate 
classes (including the Church itself), eventually led to the 
secularisation of the ecumene. 4 The first, the development of scientific 
rationality, was a particular problem for the papacy. Endowed with a 
greater interpretative role than the more exegetically constrained 
3 Ibid. p. 382 [he refers only to Europe]. 
4 Ibid. pp 463-472. 
137 
Chapter Four: The Ideology of Modernism 
Muslim theocracy, the Church had elaborated "a complete set of 
cosmological doctrines that were central to its imperial legacy of 
authority, but that were hardly central to original Christian dogma". 5 
In responding with repression to the suggestion that these might be 
refutable, the Church polarised the division between faith and reason. 
This enlarged the area of debate from issues of natural history into 
the Church's `core spheres' of social explication. The Ottoman 
organisation of Islam, with its greater theological delimitation 
between matters of belief (taqwa) worship (ibada) and societal relations 
(muamalaal generated a less authoritative grip on issues of cosmology. 
Both the comprehensiveness of Islam's early analytical texts and its 
rejection of vicarious atonement devolved only limited interpretative 
powers to the ulema and therefore offered the believer an autonomy 
quite different from the subjects of Christendom. This meant that 
significant scientific and mathematical advances, as well as rigorous 
social commentaries, 6 could be undertaken without provoking a 
comparably despotic response. Indeed, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, it was only when the Western conflict between religion and 
science had informed and exported emergent forms of consciousness, 
such as the frameworks of class and nation, during the nineteenth 
century that challenges to the Ottoman ideological super-structure 
emerged with any significant power. 
A second secularising force within both the ecumene and the ummah 
was that of emergent capitalism. Once the market started to replace 
the Ottoman state as the principal organisational form within the 
imperial economy the tension between a centralised ideological 
authority and the decentralised decision-making required by capitalist 
exchange, apparent in Europe since the middle ages, also began to 
emerge. Similarly, the institutionalised restraints on status legitimised 
by the Church in Europe and the ulema in the Ottoman empire were 
at odds with the imperatives of commodity production in which, as 
S Ibid. p. 464. 
6 For a survey of the more prominent of these, see Faroghi, S. (1999) Ch. 6. 
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Mann notes, "nothing apart from property ownership is given a fixed 
and authoritative status". 7 In contrast to the Ottoman state's 
emphasis on hisba - the surveillance of public morals - and the 
importance of intervening on behalf of the peasantry, capitalist value 
allocation offers no intrinsic worth to labour beyond its 
exchangeability with other elements of production. Furthermore, 
capitalism's logic of continual reinvestment differed from the wealthy 
believer's social obligation to maintain a large household, give alms 
(or sadaqa) to the poor and provide extensive local employment 
opportunities. As such, entrepreneurial forces found little ideological 
support in the established orders of the late medieval ecumene and the 
Ottoman empire of the nineteenth century. Instead, the fledgling 
bourgeoisie of both societies turned towards more apposite meaning 
systems which, through decentralised literary networks, better 
expressed their normative solidarity. 
The third and fourth secularising forces of the ecumene were based in 
the geopolitics of Europe. The navigational revolution of the fifteenth 
century, which in Mann's view was instrumental in the uniquely swift 
economic advance of north-western Europe, brought great increases 
in trade to the Ottoman Mediterranean ports. These, like those of the 
Atlantic and Baltic seaboards, became centres of mercantile 
interaction at the edge of the ideological centre's infra-structural 
reach. While in Europe, the geo-political effects of this could be 
quickly seen in the rapid politicisation of Luther's protest of 1517, in 
the Ottoman empire it was not until Muslim mercantile groups from 
western Anatolia began significantly investing in international trade in 
the nineteenth century that shifts in regional economic power became 
a potential means of ideological decentralisation. The segmental 
nature of the millet system, which had ensured that the ideological 
channel of `cultural traditions' remained localised and intensive 
without the organisational power to infiltrate the more extensive 
Mann, M. (1986) p. 465. 
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networks of `official' communication supervised by the ummah, 8 
proved highly susceptible to what Mann calls the `proto-nationalist' 
forces of a divided and politicised Christendom. Although socially 
embryonic and primarily apparent in the Protestant states further 
west, the gradual emergence of the national-state in the aftermath of 
the wars of religion was a powerful influence across the continent. 
This, the fourth of Mann's secularising forces, eventually became an 
important element in the Ottoman state's loss of ideological 
legitimacy. 
The `religious' proto-nationalism which emerged from sixteenth 
century Protestantism and the Catholic Counter-Reformation, was the 
first of five `phases' of nationalist development identified by Mann. 9 
Three of these will be outlined here. The fourth and fifth, the 
`industrial capitalist' and `modernist' phases, emerged following the 
Turkish industrialisation and urbanisation processes of the 1950s and 
thus will be looked at in the following chapters. There were two 
elements, Mann suggests, to the pre-modern `religious' proto- 
nationalism of the late-Renaissance ecumene. The first was the Church's 
ability to spread the vernacular of the centre through its domination 
of literary networks. This increased the efficacy of the state's `official' 
ideological channel and, in displacing local dialects, reduced the 
intensity of localised social networks in favour of broader, more 
extensive perceptions of identity. In the Ottoman empire, this effect 
was uncommon as the language of the centre was saturated with 
classical Arabic and Persian and therefore generally unintelligible to 
the reaya. The Ottoman ulema's educational and social infra-structure 
which trained state officials and, until the nineteenth century, largely 
controlled the elite's discursive literary networks in fact often 
represented an obstacle to attempts at standardisation and dispersal of 
a common language. The second was the tendency of the Church to 
organise popular support for the geo-political conflicts of the state. 
8 See Mardin, $. (1966) p. 380. 
9 See Mann, M. (1993) Ch. 7. 
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While discernible in the wars of religion, this was somewhat restricted 
by the ecumene's still essentially trans-national character. The ulema, 
too, continued to be constrained by its own universalist creed and the 
cosmopolitan nature of its constituency. 
Table Five: The Media of Commercial-Statist Proto-Nationalism 
1 The Standardisation of Milita Texts 
2 The Education of Administrators by the State 
3 The Development of Universities not under Church Control 
4 Trade-Based Literary Links 
5 The Legal Profession 
6 Printed Media 
7 Discussion Centres 
From around 1700 onwards, Mann argues that a second, pre-modern 
phase of proto-nationalism began in Europe. The secularising forces 
of emergent capitalism institutionalised a form of `commercial- 
statism' in which, as Table Four illustrates, discursive literacy 
expanded outwards from the Church through seven principal media 
eventually providing the basis for modern nationalism. 10 Both 
Protestantism and Catholicism had, from the sixteenth century 
onwards, encouraged Bible reading and the writing of simple tracts 
leading to increases in signing literacy in much of Europe. From this 
foundation, discursive literacy emerged firstly from standardisation of 
military texts in keeping with the large increases in armed forces 
expenditure during the seventeenth century. 11 Secondly and thirdly, 
the literacy of higher state administrators also moved away from 
Church control as universities took on wider educational roles. 
10 Here, Mann's categories of literary and periodical media are collapsed into `printed' 
media. Ibid. pp 35-43. 
11 Mann writes that military manpower had reached 5 per cent of the total 
population in many states by the end of the eighteenth century (1993, p. 37). 
141 
Chapter Four: The Ideology of Modernism 
Fourthly, commercial networks, particularly in trading occupations 
and regions, developed literacy links based on marketing, accounting 
and contractual arrangements beyond the reach of the Church. 
Linking these two forces with the ideology of the state, the legal 
profession emerged as a fifth medium, doubling in size in most 
eighteenth century European countries. Sixthly, the expansion of 
printed media during this period extended both religious and secular 
discursive literary networks enhancing the transcendentalism of 
decentralised ideological discourse. Lastly, discussion centres such as 
taverns, libraries and coffee-houses emerged as centres of organised 
readership well away from the influence of the Church and its 
emphasis on family life. All these media diffused a secularised literate 
culture downward from the old regime leading to what Mann 
identifies as a rudimentary shared notion of civil citizenship. 
The growth in militarism during the nineteenth century challenged 
trans-national elements within proto-nationalism and institutionalised 
the cross-class, state-linked characteristics of modern nationalism. By 
around 1840, Mann argues that this militarism had helped to produce 
three forms of `quasi' nation-states. 12 Mainland Britain and France, he 
suggests, were examples of a national consciousness that reinforced 
state boundaries. In Prussia, pan-German sentiment had begun to 
institutionalise a state creating form of nationalism and in Austria 
group identities tended to be based on units contained within the 
sovereign totality and therefore state subverting. While economic 
networks assisted in these processes by stabilising identities and 
expanding literacy over large areas of Europe, it was not until later in 
the nineteenth century that they began to encourage what Mann calls 
"a distinctively national civil society". 13 Initially, he argues, militarist 
nationalism was centred on the expansion and centralisation of 
political networks. Through taxation and conscription, states imposed 
a greater extractive demand upon civil societies in order to support 
12 Ibid. p. 218. 
13 Mann, M. (1995) p. 47. His emphasis. 
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their geopolitical commitments within a global arena increasingly 
defined by military prestige and territorial competition. Since the 
dominant classes of Europe were better able to establish organised 
resistance to such demands, the expanding pressures of the state were 
regarded by civil society, particularly the bourgeoisie and petite 
bourgeoisie, as a process of retrogression. As a result the `proto- 
national' discursive media of the `commercial-statist' phase became 
imbued with the ideology of political citizenship based on exclusive 
notions of `the people'. Male, bourgeois citizens from the dominant 
religious and ethnic groups defined themselves as a nation to which 
the state should be coterminous. The militaristic features of these 
sentiments were intensified by fears of populist radicalism 
exacerbated by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. 14 In 
all, Mann concludes that "self-conscious nations emerged from the 
struggle for representative government, initially born of the pressures 
of state militarism". ls 
Science. Language and Education 
Calls for representative government in the Ottoman empire also 
emerged from the pressures of militarism. The discursive networks of 
Young Turk modernism apparent in the 1890s had their origins in the 
elite military academies modelled on the European nation-states. 16 
Their emphasis on rationalism and pro-Westernism was, however, 
much older. A science of reason, born of a traditional interest in 
Classical Greek learning, had long prompted endogenous critical 
analyses of Islamic state-craft. Ottoman writers worked in the 
internationally-known tradition of Ibn Khaldoun's exposition on 
Abbasid society and political sociology. Lufti Pasha, for example, was 
already warning of an unpromising future characterised by growing 
social inequity and threatening maritime states to the west as early as 
14 Britain, for example, committed an unprecedented 31-43 per cent of her GNP to 
this conflict with France (Mann, M., 1992, p. 153). 
IS Ibid. p. 48. 
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1541.17 By 1630 commentaries on Ottoman collapse were meticulous 
and damning. With what Bernard Lewis calls, "sombre detail and 
astonishing frankness", 18 Kochu Bey's Risale pointedly attributed 
Ottoman enfeeblement to palace intrigue, corruption within the askeri 
and the decline of the timar system. A century later, Ibrahim 
Müteferrika argued in Usul ul-Hikam fi NiZam ul-Umam (Rational Bases 
for the Politics of Nations) that the Ottoman Empire failure to adopt 
European methods of governance and scientific exploration was the 
root of its inability to compete geo-politically. With the patronage of 
Sultan Ahmed III (1703-1730), this was complemented by treatises 
discussing Descartes' theory of vortices and Galileo's treatment of 
Aristotelian physics. 19 By the time of Sultan Selim III's reign (1789- 
1807) Western innovations were an institutionalised and ongoing 
element of Ottoman political change. As well as being aimed at 
appeasing the European powers and attempting (ultimately 
unsuccessfully) to exclude the cyan from political influence, these 
measures were also intended, perhaps primarily, to reverse the 
military fortunes of the empire. Each element of a triangular 
relationship between the bureaucratic state, the military and provincial 
elites possessed its own vested interests in further Westernisation 
legitimised by what Ergun Özbudun calls the "Islamic modernism" of 
pro-European clerics20 In this sense, many Ottoman scholars began 
to focus on the contradictions of Ottoman imperial rule in ways 
similar to those deployed by late-Roman Christian theocrats. Since 
the Ottoman imperial system provided a structure that was, nominally 
at least, universalist, cosmopolitan and normatively civilising, the 
ideology of pro-Western intellectualism increasingly emphasised 
greater equality and decentralisation. 
16 This highly disparate and often contradictory movement can only be considered 
as sharing a general unity in its opposition to "an arbitrary and fantastic Sultan" 
(Blind, Iß., 1896, p. 832). 
'7 Arafnannr (The Book of Asaph) 
1e Lewis, B. (1973) p. 203. 
19 See Berkes, N. (1964) pp 36-47. 
20 Özbudun, E. (1984) pp 25-33. 
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Two thinkers particularly influential on the development of late 
Ottoman self-reflection generally and Young Turk ideology particularly 
were the Egyptian Muhammed Abduh (1849-1905) and the Iranian21 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1899). Both argued that there was no 
distinction between Islam and human reason and emphasised the 
importance of jihad (individual reasoning) in the interpretation and 
application of the Qur'an and the Sunnah in the modem era. Afghani 
also argued that "what the prophet received through inspiration was 
the same as what the philosopher could attain by use of reason". 22 
However, such rationalism was, he continued, unlikely to appeal to 
the masses who were still dominated by the dogma of less scientific 
approaches. It was therefore up to a small, sagacious elite to guide the 
ummab away from the obscurantism of madhab-dominated 
jurisprudence towards a purer basis for `group solidarity' (al asabýyya). 
For Abduh, too, how to instil a popularly held `common will' without 
fomenting fanaticism (ta'assub) was also a recurring theme. In a 
journal published with Al-Afghani in Paris in 1884 and in his later 
work, Abdul argued that the principles of Islamic leadership should 
be grounded on the rational ethics of representation, consultation and 
accountability found within an enlightened understanding of the 
shariah. '3 
Such ideas of religion and science's commensurate properties 
significantly influenced thinkers prominent in the early development 
of opposition to Abdul Hamid's government. Elements of this 
`modernism' can be observed in each of the three major factions that 
Niyazi Berkes identifies within the pre-revolutionary Young Turk 
movement 24 For instance, Ahmet Riza (1859-1930), a former 
employee at the Ministry of Education, established a following 
through his journal Mechveret (Consultation) associated with French 
21 There is considerable controversy surrounding Jamal al-Din's place of birth. Nikki 
Keddie convincingly argues his claims to be from Afghanistan (hence the epithet) 
were based on his desire to present himself as a Sunni (Keddie, N., 1972). 
u Cited in I lourani, A. (1970) p. 123. 
u See Kerr, M. (1966) pp 129-152. 
24 Berkes, N. (1964) pp 304-313. 
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positivism and the work of Auguste Comte. 25 In 1896 and 1897 he 
wrote seven memoranda to the Sultan arguing that "there is no means 
of saving the country... other than education and the positive 
sciences" . Insisting that the sbariab obligated the Caliph to promote 
such societal betterment through representative mechanisms, he 
called for the restoration of the 1876 constitution and further 
`Ottomanisation'. Led by the Daghcstani, Murad Bey, a former 
professor at the Alekebi hfiilkiye (Civil Service Academy), a second 
group emerged around the publication Afiian (Balance). They, too, 
pointed to the limitations that the sbariab imposes upon the Caliph, 
but, unlike Riza's Parisian coterie of Western favourites, they also 
maintained a strongly anti-European line. Based in Cairo, Taurad and 
his associates called for a pan-Islamic "Board of Supervisors that 
would have the power to repel the encroachment of government... 
and, thus, to ensure quality and fraternity between the nationalities": 27 
The third dement was led by Prince Sabahaddin, a nephew of the 
Sultan, who after fleeing to Paris in 1898, developed a diagnosis of 
Ottoman problems inspired by the work of the French social 
scientist, Frederic Lc Play. With an instrumentalist approach to 
religion similar to that demonstrated by Riza and his followers, 
Sabahaddin's group argued that Western experts should be employed 
to implement a programme of educational reforms aimed at moving 
Ottoman society away from its collectivist identity towards a 
egalitarian, individualist model. This, it was suggested, could be best 
achieved with a substantial decentralisation of state power to local 
government level. 
None of these approaches considered the notion of Turkish' 
collective identity. Their objectives were to reduce nationalist 
irredentism and prevent further losses of imperial territory. Riza and 
Sabahaddin's unit of analysis was the Ottoman empire as a whole, 
while A(urad wrote of a supra-national administration governing 
35 See RAmuur, R. (1965) pp 22-26. 
36 Cited in Bctke,, N. (1964) p. 306. 
37 Cited in ibij., p. 309. 
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umrnab-controllcd lands and including both Muslim and non-Muslim 
subjects. For each, their aims could be achieved through a revitalised 
application of Islam, with existent ideological and political structures 
largely intact. By 1904, however, a fourth, much more centrist, 
ideological current was discernible in the publication of Yusuf 
Akcura's essay Üc TaTI Siyaset (Three Forms of Politics). Born in 
Russia and influenced by Pan-Turkist resistance to the Czar, he 
argued that, with the help of the technologically superior nation-states 
of Europe, non-Turkish millet: would inevitably attain independence 
regardless of the largely ineffectual creeds of Pan-Islamism and 
Ottomanism. The Turks should thus concentrate on reducing the 
provincialism and social heterogeneity of the Antolian core and 
improving its technological viability. 
In this sense, nationalism appeared to many centrist intellectuals of 
the period as not only "a political solution to the survival of the state 
and of Turks as a cultural-political group, but also as a channel for the 
introduction of science and progress for the new political unit". 28 The 
Kurdish writer Ziya G6kalp (1876-1924) joined with Akcura in 
stressing that scientific thinking was crucial to the future of the 
Turkish people arguing that modern rationalism should be entirely 
separate from the influence of Islam. One, he suggested, was the 
private individual's relationship with God, the other the public means 
of administering a social collective. In 1912 he wrote that "since 
religion consists only of sacred institutions, beliefs and ritual, non- 
sacred institutions such as scientific ideas, technological tools [and] 
aesthetic standards... are not connected with religions": 2' Influenced 
by Durkhcim, he suggested that national consciousness was a higher 
stage in social evolution than the more diffuse identity of the ummah 
and should therefore form the basis for modernisation of the 
cmpirc. 34 He went on to separate and contrast the religiosity of 
30 Karpat, K. (1972) p. 280. 
3'' Cited in ßerkes, N. (1959) pp 271-272. 
30 See lnalcik, 11. (1982) pp 356-357. Gökalp's 1916 memorandum to the Young Turk 
administration led to exclusion of the gryb1lshv, v from the Cabinet, the end of the 
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internationalist Islamic ideologies, with the stronger, `cultural' spheres 
of social life within a nation "which have to have a uniformity and 
unity". 31 In this way, religious proto-nationalism within the Ottoman 
elite gradually began to take on the ideological features of European 
commercial statism. 
For both Aksura and Gökalp, a pre-eminent element of this was 
literacy, the second of Mann's ideological track-layers, which he 
described as "the texture of morality, the substratum of culture and 
civilisation". 32 Indeed, an important part of the Ottoman divide 
between the r qya and the asked had long been maintenance of a 
rarefied Awn literary style within the centre. The importance of 
keeping official records in Islam combined with an emphasis on 
rhyme and allegory had, by the eighteenth century led to written state 
vernacular so embellished with classical Persian and Arabic 
vocabulary and convoluted with stylistic flourish as to be almost 
entirely unintelligible to the Ottoman masses. As initiation could only 
be achieved through a Palace or ukma controlled education and 
printing presses were only available to Muslims through direct 
petition to the Palace, this exclusiveness successfully prevented "the 
'common people' from becoming interested in the laws of the 
realm": 3s Indeed, so effective was it that the intake of Palace school 
students had, by the 1730s, significantly declined in quality. As a 
result, Ibrahim Müteferrika was licensed to print an Arabic-Turkish 
dictionary which was distributed at less than a tenth the price of the 
manuscript version. Ottoman syntax remained, however, abstruse. 
Within the modernising Ottoman armed forces, it was regarded as an 
inappropriate medium through which to draft precise orders and, as 
in the first of commercial-statism's media, attempts were made to 
standardise army manuals at the new military academies. By the mid- 
rlrmII control of the education and judicial systems and the beginning of a state-led 
drive to relegate Islun to the realms of private conscience only (Hardin, $., 1981, p. 
207). 
)t Cited in Ozbudun, B. (1984) p. 36. 
Ibid. 
ýý Marlin, $. (1961) p. 257. 
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nineteenth century centralised °Turkification' had progressed to the 
extent that students were finding it easier to read European scientific 
texts (usually in French) than grapple with the new lexicon of locally- 
produced manuals. 
As such, the political efficacy of bringing the language of the state 
loser to that of the masses was, for Gökalp's modernist literati, a 
major preoccupation. His Salonika-based literary movement Gene 
Kalemkr (Young Pens) led a campaign to eliminate "those superfluous 
Arabic and Persian words for which exact Turkish synonyms were 
current in the spoken language" and to introduce the use of 
European words for technical tcrms. 34 These reforms were crucial for 
the transmission of Young Turk visions of nationhood and to extend 
shared perceptions of social identity, the third of Mann's tracklaying 
achievements. Such notions of Turkey' and the Turks' were first 
conveyed through the cultural imperialism of the West and eventually 
gained an ethnically-determined meaning separate from their 
previously derogatory associations with rural backwardness35 In the 
pro-European atmosphere of Sclim III's reign, Western embassies 
had established presses in Istanbul and distributed leaflets and 
bulletins on various topics. 36 As these networks developed, the 
national and racial ideas of European writers spread through the 
modernist Ottoman elite. 37 They informed the editorials of expatriate 
publications and provided a decentralised political network 
comparable to Mann's sixth medium of commercial statism. 
The adoption of \Vcstern styles of education, such as the first 
University (the Daru/fdnxn established in 1900) also helped to 
reinforce proto-nationalist links within elite modernist circles. In a 
similar way to Mann's third medium of commercial statism, it not 
s' 1 kyd. U. (1954) p. 17. 
u See Kushner, D. (1977) p. 20. 
36 Bemard Lewis notes that the French post-revolutionary diplomatic mission were, 
by 1802. printing bilingual propaganda for distribution in Greece, Anatolia and the 
levant (1953. pp 116-117). 
31 For a survey of the more prominent of these, see Lewis, B. (1953a) pp 219-223. 
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only instilled an interest in European traditions of science and 
administration, but also highlighted new political models and methods 
of social organisation. 38 Indeed, a high proportion of students at these 
elite academies went on to join the civil service thereby reducing the 
theocracy's role in educating state administrators and institutionalising 
the second of Mann media of commercial statism. In addition, foreign 
schools grew rapidly. Britain, France and the United States were, by 
1914, running around 1,400 establishments containing approximately 
106,000 students. » Inspired by an evangelical blend of scientism and 
Christianity, many directly contributed to the growth of nationalist 
movements within the empire. 40 Associated with this, and giving rise 
to similar effects, was the increase in Western-style minority schools. 
Wt ithin the Armenian community alone these were educating 80,000 
children by 1900.41 The intertwined effects of educational expansion 
and a rapidly developing market economy made the non-Muslim 
millre religiously-determined structure increasingly inappropriate to 
the social needs of the nineteenth century merchant intelligentsia. 42 In 
other words, decentralised networks of ideological power comparable 
to Mann's fifth tracklaying achievement offered `national' groups 
within the Ottoman empire a transcendental alternative to the state's 
existing social structures. Cleavages based on ethnicity and Western- 
inspired notions of national-statehood began to replace the millet? 
religiously-determined structure with secular modes of group 
consciousness 43 As expanding educational system increasingly 
recruited students from the provinces, the effects of this 
'nationalisation' were soon felt within the state bureaucracy in "a 
continuous thread of influence in the nineteenth century from 
Western example through millet organisation to Ottoman 
organisation". N 
See Gscek, F. M. (1993) pasüw. 
Sec Davison, R. (1961) p. 291 and Szyliowicz, J. (1973) p. 149. 
For an account of the missionary movement in the Ottoman empire during this 
period, see Deringil, S. (1998, Ch. 5) and Gö4ck, F. M. (1994) pp 279-283. 
11 Sec Rodrigue, A. (1990) pp 45-46. 
u Sec Iss&%%i, C. (1982) pur m. 
u Sec Karpat, K. (1982) parries. 
N Davison, R. (1982) p. 329. 
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The 1876 Constitution and parliamentary gatherings had promised to 
continue a process of state acknowledgement of peripheral economic 
mobility based on decentralised literary links (the fourth of Mann's 
media of commercial statism) with a greater devolution of political 
status 45 Nevertheless, they neither produced the `neutral' and 
efficient civil service called for by the modernists, nor a final end to 
the simoniacal despotism of the state envisaged by the growing forces 
of provincialism within the centre. In this sense, the Young Turk 
movement was bom of a complex combination of peripheral petite 
bourgeois resentment at the continuing centripetal exclusivity of 
Young Ottoman modernism, fledgling Muslim capitalist class animosity 
towards other elements of the economic periphery (particularly the 
western Anatolian milkt' preferential and increasingly militarised 
relationship with the \Vest) and bureaucratic frustration at Hamidian 
traditionalism and corruption. '' Forging a client base, or what Caglar 
Keydcr calls a "surrogate bourgeoisie", 47 out of this milieu became 
one of the central problems for the Young Turks in legitimising, and 
later (once in government) implementing, their calls for the 
reinstatement of the representative statutes within the 1876 
constitution. 
An important unifying clement within Young Turk support was, as 
Carter Findicy has shown, the economic decline around the turn of 
the twentieth century. 48 The recovery of the Ottoman empire's export 
values and agricultural production following the famine of the 1870s 
had produced only modest decreases in the cost of living while salary 
payments remained inadequate and irregular. 49 Things gradually 
worsened during the 1890s as increasing instability in the imperial 
Is For a discussion of non-Muslim representation in the assemblies of the late 1870s, 
ace Karat. G Z. (1982). 
"See G! Kck, F. M. (1996) pp 138-141. 
't See Keyder, C. (1988) pp 193-199. 
4' 1`indlcy, C. (1986) pp 99-103. 
49 Auch of the profits of this growth passed into the hands of overseas creditors 
(see Donald Quataert's (1977) analysis of the effects of the German-built Anatolian 
railway for example). 
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periphery led to poor harvests and rising crop process 50 In 1901 the 
Turkish press reported that officials, claiming to be on the verge of 
starvation, from Salonika and Istanbul had petitioned the Sultan for 
the settlement of their wage arrears 51 Using elite discussion centres 
(the seventh of Mann's commercial statist media) in these two 
locations, the Young Turks were able to broaden their support base 
within the military and bureaucracy to include disaffected workers' 
groups S2 Following a world-wide economic downturn in 1907, a 
wave of mutinies and strikes spread through Rumelia culminating in 
the open rebellion of the Third Army Corps units based in Salonika 
and Alanastir. Faced with the threat of his heir-apparent being 
declared Sultan of Rumclia, Abdul Hamid agreed to the re- 
instatement of the 1876 constitution in July 1908. He did, however, 
waste "no time in planning the overthrow of the Constitution once 
again" by covertly funding Pan-Islamist groups opposed to the Young 
Twrkt' pro-\Vesternism. S3 The apparent reluctance of the Young Turk 
leadership to rule directly, the continuing division between federalists 
and unionists and the elections of November which brought 137 (out 
of 288) non-Turkish deputies to Parliament all fuelled fears of 
increasing susceptibility to European influcnce. 54 Following the 
resounding success of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), 
an opposition alliance, reminiscent of the 1807 revolution, emerged in 
Istanbul between religious students (softas), low and medium ranking 
ulenna and traditionalists within the capital's barracks 55 A counter- 
coup of April 1909 briefly allowed the federalists to take power 
before being suppressed by a contingent force of the Third Army 
including a junior officer from Salonika called Mustapha Kemal. As a 
50 For instance, the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 and a spate of massacres in 
Armenia in 1896. 
51 Cited in Findley, C. (1986) p. 101 (n. 58). 
u See Quataert, D. (1983) Chs. 4&5. 
51 Alderson, A. (1956) p. 71. 
54 In seeking to explain their decision to establish a supervisory committee parallel 
to incumbent personnel in Istanbul rather than establish their own Cabinet, Feroz 
Ahmzd points to their class, education, inexperience and former professions as 
reasons why they "did not see in themselves the capacity to rule" (1969, p. 17). See 
also Karpat, Imo. (1959) p. 14 (no. 31) and Tunaya, T. (1954) p. 117. 
ss Sec McCullagh, F. (1909) p. 59. 
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result, Abdul Hamid was deposed in favour of Mehmed V, weakening 
the conservatives and providing an impetus to radical reformism. 
Turkish Nationalism Ascendant 
The threat to the CUP also brought the higher echelons of the 
military into the government. According to Feroz Ahmad, the 
objective of soldiers such as Diahmud ýevket (the Iraqi-born 
commander of the Third Army) was to keep the easily swayed rank 
and file troops and the highly politicised junior officers out of 
politics. 5' While the civilians progressed with redrafting the 1876 
constitution to position the Sultan and the Porte under the control of 
the executive and parliament, the military imposed martial law, 
dismissed thousands of officers promoted by Abdul Hamid and 
installed $cvket as Minister of War. 57 Austria's opportunistic 
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, the loss of Libya to Italy 
in 1911 and much of Rumclia to the Balkan states by 1913 solidified 
the pre-eminent position of the military and strongly influenced the 
government's unionist reform programme. " The need for internal 
order and international defence, it was argued, should define the 
state's 'ottomanisation' measures. As such, laws aimed at 
consolidating central control of the imperial periphery and supported 
by large increases in security expenditure were passed restricting 
public association, the freedom of the post-revolutionary press and 
the autonomy of the milletr. Support for the Ottomanism of Riza and 
the bureaucratic modernists gradually dissipated in favour of the 
Turkism of Gökalp and Akcura. It also made decentralisation, 
promulgated by the Sabahaddin federalist faction, "seem a dangerous 
if not suicidal formula": s9 
u Ahmad, F. (1969) Ch. 3. 
See Kayah, 1 I. (1997) p. 57. 
Luftullah Karaman writes (with considerable partisanship), "It was sharply 
realised, during these wars, that it was only the Turkish element of the Empire that 
had striven, and suffered, for the unity of the Empire" (1997, p. 8). See also Landau, 
J. (1981) pp 46-47 and Okyar, O. (1984) pp 46-47. 
s' I. cwis, 13. (1961) p. 200. 
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Table Six: Parliamentary Deputies Representing Various Ottoman 
Communitics° 
Year Total Turks Arabs Albanians Greeks Armenians Jews Slavs 
1908 288 147 60 27 26 14 4 10 
1912 284 157 68 18 15 13 49 
1914 259 144 84 13 14 4 
With only the Arabs and Armenians left to appease, both became, as 
Table Six shows, proportionally better represented in parliament as 
time went on. `Tbc more backward areas of the Arab provinces 
received particular and immediate attention in terms of reforms" 
aimed at reinforcing the support of local notables through greater 
administrative accountability and more stringent anti-smuggling 
initiatives at Attempts were also made to settle nomadic groups 
through better educational provisions and land reform. Similar 
programmes were developed in the Armenian areas of Anatolia. Land 
lost during Ubaidullah's uprising was partly returned and, as Russian 
involvement increased during the Balkan Wars, limited autonomous 
powers were devolved to local a, g'as (land-owners) 62 The need to 
secure provincial support was also reflected in government policy 
towards Muslim groups within the empire. Here the CUP was able to 
turn the Hamidian policy of Pan-Islamic peripheral inclusion towards 
developing "new cultural bonds among the whole population". 63 
Indeed, with all nine of the top military positions being held by non- 
Turkish Muslims, this was perhaps as much bom of necessity as 
0° Source: Unpublished study by D. Rustow and F. Ahrnad. Cited in Ahmad, F. 
(1969) p. 155. 
u Kayah, If. (1997) p. 77. 
Fero: Ahmad states that this new law "increased local autonomy in administrative 
and financial matters, increased and defined the powers of the governor, and 
allowed for the general provincial councils to be elected by voters of the second 
degree, namely by local notables and landlords (1982, p. 423). Indeed, during a 
period of centrabsation, this do jun acknowledgement of peripheral power is a 
measure of the importance that Armenian support commanded in Istanbul. 
a Karpat, K (1964a) p. 269. 
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design. " To this end, efforts to incorporate elements of the Muslim 
mercantile classes were reinforced within the elite schools of the 
centre. As Joseph Szyliowicz notes in his study of the Mektabi Mülkiye, 
"during the Young Turk era, a marked shift took 
place in recruitment patterns - occupationally 
towards persons from official backgrounds, 
geographically away from Istanbul - so that the great 
majority of the students were sons of officials 
located in provincial and district centres. 
Furthermore... a second group, students of cyan-erraf 
background, was also well represented at the 
school". '5 
However, both the changes in provincial political representation and 
the programme of reforms initiated by CUP also contained an 
increasingly prominent clement of Turkish ethnocentrism. Article 17 
of the 1909 constitution stipulated that Turkish language classes were 
to be a compulsory part of the curriculum and that for secondary and 
higher levels Turkish was also to be the medium of instruction, 
thereby making uniform previous Hamidian policies. An entirely new 
measure, and one that met considerable resistance (particularly within 
the Arab provinces) was the requirement to use Turkish, rather than 
the Arabic of classical jurisprudence, in the judicial system. 
Furthermore, in the absence of accurate records, the government was 
often accused of equating linguistic divides with ethnicity and thereby 
inflating the size of the empire's 'Turkish' citizenry, and thus its 
parliamentary majority. 66 by including large numbers of peripheral 
Turcophoncs. 67 The problem was worsened by the stipulation that 
voters must be registered tax-payers which tended to exclude Arab 
and Kurdish nomadic groups 68 In all, the changes brought about by 
the CUP can be seen as part of a gradual move from reform aimed at 
Ottomanist integration (the strengthening of ties to a multinational 
" According to I fasan Kayak, two were occupied by Arabs (Mahmud $evket and 
his replacement at the Third Army command, Hadi Pasha), two by Albanians, two 
by Circassians and one by a Tartar, a Bosnian and a Georgian (1997, p. 88). 
ýs Szyliowicz, J. (1971) p. 397. 
"s One deputy stood for every 50,000 Ottoman citizens (Kayak, H., 1997, p. 85). 
'7 See Karpat, K (1985) pp 164-168. 
°4 For instance Sycd Ali F. droos notes that only one deputy was returned from the 
province of Jordan (1980, p. 8). 
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state pursued by Abdul Hamid) to Turkist assimilation (ensuring 
group association with the national identity of the centre) 69 Indeed, 
as Hasan Kayak's study of Arab resistance shows, the image of 
Turkish chauvinism became an effective means of resisting state 
centralisation for peripheral notables70 
While the strongly centrist ideological flavour of the CUP's attempts 
to build political links with the empire's periphery largely consigned 
them to failure, economic reforms had arguably more success. Many, 
such as the drafting of new commercial codes and the spate of 
concessions to foreign firms to extend the rail, highway and telegraph 
networks71 did help to stimulate manufacturing and agricultural 
productivity. 72 In all, though, public spending on such infra-structural 
projects was severely curtailed by security and armament budgets. The 
Ministry of Public Works, for instance received only 3.3 per cent of 
fiscal allocations for the year 1911-1912 compared with 30.7 per cent 
directed to the Ministry of War, 4.7 per cent to the navy and 3.9 per 
cent to the gendarmerie 73 To pay for these, borrowing from the 
Public Debt Administration increased, exceeding debt servicing for 
the first time since 188174 Extraction was also stepped up 
(particularly in the agricultural sector) enlarging the state's total 
taxation revenue from 148 million liras in 1909 to almost 185 million 
in 1910.75 Nevertheless, estimated expenditure still exceeded expected 
receipts by more than 20 per cent, rising to over 25 per cent by 1912 
(the actual deficit was generally much higher) 76 
69 See Eriksen, K. et al (1991) pp 392-395. 
70 Further public opposition arose from the provincial appointment of officials who 
sought to impose unionist principles of secularism and individualism. See Kayah, H. 
(1997) pp 94-95. 
7' See Mears, E. (1924) pp 218-233. 
72 See Ahmad, F. (1980) pp 335-336. 
73 See Cumberland, W. (1924) p. 399. 
74 Craglar Keyder calculates (after Yahya Tezel) that from 1908-1914 60 million liras 
were borrowed and 43 million liras repaid (1980) pp 325-326. 
75 This was despite the abolition of military exemption duties under legislation in 
1908 designed to end the millet system which cost the treasury over 6 million liras in 
lost revenue (Ahmad, F. 1969 p. 70). 
76 See Emin, A. (1930) p. 94. 
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With the outbreak of war with the Entente in 1914, the CUP set 
about attempting to create a national economy through a series of 
budgetary reforms. The Capitulations system was abrogated in 
September 1914 ending the tax-exempt status of foreign passport- 
holders which, following the revocation of the Anglo-French banking 
monopoly, allowed the state "for the first time in its history... to 
practise a monetary policy"?? The treasury printed 159 million liras 
against gold held in Germany giving the state the equivalent of an 
interest-free loan which was soon protected by higher excise duties 
on imports. New taxes were imposed on luxury goods (those not 
requisitioned for military use), war earnings and male non-combatants 
of military service age. Duty payable on gross production was 
increased to 12 per cent coupled with a further, and highly unpopular, 
12 per cent surplus acquisition at state-stipulated rates of 
remuneration 78 To improve collection efficiency and commercial 
cohesion, legislation was passed in April 1916 unifying Ottoman 
coinage which had, until then, more than eighty different valuations. 
In all, as Feroz Ahmad notes the state "began to play a more direct 
and open role in the economy" not least by embarking upon a policy 
of "fostering an entrepreneurial class among the Turks". 79 
This led to a period of high domestic growth and an increase from 3 
per cent in 1908 to 38 per cent in 1918 in Ottoman capital's share of 
corporate investment. 80 With the establishment of a war-time one- 
party system led by the triumvirate of Enver, Jemal and Talat Pashas, 
parliamentary lobbying from competing interest-groups was largely 
replaced by a clientelistic system of mercantile cadres. These were 
brought together under co-operatives schemes to establish trading 
and finance companies with a `national' orientation, eventually leading 
to the partial displacement of non-Turkish merchant groups and 
77 Keyder, Q. (1980) p. 326. 
78 See Emin, A. (1930) Ch. 8. 
79 Ahmad, F. (1980) p. 337 & 341. In some ways this was an attempt to return to the 
militarised economy of imperial expansion. Indeed, Ahmad writes elsewhere that, 
"this emphasis on etatisme was merely a reflection of the traditional role of the state 
in the Ottoman Empire and in Islamic societies generally" (1969, p. 157). 
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closer bureaucratic control of the economy. 81 In a policy described by 
Ahmed Emin as `economic Turkism', new laws were passed decreeing 
that every factory whose workforce was (apart from technical experts) 
entirely Turkish would be exempt from taxation and export excise for 
fifteen years and would receive free tools and materials not locally 
available. These measures were reinforced a year later, in 1916, with 
legislation obliging all companies possessing such concessions to 
carry out all their business exclusively in Turkish. 82 New investment 
was also allocated to artisan training centres and vocational courses 
for both men and women with the more able students often seconded 
to German institutions and corporations. "The idea", En-in 
concludes, "was to conquer fields of activity monopolised by non- 
Turks". 83 While this largely failed to arrest the war-time decline in 
industrial and agricultural production, it did succeed in promoting an 
ideological change among the emerging Turkish bourgeoisie - "the 
mentality that despised trade and industry and believed that 
government and military occupations are most worthy of an Ottoman 
Turk" was, partly at least, overcome. 84 
Concurrent with the rise in corporatism was the declining political 
role of the ulema. While the state initially attempted a call-to-arms with 
a declaration of jihad in 1914, once it became apparent that this could 
neither ensure adequate recruitment nor the loyalty of non-Turkish 
Muslims, a policy of restricting Islamist opposition was preferred. 
Influenced by Gökalp's call for the separation of state and religion, 
reforms were enacted in 1916 which removed the , reyhülislam from the 
cabinet and ended his administration of the empire's charitable assets 
as well as transferring the shariah courts to the Ministry of justice and 
the clerical schools to the Ministry of Education. As a result, there 
emerged a new class of professional teachers in direct competition 
80 Keyder, C. (1980) p. 326 
91 Turkish ascendancy was eventually assured by the mass expulsion of Armenians 
in 1915 and population exchanges with Greece following the war. See Keyder, C. 
(1988) pp 198-199. 
82 See Emin, A. (1930) pp 114-117. 
83 Ibid. p. 115. 
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with the clerics of the old educational order. Many, such as ismail 
Hakki, a lecturer (and later rector) at the DargAinun, saw their role as 
"freeing the individual from the constraints of the clericals, religious 
orders, homes, streets, coffee houses, graveyards and beggars" 85 
During the war, many departments recruited staff from overseas 
(predominantly Germany) leading Hakki to comment that it had 
become "an experimental ground for all kinds of convictions, 
methods and traditions". 86 Other professional groups were also 
increasing their power during this period. The elite medical schools, 
long a channel of Western methods (as well as the birthplace of the 
CUP), had given rise to a class of practitioners embedded in extensive 
and essentially secular discursive literary networks. The expansion of 
state influence in the judiciary since the Tan! mat had a similarly 
secularising effect on the white-collar classes. Professional lawyers, 
trained in Western precedents, began to encroach on the traditionally 
ecclesiastical domain of civil law institutionalising the fifth of Mann's 
media of commercial statism. In 1917, a new family code was 
introduced which positioned the legality of marriage and divorce 
within the authority of the state and away from the shariah courts By 
the time of the 1918 Mudros armistice "religion was", as Niyazi 
Berkes puts it, "divested of its temporal influence in state, 
educational, legislational, judicial, and financial affairs". 87 
The effects of these changes reinforced the divide between 
traditionalist and modernist within the centre. They also strengthened 
the links between anti-modernist groups within the state and elements 
of the peripheral elite disadvantaged by the war-time rise in centralism 
and Westernism. 88 Following the fall of the CUP government in 1918 
and the subsequent Allied occupation of the major Mediterranean 
cities, this loose alliance became of key importance in securing the 
Anatolian heartland. With the Arabs and Armenians courting the 
84 Consul General G. Bie Ravndal writing in 1912. Cited in Ahmad, F. (1980) p. 337. 
85 Writing in 1914. Cited in Berkes, N. (1964 [1998 edition] p. 403. 
86 Writing in 1919. Cited in Öncü, A. (1993) p. 153. 
87 Berkes, N. (1964 [1998 edition]) p. 416. 
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Entente in preparation for the peace talks in Paris, gaining the 
endorsement of the Kurdish minority was crucial for Damad Ferid 
Pasha's cabinet appointed by the Great Powers in March 1919. The 
position of the Kurdish leaders was, however, ambivalent. Many, such 
as the cleric Sheikh Abdul Qadyr (the second son of Ubaidullah), had 
long resented Young Turk centrism and called for the establishment of 
autonomous Kurdish provinces. 89 Others went further and joined 
with the Armenians to press for "a united and independent Armenia 
and an independent Kurdistan, with the assistance of a Great 
Power"90 Nevertheless, following the Greek invasion at Izmir and 
Italian landings at Antalya in May 1919,91 it was the traditionalists' 
links with the centre and long-standing opposition to Western cultural 
encroachment that seemed likely to be most efficacious to those 
resolved to resist militarily further territorial losses. 
To Mustafa Kemal, already experienced in tribal diplomacy from his 
war-time appointment in Aleppo, the ideological relationship between 
Muslim peasant and Islamic state, traditionally conceived, was to be 
the basis for "co-opting Kurdish tribal leaders into the resistance 
movement and in mobilising Kurdish loyalty to the Caliph-Sultan and 
the country". 92 From its inaugural conference in Erzerum in July 
1919, Kemal's Society for the Defence of the Rsghts of Eastern Anatolia 
argued that "all Islamic elements (i. e. ethnic communities) living in 
this area are true brothers... of the same religion and race as 
ourselves whom it is impossible to divide" 93 The importance of 
Islamic legitimisation within the movement can be seen in the 
ss See Cizre-Sakalhoglu, Ü. (1995) p. 759. 
89 According to Andrew Mango, Abdul Qadyr's movement was successful in 
securing the endorsement of the predominantly Sunni Kurdish guilds of Istanbul 
and federalist statesmen such as Fuad Pasha, but was restricted in its capacity to 
mobilise the disparate Kurdish heterodoxy beyond the province of Diyarbakir 
(1999, p. 5). 
90 Namely England. ýarif Pasha cited in McDowall, D. (1992) p. 131. This proved 
unpopular with many in Kurdistan (especially those who had engaged in the 
Armenian massacres and deportations of 1915). 
91 The 1916 Sykes-Picot arrangements to divide Anatolia between Britain, France 
and Russia had been revealed by the Bolsheviks a year earlier and was still a cause of 
widespread alarm. 
92 Kiripci, K. & Winnow, G. M. (1997) pp. 84-85. 
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background of the delegates to the conference. Out of fifty-six, 
twenty-one were connected to the ulema. 94 Similarly with the 
establishment of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara in April 
1920, more than one-fifth of the deputies were clerics and many 
others, as Table Seven suggests, were Kurdish tribal leaders 95 In 
many ways, this demonstrates the limited progress of commercial- 
statism outside the western Anatolian alliance of urban professionals 
and merchant elites. For not only did the ulema provide immanent 
morale in the form of fatwas endorsing the assembly (152 sheikhs 
from numerous provincial towns supported Ankara's edict calling on 
all Muslims to liberate the Caliph imprisoned in Istanbul), they also 
worked with local notables in collecting the 40 per cent income tax 
levied on all households 96 So with domestic revenues in place, local 
mobilisation reaffirmed by the Carthaginian peace at Sevres and gold 
and weapons arriving from the Politburo, Kemal not only offered to 
protect these sheikhs and agas, but, as Martin Van Bruinessen notes, 
he also "had power that he might delegate to them, whereas the 
[Kurdish] nationalist organisations did not' . 97 Thus the War of 
Independence was launched in Kurdistan using Kurdish troops 
commanded by Turkish officers under the banner of Islam. 98 
In the tradition of Mahmud Sevket, Kemal believed that it was 
imperative to keep both the soldiery and the field officers out of 
politics. As before though, this proscription did not extend as far as 
senior staff commanders. Although Kemal himself resigned his 
commission (until September 1921 when he was appointed 
Commander-in-Chief), most of the other positions of power were 
93 Opening proclamation cited in Mango, A. (1999) p. 8. 
94 See Toprak, B. (1981) p. 64. 
95 See Rustow, D. (1957) p. 73 and Mango, A. (1999) p. 12. It is worth noting that 
the assembly also included ninety members of the Istanbul parliament (see Rustow, 
D., 1981, p. 66). 
96 See Toprak, B. (1981) p. 65. 
97 Van Bruinessen, M. (1992) p. 279. My parenthesis. See also Webster, D. (1939) pp 
87-88 and Gökay, B. (1996) p. 67. 
98 See Bulloch, J. & Morris, H. (1993) p. 89 and McDowall, D. (1996) p. 15. 
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filled by serving members of the armed forces 99 This reliance on 
military personnel networks was unsurprising. As Dankwart Rustow 
has noted, "seven years of almost uninterrupted hostilities (with Italy, 
1911-12; in the Balkans, 1912-13; and in the First World War) 
brought the Ottoman Empire closer to being a garrison state than it 
had perhaps been at any time since its infancy". 100 In such a 
militarised environment, it was only logical for soldiers to take on an 
extended role in administration. Indeed, crucial to the nascent 
government in Ankara were the seven imperial army corps, which, 
with the Allies encamped along the western seaboard, were 
concentrated in Anatolia. Although severely depleted, they retained a 
clear chain of command and, vitally, control over the telegraph infra- 
structure. 101 The corps commanders also provided a useful link to 
demobilised officers in Istanbul. Many of these were affiliated to the 
commercial statist ideology of the centre and thus saw Kemal's efforts 
as merely a continuation of Enver's policy of militarily reinforcing 
populist movements in the south-east in preparation for the 
armistice. '°2 
The War of Independence solidified Kemalist forces, restrained 
irregular army units and incorporated other resistance movements in 
Western Anatolia and Thrace. 103 Within the new order of the Turkish 
nation-state, Kemal envisaged the military moving from its position as 
the de facto "expression of Ottoman society" to the de jure 
"fountainhead of progressive practices". 104 In this sense, the rulers of 
the Ankara movement were not an instrument of the `reactionary 
coalition' of old regime notables and emergent capitalists described by 
99 The Chief-of-Staff, Fevzi C, akmak, for instance, was promoted to a full Cabinet 
member eventually serving as Prime Minister from January 1921 to July 1922 (see 
Harris, G., 1965, pp 54-55). 
100 Rustow, D. (1959) p. 518. His parenthesis. 
101 See ibid. p. 519. Elsewhere Rustow reports that the telegraph system was 
particularly important in maintaining Kemal's links with Istanbul. In three days in 
1920,217 telegrams were sent to the House of Representatives alone (1968, p. 270). 
102 Kemal, too, saw the value of utilising former-CUP expertise. See Zürcher, E. 
(1984) p. 160. 
103 See Smith, E. (1959) pp 67-68. 
104 Turfan, N. (1987) p. 4 and Harris, G. (1965) p. 55. 
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Barrington Moore. 105 Rather, as Ergun Üzbudun argues, their alliance 
was born of the "exigencies of the War of Independence" itself. '°6 
With no Ottoman tradition of aristocratic control over the means of 
production, the limited extensiveness of commercial statism and with 
the nascent Turkish bourgeoisie fractured by territorial partition, the 
military was both able to claim territorial legitimacy and to formulate 
the basis for a future bureaucratic order. 107 Nonetheless, once the war 
was over and the geo-political position of Turkey re-negotiated at 
Lausanne, the resistance movement began to dissipate and a tension 
emerged between Ankara's provincial supporters and the military's 
position as final arbiters of constitutional interpretation. 108 
Table Seven: Birthplaces of Military and Civilian Leaders, 1918- 
1923.109 
Total Rumelia Istanbul Anatolia Arab Caucasus 
known & Cyprus %% Provinces % 
Istanbul Civilian Ministers, 1918-22 40 20 48 23 5 5 
Istanbul Military Ministers, 1918-22 26 8 46 23 8 15 
Ankara Civilian Ministers, 1920-23 23 13 9 78 0 0 
Ankara Military Ministers, 1920-23 9 33 56 11 0 0 
Nationalist Commanders, 1919 -22 25 24 44 32 0 
0 
Although preceded by a somewhat similar blend of representational 
modernism and military etatism in the CUP administration, Kemal's 
incremental inkslab had not proceeded unopposed. Within the Ankara 
assembly, resistance became centred around a heterogeneous minority 
(referred to as the `second group) of broadly Islamists and peripheral 
elites. "" During the War of Independence they had formulated plans 
to attach the gendarmerie to the Ministry of Interior (i. e. under 
civilian control) seeing the assembly as operative only until the Sultan 
105 Moore, B. (1967) Ch. 8. 
106 Özbudun, E. (1981) p. 86. 
107 See Trimberger, E. K. (1978) pp 41-43. 
108 See Harris, G. (1965) p. 55. For a discussion of the constitution adopted between 
1921 and 1923 see Altug, Y. (1984) pp 131-134. 
109 Source: Abbreviated from Rustow, D. (1959) p. 527. `Military' is taken to be all 
active and retired military personnel except for those who pursued a civilian career 
after leaving. 
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had been liberated. With success on the battleground imminent, 
Kemal moved against the dissenters. Fatwas were sponsored 
questioning the historical legitimacy of an unelected and hereditary 
leadership and Abdul Mecid was appointed in 1922 as a purely 
spiritual Caliph with neither the title nor the political influence of a 
Sultan. 111 To reduce traditionalist influence still further, the officer 
corps was purged and loyalists were appointed to the leadership of a 
nation-wide `Peoples Party' (Halk Firkass)112 which, with the 
extension of the Treason Laws to include pro-Sultanate agitation, 
gave ex-members of the military an institutionalised political role. So 
much so that in the elections of June 1923 only three members of the 
`second group' were returned to the assembly. Indeed, it is indicative 
of the enduring importance of the military to Kemal's vision of social 
reform that he only felt secure enough to announce the abolition of 
the Caliphate in March 1924 after insisting upon a pay-rise for the 
entire armed forces against the wishes of the civilian members of his 
Cabinet. 113 
As Mesut Yegen observes, "the Caliphate was an institution which 
guaranteed that the bond between the Ottoman political centre and 
the Muslim elements of the `periphery' was to be a loose one". 114 Its 
abolition threatened both the ideological legitimacy and the relative 
autonomy of peripheral, particularly Kurdish, traditionalists and 
notables unaffected by the commercial statism of the centre. This 
factor, coupled with a pronounced decline in provincial 
representation in the Ankara assembly and the proscription of the 
Kurdish language within the education and judicial systems, 
Ito See Edib, H. (1928) p. 183. 
111 See Deringil, S. '(1993a) p. 173 & Inalcik, H. (1982) pp 353-356. 
112 This quickly came to replace the Society for the Defence of the Rights of Eastern 
Anatolia (see Yerasimos, S., 1987, p. 78). 
113 See Harris, G. (1965) pp 56-57. Also instrumental in Kemal's timing was, of 
course, the successful re-negotiation of Sevres at Lausanne in July 1923. For an 
analysis of the Turkish delegation to Lausanne, see Davison, R. (1963a) pp 199-209. 
114 Yegen, M. (1987) p. 221. 
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precipitated numerous peripheral rebellions. 115 It also added to the 
support of a break-away political party, the Progressive Republican 
Party (Terakkoerver Cumhuriyet Firkass), which emerged in November 
1924 advocating less interventionist policies. 116 In south-east Anatolia, 
the pacification of Sheikh Said's large-scale rebellion amid immense 
bloodshed the following year (up to 250,000 people were killed) 
provided Kemal with the emergency conditions in which to suppress 
not only "all public vestiges of separate Kurdish identity", but also all 
organised resistance within the assembly. 117 The Law for the Maintenance 
of Order and an amendment to the treason laws to include "the 
exploitation of religion towards political ends" imposed a system of 
political monism so severe that most newspapers disappeared, no 
parliamentary opposition emerged for twenty years and an overtly 
socialist organisation was impossible until the 1960s. 118 In other 
words, with little progress in the extensiveness of collective 
perceptions of `national' identity. Kemal's government was able to 
continue the militarist autonomy of the war-time regime. 
Table Eight: A selection of reforms 1922-1935119 
1. The abolition of the sultanate in 1922 followed by 
the establishment of the Turkish republic in 1923. 
2. The abolition of the Caliphate in 1924. 
3. The abolition of the jyhülislam in 1924. 
4. The abolition of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 
1924. 
5. The abolition of the shariah courts in 1924. 
6. The abolition of the medresse schools in 1924. 
7. The prohibition of tariqas (religious brotherhoods) 
in 1925. 
8. The prohibition of the fez in 1925. 
9. The adoption of the Gregorian calendar in 1925. 
10. The adoption of the Swiss code of civil law in 
1926. 
is See Frey, F. (1978) p. 59. David McDowall notes that within a year only 215 out 
of the 4,875 functioning schools in Turkey were located in Kurdish speaking 
provinces (1992, p. 192). 
116 See Yerasimos, S. (1987) pp 82-83 
117 Under what Ahmed Emin describes as a "pretext", the Progressive Republican 
Party was accused of providing a rallying-point for the rebels and dissolved (1947, p. 
48). See also McDowall, D. (1993) p. 37 and (1996) p. 15. 
118 See Yerasimos, S. (1987) pp 83-84. 
119 Source: Toprak, B. (1987) p. 223. 
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11. The adoption of European numerals in 1928. 
12. The adoption of Latin script in 1928. 
13. The deletion of Article II of the 1924 constitution 
stipulating Islam to be the state religion. 
14. The enfranchisement of women for municipal 
elections in 1930 and national elections in 1934. 
15. The initiation of a programme removing Arabic 
and Persian words from the Turkish language in 
1931. 
16. The adoption of the metric system in 1931. 
17. The adoption of family surnames in 1934. 
18. The change of weekly holidays from Friday to 
Sunday in 1935. 
However, for such coercive longevity, an exclusive reliance on 
military support was impracticable. Kemal's programme of reforms 
(some of which are listed in Table Eight) required a civil bureaucracy 
that was both loyal and modern. Once prohibited from holding 
elected office after 1924 (a measure which usefully prevented the 
traditionally highly politicised junior officer corps from extending 
their influence) reliable ex-officers were used as a recruitment base to 
imbue the civil bureaucratic class with the values of the new order. 12° 
Kemal also selected "a small group of highly motivated administrators 
who became leaders in the Grand National Assembly and in the 
cabinet" from modernist elements of existing bureaucracy. 121 
Legitimised through a widely-publicised fear of revolutionary 
socialism and a determined campaign to portray Islamic traditionalism 
as retrogressive and obscurantist, this oligarchic cadre drafted a 
programme of legislation designed to extend mass compliance 
beyond the war-time appeal of Kemal's charismatic leadership. The 
adoption of the metric system, the Swiss legal code and the Gregorian 
calendar all provided the state's administrators with standardised tools 
to which both local variation and clerical influence were marginal. 122 
Similarly, in an extension of the ideas of Ziya Gökalp and a scheme 
120 See Rustow, D. (1959) pp 550-551 as well as Tachau, F. & Heper, M. (1983) pp 
19-20. It should also be noted that as part of the same process the Chief-of-Staff 
was placed under the direct control of the President thereby isolating the position 
from civil control. 
121 Bent, F. (1970) p. 57. 
122 See Turan, f. (1984) pp 106-108 & Stirling, P. (1958) p. 397. 
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devised by Enver Pasha during the war, the Latin script was taken up 
in place of the Ottoman alphabetical blend of Arabic and Persian. 123 
These measures did little, however, to bridge the divide between the 
Turkish centre and the periphery. In the case of linguistic reform, the 
plethora of invented neologisms further widened "the gulf between 
the official and literary language and the language of the common 
people". 124 Moreover, the bureaucratic state's emphasis on progress in 
science and economics125 proved an inappropriate medium through 
which to extend a state-wide infra-structure of mass communication, 
with the consequence that participation, both political and ideological, 
in the Westernising reforms remained minimal. Although attempts 
were made to better the conditions of the peasantry by reducing 
taxation, war damage (the productive capacity of the country was 
down 20 per cent on pre-war levels) and an acute labour shortage 
meant that substantive land reform was impossible. 126 With the 
traditional relationship between peripheral notable and small-holder 
untouched, the state bureaucracy also found it difficult to extend 
mass education. The number of primary schools only rose from 5,172 
in 1923 to 6,043 in 1931 with the south-east remaining largely 
illiterate (particularly in Turkish). 127 "Rather than reevaluate these 
policies", titer Turan concludes, "the bureaucrats were inclined to 
impose them by compulsory means, confirmed in their apprehensions 
that the largely peasant masses... should not be provided with 
opportunities to participate in the political decision-making 
process". 128 
A more favourable client base was to be found within the industrial 
and technological sectors of the economy. Here, Kemal extended the 
123 See Tachau, F. (1964) pp 193-194. 
124 Lewis, G. (1984) p. 210. 
125 See Lerner, D. & Robinson, R. (1960) p. 21. 
126 See Ahmad, F. (1981) pp 153-154. 
127 Amalgamated from Winter, M. (1984) p. 192 and Yerasimos, S. (1987) p. 86. 
128 Turan 
, 
I. (1984) p. 111. The Village Law of March 1924, for instance, sought to 
give the Anatolian peasantry representation mechanisms by making the vibyet a legal 
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CUP's policy of tax concessions and the assistance of private 
accumulation mechanisms, leading to some success in improving 
economic output. 129 As before, however, the Turkish bourgeoisie 
proved difficult to generate from above and the result was the further 
institutionalisation of the pre-war entrepreneurial cadre "via the 
enrichment of particular individuals through state resources and 
support". 130 In all, these policies, coupled with the continuing 
ideological pre-eminence of a loyally secular intelligentsia, led to a 
narrow, state-stipulated definition of `modernisation', a highly monist 
view of citizenship and an intensive brand of nationalism largely 
restricted to the urban professionals and large-estate farmers of 
western Anatolia. As a result, the Kemalist revolution remained a 
predominantly intra-elite phenomenon with little social restructuring 
taking place outside the centre and without the levelling of social 
stratification and reduction in provincialism associated with Western 
nationalism. In other words, it failed to attain ideological power's 
fourth tracklaying achievement and bring the masses closer to the 
state. 
Conclusion 
In many ways, the conclusion of the Turkish revolution represents 
the failure to resolve the social contradictions inherited from the 
Ottoman empire. As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, power 
contention at the end of the nineteenth century predominantly 
revolved around the imperial tradition of hierarchical centralisation. 
Peripheral forces represented first by the Young Turks and then, for 
the initial period of liberation only, by the Kemalists, challenged the 
institutionalised position of the Ottoman elite. Ultimately, though, the 
process proved retrogressive as the empire's ideological emphasis on 
and administrative entity, but produced negligible effects on social and economic 
conditions (see Kolars, J., 1973, p. 187). 
129 See Hershlag, Z. (1984) pp 175-176. William Hale records that GDP rose from 
640 million liras in 1923 to 1207.1 million in 1930 (1984, p. 163). For an alternative 
view, see Robinson, R. (1963) p. 115. 
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universalism, cosmopolitanism and normative civilisation was 
replaced, at least in terms of state policy, by particularism, enforced 
uniformity and militarism thereby reversing the `tracklaying' 
achievement of the Caliphiummah order. Essential elements of this 
retrogression were networks of discursive literacy which, 
decentralised by the emerging professional classes, were instrumental 
in both bringing the provinces to power and, once re-centralised by 
the Kemalist bureaucracy's censors, restoring a redefined state elite. 131 
Ultimately, though, such a top-down approach could not be 
successful in deploying ideological power's third tracklaying potential 
and extend social identities into the territorial periphery. 
Nevertheless, religion, as Serif Mardin notes, continued to serve a 
"double function: for the rulers, that of linkage with the lower classes, 
for the ruled, that of an alternative to the polity and a buffer against 
officialdom". 132 This dialectic persisted throughout the ideological 
reordering that took place during the 1920s. Contrary to Ziya 
Gökalp's vision, Kemalism did not entail a separation of state and 
religion. 133 Instead, the republican state assumed "the jurisdiction to 
exercise almost unlimited control over all the religious matters in the 
country". 134 Through the Directorate of Religious Affairs, created in 
1924, a monist vision of national unity was legitimised and built into 
the constitution informing both policy-making and bureaucratic 
implementation. 135 Non-statist groups within the periphery were also 
aware of the need to develop ideological power networks in order to 
ensure organisational immanence. Beyond this bifurcation, however, 
religion retained its capacity to transcend cleavages institutionalised 
by non-ideological power sources and perpetuated its grip on inter- 
personal ethics and familial relations. In the other words, the 
130 Boratav, K (1981) p. 170. 
131 Later, from 1929 onwards, all printing had to be produced using the newly- 
adopted Latin script thereby excluding all but the thoroughly `modernised' from 
these discursive literary networks. See Webster, D. (1939a) pp 254-255. 
132 Mardin, ý. (1971) p. 204. 
133 See Keddie, N. (1997) p. 32. 
134 Dumont, P. (1987) p. 2. 
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commercial statism of the centre could not access the sixth of 
ideological power's tracklaying achievements and was largely excluded 
from familial relations and, what Mann describes as, the `core social 
spheres'. 
Indeed, unlike the case of the Christian ecumene, the growth of science 
and rationality, the first of Mann's secularising forces, did not present 
an inherent threat to this social role. The influential work of Abduh 
and al-Afghani, as well as their proteges in the Young Turk movement, 
espoused views that had long been part of accepted debate within 
mainstream Islamic thought. What could be considered `secularism' 
(although such a term would have been unthinkable even for the 
most ardent modernist of the period) emerged within this ideological 
channel not as a result of rational endeavour per se, but through the 
international transmission of the European triumph of reason over 
faith. For thinkers such as Akcura and Gökalp, national progress, 
defined in terms of Western models, was incommensurate with a 
state-organised faith that was, itself, intrinsically supra-national. While 
not averse to the use of Islamic symbolism and jurisprudence in 
defence of their cause (a fact reflected in the blurred distinction 
between factions within the Young Turk movement), religion, they 
argued, should be relegated to matters of private conscience and not 
impinge upon the public administration of popular sovereignty. So 
whereas processes of secularisation in Europe, according to Mann at 
least, were born of the challenge that rational science represented to 
the Church's cosmological authority, in Turkey non-religious modes 
of social explication emerged through the organisation of ideological 
alternatives to Caliph's political power. 
With only a small coterie of western Anatolia elites for a client base, 
however, the ideology of a centrist urban intelligentsia was unlikely to 
gain extensive institutionalised credence. While middle-class 
135 For an account of Kemal's attempts to 'Turkify' Islamic ritual, see Reed, H. 
(1980a) pp 325-326. 
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expansion was sufficient to meet the recruitment demands of an 
expanding state bureaucracy, it did not provide the constitutionally 
required mass political participation and was thus unable to 
`nationalise' the state. 136 Instead, the Kemalist state continued the 
particularism embodied in the CUP's `economic Turkism' in a 
perpetual struggle to extend its support base. 137 Without an extensive 
bourgeois citizenry defining themselves as `the nation' to which the 
state ought to be coterminous, the Kemalist administration remained 
highly autonomous. It was able to continue the militarisation of 
commercial statist proto-nationalism first begun in the build-up to the 
First World War almost unilaterally. Severely weakened by territorial 
division and the devastation of the First World War, Turkish civil 
society could exert little influence over the direction of social reform. 
As a result, it was the state itself, rather than what Mann terms 
`emergent capitalism', that formed the primary basis for the diffusion 
of notions of popular sovereignty. 
That is not to say, however, that mercantile exchange was 
insignificant in the organisation of ideological alternatives to the 
Ottoman regime. The third of Mann's secularising forces, navigational 
advances, brought increasing numbers of foreign merchants to the 
western seaboard. Institutionalised by the Capitulations system, they 
increased peripheral economic mobility and brought with them the 
culture and technology of the Enlightenment. It was through this 
ideological channel that ideas of national statehood, the fourth of 
Mann's secularising forces, became influential following the French 
Revolution. Non-Turkish millets were able to exploit their cultural 
autonomy within the Ottoman polity to intensify religious and 
political networks of interaction with external powers such as the 
136 See Heper, M. (1976a) pp 485-486. This explains why, in Frederick Frey's words, 
`°The Kemalists concentrated on the extension and the consolidation of the 
modernist beachhead within the ruling elite" (1963, p. 313). 
137 Given that, in Metin Heper's words, "the State elites took democracy not as the 
representation and reconciliation of the interests and opinions of different social 
groups but as finding the one best policy by the enlightened elite, that is, by the State 
elites themselves" (1991, pp 48-49, his emphases), this did not imply a loss of top- 
down control (see Turan, 1., 1984a, p. 89). 
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Orthodox Church and British Whigs. The conflict between their 
restrained status, political awareness and economic mobility found 
expression through both separatist agitation and, for those recruited 
by the expanding state bureaucracy of the nineteenth century, 
reformism from within the centre. Such state creating nationalism 
informed Turkish national consciousness and prompted efforts aimed 
at reinforcing the state (defined as both the empire and the Turkish 
`nation) from the CUP. 
The Ottoman state had, however, spent centuries institutionalising 
peripheral diversity and a highly structured centre/periphery 
(askeri/reaya) divide. Although greatly challenged during the 
nineteenth century, its networks of ideological organisation (which 
had provided both the flexibility and omnipresence fundamental to 
the empire's longevity) could not easily be redirected. The ulema, like 
the European ecumene described by Mann, had been one of the 
primary vehicles for institutionalising the relationship between ruler 
and ruled and thus an important element in legitimising and 
transmitting the ideology of the centre. Without the exegetic 
autonomy of the Church and the polarising effects of its sixteenth 
century schism, however, the Ottoman theocracy was less suited to 
what Mann terms the `religious proto-nationalism'. Both in ideological 
and political terms the ulema's universalist foundation and 
intermediary role between Caliph and subject (including the non- 
Mulsim millets as `people of the book') were strongly multi-national 
and therefore intrinsically inappropriate to the needs of the Turkists. 
Particularly out of step with the modernising centre's view of the 
twentieth century was their emphasis on the scholarly value of Arabic 
and Persian. Unlike in Europe, classic scriptures could not be 
approached in the mother-tongue of the student so Ottoman 
vernaculars remained localised within the `cultural traditions' of the 
region. The break-down in the relationship between clergy and state 
during the nineteenth century (described in the previous chapter) led 
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to a decline in educational provision further fragmenting religious 
discursive literary networks. 138 
So rather than expanding from the extensiveness of theocratic 
networks of discursive literacy and education, commercial-statism was 
largely imported from the West and institutionalised in parallel to 
what may be called `traditional' ideological structures. Linguistic 
standardisation, first implemented by the military, was an innovation 
unconnected to the ulema's ideological networks and one that spread 
not from the existent medresse education system, but originated in the 
Western-orientated and increasingly German-staffed military 
academies. Similarly, educational reforms and the bureaucratisation of 
the kalemýyye which led to a significant growth in non-clerical state 
administrators, were based on European models of the rational state 
imposed by Istanbul and unsupported by organic changes in civil 
society. So, despite gradually involving more social groups from the 
periphery, modernism's `secularising' effects were restricted to an 
intelligentsia born of the centrist adab training systems. Incorporated 
into this etatist elite through attempts by the state to nurture a 
`national' bourgeoisie were commercially mobile social networks from 
western Anatolia and a predominantly Turkish cadre of professional 
lawyers and educators. 
Institutionalised as a result of Western-inspired modernism, these 
social networks lacked extensive literary links to the mass of civil 
society which remained largely embedded in the ideological 
organisation of the ulema. With the failure of the modernisers to 
alleviate the parlous peripheral education system, the discursive 
expansion that had occurred within state-connected social groups 
could not be extended downwards through civil society. As a result, 
no broadly-held notions of citizenship comparable to those of 
Europe could be institutionalised. On the one hand, with neither an 
extensive middle-class nor an independent intelligentsia, the state was 
138 See Frey, F. (1964) p. 211. 
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able to pursue autonomously a policy of top-down, militarised state- 
reinforcement. On the other, however, such centrist and anti-clerical 
despotism was an ineffectual means of maintaining peripheral 
support. While the Kemalists were initially careful to connect their 
approach to state-reinforcement to traditional ideological networks, the 
highly centralised and militarised bureaucracy of the republic proved 
neither capable of fully eradicating provincial state-subverting 
nationalism nor of institutionalising a `national' civil society. In 
contrast to the European dialectic of militarism versus representation 
within a delimited nation-state, the Turkish state continued the 
Ottoman tradition of despotic autonomy with decentralising 
opposition still largely centred around peripheral religiosity. 
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Chapter Five: The Economics of Liberalisation 
This chapter looks at political and economic liberalisation in Turkey 
following the Second World War. The roots of industrial capitalism 
will be traced back through the single-party period (1924-1945) with 
an emphasis on the role played by the state. This is in keeping with 
Michael Mann's focus on centralised political power as key to 
economic advance, and societal change generally, in north-west 
Europe. In seeking to uncover the social origins of the various 
political and ideological alignments that emerged in Turkey during the 
period of Democrat Party governance in the 1950s, this chapter will 
concentrate on Mann's elucidation of `class'. Here, the rural and 
urban groups that he identifies within European polities will be 
compared with those existent in Turkey during the post-war years. It 
is intended that this will provide a means of examining the extent to 
which these networks conform with, or deviate from, the pattern of 
European social development that he outlines. Of particular interest 
will be the role such organisations played in the emergence of what 
Mann terms the second phase of modern nationalism, that of 
`industrial-capitalism'. 
Class and State 
Central to the social dynamics of this period (in Europe broadly from 
the mid-nineteenth century until the First World War), was, in Mann's 
parlance, the `crystallisation' of class. He writes, "capitalism had 
created potentially extensive, political and (occasionally) symmetrical 
and dialectical classes". 1 This did not, however, necessarily lead to 
compartmentalised social collectives cemented by a shared sense of 
group consciousness. Mann argues that for such perceptions of class 
unity to develop, four components (what he terms the IOTA model) 
I Mann, M. (1993) p. 27. His parenthesis. 
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are required. 2 Firstly, a shared `identity' must exist between class 
members. Secondly, this identity must include the perceived 
`opposition' of (and to) other class interests. Thirdly, the first and 
second components must combine in a `totality' that defines the class 
members' social situation and society in general. Fourthly, an 
`alternative' to the existing power relations must be conceived. In 
Mann's view these criteria were not generally met. Classes, he argues, 
did not emerge as `pure' features of modernity. Instead, they were 
divided by other networks of social interaction, both from within the 
relations of production and through the influence of non-economic 
forces. 
Mann illustrates this by initially focusing on workers' political 
movements in Great Britain, the home of the first proletariat. He 
identifies two `collectivities', additional to class, arguing that capitalist 
development's tendency to homogenise labour skills was less uniform 
than Marx and Engels believed. 3 Firstly, workers may be `segmentally' 
organised in interdependent relations with their employers. This is 
particularly the case if the skills of the labour force are highly 
specialised, developed through in-house training and scarce in the 
general job market. In these conditions workers are not easily able to 
leave and seek comparable positions elsewhere and employers are 
more reliant on their existing workforce as the costs of recruiting 
replacement staff are high. As a result, "employees become segregated 
from the mass of workers outside, and conflict becomes employer- 
specific, not generalizable to a class" 4 Secondly, workers may be 
organised within `sectional' collectivities determined by their 
occupation or trade. This can be used to restrict the supply of their 
skills and oppose employers without recourse to a working class 
totality. In Britain, mid-nineteenth century trade unionism was subject 
to these sectional restraints. As unions moved their power base from 
the artisan trades to engineering, factory-floors and smelting works, 
2 See also his original formulation of these criteria (1973, p. 13). 
3 Mann, M. (1993) Ch. 15. 
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they sought to avoid state harassment under conspiracy legislation by 
retaining what Mann calls "privileged craft sectionalism" instead of a 
more generalist extensiveness. 5 Although many trade unionists began 
to view society as an economic totality within a broader capitalist 
system, collaboration with middle-class reformers and employers 
remained the norm with violent confrontations mainly restricted to 
the mining industry. In all, Mann concludes that "identity with the 
sectional trade and with the segmental enterprise strengthened more 
than with class". 6 
The European agrarian sector has also been subject to comparable 
segmental and sectional cleavages which imposed varying levels of 
cross-class divisions on the three broad agricultural classes that Mann 
identifies, namely large-estate farmers, peasants (or smallholding farm 
proprietors) and landless labourers? The first, the land-owners (gentry 
and commoner), made up a fundamental element of both the old and 
the new ruling European regime and were therefore less subject to 
these structures. While divided by employment status, 8 the power 
relations of the third group, the landless labourers, were, for the most 
part, similarly straightforward. Exploited and segmentalised by the 
estates and by wealthier, market-orientated smallholders they were 
generally unable to develop organisational links with any significant 
extensiveness and remained, for the most part, a latent class .9 The 
second group, the peasantry, was more complex. While Marx held the 
view that the fragmented nature of their mode of production made 
them incapable of class organisation, Mann, augmenting the theses of 
Weber, Tilly and Kautsky, argues that what he terms "the global 
commercialisation of agriculture" did in fact lead to the 
4 Ibid. p. 511. 
5 Ibid. p. 536. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. p. 694. 
8 Mann writes that they may be "casual, seasonal or permanent, waged or paid in 
kind, free or bonded" (ibid. ). 
9 Nevertheless Mann acknowledges that exceptions to this do exist. For instance, 
socialist agitation did have some success, particularly in regions dominated by 
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"proletarianisation" of the European peasantry. 10 The employment 
requirements of industrialisation and improvements in transportation 
in the mid-nineteenth century both integrated the rural and the urban 
within states and brought continental landmasses closer together. As 
these developments favoured farmers with capital to invest, 
borrowing rose resulting in intensified credit conflicts and social 
stratification. The more successful smallholders specialised, organised 
distribution networks and competed with the larger estates, while 
others were threatened by foreclosure and forced into crop liens. 
Both called for improved credit terms, greater financial regulation, a 
standardisation of seed, fertiliser and machinery supply and an end to 
the collusion of urban corporations and rural capital. Mann concludes 
that this `class populism' pitted "the `people' against corporate 
capitalism, potentially uniting peasants and workers, with similar 
opponents, in a Leftist alliance". 11 Like the urban proletariat, 
however, increased market competition also intensified sectional 
divisions. Greater specialisation and interdependence made producers 
more vulnerable to the effects of agricultural depressions, natural 
disasters, regional technological advance and state protectionist 
policies and therefore more inclined to form local organisational 
networks based around their own cultivation. This meant that the 
peasantry, like the estate farmers and the landless, remained 
segmentally divided from other agrarian class members outside their 
locality. Such cross-class linkages led to a more general sectional 
division between agriculturists and urbanites, often based on the rural 
influence of old regime and clerical traditionalism. 
The middle-classes of nineteenth century Europe were similarly 
segmentalised. While relatively insulated from the workers by the 
gradual collapse of the artisan sector, their commitment to capitalism 
ensured a varied degree of loyalty to the ruling regime. The petite 
absentee landlords, in radicalising the sharecroppers of southern Europe and 
western United States. 
lo Ibid. p. 697. 
11 Ibid. p. 698. 
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bourgeoisie (the first of three middle class `fractions' identified by 
Mann) were owners and controllers of their means of production 
(typically as a family or non-contractual association) and as such 
experienced little exploitation. 12 Discontent was minimal and their 
conservatism, which helped to defeat the Chartist movement in 
Britain for instance, persisted throughout the challenge of rising 
corporate power during the nineteenth century. 13 The second middle- 
class fraction, the careerists, were generally salaried employees in 
corporate or state bureaucracies. Some were managers, others 
(predominantly women, ex-manual workers and young men) clerks 
and sales assistants. All were caged within disciplined, segmental and 
graded hierarchies which simultaneously provided career mobility and 
constrained collective action. The third fraction of the middle-classes 
were the professionals. Theirs was "a `learned' (involving technically 
and culturally valued knowledge) occupation requiring special 
education, whose practice is formally licensed after negotiation 
between the state and an occupational organisation". 14 The success of 
the state in authoritatively controlling qualification processes (with the 
exception of the medical profession) and establishing regulatory 
supervision in most sectors restrained the autonomy inherent in the 
quasi-capitalist partnerships and price-fixing monopolies of fee- 
charging professionalism. 
Indeed, the role of the state is, for Mann, a key determinant in the rise 
of extreme right-wing politics during the `industrial-capitalist' phase 
of modern nationalism. State expansion began to adopt a greater 
number of civilian functions. Spending on the requirements of 
economic growth, such as the communications and educational infra- 
structure had, in most European states, overtaken military 
12 Ibid. Ch. 16. 
13 Here Mann rejects the argument that the petite bourgeoisie were proletarianised 
by the growth of economies of scale. Their decline, he suggests, was relative rather 
than absolute and mainly occurred following the Second World War. In general, 
they maintained prosperity levels through diversification and did not suffer the 
`status-panic' which is sometimes ascribed causal value in explaining the rise of 
extreme Rightist politics during the 1920s and 30s (ibid. pp 557-558). 
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expenditure by the early twentieth century. As Mann comments, 
"welfare and fiscal policies redistributed resources between regions, 
age-groups and classes, reducing inequalities and further solidifying 
the nation". 15 This tended to reduce mass deference to the old regime 
and extend notions of popular sovereignty, previously the preserve of 
the bourgeoisie, into the proletariat and the peasantry. The result was 
threefold. 16 Firstly, the ruling classes responded by using religious 
affiliation as a means of challenging the appeal of socialism. The 
social welfare associations of Catholic landowners were, for instance, 
particularly effective in maintaining peasant deference in southern 
Germany, France and Austria. Secondly, a more secular brand of 
conservatism appeared in northern Germany, Britain and the United 
States which stressed the greater technocratic value of the existing 
relations of production. Parties hitherto dominated by landed 
interests increasingly emphasised their members' professional aptitude 
to manage a modern economy. 
Thirdly, an inwardly-directed brand of industrial-capitalist nationalism 
emerged. Predicated on the idea of the internal enemy and 
propagated by `top-down' authoritarian or semi-authoritarian ruling- 
class regimes, it was primarily extended through ideologically 
integrated state bureaucracies. This was particularly true in Germany 
during the early years of the twentieth century where it was used by 
the old regime to bring "the middle classes into the edges of the state 
in order to keep labour and the ethnic minorities well outside it". 17 
Unlike liberal countries that were more subject to the control of mass 
political parties, Germany and, to some extent, Austria developed 
highly statist, anti-proletarian segments of the bourgeoisie. Since few 
within the entrepreneurial sector wished for a greater extractive role 
for the state, it was largely within these state-affiliated professionals, 
public administrators and civil servants (i. e. those who had received 
14 Ibid. p. 564. 
15 Mann, M. (1995) p. 54. 
16 Summarised in Mann, M. (1995a) pp 27-35. 
17 Mann, M. (1993) p. 584. 
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the most extensive state education) that support for old regime 
militarism (still around 40 per cent of many European national 
budgets) centred. 18 As this evolved into what Mann terms `aggressive' 
forms of nationalism, it gradually took on a violent chauvinism (often 
directed against transnational ideologies such as anarchism and 
socialism) largely beyond old regime control. 
In this sense, ideological, military and political networks of social 
organisation "have welded solidarities among these economically 
heterogeneous fractions, strata and segments". 19 Modern classes and 
class consciousness have, Mann argues, emerged from the interaction 
of all four sources of social power. Revolutionary politics, in both its 
nationalist and internationalist forms, emerged as imperfect 
`crystallisations' of class sentiment from the tensions within civil 
society and, perhaps most importantly, between civil society and the 
state. While ideological and military power exerted a more ambiguous 
influence over class development, centralised political power "played 
a very substantial structuring role" in the mobilisation of class 
sentiment. 20 Ideological relations of the `industrial-capitalist' period 
were certainly important in articulating class interests, but they were a 
phenomenon rooted in an already constituted structure of social 
stratification which they could reinforce or transcend. Similarly, 
military recruitment may train revolutionaries, as Engels believed, or, 
as Mann suggests, serve to segmentalise subordinate classes, 
strengthening the organisational power of the old regime. In contrast, 
both the extension of state infra-structure and access to the state itself 
were determining factors in the formation of capitalist stratification 
and the course of inter-class relations during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. 
18 See Mann's analysis of the German Nay League, The Society of the Eastern Marcher and 
the Pan German League 1900-1914 (1993) pp 585-586. 
19 Ibid. p. 29. 
20 Ibid. p. 30. 
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Late Development and the Turkish Bureaucratic-Industrial Complex 
As industrialisation greatly increased the power of the dominant 
classes, it became quickly diffused. Outside north-western Europe, 
social elites noted the course of earlier development patterns and 
established adapted models of industrial advance, inadvertently 
furthering state centralisation. Mann argues, after Gershenkron, that 
key attributes in the success of `latecomer' industrialisation were (1) 
rapid growth, (2) an emphasis on producers' goods, (3) large-scale 
plant and enterprise, (4) increased mass consumption, (5) a 
diminished role for agriculture, (6) an active financial sector and (7) an 
interventionist state. 21 This collaboration between state and capital led 
to subsidised manufacturing and banking systems and the promotion 
of cartels large enough to invest in technology and research. If, 
however, development was erratic or sectionally variable what Mann 
terms `enclaves' may emerge in which `comprador' classes could 
institutionalise transnational links seeking "to keep their own state 
weak and ally with foreign capital, even with foreign states". 22 Such 
uneven development often exacerbated regional and class tensions 
destabilising the economy and forcing political elites to focus on 
issues of internal order. Following the relative stability of the first 
wave of late developers (Prussia-Germany, Sweden and Japan), 
Austrian and Russian industrialisation was successful only at the cost 
of territorial disintegration. 
Turkey, the remnants of the other great European `empire of 
domination', was, like Austria and Russia, heavily reliant on 
agricultural exports as a means of paying for imported capital goods 
and therefore shared the sectoral discrepancies of its old enemies. 23 
21 Ibid. p. 492. 
22 Ibid. 
23 This was particularly the case in Turkey where the terms of the 1923 Treaty of 
Lausanne had forbade the government from pursuing a protectionist trade policy 
leaving foreign capital free to take over abandoned Greek businesses (See Keyder, 
" (;., 1987b, pp 32-33). A further point to note is the highly agrarian nature of the 
Turkish economy. In the 1927 census 81 per cent of the Turkish labour force were 
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Reform generally involved core-peripheral conflict as the degree to 
which the state was able to influence agricultural producers was 
limited by the inherent autonomy of an agrarian system yet to be 
proletarianised by the proliferation of large-scale estates. While 
smallholders predominated 24 the possibility of a withdrawal from the 
market to the level of subsistence gave the peasantry (landless 
labourers obviously had no surplus with which to bargain) greater 
distance from the policies of the centre than the industrial and 
commercial sectors. In response, the state had, according to Farük 
Birtek and Caglar Keyder, any combination of three possible 
strategies. 25 The first was a mixture of taxation and acquisitive price- 
fixing. The second was regulation or influencing market prices by 
fixing the cost of inputs like land, machinery and fertiliser. The third 
was controlling production through measures such as land 
distribution/reclamation, import subsidies and credit policies. 
For much of the 1920s, support of the large, export-orientated 
farmers, as both a means of institutionalising controls over 
transnational exchange and a valuable source of surplus extraction, 
dominated the Kemalist state's development policies. Tax burdens 
were lessened with the abolition of the land tithe in 1925, rail 
subsidies were announced and the profitable estates of the recently 
expelled Greek farmers of the Aegean region were allocated to 
Muslim land-owners. 26 In 1924 the Ministry of Agriculture was 
created which, through its partnership with the Agricultural Bank 
(Ziraat Bankasi), extended lending in this sector from 17 million lira 
in 1924 to 36 million in 1930.27 Supported by an increase in road 
(22,000 km to 30,000 km) and railway (4,000 km to 6,000 km) 
employed in the agricultural sector (I, sikh, A., 1987, p. 312). This compares with 59 
per cent in Russia in 1897,57 per cent in Austria in 1910 and 9 per cent in Britain in 
1911 (Mann, M., 1993, p. 693). 
24 Resat Aktan, writing in 1957, suggests that 97 per cent of the total number of 
agricultural holdings during the 1930s were less than 50 hectares in area and around 
8-10 per cent of all farmers did not own their own land (pp 274-275). 
u Birtek, F. & Keyder, (;. (1975) p. 448. 
26 See McCarthey, J. (1980) p. 70. 
27 Margulies, R. & Yildizoglu, E. (1987) p. 273. 
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construction over the same period, 28 the state had some success in 
increasing productivity. Although agricultural output did increase 
between 1923 and 1929,29 only the largest and most profitable estates 
were `marketised'. As Zvi Hershlag puts it, "in spite of a general trend 
towards increase in agricultural output... the shortcomings were still 
overwhelming' . 3Ö As a result, the export drive had only minimal 
effects of the balance of trade. The deficit was 60 million lira in 1923 
and 50 million in 1928.31 
The 1929 crash worsened the situation considerably. Coinciding with 
a number of poor harvests, it halved the value of Turkey's five major 
exports, 32 and had, by 1932, reduced total export revenues by 
between 30 and 50 per cent. 33 As a result, the limited progress of 
smallholder incorporation into world markets was arrested, the estate- 
farmers lost the surpluses that had underpinned a favourable alliance 
with the state and Turkey abandoned liberal integrationism. In 
response, agricultural policy aims changed. Food production surpluses 
were required not for export, but in order to offset the contraction in 
the domestic economy caused by the curtailment of imports. These 
declined from 256 million lira in 1929 to 85 million in 1932, of which 
up to 20 per cent (the figure for 1925) were food stuffs 34 The state 
moved away from supporting large, export-orientated farmers and 
towards the cereal producer, an agricultural section dominated by 
smallholders. It embarked upon a price subsidising policy which 
established the government, through its network of purchasing 
stations, as the primary buyer of first, wheat, and later, barley and 
oats. Thus "by cutting down on imports and controlling commodity 
exchange in general the state put the large farmer at a disadvantage" 35 
28 Ibid. p. 286, n. 7. 
29 See Keyder, Cr. (1981) pp 38-42. 
30 He suggests a figure of 58 per cent as an increase in agricultural production 
between 1923 and 1932 would be more accurate. Hershlag, Z. (1968) p. 51. 
31 Keyder, C, (1981) p. 76. 
32 Margulies, R. & Yildtzoglu, E. (1987) p. 273. 
33 Kindleberger, C. (1973) p. 191. 
34 See Margulies, R. & Yildizoglu, E. (1987) p. 274 and Okyar, O. (1965) p. 99. 
35 Birtek, F. & Keyder, C,. (1975) p. 452. 
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Rather than tractors and Derv being imported on Ministry-sponsored 
terms, the government restricted speculative investment and 
redistributed barely viable plots of land more suited to the labour 
intensive inputs of small-surplus peasants. 36 During the Second World 
War the state increased its purchases of unused peasant produce. 
However, despite the inflationary pressures of mass conscription and 
a general shortage of consumer goods, which pushed up the general 
price index by 450 per cent between 1939 and 1944, the government 
fixed its purchasing prices. 37 With prices in other economic sectors 
rising rapidly, profitable smallholdings that were too market- 
orientated to return to subsistence levels suffered a sharp fall in living 
standards and attempted to withhold their surpluses from the state. 
As a result, agricultural production declined from an index fix of 100 
in 1939 to 70.4 in 1944.38 In all, this gave rise to a social stratum of 
significant size that was "mobilised and integrated into the economy, 
yet left most vulnerable to the economic downturns, and hence 
readily motivated to play a role in the political sphere". 39 
The crash of 1929 also profoundly affected the Turkish state's 
relationship with the urban classes. Industrial policy during the 1920s 
had been determined by the free trade stipulations of the Treaty of 
Lausanne. While not entirely unprotected, the Turkish economy had 
relatively low tariffs (11-12 per cent on textiles and 7 per cent on 
metals, for instance). 40 This `mixed economy' approach had seen 
some state activity in the industrial sector, but public enterprise was 
not intended to usurp decentralised entrepreneurial endeavour. 41 As a 
result of the 1929 crisis, however, an etatist policy was adopted which 
36 See Hershlag, Z. (1968) pp 78-79. 
37 Birtek and Keyder note that while over a million men were taken out of the active 
labour force, families that cultivated large plots were exempted. This, they argue, 
had the effect of reducing the amount of land under cultivation and restricting the 
surplus of the smallholder, thereby pushing up prices (1975) p. 459. 
38 Yerasimos, S. (1987) p. 90. 
39 Birtek, F. & Keyder, Cr. (1975) p. 460. 
40 Hale, W. (1984) p. 155. 
41 For example, Gundüz Okcün calculates that foreign investment was able to 
establish a 43 per cent share of Turkish corporate capital during this period (cited in 
Keyder, (;., 1981, p. 100). 
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favoured "direct state participation, ownership and planning of the 
economy" 42 This was influenced by the Soviet model of central 
planning and a loan of $18 million offered by Moscow in 1933 on 
very favourable terms 43 Intellectual currents within Turkey also 
favoured greater state planning. The periodical Kadro (first published 
in 1932), for example, called for a small elite to take charge of the 
development process 44 This was, in part a least, effected under the 
first Five Year Plan (inaugurated in 1934) which established public 
investment and state-led enterprises as the principal mechanism of 
industrialisation. Although the state was at pains to stress that this did 
not represent an attempt to eliminate private initiative, it resulted in 
"a noncompetitive, closed economy dominated by state monopolies 
that were ... managed primarily 
for the benefit of a privileged elite 
controlling the state apparatus". 45 The distance between the state 
bureaucracy and the masses was further widened by the failure of 
government policy to produce any sustained growth in the agricultural 
sector. Whereas industrial output was doubled from the 1929 slump 
to the end of the first Five Year Plan in 1939, agricultural output had, 
by the end of the Second Five Year Plan in 1944, fallen back to 
virtually the same levels as 1929 with national income per capita 
actually declining over the same period. 
During the 1930s, the state's bureaucratic elite was able to 
institutionalise a considerable degree of autonomy. Following the 
closure of a short-lived opposition party, the Free Republican Party 
(Serben Cumburiyet Firkaa), which had emerged in the aftermath of the 
1929 crash, the elite was "left unhindered to formulate the ideology 
underlying the new role of the state and its socio-economic 
42 Mehmet, O. (1983) p. 52. 
43 See Thomberg, M, Spry, G. & Souls, G. (1949) pp 26-27. 
44 See Okyar, O. (1965) p. 100. 
45 Mehmet, O. (1983) p. 53. 
46 With a base index of 100 taken in 1938, Alec Alexander calculates that industrial 
production was at 57 in 1929 and 114 in 1939 (rising unsteadily through the war to 
128 in 1945), agricultural production was at 73 in 1929 and 74 in 1945 and national 
income per capita 85 in 1929 and 78 in 1945 (1961, p. 474). 
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practices" 47 As Frederick Frey has found, senior civil servants and 
bureaucrats held many of the key positions of power in the National 
Assembly between 1931 and 1943. Two-thirds of the entire electoral 
body were continually returned to office throughout this period and 
the proportion of deputies born in their constituency went down 
from 62 per cent in 1920 to 34 per cent in 1935.48 As Kemal's party 
dictatorship stabilised, bureaucratic and political power merged "to 
create an apparatus to impose [their perception of the national] will 
on the public" 49 In the tradition of the Ottoman ruling elite, the state 
attempted to direct the economic, political and ideological aspirations 
of `the people' (defined as "a unified mass without class or privilege') 
without seeking to institutionalise mechanisms of social 
representation. 50 The bureaucracy's prominent position in the 
economy led to what Keyder calls "a seamless coalition" being 
formed with a small cadre of industrial magnates. 51 Such corporatism 
was supported by the suppression of trade union movements and 
workers' organisations. Legislation, modelled on Italian fascism, 52 in 
1935,1936 and 1938 effectively criminalised strike action and 
prohibited the formation of associations based on social class. As a 
result, the "developing bourgeoisie was an exceptionally `national' 
one in its practical orientation. Deprived of a strong international 
connection... it became a full supporter of the centrality of the state. 
47 Keyder, Cr. (1987b) p. 35. 
48 Frey, F. (1965) passim. He also noted that up 46 per cent of deputies elected 
between 1920 and 1950 were from a state bureaucratic background despite making 
up only 3-6 per cent of the country's economically active males. 
49 Riggs, F. (1964) p. 265. My parenthesis. 
so I, sikh, A. (1987) p. 313. Farilk Birtek notes that "social mobility and membership 
in the urban and semi-urban professional middle class (in particular, teachers, judges 
and state officials) depended on their participation in the expansion of the Kemalist 
state. In turn the achievement of higher social status necessarily involved the 
rejection of local hierarchies, organisation, and traditional ties... There had been no 
social revolution, however, the CHP [RPP], basing its power on limited social 
participation and its ability to recruit a substantial part of the local elite, controlled 
the state by distancing the centre from - rather than attempting to transform or 
incorporate - the cultural periphery in the countryside" (1994, p. 225). His 
parenthesis. 
51 Keyder, C. (1987b) p. 36. 
52 See Ibid. 
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Thus, there was no desire on the part of the bourgeoisie to challenge 
the normative concerns of the bureaucracy" 53 
Some writers have argued that the state's autonomy of both landed 
interests and an extensive, politically active capitalist class explains 
why it was not obliged to employ widespread military force to achieve 
its transformational goals. 54 However, despite the state's increasingly 
consolidated socio-economic position, the 1930s saw little change in 
the martial administration of many south-east Anatolian provinces. A 
rebellion of approximately 5,000 Kurds around Agri in 1930, for 
instance, was brutally suppressed with a force of 50,000 Turkish 
troops. According to David McDowall, state forces executed all 1,500 
prisoners and killed over 3,000 non-combatants, before issuing a 
decree (Law 1850) stating that "murders and other actions committed 
... by representatives of the state or province, by the military or civil 
authorities... or by any civilian having helped the above... will not be 
considered as crimes". 55 In support of these measures, the then 
Minister of justice announced that, "those who are not of pure 
Turkish stock can only have one right in this country, the right to be 
servants and slaves" 56 In June 1934 further legislation (Law 2510) 
was enacted giving the state extended powers to evacuate, and 
relocate to western Anatolia, all regions defined as non-Turkish. 
While logistical problems prevented a full implementation, reports 
from refugees suggest that "massacres, deportations and forced 
assimilation were proceeding apace" in many south-eastern 
provinces. 57 The destruction, in 1937, of the partly Kurdish Alevi 
town of Dersim, later given the Turkish name `Tunceli' (`the bronze 
hand'), with the loss of up to 40,000 lives, was a case in point. 58 
53 Keyder, Cr. (1987) p. 199. 
54 See Özbudun, E. (1981) pp 95-96 for instance. 
55 McDowall, D. (1993) pp 37-38. 
56 Cited in ibid. 
57 McDowall, D. (1992) p. 207. 
58 Rambout's estimate cited in ibid. 
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While these measures were influenced by the fascist regimes of 
contemporary Europe, particularly that of Germany with whom 
Turkey signed a large-scale trade agreement in 1935,59 they were 
primarily based on a belief in the practical efficacy of social 
engineering rather than ideologically grounded in socio-biological 
notions of ethnic difference. In other words, discrimination against 
non-Turkish identities was part of a search for greater social cohesion 
within the ideological framework of industrial-capitalist advance 
(discussed below) rather than the deliberately divisive `otherisation' 
measures of Hitler's Germany. Having rejected the republic's 
Ottoman heritage as obscurant and atavistic, Kemalist visions of an 
idealised 'national' heritage were vague and lacked the Nazi's 
ideological construction of the past as an attainable and worthy social 
goal. Non-Turks could, through individual or state action, become 
citizens - an option not commonly available to non-Germans under 
Nazi administration. In keeping with fascist regimes in Europe, 
however, this denial of the utility of ethnicity coincided with a general 
rejection of religiosity and social stratification. In this sense, Stephane 
Yerasimos was correct to conclude that "the role assigned to the 
party, the denial of social classes and their replacement by 
occupational bodies, the foreign pressures under which the republic 
and the party were founded, and the orientation toward racist 
reference points in the search of a national culture and history, had all 
predisposed them [Kemal's political elite] to a fascist inclination" 60 
It was, however, the Turkish state's attempts to extend its political 
power that was at the heart of these developments, not an ideological 
construct pursued for its own sake. Efforts to increase the centre's 
infra-structural reach into south-eastern Anatolia produced chauvinist 
effects which became increasingly incorporated into a national 
education system primarily aimed at grooming future public 
administrators as resistance to its extractive and tutelary policies were 
59 According to Keyder (after Fleury) Germany received 51 per cent of Turkey's 
exports from where Turkey bought 41 per cent of her imports (1987b) p. 37. 
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encountered. The object of territorial homogenisation was not a 
purification of the `Volk', but (as borders solidified, internal disorder 
lessened and the Lausanne restrictions expired) the etatist 
management of a national economy through the disempowerment of 
peripheral comprador agents. To return to Gershenkron's seven point 
model highlighted earlier, successful latecomer industrialisation could 
only be effected through state intervention. In order to prevent 
regionally uneven development and, perhaps most importantly, the 
rise of class consciousness, the state must have infra-structural access 
to peripheral social groups. This is essential to both facilitate 
industrial growth and eliminate enclaves of unregulated transnational 
trade. Attempts were made by the Turkish administration to extend 
the infra-structural development schemes of the Five-Year Plans to 
the eastern provinces, but the bulk of state investment and public 
enterprises remained in western Anatolia, as did the majority of 
market-orientated agricultural estates. 61 In all, military measures such 
as relocation and forced assimilation were preferred to developmental 
policies as a means of curtailing decentralised transnational trade. 62 In 
the tradition of Ottoman governance, the republican state, perhaps 
wary of Austrian and Russian fragmentation during industrialisation, 
placed political integration before economic development as its 
primary policy aim. While this may have succeeded in preventing 
comprador commercial groups from gaining autonomy, it could not 
60 Yerasimos, S. (1987) p. 90. My parenthesis. 
61 While noting a dearth of primary sources regarding agricultural reforms during 
this period, Margulies and Yildizoglu suggest that, at least until 1937, land-owners in 
south-eastern provinces continued to divide up their estates along the traditional 
lines of sharecropping and "can be distinguished from the rest of the country by a 
historical background of tribal relations" (1987, p. 277). Walter Weiker writes, 
"factors influencing relative low levels of developmental efforts in these regions 
included the prospects of quicker and larger returns in the already semi-developed 
central areas, the need to keep order... and, possibly, the RPP's at least tacit alliance 
with many large landowners of the eastern region" (1981, p. 233). 
62 This may be part of the reason why agriculture's share of the Turkish working 
population only dropped from 81 per cent in 1927 to 78 per cent by 1950 and from 
a 49 per cent GDP share to 43 per cent over the same period. See Tezel, Y. (1975) 
pp 75-86. 
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provide the necessary "penetrative' strength" to pursue the Western 
model of capitalist development G3 
Democratisation and the Challenge of the Bourgeoisie 
The Second World War affected Turkish society in a number of 
different ways. Within the agricultural sector, as has been already 
noted, the peasantry fared very badly. In contrast though, "conditions 
were particularly conducive to the expansion of rurally based 
merchant capital" G4 The decrease in agricultural production, coupled 
with states' greater extractive needs (features of both the domestic 
and the world market), reduced the availability of food stuffs and 
pushed up prices. Abraham and Eva Hirsch note that this led to a rise 
of over 80 per cent in the internal terms of trade for agriculture 
between 1939 and 1943.65 Thus the large estate farmers, whose more 
substantial surpluses already allowed them to withstand better the 
acquisitive infra-structure of the state, were able to generate 
significant profits during the war by both monopolising urban supply 
chains and speculating on the international exchange of staple 
commodities. Through associated networks of traders and 
middlemen, these forces of agricultural mercantilism brought rural 
modes of production closer to urban capitalists. To this nascent 
entrepreneurial class, the rigid controls of etatism and its corporatist 
partiality were seen as unduly restrictive, corrupt and a grossly 
inefficient means of allocating their tax returns 66 Similarly dissatisfied 
were the burgeoning professional classes which the state elite had 
promoted, partly through a quadrupling of the literacy rate (from 6 
per cent to 23 per cent in the years 1927 to 1945), 67 to support their 
bureaucratic control of the provincial economy. Occupational groups 
such as lawyers, doctors and educators saw that by combining their 
63 Mardin, S. (1980) p. 43. 
64 Margulies, R. & Yildizoglu, E. (1987) p. 277. 
65 Hirsch, A. & Hirsch, E. (1966) p. 454. 
66 See Walstead, B. (1977) pp 76-77 and Tachau, F. (1973) p. 299. 
67 Rustow, D. (1967) p. 19. 
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interests with the local nobility, clientelistic links with the peasantry 
could develop constituting "a formidable alliance" against state 
intervention. 68 
The breakdown of the bureaucracy's control of the emerging 
bourgeoisie can be seen in the reasons behind President Ismet 
Inönü's (Kemal had died in 1938) decision not to appoint candidates 
for six by-elections held in June 1945. This was followed in 
September by an announcement sanctioning the establishment of an 
official party in opposition to the Republican People's Party 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Parti. ri - RPP) which had monopolised constitutional 
politics since the inception of the republic. Cern Erogul offers four 
explanations to account for these early moves towards political 
liberalisation. 69 Firstly, they were to appease the peasantry (still 
around 80 per cent of the population) who had been alienated by war- 
time austerity and top-down modernisation. Secondly, they were a 
response to the breakdown in international relations with the Soviet 
Union and the need to move closer to the West. Thirdly, they were 
simply another step along the path of Westernisation begun in the 
years of the Tan! mat. Fourthly, they were an attempt to allay the 
propertied classes' dismay at the RPP's land reform initiative which 
stipulated that all private holdings of more than 500 hectares (in some 
cases it was to be 200) would be expropriated by the state and 
redistributed amongst subsistence farmers. Land that was cultivated 
by sharecroppers and tenants was to be seized and reallocated 
regardless of size. Although heavily supported by the military- 
bureaucratic-intellectual wing of the Party as an attempt to both 
nurture a franchise base and reassert centralised state power over the 
rich farmers, implementation was reliant on the co-operation of local 
landowners and merchants and therefore impossible. 70 Such an 
Ottoman-type measure was highly unpopular amongst a wide section 
68 Mardin, ý. (1980) p. 42. 
69 Erogul, C. (1987) pp 102-103. 
70 Only 3,600 hectares were expropriated forcing the resignation of the Minister of 
Agriculture (Özbudun, E. 1970 p. 398). 
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of the bourgeoisie where it was seen as illiberal and likely to lead to a 
decrease in productivity levels71 
Table Nine: The Birthplace of Political and Bureaucratic Elites 72 
1943 1946 1954 
Region of Birth Pol. Bur. Pol. Bur. Pol. Bur. 
Western 54 62 44 51 31 41 
Central 26 33 36 44 45 43 
Eastern 8 0 14 6 17 13 
Outside Turkey 12 6 5 2 7 2 
So, while Inönü was successful in ensuring that the rival party (the 
Demokrat Parti - DP) was initiated by loyal members of the RPP 
without Leftist sympathies, he was unprepared for the instant 
popularity it commanded, especially among the provinces. In what 
Özbudun describes as "a typical centre-periphery issue" the DP 
"advocated less strict government controls and a greater reliance on 
market and/or local forces - in other words more power for the 
periphery" 73 The RPP, on the other hand, remained dominated by 
urban intellectuals and bureaucrats disassociated from both the small 
to medium sized market-orientated farmers, who had forged 
decentralised links with urban entrepreneurial groups, and the rural 
masses74 Although opposed to land reform, sharing the RPP's low 
institutional penetration of rural society and lacking a clear ideological 
position, the DP were able to gain peasant support by promising 
lower taxes, less state intervention and "by rewarding regional cliques, 
kinship ties, religious demands and personal influence networks". 75 
This led to provincial Party moieties based on micro-factors ingrained 
in localised power networks from which it is difficult to draw national 
71 See Ahmad, F. (1977) p. 11. 
72 Source: Roos, N. & Roos, L. (1968) p. 290. 
73 Özbudn, E. (1980) p. 58. 
74 For an overlapping, but slightly different view, see Karpat, K (1962) p. 310. 
75 Sunar, 1. & Sayan, S. (1986) p. 173. 
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generalisations. 76 Nonetheless, it can be seen from the 1950 election 
results that the DP was initially less able to gain support in south-east 
Anatolia. Within the fifteen provinces where Kurdish makes up more 
than 15 per cent of the population's mother tongue, the RPP received 
53.4 per cent of the vote compared to a national average of 39.9 per 
cent, the DP's share was 43.7 per cent with a 53.3 per cent average?? 
In these areas the carrot and stick of militarised corporatism had 
institutionalised support for the state bureaucracy amongst local elites 
whose feudatory position had not been undermined by advances in 
rural merchant capital. As a result, the peasantry continued to be 
"deeply subservient" to the landlord/cleric alliance. 78 By the 1954 
election, however, the DP had, as Table Nine shows, presided over an 
increase in Eastern Anatolian representation within the political elite. 
They secured fatwas from eminent sheikhs reaffirming the sanctity of 
private property in Islam thereby keeping the possible benefits of land 
reform off the agenda and successfully obtaining the support of 
numerous south-eastern landowners. As a result, the DP won 34 out 
of the 40 seats in the south-east. 79 
In all, then, the DP's election victory in 1950 and subsequent 
consolidation in 1954 "can be seen as a decisive shift in Turkey's 
history from elite rule to full class rule and from one pattern of 
capitalist development to another". 80 The bureaucratic state elite was 
replaced by an administration empowered and maintained by 
decentralised organisational networks located primarily in the 
periphery. 81 As claimant to the guardianship of state values since the 
76 See Rustow, D. (1966) p. 123. 
77 Kiri,; ci, K. & Winrow, G. (1997) pp 106-107. See also Tachau, F. & Good, M. 
(1973) pp 563-564. 
78 McDowall, D. (1992) pp 397-399. Sabri Sayan writes "Unlike other parts of the 
country, traditional patron-client ties rather than party patronage are of primary 
importance in the structuring of political loyalties"(1977, p. 110). See also Kudat, A. 
(1975) passim. 
79 See McDowall, D. (1992) p. 398. 
80 Keyder, C. (1987b) p. 40. 
81 Arnold Leder comments that the DP made every effort "to present themselves as 
the champions of the periphery against the hated centre" (1979 p. 84). 
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days of the ö sultani, 82 the bureaucracy had long been at the 
forefront of an `induced' process of social change and was slow to 
adapt to "the weakening of the deferential political culture of the 
countryside" now apparent in Ankara. 83 As a result, "the bureaucratic 
response to the demands of the DP government and the provincial 
leadership was slow, and often negative". 84 The DP leadership, under 
Premier Adnan Menderes, reacted in three ways. The first was to 
reduce the status of the civil and armed services by circumventing 
their decision-making hierarchies. 85 This was achieved by appointing 
DP supporters to positions of power, the dismissal of the entire army 
command within a month of the 1950 elections and by appealing 
directly to the masses through the extension of RPP legislation 
relaxing bureaucratic controls on the practice of Islam. 86 Secondly, 
the government allowed salary levels within the public sector to drop 
during the highly inflationary period of the mid-1950s. 87 
The third measure the DP adopted was an attempt to outflank the 
bureaucracy's instrumental role in regulating social change through 
the promotion of `organic' modifications within its power base, the 
agricultural sector. To bring the provinces closer to the economy of 
the centre, a large-scale highway building programme was undertaken. 
This increased all-weather roads from a national total of 17,000 
kilometres in 1950 to 39,000 in 1960.88 Exploiting the close ties that 
the RPP had developed with the United States in the post-war years, 89 
the government used Turkey's key position in John Foster Dulles' 
concept of an anti-Soviet, Middle Eastern `northern tier' to generate 
"a cornucopia of subsidies" 90 This aid, coupled with earnings from 
an export boom in the early 1950s, was invested in agriculture 
82 See Heper, M. (1979-80) passim. 
83 Sayan, S. (1977) p. 109. 
84 Turan, I. (1984) p. 114. 
85 See Heper, M. (1984a) p. 74 & (1990) p. 218. 
86 See Erogul, C. (1987) p. 107 and Saribay, A. (1991) p. 129. 
87 See Turan, 1. (1984) pp 114-115. 
88 Ulman, A. & Tachau, F. (1965) p. 154. 
89 Turkey had received $391 million dollars through the Marshall Plan between 1946 
and 1950 (Schick, I. & Tonak, E., 1987, p. 340). 
195 
Chapter Five: The Economics of Liberalisation 
through the extension of state assistance to large landholders 91 A 
price-fixing scheme was revived in which the state paid more than the 
market price for agricultural surpluses increasing the public cost from 
23 million lira in 1949-1950 to 519 million in 1954.92 
Table Ten: Numbers of Selected Farm Machinery 1948-54.93 
1948 1952 1954 
Tractors 1 756 31 415 37 740 
Ploughs (Tractor-drawn) 1 472 30 766 38 000 
Trailers 140 12 982 18 088 
Disc Harrows (Tractor-drawn) 680 9 623 14 097 
Cultivators (Tractor-drawn) 401 4 028 5 075 
Graindrills (Tractor-drawn) 162 4 406 6 870 
Cotton Planters 2 570 13 909 ..... 
Reapers 14 384 21 122 19 782 
Combines 268 3 222 4 705 
Threshers 430 959 1 220 
Hay Mowers 612 1 553 3 159 
In addition, financial credits allowing landlords to mechanise large 
estates increased from 3 million lira for the period 1945-50 to 9.7 
million for 1950-1956.94 As Table Ten shows, such stimuli had a 
significant effect on mechanised agricultural input levels. Supported 
by a number of exceptionally good harvests and high commodity 
prices provoked by the war in Korea, they led to an increase of 50 per 
cent in agricultural output between 1950 and 1958.95 Furthermore, 
with the imperatives of a quickly growing populace, 96 the total 
amount of land under cultivation was also increased from 11 million 
to 17 million hectares between 1950 and 1959.97 
90 Rustow, D. (1979) p. 87. 
91 See Berberoglu, B. (1982) p. 71. 
92 Ibid. p. 83, n. 12. 
93 Source. Aktan, R. (1957) p. 276. 
94 Ibid. p 71. See also Aresvik, 0. (1975) p. 19. 
95 Simpson, D. (1965) p. 144. 
96 After 1950 Turkey maintained an annual population growth of almost 3 per cent. 
See Kolars, J. (1973, p. 191). 
97 Ulusan, A. (1959) p. 129. 
196 
Chapter Five: The Economics of Liberalisation 
Table Eleven: Urban and Rural Populations98 
Province & Sub-Districts 
District Centres & Villages 
Population % Population % Total 
1950 5,244,337 25.0 15,702,851 75.0 20,947,188 
1955 6,927,343 28.8 17,137,420 71.2 24,064,793 
1960 8,859,731 31.9 18,895,089 68.1 27,754,820 
In ascertaining the effects of these changes, some writers have argued 
that state efforts at land redistribution ensured that large-estate 
farmers did not increase their hold on agricultural production. 9" 
However, while the proportion of landless village families probably 
did decline from around 16 to 10 per cent from 1950 to 1960,100 the 
continual threat of land reform meant that large holdings were heavily 
underreported. Moreover, the figures are further skewed, particularly 
in the south-east, by the practice of employing small farmers, recently 
rendered landless by mechanised inputs, as subsistence tenants on 
large-estates in order to secure their voting allegiance and "remain 
attractive to the political parties". 101 As a result, a more accurate 
figure may be Berberoglu's estimate that, by 1957, between 18 and 20 
per cent of all cultivated land was operated by large-estate capital. 102 
Indeed, Re; at Atkan has found that all farmers investing in 
mechanisation were able to increase the size of their estates by an 
average of 31 per cent with plots in the south-east growing by an 
average of 43 per cent. 103 In all, it is possible to conclude that, during 
this period, "thousands of middle and small farmers were driven to 
bankruptcy, losing their land to big landowners and joining the ranks 
98 Source: Keyder, Cr. (1986) p. 297 after Devlet tstatistik Enstitüsü, Istati. rtik Yil: gr 
(various years). 
99 Indeed, statistics show that the number of large holdings (20 or more hectares) 
actually declined from 145,000 in 1952 to 115,000 in 1963. See Margulies, R. & 
Yildizoglu, E. (1987) p. 283. 
100 Keyder, C,. (1987) p. 131. 
101 McDowall, D. (1992) p. 399. 
102 Berberoglu, B. (1982) p. 71. 
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of the rural unemployed and underemployed or migrating to urban 
centres in search of work". 104 By 1953, Kemal Karpat states that 
mechanisation had already dislocated over one million farmers with 
urban migration, shown in Table Eleven, further exacerbated by an 
economic down-turn the following year. 105 
Before the recession of the mid-1950s, the DP had pursued the 
threefold economic recommendations made by the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD - now the World Bank) 
in 1951.106 Firstly, the state withdrew a considerable proportion of its 
investments in industry. As a result, private capital's share of 
manufacturing increased from 58 per cent in 1950 to 65 per cent in 
1954 and the number of joint-stock companies rose from three to 
fifty-six over the same period. 107 Secondly, favourable foreign 
investment conditions were introduced which eventually led to "the 
gradual integration of the newly emergent indigenous bourgeoisie into 
the worldwide production process". 108 Direct investment from the 
United States alone rose from $16 million to $33 million between 1950 
and 1954.109 Thirdly, the DP focused development on the light 
manufacturing and, as we have seen, the agricultural sectors, leaving 
heavy industrial investment to foreign capital. 110 In return for these 
measures Turkey received $56 million dollars in loans from the IBRD 
between 1950 and 1957 and a further $100 million from the IMF and 
OEEC in 1958.111 However, while the early part of this period saw a 
considerable increase in export levels (from 738 million lira in 1950 to 
1,110 million in 1953), imports also rose leading to a trade deficit of 
516 million lira in 1955.112 As a result, Turkey's national debt grew 
from 775 million lira in 1950 to over 5 billion in 1960 which, 
'03 Aktan, R. (1957) p. 277. 
104 Berberoglu, B. (1982) p. 71. 
105 Karpat, K. (1976) p. 56. See also his article of 1960 in Social Research. 
106 See Berberoglu, B. (1982) p. 81, n. 1. 
107 Ergil, D. (1975) pp 141-142. 
I" Berberoglu, B. (1982) p. 68. 
109 Ibid. p. 82, n. 8. 
110 For a survey of overseas interests in Turkish corporations, see ibid. p. 70. 
t"I Krueger, A. (1974) p. 77. 
112 Berberoglu, B. (1982) p. 72. 
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worsened by the governmental policy of printing ever more money, 
devalued the lira, led to high domestic inflation and doubled the cost 
of living. '13 
Price pressures not only acted as a `push' factor in migration, they also 
stimulated housing speculation, producing a construction boom 
cyclically fuelled by accelerating urbanisation. 114 As the building 
industry prospered, more migrants arrived increasing the number of 
urban plants employing ten or more workers from 163,000 to 324,000 
in the latter half of the 1950s. '15 With an average growth of more than 
5 per cent per annum for each of the four largest centres of 
population in Turkey (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Adana) between 
1950 and 1975, shanty towns (or gecekondu) began to dominate most 
Turkish cityscapes. 116 With the rapidly expanding private business 
sector focused on western Anatolia (63 per cent of the 401 projects 
the Industrial Development Bank helped to fund between 1950 and 
1960 were in the Marmara region) regional disparities became 
increasingly apparent. 117 As Table Twelve shows, the majority of 
migrants from the east moved westwards. The result was that many 
gecekondu became "permanent strongholds of Kurdish identity across 
the republic... mak[ing] the Kurdish question a visible reality for the 
citizens of Istanbul 800 miles away from Kurdistan". 118 Thus "social 
lines came to be drawn along geographical differences... [which] 
reinforced solidarities in the labour market and political rivalries were 
inevitably superimposed on such divisions". 119 
tts Hershlag, Z. (1968) p. 334 & 338 & Yenal, 0. (1967) p. 98. See also Turan, 1. 
(1988a) pp 77-78. 
114 Kemal Karpat cites building plots in Ankara that were priced at 50 liras in 1949 
and 50,000 liras in 1965 (1976) p. 57. 
Its See Singer, M. (1977) p. 242 and p. 295 and Dervis, K. & Robinson, S. (1980) p. 
95. 
116 A gecekondu is defined by Fehmi Yavuz as "those buildings, constructed hastily, in 
a way violating construction regulations, and generally lacking even the most 
primitive facilities" (cited in Saran, N., 1974, p. 329). See also Danielson, M. & 
Keles, R. (1980) p. 290. 
117 Bianchi, R. (1984) p. 58. 
118 McDowall, D. (1992) p. 402. My parenthesis. 
119 Keyder, C,. (1987) p. 206. My parenthesis. 
199 
Chapter Five: The Economics of Liberalisation 
Despite an increase of 52 per cent in the numbers employed in 
industry during the 1950s, the urban industrial sector was unable to 
absorb the large numbers of migrants arriving from the countryside. 120 
By 1951 there was over a million people unemployed amounting to 
more than 50 per cent of the urban workforce. 121 For those who were 
able to find work, wages, continually devalued by spiralling inflation, 
rarely provided a standard of living beyond subsistence. Attempts 
were made to improve conditions through unionisation which 
increased by 500 per cent between 1948 and 1958.122 However, while 
the 1947 Trade Union Act had relaxed Kemal's prohibition on 
"associations based on class", strike action and collective bargaining 
with employers remained illegal. 123 Furthermore, its generous 
severance pay stipulations for employees of over six months' tenure 
meant that many firms took on workers for periods limited to five and 
half months thereby worsening the plight of the urban proletariat. 124 
Despite labour relations forming part of both parties' electoral 
platform during the 1950s, few changes materialised. Since the DP 
were not reliant on proletarian support, the corporative relations 
which developed between union leaders and the state did not provide 
a basis for populist inducements. Contrary to contemporary Latin 
American examples, they were rather "used for applying strong 
control over the development potential of labour through anti-labour 
policies". 125 The DP was able to effect these restraints through three 
principal mechanisms. The first was the government's administration 
of union finances which, with a membership basis too impoverished 
to subscribe dues, were based on a "fund formed by the fines levied in 
accordance with Labour Law". 126 Secondly, unions were 
conglomerated into the Confederation of Turkish Labour Unions 
(Turk-Is) in 1952. It was felt that such a centralised body would be 
tm Berberoglu, B. (1982) p. 73. 
121 Ahmad, F. (1977) p. 136. 
122 Berberog1u, B. (1982) p. 74. 
123 See Hershlag, Z. (1958) p. 288. 
124 See Rustow, D. (1967) p. 17. 
125 Cizre-Sakalhoglu, Ü. (1992) p. 714. 
126 Ieikh, A. (1987) p. 317. 
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(and in fact proved to be) easier to influence. Thirdly, those that 
continued to pressure the government for concessions were 
"subjected to repression and persecution". 127 In all, the DP was 
successful in continuing the RPP's long-established suppression of 
left-wing political organisation. 
Table Twelve: Urbanisation by Region in Percentage. 128 
Year 1 1927 1935 1945 1955 1965 
Marmara 36.3 34.9 36.2 41.8 55.0 
Southern Anatolia 19.2 19.1 21.9 25.8 33.9 
Aegean 20.5 22.3 22.7 26.9 37.9 
Central Anatolia 11.1 13.0 16.5 23.3 30.0 
Southeast Anatolia 15.0 16.0 15.6 15.4 19.0 
Eastern Anatolia 7.6 6.3 8.8 10.1 15.8 
Black Sea 5.7 6.7 7.2 9.1 13.6 
National Average 16.4 16.6 18.3 22.1 29.8 
Within the growing networks of small-scale capitalism, however, leftist 
sympathies did find greater room for expression. These were part of 
an overall expansion in the middle-classes from around 5 per cent of 
the total population in 1950 to more than 20 per cent by 1965. Nezih 
Neyzi points to an enlargement of more than 10 per cent per annum 
in the numbers of registrants at the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce 
from 1952 to 1956 arguing that much of this had its roots in upper 
working class and lower middle-class entrepreneurialism. 129 Initially 
economically supported by the liberalising DP government as a means 
of nurturing a client base close to the masses and beyond the RPP- 
orientated officialdom's control, they were largely excluded from a 
political discourse in which social criticism was condemned as disloyal 
or insurgent. However, as "earlier social values, based on education 
and dedication to state ideals were undermined by an order based 
essentially on economic power", decentralised literary networks did 
127 Ibid. p. 315. 
128 Source: Danielson, M. & Keles, R. (1980) p. 285. 
129 Neyzi, N. (1973) pp 138-139. 
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begin to proliferate within urban, lower middle-class groups. 130 The 
result of this was that "the significance of the bureaucratic elite as the 
modernising centre of a developing society was diminished". 131 
In a similar vein to the eighteenth century European novelists' "search 
for authentic `use values' amid the `degraded' materialism of a 
capitalism concerned only with `exchange values"1,132 literary realism 
highlighting and ennobling the struggle of the peasantry gained 
considerable intellectual currency in Turkey during the 1950s. 133 
Broadly tolerated by the DP who were keen to portray their 
agricultural investments in a morally favourable light, many of these 
novels, short stories and plays were serialised in the daily press. With 
urban male literacy as high as 72 per cent in some cities, the demand 
for newspapers had increased daily circulation from 241,000 in 1948 
to 412,000 by 1951.134 Associated with these were a number of 
journals, of which the bimonthly Forum (first published in 1955), 
formulated some of the most sophisticated critiques of Democrat 
policies. 135 Another was h eri Yurt (Future Homeland) which appeared 
in Diyarbakir in 1958. Put together by intellectually promising Kurdish 
emigres who had been evacuated under the state's assimilation policy, 
it led a campaign (greatly encouraged by the Iraqi revolution and the 
return of Mullah Barzani later that year) "to develop Turkey's woefully 
neglected Kurdish provinces" in what was the first expression of a 
Kurdish identity since the Dersirn revolt. 136 In all, Karpat concludes, 
this body of "literature, written mostly in colloquial Turkish, was social 
in character and represented the views of lower-class intellectuals and 
reflected the infinite problems and aspirations of all other classes". 137 
130 Karpat, K (1966) pp 177-178. 
131 Ibid. p. 148. All Kazancigil writes that "the bourgeoisie gradually took hold so 
that, from 1945, it could defy the power monopoly held by the state elites" (1994, p. 
230). 
132 Mann, M. after Lukacs and Goldmann (1975) p. 286. 
133 See Karpat, K (1960a) passim. 
134 Lewis, B. (1961) pp 304-305. 
135 See Karpat, K (1973b) pp 347-348. 
136 McDowall, D. (1992) p. 403. 
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Connected to this predominantly literary movement, were a number 
of mostly clandestine and illegal Leftist organisations, foremost among 
which was the Turkish Communist Party (Türkiye Komünist Partisi - 
TCP). Founded by Russian emigres soon after the First World War it 
sustained a degree of influence during the single-party period through 
occasional publications in journals such as Aydinlak 
(Enlightenment). 138 Nonetheless a combination of repression, 
absorption into state administration and factionalism prevented 
effective party organisation. 139 Following the Second World War and 
the amendment of the Law of Associations, though, attempts were 
made by the TCP leadership to broaden the Party's social appeal. A 
twenty-six point programme was published in 1945 containing a 
strongly patriotic preamble and professing to be aimed at all 
independent groups hostile to the forces of reaction. Point Two, for 
instance, expressed the intention to form "a government out of 
worthy citizens clearly committed to Atatürk's reforms and the 
principles of democracy". 140 However, calls were also issued for closer 
ties with the Soviet Union at a time when Stalin was pressurising 
Turkey over a territorial dispute in the north-east and for improved 
access to the Straits. 141 As a result, anti-leftist measures were restored 
culminating in the arrest and prosecution of 167 members of TCP, 
including much of the leadership, in 1951. With an average age of 32.1 
years, the majority (120) of this group were junior artisans and office 
clerks, young workers and students. 142 In some ways, its youthful 
membership can be explained by the existence of highly active 
university-based organisations loosely affiliated to the TCP. Both 
Istanbul wings of the nominally legal Higher Education Youth 
Association (Yiiksek Tabsil Genclik Dernegi) and The Turkish 
Association of Peace-Lovers (Turk Baricseverler Cemiyeti), for instance, 
137 Karpat, K (1972a) p. 355. 
138 See Karpat, K (1959) pp 355-356. 
139 See Harris, G. (1967) Epilogue. 
140 Cited in Landau, J. (1974) pp 101-102. 
141 See Karpat, K (1966) p. 176. For a more detailed account of the international 
context, see Rustow, D. (1965) pa rim. 
142 See Landau, J. (1974) pp 110-111. 
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maintained a leftist populism based on a literary circulation of 48,000 
and 24,000 respectively. 143 
Opposition to the Menderes regime also came from sectors of the 
bureaucracy proletarianised by the inflationary policies of the mid- 
1950s. This `new leftism', as Kemal Karpat puts it, had little 
association with the Marxism of the TCP. Not, as he continues, "a 
replica of a foreign ideology", 144 it emerged from domestic 
conditions, particularly the urban expansion of the state bureaucracy 
during the 1950s. Between 1950 and 1960 central government 
personnel alone rose from 174,000 to 314,000 leading to salary caps 
and, with the concurrent rise in the professional sector proving a 
more attractive choice for the growing body of university graduates, a 
severe drop in civil service prestige. 145 Of the fourteen career grades, 
only the top seven could be considered middle-income, so, with 
vertical progression made extremely difficult by nepotism and 
favouritism, the great majority of posts provided few opportunities 
for social mobility. Despite being prepared "to fill administrative 
slots" by "a strongly patriotic education with chauvinistic overtones" 
at the very vanguard of statist officialdom, even the elite apparatchiks 
found themselves increasingly overlooked. 146 As a result, Karpat 
concludes, "these rising social currents eventually sought legitimation 
in the unfulfilled social promises of Kemalism, through an expanded 
interpretation of its populist, statist and reformist principles". 147 An 
ideological coalition between the RPP, revivalist elements of the 
Kemalist intelligentsia and disaffected groups with bureaucratic 
officialdom emerged in opposition to the pragmatist politics of the 
143 Figures relate to the publication of each organisation's manifesto in 1950. See 
ibid. pp 114-115. 
144 Karpat, K (1966) p. 179. Edwin Cohn also points to the fact that multiparty 
democracy "made politicians more accessible to voters and thus opened to them an 
alternative route for bringing their appeals to authority" (1970, p. 94). 
145 Neyzi, N. (1973) p. 132. 
146 Landau, J. (1973) p. 277 and Mardin, ý. (1980) p. 40 respectively. A study by H. 
Hyman, A. Payaslioglu & F. Frey in 1958 found that the nationalist nature of the 
state education system had so conditioned students that they produced strongly 
nationalist responses to even broadly framed questions (pp 282-285). 
147 Karpat, K (1966) p. 179. 
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DP. 148 Through a greater emphasis on rational administration free 
from the subjective criteria and interjections of the government, they 
aimed to consolidate the modernist institutions and objectives of 
Kemal's republic and reduce the influence of religious obscurantism 
and reactionary conservatism. 149 
Nonetheless, in terms of organisational implementation Turkish civil 
servants remained what Metin Heper calls `patrimonial-legalists' and 
did not develop the `rational-productive' orientations required to 
institutionalise a neutral, apolitical public service. 150 Ilkay Sunar 
explains this by pointing to a possible discrepancy between the 
bureaucracy's `manifest' values, as exemplified by an ostensible 
commitment to progressive reformism and more traditionally 
conceived `operational' values born of perennial salary, employment 
security and status concerns. 151 Indeed, a study published in 1955 
found those considering choosing the bureaucracy as an occupational 
path predominantly did so on the basis of an assured permanent 
tenure. Of the `emergent administrators' interviewed, 76 per cent 
preferred a career that promised maximum security combined with a 
low salary with only 7 per cent opting for `little security; high salary' 
and 14 per cent for `moderate security; moderate salary'. 152 For Metin 
Heper, this is expressed in a propensity for conservatism and a 
relatively low tolerance for "democratic political life". 153 In this sense, 
the recruitment of officials from lower socio-economic strata may 
have brought in "persons who [we]re even less secure and so need[ed] 
even more to reinforce their own sense of status" thereby offsetting 
any increased empathy these non-elite groups might have had with 
148 Many university campuses also became centres of pro-RPP activities as "students 
increasingly protested their frustration at what they considered the DP's sacrifice of 
Atatürk's reforms, as well as its repression of all political opposition" (Landau, J., 
1974, p. 30). 
149 See Heper, M. (1984a) pp 72-73. For a study comparing popular attachment to 
the memory of Kemal in urban and rural areas, see George Angell's research of 
1963 cited in Frey, F. (1968) pp 941-943 
150 Heper, M. (1981 a) passim. 
151 Sunar, I. (1974) pp 136-138. 
152 Matthews, A. (1955) p. 24. 
153 Heper, M. (1977) p. 75. 
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their `clients'. 154 So despite remaining professedly reformist, the 
proletarianised bureaucracy of the 1950s tended to spread an 
inclination towards nationalist authoritarianism from the 
administrative elite to a much wider section of Turkish society. 155 
In the absence of an institutionalised ideology legitimising the DP's 
position as representatives of provincial capitalist development, the 
economic elite of the centre maintained a value structure similar to 
the urban bureaucrats' espousal of a return to 1930s Kemalism. 
Successful industrialists were not the risk-taking, socially mobile 
innovators characteristic of European development. A study 
undertaken by Arif Payaslioglu in 1961, for instance, found that 66.6 
per cent of businessmen surveyed came from large-scale agricultural, 
commercial or industrial backgrounds. 156 With 14 per cent from 
market-orientated farming interests (this may be much higher if 
marital contacts are also included), a pronounced pattern of 
entrepreneurial investment in land and the commonplace 
establishment of farmer-owned commercial organisations, these 
industrialists overlapped heavily with large-scale agricultural 
interests. 157 In this sense, the Turkish economic elite were not the 
developmentalist middle class struggling against old regime, rural 
feudalism so characteristic of the Western model. Rather than 
pressing for agrarian reform and a minimum wage for the peasantry in 
order to expand the internal market, they were, in general, more 
concerned with maintaining political stability and continuing their 
profitable relationship with the state. A result of this was that, during 
the inflationary upheavals and the end of commercial liberalism in the 
mid-1950s, the government was able to reintroduce greater controls 
on exchange, as part of a gradual move towards an import- 
substitution policy, 158 and shift its support from the agricultural to the 
154 Weiker, W. (1981) p. 34. My parentheses. 
155 See Caldwell. L. (1959) pp 123-127. 
156 Cited in Sunar, 1. (1974) p. 110. 
157 Ibid. pp 117-118. 
151 See Öncü, A. (1980) pp 466-467. 
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industrial sector without generating high levels of resistance within 
the integrated economic elite. 159 
To cushion the blow of this change in policy amongst the peasantry 
(their primary electoral base), as well as to continue countering 
bureaucratic opposition, the DP sought to acknowledge the 
continuing political efficacy of Islam. 160 A part of this was the 
recognition that the secularising reforms of the 1920s and 1930s had 
penetrated the Anatolian countryside very little -a conclusion also 
reached by the RPP in the 1940s. 161 As such, the government 
reinstated the call to prayer in Arabic, reopened mystic retreats and 
the tombs of Sufi `saints' and established a large-scale religious 
education programme under the imam-hatrp schooling system. 162 
When accused, by secularist thinkers, of betraying Kemalist 
principles, Menderes controversially replied that the government 
would preserve the reforms that the people had accepted "implying", 
in Binnaz Toprak's view, "that the rest would be subject to 
change". 163 Supported by a large-scale mosque building programme, a 
considerable rise in the circulation of religious publications and an 
increase in congregational attendance, "Islamism made important 
strides, for the first time visibly since the proclamation of the Republic 
in 1923". 164 Thus, through what Umit Cizre-Sakallhoglu describes as 
"the discovery of the prayer-rug vote", the DP were able to gain 
considerable credibility amongst traditionalist groups. 165 Said Nursi, 
leader of the influential religious order, the Nurcular, for instance, 
announced his support for the DP during the 1954 general election 
campaign. 166 However, the overtly instrumental reasoning behind the 
government's courtship of the Islamic vote plus "the unflinchingly 
159 Re,; at Atkan argues that the subsequent decline in agriculture was due to this 
integrated elite transferring funds from the rural-agricultural sector to their urban 
industrial interests (1966, p. 323). 
160 See Reed, H. (1954) & (1957) passim. 
161 See Stirling, P. (1965) Ch. 12. 
162 See Shankland, D. (1999) pp 27 & 38. 
163 Toprak, B. (1981) pp 78-79. 
164 Landau, J. (1981 a) p. 370. His emphasis. 
165 Cizre-Saka11ioglu, Ü. (1995) p. 756. 
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hard stand it took to anti-Atatürk activities of some religious orders 
[such as the Ticaniya] attest to the claim that the DP would never 
tolerate the autonomous and self-sustaining development of religious 
forces". 167 So while Islam did provide the administration with a vote- 
winning means of appealing directly to the peasantry (and 
organisationally outflanking the bureaucracy), it was not deployed as 
a means of political legitimisation. New legislation in July 1953 
ensured that religion could not be used for `political' ends and that 
secularism remained the dominant paradigm of Turkish 
administration. 168 
Nonetheless, "there seems to have existed some form of tacit 
collaboration, based on a community of interests, between the 
leadership of the Democratic Party and the Nurcular". 169 For entirely 
pragmatic reasons, the government promoted what Dankwart Rustow 
characterises as `moderate' Islamism, of which elements within 
Nursi's following were a part. 170 Presenting government policy as 
grounded upon liberal freedoms of conscience, Menderes hoped to 
attract the supporters from each of the two other ideological 
alignments that Rustow identifies; `secularism' and `clericalism'. While 
this position was useful in maintaining the sympathies of the 
peasantry, which had been affected little by both the republican state's 
efforts at secularisation and the rise in urban political Islam, 171 it was 
also appealing to traditionalist groups within the entrepreneurial 
sector who saw "no basic conflict between her [Turkey's] Islamic 
religion and her membership in the Western family of nations". 172 
Another reason may have been `moderate' political Islam's partial 
connection to Turkism, or what was termed `Islamic nationalism' 
166 See Toprak, B. (1981) pp 83. 
167 Cizre-Sakalhoglu, Ü. (1995) p. 758. My parenthesis. 
168 See Ahmad, F. (1977) pp 368-369. 
169 Landau, J. (1974) p. 185. 
170 This section owes much to Rustow, D. (1957) pp 101-107. 
171 The Nurcular's primary constituency was the stubbornly traditional eastern 
provinces. See Cizre-Sakallioglu, Ü. (1995) p. 767. 
172 Rustow, D. (1957) p. 104. My parenthesis. 
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(Islam milliyetfiligr). 173 Some of these activists saw their views as in 
keeping with the modernist tradition of Gökalp and Akcura and were 
keen to portray their struggle as within the parameters of Kemalist 
revolutionary patriotism. 174 Rustow quotes Halit Ziya Atatug speaking 
in 1951 thus; "Those who helped the nation win the day of salvation 
[i. e., the Democratic Party landslide] of 14 May 1950, are the religious, 
patriotic, genuine, pure Turks... loyal to the revolution of Atatürk 
and to the Muslim religion". 175 Others, such as Riza Nur (1879-1942) 
were influential in equating Islamic revivalism with Pan-Turkish 
sentiments. 176 In this sense, the DP continued Kemal's use of Turkish 
nationalism as a means of directing Islamism, outflanking class-based 
ideologies and providing a statist model of social cohesion. 177 
Although "based on shaky intellectual foundations", 178 Pan-Turkism's 
emphasis on the mythical, Hittite or Central Asian Turk gained 
considerable support following the Second World War and the return 
of Russian expansionism. 179 Although such a focus did attract some 
interest from `moderate' Islamists, it was within secularist networks 
that Pan-Turkist ideas gained the greatest credence. Competing with 
the more reform-orientated secular nationalism of RPP affiliated 
groups, a racist and anti-Semitic press emerged with, according to 
Bernard Lewis, the apparent support of the Department of Religious 
Affairs. 18° Organisations such as The Great East (Bu)iik Dogu)181 put 
forward chauvinist, anti-socialist and often pro-Nazi opinion 
embellished with varying amounts of theological rhetoric in what 
173 Landau, J. (1974) p. 192. 
174 The Turkish Hearths (Turk Ocaklan), re-established in 1949, based their ideology 
on Gökalp's motto of three affiliations; firstly, to the nation, secondly to the ummah 
and thirdly to contemporary civilisation (see Karpat, K, 1973b, p. 330). 
ns Rustow, D. (1957) p. 103. His parenthesis. 
176 Associated with the writing of late Ottoman commentators such as Gokalp, this 
movement sought the unity of all Turkic peoples under a single state (often to be 
led by the Anatolians). See Landau, J. (1974) pp 193-194. 
177 See Cizre-Sakalhoglu, Ü. (1992a) p. 143. 
178 Keddie, N. (1988) p. 11. 
179 See Agaogullari, M. (1987) p. 188. 
180 Lewis, B. (1952) p. 44. 
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Lewis describes as "boulevard fascism with religious colouring 
matter'. 182 Numerous other clandestine associations, discussed by 
Mehmet Agaogullan under the heading `the ultranationalist right', 
promulgated similar sentiments in publications such as BoZkurt (Grey 
Wolf) -a journal much boosted by a DM5 million gift from Foreign 
Minister Ribbentrop in 1942.183 Although occasionally critical of 
Kemal as too limited in his geopolitical objectives, ultranationalists 
generally emphasised the reforms of the 1920s and 30s (particularly 
etatism, Turkism and pro-Westernism) as a means of broadening their 
appeal among Islamist `moderates', the middle classes and elite 
capitalist networks. The single-party period was depicted as a period 
of stability when the supposed values of Central Asia, namely "valor, 
a moral, disciplined, and hierarchical society, obedience, glorification 
of the leader, and self-sacrifice for the state", had been allowed to 
flourish. 184 Hankering after a glorious past established by military 
conquest, the Rightists viewed the armed forces as not only the key 
element in the struggle against communism and foreign imperialism, 
but also as an important political actor. Within the military itself and 
particularly junior staff officers, ultranationalist sympathies were 
divided between the Kemalist revivalists such as the Atatürkist 
Society founded in 1955 and the Pan-Turkist faction of Alparslan 
Türke; and others. 185 The origins and development of these 
organisations, as well as the more general political objectives adopted 
by the military during and after this period, will be looked at in the 
following chapter. 
Conclusion 
181 Their criticism of Kemal as oblivious to the wider cause of Turkic peoples led to 
their disbandment in 1951 and reformation a year later under the name The New 
Great East (see Reed, H, 1957a, p. 338). 
182 Lewis, B. (1952) p. 44. Mehmet Agaogullan suggests that the more extreme Pan- 
Turkists "tried to protect themselves from probable official censure by admitting to 
their associations religious or nationalist right-wingers close to the administration, 
and joining those founded by them" (1987, p. 190). 
183 See Lenczowski, G. (1956) p. 143. 
184 Aj; aogullari, M. (1987) p. 191. 
185 For the former, see Harris, G. (1965) pp 171-172 and the latter, see Landau, J. 
(1974) pp 222-223. 
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To summarise, then, social change in Turkey during this period has 
been underpinned by a number of fundamental conflicts. A primary 
ingredient of which was a realignment in class structures. Near the 
top of the social hierarchy were the large-estate farmers. As 
descendants of the cyan, they inherited both a tendency to 
decentralise economic power through connections with export- 
orientated merchant interests and a strongly state-dependent social 
position. During the period of Kemalist economic liberalism in the 
1920s, these links, supported by corporatist arrangements between 
urban industrialists and the government institutionalised during the 
First World War, were solidified in the pursuit of foreign capital (a 
process that had significant implications, to be discussed shortly, for 
the peasant smallholder). Following the 1929 crash, state policy 
moved away from large-estate farming and towards centralised 
industrial planning in the manner of the contemporary Soviet Union. 
As a result, the integrated economic elite shifted capital investment to 
the manufacturing sector where it made substantial profits, especially 
following the outbreak of worldwide hostilities in 1939, through an 
intensive, yet not altogether peaceful, relationship with an increasingly 
interventionist state bureaucracy. 
Within this process there were two seeds of future conflict. The first 
was the uneven distribution of economic development. The peculiar 
artificiality of inter-state border delimitation in the south-east of 
Anatolia, its topography and its intensively localised culture made the 
Kurdish-speaking provinces particularly resistant to the political infra- 
structure of the centre. Based on the violent chauvinism of the state 
bureaucracy, akin to the `aggressive' nationalism that Mann identifies 
within contemporary Europe, military approaches to extending 
centralised control were generally preferred. Large-scale commercial 
enterprises were also undertaken in the region, but their corporatist, 
anti-competitive nature prevented the emergence of integrative capital 
investment. So without a cohesive economic system in which direct 
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notions of citizenship could be institutionalised, political and 
ideological links between the state bureaucracy and the masses were 
subject to the intermediary influences of the traditional 
landowner/cleric coalition. This was quite different from the 
relationship the commercial-state alliance had with the masses in 
many other parts of the country. There, the state-supported surplus 
investment and speculation of the economic elite had, as an 
unplanned corollary, empowered networks of merchant capital which, 
initially rurally located, had forged links with decentralised urban 
capitalists enriched by wartime profiteering and strengthened by a 
rapidly enlarging professional sector. Herein lay the second problem 
of Turkish elite-led industrialisation. In supporting capitalist 
development through its integrated cadre, the state was obliged to 
extend its infra-structural reach (thus decentralising power) 
unintentionally assisting in the organisation of economic networks 
opposed to bureaucratic interventionism (particularly structural 
restraints on competition and international exchange). So rather than 
a decentralised economic elite establishing developmental patterns 
inadvertently furthering state centralisation, which Mann points to in 
Europe, in Turkey it was the consolidation of what Metin Heper calls 
the `superstrong state' which, while coalescing with a capitalist elite, 
inadvertently empowered decentralised economic power networks. 
In this sense industrialisation, beginning in the First World War and 
politically institutionalised in the 1930s and 40s, had extended the 
powerbase of what could be considered the economic facet of the 
Turkish `old regime' from its agricultural cyan roots to urban 
commercial centres gradually forming an intensive coalition with 
another old regime faction, the bureaucracy. In a similar way to the 
European old regime, it adopted democracy as a means of 
perpetuating its socio-economic position. By 1946, it had become 
clear that a process of democratisation was inevitable if Turkey was to 
maintain its favourable geopolitical position. This, in turn, 
necessitated some kind of land reform as a means of gaining mass 
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peasant support. In the tradition of the inkilab, the bureaucracy 
viewed such a dual approach as a way of maintaining control over the 
modernisation process. Separated from emergent networks of lower- 
middle class capitalism, however, they underestimated the strength of 
the bourgeois/provincial alliance that emerged in the 1940s. Although 
the RPP's defeat in the 1950 election did represent a political 
revolution as old regime governance gave way to an administration 
more closely connected to provincial elites, there was little associated 
change in economic power structures. Of the bureaucratic/industrial 
alliance that made up the centre, it was only the former that suffered a 
significant diminution in hierarchical position while the economic 
elite prospered from mechanisation, greater trade liberalisation and an 
abundance of overseas investment. 
The end of the single-party period did not, therefore, represent a 
revolution based on class, nor did it prompt the instigation of a new 
political paradigm. Within what Mann calls the `careerist fraction' of 
the middle classes, public sector employment predominated. 
Although the bureaucracy claimed to be neutral and reformist, 
especially at senior levels, the combination of numerical expansion 
and declining power both reinforced segmentally-determined 
differences from the corporate sector and contributed to the overall 
conservatism of post-war bourgeois development. Although lacking 
the state bureaucracy's propensity for what Mann terms `aggressive 
nationalism', the professional fraction of the middle classes did share 
a comparable level of exposure to the chauvinism of a state- 
sponsored education. Despite this and their historical connection to 
the bureaucratic reforms of the 1920s, particularly in relation to the 
decline of the ulema, the professional classes were generally opposed 
to etatism as an inefficient method of commercial management. So, 
while differing in their economic outlook, these two middle-class 
fractions possessed ideological interests broadly associated with the 
RPP's blend of secular elitism. The petite bourgeoisie, on the other 
hand, had received less input from the state and were, in general, 
213 
Chapter Five: The Economics of Liberalisation 
favourably disposed to neither the restraints of authoritarian 
interventionism nor the aggressively secularist ideology of 
officialdom. Nevertheless, because of the contrasting interests of 
`moderate' religious traditionalism, sectionally constrained mercantile 
internationalism and a desire for improved provincial access to the 
state, they maintained the overall conservatism that Mann ascribes to 
their European counterparts. 
Although some petite bourgeois networks had emerged from the state 
support of cereal producers during the 1930s, the vast majority of 
farmers remained non-market-orientated smallholders. With little 
change in the percentage of the population employed in the agrarian 
sector between 1927 and 1950, Turkish industrialisation did not 
significantly increase rural social stratification during this period. The 
continued presence of the state as the primary buyer of agricultural 
produce meant that, unlike in Europe, there was not the same 
organised collusion between private urban capital and the large- 
estates. The artificially high prices that the government paid for 
surplus cereal during the 1930s ensured that the peasantry did not 
follow the European pattern of proletarianisation. It was not until the 
beginnings of large-scale urbanisation during the late 1940s that urban 
working-class networks emerged with sufficient extensiveness to 
support such a dynamic - by which time small to medium capitalist 
groups had been reincorporated into a more buoyant market by a 
return of state patronage. As a result, the decline in the living 
standards of the peasantry during the Second World War did not give 
rise to decentralised political networks of a strongly Leftist character. 
Without extensive economic connections to urban or international 
markets other than through central officialdom or their agents, rural 
smallholders focused their disaffection on the RPP bureaucrat rather 
than corporate capitalism. As Keyder puts it, "instead of a peasantry 
consolidating its rights on the land against a feudal class as in France, 
or the emergence of capitalist farming as in England, the revolution in 
Turkey featured an independent peasantry defending its aspiration to 
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a market society against the redistributive policies of a bureaucratic 
elite". 186 In all, the greater levels of social space between town and 
country than Mann identifies as existent in Europe meant that 
segmental divisions and the traditional centre/periphery cleavage 
remained much more influential. 
Even during the great influx of villagers into Turkey's metropolitan 
centres during the 1950s, an internally cohesive working-class 
movement was not forthcoming. Although trade union membership 
expanded rapidly, workers' leaders failed to secure significant 
concessions from the administration. Apart from state action and 
sectional/segmental divides akin to those Mann points to in Europe, 
three further cross-class cleavages, more or less peculiar to Turkey, 
prevented a collective sense of group consciousness from emerging 
within the urban proletariat. The first was the nature of settlement. 
Chain migration established regionalised, or as some writers have put 
it `ruralised', neighbourhoods, particularly within or including 
gecekondu districts, which tended to act as a locus for traditional social 
structures and economic networks extraneous to shared class 
interests. Secondly and associated with this, was the gradual re- 
emergence of a separate Kurdish identity. This, as we shall see in the 
following chapter, took place not in the south-east of Anatolia, but 
within the ranks of the urban proletariat and unemployed. Although 
generally fused to the politics of the left as the ascending Turkish 
middle-classes came to be identified with the failure of democracy to 
bring political and economic changes to the vast majority of Kurds, it 
tended to localise and intensify group affiliations rather than assist in 
the emergence of an extensively organised class consciousness. 
Thirdly, the relaxation of Kemal's constraints on religious practice 
provided a cross-class basis for political organisation that maintained 
a strong influence on the proletariat in general and economic 
migrants in particular. In all, these factors mitigated against the 
emergence of working class unity in Turkey during the 1950s. In all 
186 Keyder, Cf. (1987b) p. 42. 
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four areas of Mann's IOTA model they played a divisive role at least 
partially determining perceived identity, opposition, the social totality 
and possible alternatives. To conclude then, it is possible to say that 
the official ideology of the republican state predominated during the 
political ascendancy of the Turkish middle-classes. While divided 
between the merits of economic liberalism and etatism, the 
bourgeoisie were able, until the late 1950s, to restrict political debate 
to largely within the parameters of Kemalism as both `moderate' 
Islamism and Turkish nationalism were deployed to extend support 
for industrial-capitalist progression. The following chapter will 
examine the reaction of the old regime, particularly the civil and 
armed services, and the emergence of polarised ideological groups 
during the 1970s and 80s. 
216 
Chapter Six: The Military/Industrial Complex 
Chapter Six: The Military/ Industrial Complex 
This chapter looks at the manifestations of Turkish militarism from 
the 1960 intervention to the early 1990s. Contemporary issues will be 
dealt with in the next chapter which concludes the thesis. Here, the 
narrative will outline how the military elite managed the 
contradictions inherent in their interpretation of Kemalism, how this 
informed their approach to constitutional politics and the extent to 
which their role was restrained by civil society. It will examine the 
different ways in which domestic repression blended with social 
representation to produce varying regime strategies. These will be 
compared to other combinations of militarism and social 
incorporation identified by Mann as features of the polities of the 
United States and Western Europe. In the case of Turkey, the 
relationship between such formations, the advance of capitalism and 
the decline in the military elite's autonomy will also be considered. 
These will be traced through the 1960s, the military intervention of 
1971, the subsequent polarisation and fragmentation of Turkish 
politics, the 1980 coup and the militarisation of south-east Anatolia. 
Militarism 
Mann defines militarism as "an attitude and a set of institutions which 
regard war and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable 
social activity". 1 While these may, he argues, be organised and 
directed by less centralised actors, militarism was generally a feature 
of the state's pursuit of geopolitical objectives or enhanced methods 
of domestic repression. Since pre-modern infra-structures restricted 
the state's capacity to reach and coerce its citizens, militarism was, in 
historical terms, a primary part of foreign policy. From 1130 to 1815, 
for instance, the English government allocated between 75 and 95 per 
I Mann, M. (1988) p. 124. 
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cent of its entire revenue to warfare or military preparation. 2 Such 
figures are typical of other European states and, indeed, states in 
general. That is not to say, however, that there was little variation in 
their deployment of militarist techniques. Marked differences existed 
in terms of expenditure and in the overall blend of external and 
internal coercion states could organise and deploy. During the last 
two centuries Great Britain, for instance, has combined high levels of 
international militarism with a comparatively pacific approach to 
domestic administration. The United States, in contrast, has, despite 
being relatively secure from foreign aggression, combined slavery and 
a repressive policy aimed at organised labour with violent coercion 
towards Native Americans and other minority groups. 3 So, although 
broadly comparable in overall military expenditure (allocating an 
average of 47.2 (GB) and 54.4 (US) per cent of their total yearly 
budgets to the armed forces between 1820 and 1910), each 
represented quite different forms of militarism. 4 
Everywhere, though, state militarism was resisted by elements of civil 
society, particularly liberals and socialists, who sought to limit 
governmental infra-structures, military budgets, higher taxation, 
conscription and warfare. While parliamentarians had few successes 
in restricting geopolitical militarism (foreign policy had long been the 
prerogative of the monarch), 5 restraints, of varying degrees of 
institutional power, upon the state's use of domestic repression did 
emerge. Mann argues that this tension gave rise to four methods of 
maintaining public order. 6 Firstly, as a general alternative to coercion, 
states could resolve civil disaffection through the use of conciliation, 
arbitration and persuasion. This was usually supported by a second 
method, the use of a relatively lightly armed police force organised 
2 See ibid., p. 130. 
3 See Mann, M. (1993) p. 86. 
4 Ibid. p. 373. 
5 In Italy, for instance, foreign affairs remained a matter for the King well into the 
twentieth century. In Great Britain, the Foreign Secretary was normally a hereditary 
peer, second in power only to the Prime Minister and insulated from the Commons 
by the catchall rubric of `the national interest' (see Mann, M., 1993, pp 414-415). 
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either segmentally (through local landed agents) or centrally. Should 
disorder be beyond the resources of a constabulary, then paramilitary 
units could be deployed. If this did not succeed, then state action may 
escalate to a fourth level, large-scale military repression involving high- 
intensity violence and regular troops. According to Mann, the growth 
of economic interdependence and the division of labour has led to a 
decline in the need for centrally organised coercion. Once firmly 
established, capitalist exchange can generally determine value and 
property rights without recourse to coercive regulation thereby 
institutionalising lower levels of domestic repression in comparison to 
previous modes of production. 
The result, Mann suggests, is that capitalist expansion has tended to 
produce bifurcated structures consisting of "an institutionalised, 
relatively non-coercive core and an expropriated, militaristic 
periphery"? As Western states have advanced, their cores have 
enlarged from `home counties' around their capitals to national 
boundaries before eventually including imperial and then neo-colonial 
agents all over the world. While not inherently more militaristic than 
other historical forms of imperial expansion, capitalist enlargement 
has relied on the institutionalisation of norms that could govern trade 
values and minimise localised disruption to the production, 
transportation and exchange of commodities. So in order to be 
introduced into regions with established and complex property rights, 
the spread of capitalism has commonly required political support 
backed up by military force. For Mann this has produced four major 
effects. 8 Firstly, technological advances driven by manufacturing have 
led to ever-more effective weaponry and exponential increases in 
casualty levels. Secondly, global economic interdependence has 
greatly enlarged Great Power entanglements leading to the instigation 
or intensification of conflicts in regions geographically marginal to 
their strategic interests. Thirdly, capitalism has assisted in the 
6 Ibid. p. 403. 
7 Mann, M. (1988) p. 138. 
219 
Chapter Six: The Military/Industrial Complex 
transformation of militarily valued social qualities from physical 
prowess, ferocity and cruelty to precision, callousness and impersonal 
rationality. Fourthly, "the capitalist era has directly implicated not just 
military personnel but the whole population in its militarism". 9 
Although the per capita size of most European armed forces has 
erratically declined since the seventeenth century and dropped 
considerably from Classical levels, civilian participation in armaments 
and militarily-related industries makes the proportion of civil society 
involved in militarism considerably higher than in previous centuries. 
Moreover, the modern state's capacity to extract revenues from its 
subjects means that, as a percentage of overall GDP, twentieth 
century governments can mobilise far greater resources than their 
historical counterparts. 
Within this macro-process, however, there remained considerable 
contextual diversity. Domestic militarism did, in fact, blend with the 
forces of capitalism and social representation in quite different ways. 
Mann identifies four such variations, namely autocratic militarism, liberal- 
reformist incorporation, capitalist-liberal militarism and semiauthoritarian 
incorporatzon. 10 The first was visible in Tsarist Russia and was typified 
by the widespread denial of citizenship, the vehement repression of 
workers' groups and the polarisation of class. State elites ran the 
economy and regularly brought in armed police, paramilitaries and 
(on almost two thousand occasions between 1895 and 1905) regular 
troops to enforce strike bans. 1' Under such conditions and in the 
absence of any institutionalised system of labour relations, few 
moderate reform strategies could survive. In response to a uniform 
system of domestic repression without sectional distinctions, urban 
working class consciousness "became a totality - aimed at a state that 
brought a highly centralised and politicised exploitation into almost 
8 Mann, M. (1988) pp 132-136. 
9 Ibid. p. 134. 
10 Mann, M. (1993) pp 682-6 
li See ibid. pp 660-666. 
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every aspect of life". 12 As a result, bourgeois democrats were driven 
underground towards revolutionary socialism and highly statist 
alternatives. 13 The second variation, liberal-reformist incorporation, often 
consisted of systems in which old regimes had involved the middle 
classes in the organisation of party democracies and then seen "the 
necessity and even the advantage in compromising sectionally and 
segmentally with workers" over the institutionalisation of 
citizenship. 14 Following the suppression of the Paris Commune in 
1870, the French state embarked on such a policy. Domestic 
militarism became more restrained and the police and judiciary were 
often used to conciliate rather than coerce. According to Mann this 
had the dual effect of focusing reformism on the level of the state and 
factionalising decentralised ideological organisation between 
"economism, mutualism, social democracy, syndicalism and 
Marxism... [which] all emerged to compete and conflict, weakening 
overall working-class cohesion". 15 
In the third of Mann's ideal-types, capitalist-liberal militarism, citizenship 
was generally well institutionalised, but accompanied by restrictions 
on collective civil rights and the selective suppression of labour 
organisation. Exemplified by state policy in the United States between 
the Civil War and First World War, 16 domestic repression took on 
two forms. The first was the essentially individual nature of property 
rights which tended to favour employers over organised boycotts, 
unions, strikes or pickets. The second was the widespread deployment 
of state militias often reinforced by regular troops. Moreover, for the 
more extensive and prolonged industrial confrontations private 
employer paramilitary forces were licensed and given legal powers. As 
a result, between 500 and 800 American workers died in labour 
'2 Ibid. p. 662. His emphasis. 
13 See Mann's IOTA model outlined in the previous chapter. 
14 Ibid. p. 683. 
15 Ibid. p. 669. My parenthesis. 
16 See ibid. pp 644-659. 
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disputes between 1872 and 1914.17 These high levels of industrial 
militarism were supported by what Mann calls "a virtually sacred 
capitalist conception of legality" which, through policing and the 
judiciary, gave American economic interests almost complete control 
of the state. 18 Labour also received little state representation from a 
party democracy in which issues of domestic repression were handled 
by the judiciary rather than the politicians. Since the President selects 
the Cabinet and sets the legislative agenda, both the Republican and 
the Democrat parties remained factionalised by cross-class, local- 
regional, ethnic-religious segmental coalitions. The United States' 
federal structure which tended to break-up civil action and focus 
conflict at a local rather than national level further "fragmented 
potential class unity". 19 In all, state action reinforced the inherent 
divides within American labour preventing the emergence of a 
perceived totality and potential alternative necessary for the 
institutionalisation of class consciousness. 
The fourth regime strategy, semiauthoritarian incorporation, was apparent 
in Imperial Germany, Austria-Hungary and Japan. It emerged when 
old regimes successfully absorbed bourgeois calls for greater 
representation without surrendering to a sovereign party democracy. 
"Aided by semiparliamentary constitutions that institutionalised 
segmental divide and rule strategies", 20 these monarchies succeeded in 
dominating emergent capitalist interests and remained strongly 
militarist. In Germany, for instance, Bismarck was able to perpetuate 
old regime rule despite the introduction of universal male suffrage in 
1867.21 By preventing political power networks from developing 
amongst labour groups (freedom of association was not granted until 
17 A figure second only to Russia where between 2,000 and 5,000 workers died. In 
France it was around 35. Ibid. p. 635. 
18 Ibid. p. 647. 
19 Ibid. p. 653. 
20 Ibid. p. 683. 
21 Mann suggests that this was achieved by using geopolitical competition to distract 
attention away from the domestic class struggle, by including liberal elements of the 
bourgeoisie through the introduction of social welfare palliatives and by excluding 
ethnic minorities and socialists (ibid. pp 671-678). 
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1908), the German old regime controlled the emergence of a large 
Social Democratic party. Through this strategy, which G. Roth 
describes as "negative integration", an electorally successful and 
fundamentally anti-sympathetic organisation was permitted to exist, 
but, disassociated from its support base, was prevented "from gaining 
access to the centres of power". 22 The failure to institutionalise a 
party democracy, however, led to few restraints on the German 
military which remained, particularly within its geopolitical functions, 
largely autonomous from both the German state and civil society. 23 
In terms of domestic repression, however, such high levels of military 
autonomy were generally more difficult to maintain. An active role 
for the military in state administration usually "embedded the officer 
corps in broader political power networks and in dominant economic 
classes". 24 This was significantly intensified by the effects of 
industrialisation. Although mostly recruited from the old regime, the 
military did absorb significant amounts of capitalist personnel and 
values during nineteenth and especially the twentieth centuries. This 
"led them to collaborate with the expanding police and paramilitary 
institutions of the state" making the dominant economic class much 
more secure. 25 Economic links were also developed, sometimes to the 
extent of institutionalising a `military-industrial complex', as the high 
command co-operated with capitalist interests particularly in the areas 
of weapons production, communications and munitions supplies. In 
all, by the First World War the military's domestic repression function 
in many European states can be seen as a complex and often 
contradictory product of capitalist modernism and old regime 
interests and values. 
Following the end of old regime preponderance in European politics 
institutionalised at the peace settlement in Paris in 1919, this 
u Roth, G. (1963) p. 8. 
23 See Mann, M. (1993) p. 438. 
24 Ibid. p. 439. 
25 Ibid. 
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combination was reformulated. Notables, the military elite, Churches 
and royalty were forced "to compromise with the lower classes 
through parliamentarianism, institutionalised labour relations and land 
reform". 26 Under the strain of high proletarian expectations, mass 
suffrage and weakened state executive powers, the old regime, 
including the military elite, split into two factions. The first, 
conservative democrats broadly committed to representational party 
politics, moved closer to the bourgeoisie-dominated centre. Secondly, 
authoritarian rightists, predominantly apparent amongst the 
`revisionist states' of Hungary, Italy and particularly Germany, 
advocated anti-democratic constitutions paradoxically claiming to 
represent `the people' and established authoritarian, quasi-fascist 
organisations initially based on post-war paramilitaries. For Mann, the 
latter eventually institutionalised a new form of modernist nationalist 
ideology which, in sweeping to power across much of Europe during 
the 1930s, emerged in place of the industrial-capitalist phase (see 
previous chapter). Proponents of such extreme rightism argued that 
liberal, socialist and anarchist internationalism weakened the state 
making `true', `organic' democracy unworkable. Although regional 
minorities were subject to the same accusations, it was, with the 
exceptions of Nazi and Japanese concepts of race, voluntary political 
allegiance rather than ethnicity that determined membership of the 
nation. 27 
To combat those defined as `enemies of the people' many advocated 
extremely high levels of domestic repression. Support for such 
aggressive nationalism continued to be defined by individuals' 
relationship with the state. Soldiers, civil servants, blue-collar workers 
in the public sector, employees of the higher education system and 
adherents (including some clerics) of the state religion were 
disproportionately represented in the leadership and more militant 
membership of such rightist organisations. There was also a 
26 Mann, M. (1995) p. 57. 
27 "Anyone could", as Mann puts it, "repent and join the nation" (ibid. p. 59). 
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significant class bias. Although modernist nationalists found support 
within a broad range of social groups, including the proletariat, their 
opposition to labour organisation meant that, broadly speaking, "the 
higher the social class, the more support they got". 28 In this sense, 
modernist nationalism, emerging as it did from the collapse of the 
entrenched control of the masses that the pre-war regimes had 
enjoyed, represented a rejection of bourgeois-capitalist notions of 
liberal incorporation (the basis of industrial-capitalist nationalism) in 
favour of authoritarianism. 
In the post-Second World War era, Western European modernist 
nationalism has been largely neutralised by a gradual process of 
increased political representation and institutionalised domestic 
demilitarisation. 29 Social citizenship, imposed by the Western Allies, 
has conciliated class relations, albeit "over a narrower band of 
alternative forms than had existed in the inter-war period", and 
detached them from the military by shifting the focus of coercive 
power from its historical dualism of domestic repression/geopolitical 
competition to the singular function of warfare 30 Since capitalism, 
once established, requires less coercive regulation than previous 
modes of production, Western European societies have become 
further demilitarised during the second half of the twentieth century. 
Since, however, "the absolute level of economic development 
seemingly required for a transition to democracy has steadily 
increased throughout the twentieth century", civil citizenship in 
countries where industrialisation has affected a smaller proportion of 
society remains limited and military power continues to be directed 
inwards by the state 31 This is particularly so in polities based on what 
Mann terms `organic' rather than `liberal' conceptions of the nation- 
state. He argues that three features tend to be apparent in such a 
28 Ibid. p. 58. 
29 Though, as Mann notes, it remains "in a more symbolic aggression, requiring few 
commitments from citizens, directed against hate figures in the less developed 
world" (1993a p. 120). 
30 Mann, M. (2000) p. 8. See also Giddens, A. (1985) p. 192. 
31 Mann, M. (1999) p. 40. See also Tilly, C. (1990) p. 125. 
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system. Firstly, the presence of a strong executive, often built by elites 
on the tradition of monarchic office, which has successfully 
institutionalised restraints on parliamentary sovereignty. By reducing 
the power of the legislature, these elites can minimise the 
decentralising potential of a widely enfranchised citizenry and ensure 
that an often predominantly rural populace, largely beyond the reach 
of urban working-class organisation, maintain a statist loyalty in 
excess of politically liberal levels. Secondly, `organic' nation-states 
tend to take an active role in the co-ordination of civil society's 
economic development commonly favouring centralised planning, 
corporatist links with big business and large and expensive public 
sectors. Thirdly, `organicism' was frequently influenced by the 
collapse of multi-national empires and subsequent rises in the efficacy 
of ethnicity as a basis for political mobilisation. Since the state elite is 
best positioned to speak for the unified, `organic' people, 
institutionalised political competition tends not to endure leading to 
"the exclusion of minority communities and political opponents from 
full membership in the nation". 32 
The following section will look at how these factors have related to 
the political institutionalisation of capitalist interests in Turkey. 
For the People. of the People and by the Military 
Writing in 1967, Colonel Fox of the United States Army observed 
that in Turkey "consciousness of being a part of the whole nation is 
greatly strengthened by compulsory military service. The conscript 
soldier develops a sense of citizenship and a fierce pride in being a 
Turk". 33 The basis of this was, and continues to be, Article 35 of the 
Turkish Armed Services Internal Service Code which states that "the duty of 
the armed forces is to protect and safeguard Turkish territory and the 
32 Mann, M. (1999) pp 29-30. 
33 Fox, C. (1967) pp 73-74. 
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Turkish Republic stipulated by the Constitution" 34 Although, as one 
of the 800,000 members of the armed forces, the conscript is 
thoroughly inculcated with its values, he discovers little about the 
35,000-strong officer corps which guides one of the largest and most 
important institutions in Turkey. As Mehmet All Birand puts it, "in 
no other civilised country in the world is the army so little known and 
yet so close to hearts of the people" 35 Nowhere is this civil/military 
divide more apparent than between elected political leaders and junior 
officers. Part of the explanation for this, Birand argues, is that training 
at the military academy is largely focused on how democracy `should' 
work and when the newly-graduated officer "discovers the inevitable 
conditions underlying the realities in the country, he blames the 
politicians rather than the conditions". 36 
This, combined with the military's autonomy, means that many within 
the officer corps, particularly amongst junior field ranks, persist in 
seeing "themselves as continuing the revolutionary vanguard role 
which they had inherited from the late Ottoman period". 37 The 
`higher' nature of their guardianship position places them above party 
politics and the relations of production. In this sense, the military in 
post-war Turkey is quite different from those in other Middle Eastern 
polities in which, as Manfred Halpern argues, they have been more 
closely associated with the interests of an emerging capitalist class 38 
Instead, the Turkish armed forces identify themselves as 
`independent' protectors of `progressive' Kemalist values. 39 However, 
since "Kemalism is simultaneously an authoritarian reformism and an 
aspiration to a Western-style democracy" these values are profoundly 
contradictory. 40 The rapid rise of capitalist class power in Turkey 
during the 1940s and 1950s has exacerbated this inherent 
34 Quoted by the General Secretariat of the National Security Council (1982) p. 224. 
35 Birand, M. (1991) p. xiii. 
36 Ibid. p. 77. 
37 Hale, W. (1990) p. 57. 
38 See Halpern, M. (1963) pp 58-59. 
39 This is perhaps particularly obvious in their ideological affiliation to the West. See 
Karaosmanoglu A. (1993) passim. 
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irreconcilability. It has forced civil and military bureaucratic elites to 
compromise with the political expression of this emergent social 
network. As a result, some have moved towards representational 
party politics and the emergent bourgeoisie and others, in a similar 
way to old regime groups in post-1919 Europe, have shifted 
rightwards favouring quasi-fascist modernist nationalism. This section 
will examine how, as the divide between democratic and non- 
democratic versions of Kemalism widened in the post-war period, the 
military sacrificed a degree of its political autonomy and moved closer 
to bourgeois capitalism. 
Both the democratic and the authoritarian elements within the 
Turkish officer corps can be seen in their leadership of the 1960 
coup. Following a period of severe decline in the status and 
remuneration of both the civil and the military bureaucracy during the 
late 1950s, resentment became focused on the leadership of the DP 
government 41 One faction within the conspirators, led by Colonel 
Alparslan Türke§, favoured a prolonged term of military governance, 
while another, generally consisting of more senior soldiers, preferred a 
more limited period of rule 42 Although the coup itself followed the 
chain of command with the more moderate officers predominating, 
conflict continued within the new military administration. Those that 
viewed the intervention as an opportunity to embark on an 
authoritarian programme of social reforms initially faired well. Türke; 
was appointed under-secretary to the Chief-of-Staff and new political 
leader, General Gürsel, and many predicted that, like Nasser from 
Nagib, he would eventually assume power. He caused considerable 
alarm, however, in proposing the establishment of a highly centralised 
`Culture Super-ministry' outside political influence and absorbing 
ao Vaner, S. (1987) p. 238. 
41 Two of the leaders of the takeover, Colonels Yurdakuler and Kaplan later 
commented respectively that the Menderes administration "were leaving the 
civilised road Ataturk had outlined" through "a policy of greed based on group 
domination under the guise of economic development". Quoted and translated in 
Ba,; kut, C., Kemal, Y. & Güresin, E. (1960). See also Özbudun, E. (1966) pp 15-21. 
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control of departments responsible for the media, religious affairs and 
education 43 As Walter Weiker notes, "few discerning observers failed 
to see the seeds of dictatorship" in these measures. The generals 
were particularly worried by criticisms from their supporters within 
the "radical statist-secularist wing of the RPP" 45 The result was that 
Türken and thirteen of his more junior colleagues were dismissed. 
Gürsel now pursued a paradoxical policy of appeasing the RPP 
political activists, the state bureaucracy, the capitalist class and the 
authoritarian wing of the armed forces who remained aggrieved at 
both his limited social objectives and the dismissal of the `14'. As a 
concession to the latter, Menderes was hanged with Foreign Minister 
Zorlu and Finance Minister Polatkan. 46 In order to solidify support 
within the RPP, a State Planning Organisation was established in 
conjunction with another Five-Year Economic Development Plan. 47 
This was undertaken within a new, more politically liberal constitution 
designed by Istanbul University and ratified by a popular vote in July 
1961.48 Nonetheless, the military retained a considerable amount of 
power in the new constitutional assembly. As a National Security 
Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu - NSC), they stayed on as permanent 
members of the Senate and reserved control of the appointment of a 
further fifteen appointees within the Upper House. 49 By arranging the 
political make-up of the subsequent coalition governments and 
threatening further interventions if their interests were not respected, 
42 Sydney Fisher described Türke,; as "a Pan-Turkist and a firm follower of the 
ideology of Yusuf Aksura" (1963, p. 34). See also Karpat, K (1970) p. 1666. 
43 See Weiker, W. (1967) p. 133-134. 
44 Ibid. p. 134. 
45 Karpat, K (1988) p. 141. 
46 See Ahmad, F. (1977) pp 171-172. 
47 Trimberger, E. (1978) p. 132. 
48 See Özbudun, E. (1988a) pp 83-84. Samuel Huntington comments that "the army 
had placed its guns behind the programme of technocrats and ideologues of the 
RPP in order to increase political participation and mandate more equitable 
distribution" (1968, p. 232). 
49 Dogu Ergil comments that this Chamber was established by "the ruling Turkish 
military/civilian intelligentsia... to safeguard the democratic institutions created 
through elite decisions rather than popular action" (1975, p. 144). 
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the military continued to take an active part in parliamentary politics 
throughout the 1960s. 5° 
Disaffection within the high command persisted, however. Following 
a failed putsch attempt in February 1962 and another, led by the 
exiled `14', in May 1963,51 authoritarian elements within the armed 
forces concentrated on utilising the liberality of the 1961 constitution 
which had reversed a considerable proportion of the restraints on 
political association imposed by the DP regime of the late 1950s. 
Many became influential in organisations with radically reformist 
objectives. Of the original 1960 coup leaders, three joined the 
traditional political home of the state elite, the RPP, two began 
writing for the Leftist periodical Türk Solu (Turkish Left) and two 
others joined the socialist group Devrim (Revolution). 52 By June 1965, 
however, ten others had joined a small, conservative party, The 
Republican Peasant National Party (Cumhuriyet1i Kylü Millet Partisi - 
RPNP). Led by Türke,, who quickly assumed the chairmanship of the 
party, these officers set about dislodging incumbent personnel and 
giving the organisation a "national-socialist bent". 53 Although Türke; 
was at pains to deny any Nazi sympathies, "the party's casual interest 
(at best) in the future of democratic institutions in Turkey, their 
special attention in fostering youth groups and their arranging 
paramilitary marches and youth demonstrations, were reminiscent of 
fascist parties elsewhere". 54 
Although in electoral terms the RPNP did not become a major party 
during the 1960s, three factors served to reinforce anti-leftist 
sentiments amongst the military and within large-sections of the 
bourgeoisie thereby pushing both towards the neo-liberalism of the 
so See Pevsner, L. (1984) p. 34 & Erogul, C. (1987) pp 122-129. 
51 See Weiker, W. (1963) passim, Dodd, C. (1979) p. 137 & Lewis, G. (1976) p. 16. 
52 See Vaner, S. (1987) p. 249. 
53 Former Justice Minister Irfan Baran quoted in Agaogullan, M. (1987) p. 193. 
Landau, J. (1974) p. 210. His parenthesis. Often deploying strongly racist rhetoric 
in an attempt to appeal to Sunni Turks, the NAP had, by the late 1960s, begun to 
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official opposition party, the justice Party (Adalet Partisi - JP). The 
first was the failure of the RPP-led coalition to reach a satisfactory 
solution to the crisis in Cyprus. In response to continued attacks on 
the island's Turkish minority, Prime Minister Inönü threatened to 
intervene under the conditions of the 1960 Treaty of Zurich. 55 The 
refusal of President Johnson to support such a tactic, however, led to 
the abandonment of already well-advanced military intervention plans 
in June 1964.56 As a result, Turkey withdrew from NATO's 
Multilateral Force and pursued closer relations with the Soviet Union 
including a cultural agreement and a state visit of Foreign Minister 
Gromyko. 57 This caused considerable anger and alarm within the 
military, particularly from those influenced by Türken who was 
himself a Turkish Cypriot 58 It also had a significant effect on the 
Turkish electorate for, as Abadan notes, "the RPP was constantly 
attacked during the [1965] electoral campaign for forging dangerous 
links". 59 
These concerns were intensified by a second factor, the plethora of 
labour groups which emerged quite legally under the 1961 
constitution. Of particular importance was the Workers Party of 
Turkey (Türkiye 1fd Partisi - WTI) which grew strongly in the early 
1960s and "was instrumental in advancing the interests of the 
working class" G0 Despite the RPP's close surveillance of this group 
through a revitalised National Intelligence Organisation (Milli 
Irtibbarat Teckilati - the soon to be infamous MIT), the failure of the 
civil authorities to restrict the WPT was a growing source of concern 
for both the high command and the capitalist elite. Under the 
interpret Turkish nationalism as "a doctrine of civil war" (Bozarslan, H., 1996, p. 
141). See also Yalman, N. (1968) p. 133. 
ss See Erogul, C. (1987) p. 127. 
56 See Evin, A. (1985) pp 129-130. Given that Turkey had received almost $4 billion 
of aid (53 per cent was military items and services) between 1948 and 1962, 
Johnson's views were difficult to ignore (Shorter, F., 1967, pp 48-49). 
57 See Karpat, K (1967) p. 166. 
58 For a discussion on how Türkeil exploited the crisis in Cyprus see Landau, J. 
(1973) p. 284. 
59 Abadan, N. (1966) p. 340. My parenthesis. 
60 Berberoglu, B. (1982) p. 91. See also Ecevit, B. (1973) passim. 
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leadership of Süleyman Demirel, a former employee of the American 
Morrison Corporation, the JP (who were benefiting from 
considerable financial support from the United States) "began to 
whip up a `red scare' throughout the country" G1 This was exacerbated 
by the WPT's public recognition of the Kurds as a persecuted 
minority. The military, who had been careful to intern or exile most 
prominent Kurds as soon as they assumed power in 1960, were 
especially alarmed. 62 The third factor which supported a rise in 
rightist politics was the rapidity of social change in Turkey during the 
1960s. The advent of a televisual mass media, the sudden rise in 
geographic mobility, the spread of urban, capitalist values, increasing 
Americanisation and innovations in the built environment were not 
matched by sustainable economic development. Although 
consistently high growth rates had enriched and enlarged a significant 
capitalist class, by 1967 unemployment had reached 11 per cent of the 
workforce and the average cost of living had risen by 45 per cent 
since 1960.63 For many petite bourgeois groups disadvantaged by the 
failure of RPP etatism, threatened by changing social values or de- 
skilled by systemic alterations in the economy, "a trustworthy, 
uncompromising and `paternalistic' leader" appeared to be a 
favourable prospect 64 
So, despite a sharp move towards the political left the RPP was 
unsurprisingly defeated by the JP in the 1965 general elections G5 The 
return to government of capitalist class interests did not, however, 
represent an unconditional resumption of civilian rule. The military 
remained prepared to intervene should the government attempt to 
61 Berberoglu, B. (1982) p. 92. 
62 See Entessar, N. (1992) p. 90. Kemal Kiri,; ci writes that during the election 
campaign of 1963 the WPT's "party leadership organised meetings in eastern parts 
of the country to raise public consciousness of what it termed the `eastern and 
Kurdish reality"' (1998, p. 240). This contrasts with the attitude of General Gürsel 
who stated, while standing on an American tank in Diyarbakir, "there are no Kurds 
in this country. Whoever says he is a Kurd, I will spit in his face" (quoted in Muller, 
M. (1996, p. 177). 
63 Berberoglu, B. (1982) pp 97-98. 
64 Agaogullan, M. (1987) p. 192. 
65 See Landau, J. (1973) p. 266. 
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implement unacceptable policy decisions 66 As a result, the JP 
maintained the tradition of DP pragmatism and pursued a mixed 
economy "while displaying the traditional reverence for the army" 67 
With the election of General Sunay to presidency in 1966, "an 
attitude of benevolence bordering on complicity" emerged between 
the JP leadership and the military. 68 A proportion of the basis for this 
was the growing tendency for senior military officials to accept 
executive positions within large corporations upon retirement. In 
part, such appointments were facilitated by the investment 
programme of the Army Mutual Assistance Association (Ordu 
Yardimlarma Kurumu - AMAA). Established in March 1961 to provide 
social security to military personnel, it had, by 1975, subsidised 19,000 
homes, advanced 35,000 personal loans and amassed assets in excess 
of two billion Turkish lira. 69 Since it was managed by the generals 
themselves, the success of the AMAA in positioning itself at the heart 
of middle-class consumption, import-subsidising industrialisation and 
foreign capital exchange led to a significant `bourgeoisification' of the 
military elite. 
In terms of political expediency, the growing capitalist-military 
coalition can also be seen as a response to the radicalisation of leftist 
activism and to continuing divisions within the high command itself. 
Groups such as the National Democratic Movement (Milli Demokratik 
Devrim - NDR) and the Federation of Revolutionary Youth in Turkey 
(Tiirkiye Deverimci Genclik Federayonu - Dev Genc), having profited from 
the growth in trade unionism and in higher education enrolment, 70 
emerged as significant social movements in the late 1960s. Inspired by 
66 For instance, in 1969 a bill aimed at restoring political rights to former DP 
members had to be hastily withdrawn in the face of hostility from the military. See 
Hyland, M. (1970) p. 2. 
67 Karpat, K. (1972a) p. 365. See also Sayan, S. (1971) p. 180. 
68 Vaner, S. (1987) p. 249. 
69 See ibid. pp 251-253. 
70 From 360,285 workers in 1965 to 2,088,219 workers in 1970 (I,; ikh, A., 1987, p. 
316) and from 92,080 students to 149,119 students over the same period (Samim, 
A., 1987, p. 174, no. 20). There were also great increases in urbanisation. Between 
1965 and 1970 all five of Turkey's largest cities grew by more than a quarter (Ankara 
increased its size by a third) (see Weiker, W., 1972, p. 19). 
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the struggle of Guevara in Bolivia and the Viet Cong in Indo-China, 
the former, in particular, promulgated a Maoist ideology in which 
loosely associated urban-guerrilla units aimed to destabilise the regime 
sufficiently to facilitate the takeover of a radical junta from within the 
armed forces. The result was "a compelling `fit' between Guevarist 
concepts of revolutionary immediacy and the tradition of left- 
Kemalism". 71 With the breakdown in industrial relations and the 
subsequent increase in strike activity towards the end of the 1960s, 
the NDR's putative contacts within the officer corps were particularly 
worrying for the JP/NSC administration. A lack of support from the 
Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Turk-1f) and the state's 
deployment of both regular troops and ultranationalist militia to 
police the strikes, significantly radicalised labour groups and led to the 
establishment of the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions 
(Devrimci I, cFi Sendikalan Konfederayonu - DISK) in 1967.72 The 
following year the number of strikes rose to fifty-four and, by 1970, 
the figure was 112 including a co-ordinated walkout of over 100,000 
workers in Kocaeli and Istanbu1.73 Amid "a general loss of confidence 
among sections of the bourgeoisie", 74 the high command forced 
Demirel's government to resign in March 1971. 
As well as an attempt to restore the confidence of the capitalist class, 
this coup can also be seen as a way of pre-empting the activities of 
the NDR/radical officer conspiracy. 75 As Sen-ih Vaner notes, such an 
alliance "bore upon two issues of particular sensitivity: the Kurdish 
question and the organic integration of the national military apparatus 
within the Western bloc' . 76 In the tradition of Mahmud ýevket and 
Mustafa Kemal and following the pattern of the 1960 coup, the 
general staff and President Sunay acted quickly to protect the chain of 
71 Samim, A. (1987) p. 159. 
72 Türk-Ij "preferred to remain apolitical... it preferred national consciousness over 
class consciousness and hence over the Turkish Workers Party" (Levy, 1991, pp 
142-143). See also Agaogullari, M. (1987) p. 192 and Erogul, C. (1987) p. 135. 
73 Berberoglu, B. (1982) p. 103. 
74 Barkey, H. (1984) p. 54. 
75 See MacKenzie, K. (1974) pp 5-6. 
234 
Chapter Six: The Military/Industrial Complex 
command from radicalised elements within the officer corps. As a 
result, three generals and eight colonels were immediately dismissed 
for "having gone outside the hierarchic mechanism and engaged in 
political activities basically inconsistent with the disciplinary rules of 
the armed forces" 77 These measures were reinforced by 
institutionalising military control over a series of non-party 
governments between 1971 and 1973 and instigating a number of 
economic reforms aimed at eliminating the causes of leftist disorder. 
Most were, however, successfully blocked by the combined 
opposition of Ecevit (the less pro-military successor of Inönü at the 
helm of the RPP) and Demirel who were both resentful at the 
powerful position of the high command's political agents 78 
Nonetheless, in the case of constitutional amendments, the JP 
concurred with the military and insisted that the liberality of the 1961 
constitution was a luxury Turkey could ill-afford 79 As a result, the 
early 1970s were marked by severe limitations on the freedom of the 
judiciary, the media, universities and the Assembly Houses. Martial 
law was declared and, in a series of bloody police and military 
operations, large numbers of socialists were arrested, silenced or 
killed. 
In many ways the 1971 military reassertion can be seen as a shift in 
Turkey's socio-economic development. The 1960 coup had brought 
about a situation comparable to Mann's characterisation of 
Bismarckian Germany. The politically decentralising effects of a 
relatively liberal constitution had been considerably allayed by an elite 
strategy that had absorbed bourgeois calls for greater representation 
without surrendering to a full party democracy. Through a process of 
semiauthoritarian incorporation, the military was able to retake its 
traditional position at the heart of the state elite while not only 
permitting a return of capitalist rule under Demirel's JP, but also 
76 Vaner, S. (1987) p. 253. 
77 General Muhsin Batur cited and translated in Hale, W. (1990) p. 70. 
78 See Lewis, G. (1976) p. 18. 
79 See Ahmad, F. (1977) pp 295-296. 
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presiding over a significant growth in the power of left-wing 
reformism. As with Germany, however, such a policy of `negative 
integration' held many perils for continued military autonomy. The 
combined pressures of capitalist expansion and civil calls for greater 
political representation politicised the Turkish officer corps, already 
fractured by the intrinsically contradictory nature of the Kemalist 
legacy they inherited. So the gradual `bourgeoisiefication' of the high 
command, coupled with their age-old imperative of excluding the 
more radical elements among their subordinates, produced a marked 
decline in military autonomy and prompted the end of 
semiauthoritarian incorporation. Purged of its of leftist sentiments, 
the military elite took on what Mann identifies as the conservative- 
constitutionalist / rightist-authoritarian split apparent in Germany. 
This, plus the state's clear focus on repressing the left, helped to 
reinforce and legitimise the political message of. the extreme right- 
wing. 80 These coalesced around the issue of the presidency as General 
Sunay's term of office reached an end in 1973. As before, 
authoritarian Kemalists committed to a prolonged period of political 
supervision preferred a military candidate whereas a more moderate 
group argued for an immediate return to complete civilian rule - an 
option favoured by the main parties 81 The result was a compromise 
in the person of ex-Admiral Fahri Korutürk. Critically, though, this 
was widely perceived as a defeat for the high command. The effect of 
this was, as George Harris notes, to create "a fatal disjunction 
between the real power of the military establishment and the illusion 
that it could be confronted with impunity by civilian politicians". 82 
The combination of a fragmented civil bureaucracy (which, with the 
RPP's new left-of-centre position, was no longer held together by an 
institutionalised opposition to socialism), a divided military elite and a 
wave of nationalist sentiment in the wake of the 1974 Cyprus invasion 
80 See Landau, J. (1973) p. 287. 
81 See Pevsner, L. (1984) p. 55. 
82 Harris, G. (1988) p. 191. 
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produced rising violence levels on university campuses and an 
atmosphere highly conducive to Türke; ' quasi-fascist networks. 83 
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Indeed, as Table Thirteen shows, the RPNP (which became the 
National Action Party (Milliyet Hareket Partisi - NAP) in 1969) was 
gradually able to enlarge its influence during the early 1970s. 85 This 
was also true of Necmettin Erbakan's Islamist National Salvation 
Party (Milli Selamet Partisi - NSP) who had benefited from the JP 
government's willingness to utilise Islam in order to garner peasant 
support during the second half of the 1960s. 86 Using this constituency 
as a political lever, Erbakan was able to acquire the "legitimisation of 
an anti-Kemalist party". 87 By 1973, he had entered government in an 
unlikely, and extremely volatile, coalition with the ever-more leftward 
RPP. 88 Increasingly, though, the NAP were able to draw support 
83 Serif Mardin records that 517 students were killed in clashes between violently 
radical political groups from autumn 1973 to spring 1977 (1978, p. 230). 
84 Source: Agaogullan, M. (1987) p. 216 n. 122 and Weiker, W. (1981) p. 145. 
85 See Landau, J. (1982) p. 590. 
86 Enrolment in religious Imam-Hatip schools, for instance, rose from 10,961 in 1965 
to 44,275 in 1970 (Landau, J., 1974, p. 176). See also R. Scott's two articles in The 
Muslim World (1965 & 1971) and Shankland, D. (1999) p. 88. For an authoritative 
study of the Party's history, see J. Landau (1976). 
87 Alkan, T. (1984) p. 83. See also Ergüder, Ü. (1988) pp 114-124. 
88 This was particularly apparent following the death of Inönü (the last living link 
with Kemal) in 1974. Indeed, as Frank Tachau notes, "the leftward shift of the RPP 
seemed to the military to move the party to an anti-statist stance" (1991, p. 112). 
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away from the NSP through the tactical deployment of religious 
rhetoric concerning Cypriot and Thracian Muslims. 89 The NAP also 
proved particularly adept at using the JP's parliamentary fragility to 
improve its political standing. Despite possessing only three deputies 
and 3.4 per cent of the vote, Türke; was appointed Deputy Prime 
Minister and given control over two key ministries. 90 Under the 
newspaper slogan `Demirel in parliament and Türken on the streets', 91 
"its armed paramilitary phalange stepped up its acts of violence as the 
government tolerated, and at times encouraged, them as a defence 
against the perceived threat from the Left - and especially as a 
weapon against the RPP" 92 This rapidly became self-perpetuating for, 
as Feroz Ahmad notes, the aim of the NAP's programme of violence 
"was to emphasise the so-called danger from the Left" and thereby 
provide for itself "an opportunity to exert a political influence totally 
out of proportion to its following in the country and its strength in 
the Assembly". 93 
Superimposed upon the left-right political cleavage were two further 
divides, Sunnis/Alevis and Turks/Kurds. In focusing on these 
differences, Türken may be regarded as significantly departing from 
the nationalist discourse of his state sponsors which had always been 
wary of acknowledging such cleavages. Nevertheless, the growing 
affiliation between minority groups and left-wing politics continued 
to provide a role for the NAP's activists. With RPP attempts to 
reconstruct themselves as a mass socialist party, signified by Ecevit's 
description of the Alevis as an "oppressed" minority in 1974, the 
89 This can be seen in the election results of 1977 where the NSP lost half their 48 
deputies compared to an NAP gain of 13 (see Landau, J., 1982, pp 591-592). 
90 See Cizre-Sakallioglu, Ü. (1992a) pp 151-152. The NAP was also able to secure 
virtual control over the Education Ministry through a close affiliation with the right- 
wing JP deputy Ali Naili Erdem who "appointed their partisans headmasters in all 
Anatolian secondary schools" (Keyder, (;., 1987b, p. 56). This also served to 
strengthen the campus activities of its direct action units (see Schick, I. & Tonak, E., 
1987a, p. 369). 
91 Parlamentoda Demirel, Sokakta Türke{ (see Ahmad, F., 1977, p. 347). 
92 Schick, I. & Tonak, E. (1987a) p. 369. They go on to claim that the NAP 
"maintained a persistent policy of infiltration at all levels of government, including 
the police and armed forces" (ibid). 
93 Ahmad, F. (1977) p. 347 
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traditional political `centre' "remained largely unoccupied". 94 In such 
an atmosphere, emergent minority consciousness, reformulated by the 
experience of migration and large-scale social change, took on an 
increasingly radical tenor. 95 This was particularly so following the oil 
price crisis of 1973 (Turkey was importing over 70 per cent of its oil) 
which made Kurds acutely aware of the fact that only 5 per cent of 
the $10 million (1972) generated from the south-east Anatolian 
petroleum industry was being spent in that region. 96 Support also 
came from the WPT leadership who condemned state policy in 
Kurdish-speaking areas as one "of assimilation and intimidation 
which has often become a bloody repression" 97 As a result, 
ostensibly Kurdish groups such as The Road to Freedom (bxgürlük 
Yolu) began to identify with the Turkish left's goal of proletarian 
leadership 98 Others rejected such an association and combined a 
broadly Marxist-Leninist agenda with the overall aim of establishing 
an ethnically defined independent Kurdish state. 99 Foremost amongst 
the latter was the Kurdish Workers' Party (Partrya Karkareni Kurdistan - 
PI K. Founded by Abdullah Öcalan, a former member of Dev Genf, 
in Ankara in 1974, it became increasingly active as the Turkish 
political situation deteriorated into chaos during the late 1970s. 100 
In June of 1977, a year in which there were 758 bomb attacks and 318 
deaths (of which the average age was 22), Demirel's coalition lost the 
general election to the RPP. 101 Ecevit was able to form a government 
only in January 1978, however, after a number of JP deputies 
94 See Karpat, K. (1988) pp 147-148 and Özbudun, E. (1981a) p. 233. 
95 Confrontations between labour-affiliated Alevi groups and broadly NAP- 
supporting Sunnis, for instance, claimed more than 100 lives in the town of 
Kahramanmara,; in 1978. See Harris, G. (1980) pp 37-38. 
96 See jafar, M. (1976) pp 67-68. 
97 See Nezan, K. (1980) p. 97. 
98 See Entessar, N. (1992) p. 92. 
99 For more detailed surveys of these groups, see Entessar, N. (1989) p. 94 and 
Bölükba,; i, S. (1991) pp 16-19. 
100 Since over 50 per cent of the Turkish middle classes are descended from non- 
Anatolian refugees who arrived during the turmoil of the nineteenth century, 
Kurdish nationalism is unlikely to gain widespread public sympathy (Barchard, D., 
1985, p. 13). As a result, "the Turkish ruling class is all too aware of the disruptive 
effect of non-Turkish nationalism" (Hyman, A., 1988, p. 10). 
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defected. Disastrously, he appeared to support the political left while 
failing to bring political militias under the control of the state. 
Kurdish officials were appointed at Cabinet and municipal levels, an 
historic `social contract' was signed between the government and 
Türk-I{ and Ecevit, himself, represented DISK's request to stage a 
May-Day Rally in 1979 to the security forces. 102 Seeing that the 
military would be difficult to dominate politically, he also resisted 
introducing martial law until a sharp increase in violence towards the 
end of 1978 forced the Cabinet to act. Apart from Istanbul and 
Ankara, all nineteen provinces placed under military administration 
were areas predominantly populated by Kurds. 103 Allegedly working 
with rightist groups, and with the assistance of the American Central 
Intelligence Agency, soldiers and gendarmes, supported by the NAP's 
partial "colonisation of [the] government bureaucracy", embarked 
upon a programme of curfews, police operations and extra-judicial 
detentions aimed at nullifying labour groups and restoring business 
confidence. 104 
According to Kenneth MacKenzie, the high command was 
particularly concerned to present the IMF, with whom Ecevit was in 
the process of negotiating an unprecedented rescue package of $1.5 
billion, with a democratic and relatively stable front. Indeed, this was 
part of the reason why the Chief-of-Staff, General Kenan Evren, 
decided to postpone plans, drawn up in some detail in mid-1979, for a 
military intervention. 105 Another reason was the wisdom of awaiting 
the outcome of the mid-term elections in October 1979. These 
101 Data for 1977 calendar year, see Pevsner, L. (1984) pp 68-69. 
102 With declining industrial production (5.4 per cent down in 1979), the business 
community were horrified and organised an anti-RPP advertising campaign. See 
Cizre-Sakalhoglu, Ü. (1992) p. 726 and Boratav, K. & Türel, 0. (1988) p. 38. 
103 See Berberoglu, B. (1982) p. 119. 
104 Schick, I. & Tonak, E. (1987a) p. 369. My parenthesis. In addition, see J. 
Chediac's articles in Workers World in January and February 1980. It should also be 
noted that the NAP's influence within sectors of the civil bureaucracy was 
somewhat offset by the fact that "throughout the 1970s Alevis gained increasing 
power both in central government and the municipalities, sometimes beyond their 
population ratios" (Ayata, A., 1997, p. 67). 
105 MacKenzie, K. (1981) p. 10. 
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increased the JP's share of the votes in the Assembly and led to the 
formation of a minority government under Demirel. The new Deputy 
Prime Minister, Turgut Özal, devised an implementation plan with 
the IMF and announced a devaluation of the lira and other structural 
adjustments to the economy. 106 This provoked a furore from the RPP 
who joined with violent left-wing groups in condemning the new 
administration as a "fascist" regime. 107 Despite a renewed 
commitment to the martial law authorities (reminiscent of the JP's 
approach to the military in the late 1960s), the number of politically- 
motivated murders rose from seven or eight a day to twenty during 
1980.108 The position of the NSP, who controlled a parliamentary 
vote of twenty, was of particularly concern to the high command. 
Erbakan refused to support JP anti-insurgency measures to increase 
the power of the executive, conspicuously failed to sing the national 
anthem and attended a conference at which his supporters 
proclaimed "today Iran - tomorrow Turkey". 109 Within a week of this 
rally, he, Demeril, Türken and Ecevit were under arrest and Evren 
had declared that the "armed forces have invoked the powers granted 
to them by the Services Code to protect and look after the Turkish 
Republic". '1° 
In conclusion, the Second Republic can be seen as a process of 
political realignment between the state and the industrial elite. The 
capitalist class, which had previously failed to organise extensive 
power networks within the bureaucratic elite, despite their political 
representation institutionalised in the 1950s, were, during the JP 
administration of the 1960s, successful in forging a new relationship 
with both the civil service, and, most importantly, with the military. 
By the end of the 1970s, however, the civil authorities had become 
politically polarised and ineffectual. The growing commitment to pro- 
106 See Pevsner, L. (1984) pp 78-79. 
107 See MacKenzie, K. (1981) p. 14. 
108 See Pevsner, L. (1984) p. 80. 
109 See Harris, G. (1988) p. 192. 
110 Quoted in Birand, M. (1987) p. 187. 
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Western neo-liberalism, strongly anti-leftist ideology and 
organisational integrity of the armed forces, on the other hand, meant 
that they, rather than elected officialdom, became regarded as the 
only viable source of political stability. Furthermore, with the middle- 
ground of party politics largely unoccupied for much of the 1970s, 
the bourgeoisie, in seeking to institutionalise this reformulated blend 
of capitalism and social representation, had few alternative to the 
armed forces. The following section will look at how the 
reconstructed state was organised and the ways in which it sought to 
reduce the influence, especially within the political centre, of social 
groups such as socialists, Kurdish separatists and Islamists. 
The Militarisation of the Turkish Periphery 
The 12th September coup was a result of two factors. The first was 
the extremely high levels of civil violence which, in the two years 
before the takeover, had claimed over 5000 dead and injured nearly 
20,000 more. 111 The second was the inability of the JP to implement 
the economic austerity measures required by the IMF. 112 These 
elements made it quite different from the 1960 and 1971 
interventions. There were, however, similar concerns regarding 
discipline within the officer corps. While it was clear that the generals 
favoured the economic approach of the JP, they were also worried 
that the politicisation of the civil bureaucracy might exacerbate the 
inherent tensions within their role as guardians of the Kemalist 
republic. Speaking on September 30th 1980 General Evren expressed 
these concerns thus: "whenever the army entered into politics it 
began to lose its discipline and, gradually, it was led into corruption... 
we had to implement this operation... to save the army from politics 
and to cleanse it from political dirt". 113 So a third factor was the 
generals' desire, based on the tradition of Mahmud SSevket and 
Mustafa Kemal, to establish a regime which would keep the ever- 
111 See Caglar, A. (1990) p. 79. 
112 See Yegilada, B. (1987) p. 38. 
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volatile low and middle-ranking officers out of the political arena for 
good. l14 
Here the civil unrest of the 1970s provided the high command with a 
means of busying the authoritarian faction within its ranks. Firstly 
directed against the left and then, following the PICK's inaugural 
attack on the army in 1984, at Kurdish political agitation, the 
provision of an identifiable `enemy of people' became key to the 
perpetuation and legitimacy of the military's role in Turkish political 
life. As a result, the state coercion function was increased over the 
south-eastern provinces thereby providing a battlefield for modernist 
nationalism's dogma of civil war. Outside the areas administered by 
`emergency rule', domestic repression levels were gradually reduced 
leading to a polarised and bifurcated system of governance. 
Geopolitically, the state moved towards a closer affiliation with the 
West's multilateral military regime supported by a renewed 
commitment to economic neo-liberalism. In other words, unlike 
Mann's account of the West's development following the Second 
World War, Turkish militarism has not moved away from the 
traditional dualism of warfare and repression towards a single 
geopolitical function. Within the post-1980 administration's 
restructured blend of militarism, neo-liberalism and social 
representation modernist nationalism has endured and prevented the 
adoption of a more pacific domestic regime. 
Top of Evren's agenda following the 1980 coup was neutralising the 
large numbers of political activists operating throughout the country. 
To this end, martial law was extended to all regions and, within the 
first seven months of military rule 122,609 arrests (more than 10,000 
in the first week) were made. 115 By the end of January 1981,215 
113 Cited in Hale, W. (1988) p. 163. 
114 See Ahmad, F. (1981a) passim. An example of this new, tighter control of the 
coup's forces can be seen in Evren's decision not no allow anyone but himself to 
discuss politics publicly, see Heper, M. (1987) p. 57. 
ISS NSC figures quoted in United States Helsinki Watch Committee (1983) p. 10 and 
The Financial Times September 18th 1980. 
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people had died, 108 had been sentence to death and, as in the 1971 
intervention, many had been tortured. 116 Newspapers were suspended 
and general guidelines on `self censorship' were issued. 117 A Higher 
Education Law was passed by an interim Cabinet led by former 
admiral Ulusu and dominated by `retired' staff officers in July 1981118 
which ended universities' political independence and permitted the 
martial law authorities to sack a great number of `undesirable' 
academics. 119 This was supported by the establishment of a Higher 
Education Council (Yuksek Ögretrm Kurulu - YÖK) in November 
1981 which monitored student and staff and ensured that they did not 
join political parties or engage in `ideological activities'. 120 Other 
professional groups such as lawyers, doctors, artisans and engineers 
were similarly restrained. 121 By September 1981,167 mass trials, 
including the leadership of DISK, were underway and by 1983 these 
had sentenced 39,529 people to jail terms of various length. 122 Trade 
unions were banned with the exception of Türk-11 who was 
"prohibited from any form of political activity". 123 In January 1984 
102 WPT members were imprisoned for up to 12 years for 
"attempting to establish the dictatorship of one class over another". 124 
Similarly punitive measures were taken against members of the civil 
bureaucracy deemed to be politicised. 125 In total, nearly 5,000 state 
employees were dismissed (including 1,700 elected mayors) and a 
further 18,000 received administrative or penal punishments. 126 
Although numerous rightists were apprehended, including 588 
116 See Cousins, J. (1973) passim & Berberoglu, B. (1982) p. 130. 
117 This was universally adhered to - especially after one leftist editor was sentenced 
to seven and a half years imprisonment. 
116 See Dodd, C. (1996) p. 133. 
119 See Hale, W. (1982) pp 38-39. 
120 These regulations were extremely broad and included instructions on, amongst 
many other things, the wearing of facial hair. By autumn 1981, three hundred 
academic had been sacked. See Dodd, C. (1983) pp 48-49. 
121 See Pevsner, L. (1984) p. 99. 
122 See Hale, W. (1994) p. 253 and Ye, §ilada, B. (1988) p. 351. 
123 Yesilada, B. (1988) p. 353. 
124 Quoted in Pevsner, L. (1984) p. 92. 
125 The focus of this on left-leaning groups has been particularly detrimental to the 
Alevi presence within the state bureaucracy (see Ayata, A., 1997, p. 67). 
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members of NAP who were charged with inciting 600 murders, left- 
wing sympathies were perceived by the high command as offering the 
greatest institutional threat. In all, of the arrests officially 
acknowledged between September 1980 and February 1983, the 
government classified 54 per cent as leftists, 25 per cent as unknown, 
14 per cent as rightists and 7 per cent as Kurdish separatists. 127 David 
McDowall (citing The International League of Human Rights), 
however, puts the number of Kurds detained much higher at 81,000. 
By deploying 65 per cent of the second biggest army in NATO in the 
south-east the military was, he argues, able to force the PKK out of 
Turkey and into Syrian-protected abeyance. 128 
In order for the military executive to prevent the kinds of particularist 
political allegiances that polarised Turkish society during the 1970s, a 
constitution was brought into force in 1982 which imposed much 
greater governmental controls on interest group formation and 
organisation. 129 Supported by 628 additional pieces of legislation 
passed into law between 1980 and 1983,130 it generally formalised 
existent restrictions on voluntary, professional and labour 
organisation implemented during the immediate aftermath of the 
coup. As part of a "well corseted framework... for the conduct of 
political participation by civilians", 131 commercial groups were 
organised into various chambers more designed to regulate them than 
'26 Pevsner, L. (1984) p. 93. 
127 Ibid. p. 88 & 91. This included the former Minister of Public Works, Serafettin 
Elgi, who was jailed for two years and three months for stating in an interview that 
"I am a Kurd. There are Kurds in Turkey" (New York Times, March 27th, 1981). 
128 McDowall, D. (1992) p. 414 & 420. For the Syrian government, support of the 
PKK proved a useful bargaining chip in their negotiations with Turkey over the 
Euphrates water flow which, in 1984, was supplying only 11.3 per cent of her 
requirements. See Kibaroglu, A. (1994) p. 143. This became particularly pertinent 
following the commencement of work on the South East Anatolian Development 
Project (Güney Do, gu Anadolu Projeri - GAP) which proposed to construct twenty-one 
dams, nineteen hydroelectric power stations and a vast irrigation system. See Kolars, 
J. & Mitchell, W. (1991) passim and Van Bruinessen, M. (1988) p. 44. 
129 See Weiker, W. (1987) pp 36-39. In a referendum of November 1982, in which 
participation was obligatory, the constitution was accepted by 92 per cent of the 95 
per cent who voted. The choice, however, was between the constitution and a 
continuation of military rule. See Pevsner, L. (1984) p. 97. 
130 See Özbudun, E. (1991) p. 41. 
131 Ludington, N. & Spain, J. (1983) p. 161. 
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represent their political interests. 132 Labour was similarly constrained 
through legislation which significantly narrowed the definition of 
legitimate industrial action and provided a mechanism whereby the 
Cabinet could postpone a strike for sixty days in principal and almost 
indefinitely in practice. 133 The constitution also contained 
considerable implications for non-Turkish minorities: 
Article 26 No language prohibited by law shall 
be used in the expression and 
dissemination of thought 
Article 28 Publications shall not be made in any 
language prohibited by law 
Article 89 No political party may concern itself 
with the defence, development, or 
diffusion of any non-Turkish 
language or culture; nor may they 
seek to create minorities within our 
frontiers or to destroy our national 
unity. 134 
A year later, these constitutional measures were reinforced by 
legislation which established Turkish as the mother tongue of the 
country's entire citizenry (as opposed to the official language) and 
banned the use of all others. It also revised the 1938 penal code 
which outlawed `separatist' organisation and dissemination to include 
explicitly the expression of Kurdish ethnic identity. 135 In a 
reintroduction of the discourse of the 1930s, "the constitution also 
revitalised the Turkish Language and Turkish History institutes". 136 
Amid a considerable increase in state-sponsored ethnographic studies, 
these promulgated the idea that the Kurds were simply another 
132 See Heper, M. (1991b) pp 166-167. 
133 See Özbudun, E. (1991) p. 54. 
134 See Gunter, M. (1988) p. 399. 
135 This was regularly used to prosecute Kurds and even their defence lawyers. See 
Entessar, N. (1992) p. 96. 
136 Kiri; cl, K. (1998) p. 242. 
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branch of Central Asian Turkomen. 137 In the view of Henri Barkey 
and Graeme Fuller, the constitution as a whole contained "the most 
culturally repressive policies of modern times". 138 
Figure Five: The Position of the National Security Council in 
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As Figure Five shows, the constitution also solidified the position of 
the military within the executive. The NSC, chaired by the president, 
included five members of the general staff and was supported by a 
new State Supervisory Council to work directly with the chief 
executive. 140 For a period of seven years Evren was installed as 
president and given the right to veto constitutional amendments and 
appoint constitutional court judges. 141 Apart from their central role in 
state security, the high command also controlled military liaison 
officers in every ministry. The 1961 constitution was amended to 
abolish the senate and create a single house to which the NSC was 
not accountable. Furthermore, the military's access to the Cabinet was 
enhanced under a stipulation which obliged ministers "to give priority 
137 See Izady, M. (1990) p. 35. 
tss Barkey, H. & Fuller, G. (1997) p. 73. See also Watts, N. (1999) p. 635. 
139 Source: The Economist January 31111998. 
140 The NSC comprised of the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Interior Affairs and National Defence, the Chief of the General staff, the 
commanders of the army, navy, air force and gendarmerie and the President. See 
Heper, M. (1990a) p. 307. 
141 See McFadden, J. (1985) pp 72-73. 
President 
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consideration" to matters put forward by the NSC. 142 Although 
ostensibly to be reserved for matters of national security, these were 
generally interpreted to include "almost all issues which fall under the 
responsibility of government"143 thereby institutionalising the NSC as 
the "highest non-elected decision-making body of the state". 144 
Through a dual approach of pursuing geopolitical legitimacy and 
institutionalising high levels of domestic repression, it was hoped that 
Turgut Özal, who was retained as Deputy Prime Minister, would be 
able to pursue the stabilisation plan devised by him and Demirel 
undistracted by social unrest and international economic sanctions. 145 
Importation practices were liberalised, a realistic exchange rate policy 
was adopted, export initiatives were promoted, monetary controls and 
debt management programmes were put in place, a greater role for 
the private sector was announced and public spending was 
rationalised. 146 Furthermore, with all political parties banned in 
November 1981 and most organised social groups either excluded 
from politics or carefully monitored, a highly corporatist arrangement 
developed between the military state and the capitalist elite. 147 A key 
element of this was the need to return to party polices as soon as 
possible. As Vehbi Koc, one of the wealthiest men in Turkey, warned 
in a letter to Kenan Evren on October 3rd 1980, if there should be 
any delay in this then "Western countries and their institutions will be 
suspicious and will not deliver their promises". 148 In fact, the military 
elite had been long aware of this possible hazard. 149 Nine days before 
142 See Hale, W. (1994) p. 258. 
143 Quoted in Gürbey, G. (1996) p. 13. Since Kurdish attempts at self-realisation 
have long been regarded as a threat to the `indivisible unity of the state's people and 
territory', the NSC remained "the primary decision-maker in the Kurdish issue" 
(ibid. ). 
144 Hikmet Özdemir quoted in Karabelias, G. (1999) p. 135. 
145 See Yesilada, B. (1988) pp 349-350. 
146 See Baysan, T. & Blitzer, C. (1990) pp 10-11 and Wolff, P. (1987) passim. The 
result of this was, as Korkut Boratav notes, a drop in real wages from an average of 
$2.46 in 1979 to $1.11 in 1985 (1990, p. 209). For a broader discussion of the effects 
of these changes during the 1980s, see Önis, Z. (1996) pasrim. 
147 See Ilkim, S. (1993) p. 193. 
148 Quoted in Arat, Y. (1991) p. 142. 
149 See Karaosmanoglu, A. (1991) pp 172-173. 
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the coup they had dispatched General ý ahinkaya to Washington for 
high-level talks and in October 1980 Evren received four visits from 
the NATO Commander General Rogers. These were followed by 
loans of $182 million from the World Bank and other private 
institutions. 150 In this context, Evren's decision to announce a 
transition timetable to return to democracy within a few weeks of 
abolishing party politics (two years before they were actually re- 
established) can be seen as an attempt to reassure the West and, with 
few visible opponents at home, "hardly anything to do with internal 
demands". 151 
Nevertheless, within four months of the ban on political parties being 
lifted in April 1983, fifteen parties had registered their intention to 
compete in the November elections. 152 The NSC vetoed 719 of the 
prospective parliamentary candidates, however, and reduced the field 
to only three parties broadly centred on the middle ground of the 
political spectrum. 153 Slightly to the left, although deprived of labour 
and other grass-roots linkages with civil society, was the Populist 
Party (Halkfs Parti - PP) which gained 30.5 per cent of the vote and 
117 seats. 154 On the right was the Nationalist Democracy Party 
(Milliyetfi Demokrasi Partisi - NDP) which was led by a retired 
four-star 
general and essentially stood on the electoral platform of the 1981 
constitution. 155 It performed poorly in the election, however, and 
gained only 23.6 per cent and 71 seats. 156 Between the two was the 
extremely heterogeneous Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi - MP). 
Led by Turgut Özal and consisting mainly of personnel recruited 
150 See Paul, J. (1981) p. 4. 
151 Dagi, I. (1996) p. 138. 
152 See McFadden, J. (1985) p. 74 and Ye,; ilada, B. (1988) pp 360-361. 
153 See Hale, W. (1988) pp 170-173. 
t54 The PP merged with the Social Democracy Party (Soya1 Demokrasi Partin - 
SODEP), which had not been allowed to compete, to become the Social Democrat 
Populist Party (So yal Demokrat Halk1 Parti - SDPP) in 1985. See Ayata, A. (1993) p. 
43. 
155 See McFadden, J. (1985) p. 74. 
156 See Turan, I. (1994) p. 55. Ergun Özbudun writes that "this seems to be related 
to the fact that most voters perceived the NDP to be an extension of military rule" 
(1989, p. 14). 
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from the private sector, it maintained a pragmatic, and often 
paradoxical, approach by developing conciliatory links with the 
military, with moderate Islamism, with the NAP and, perhaps most 
importantly, with pro-Western capitalism. 157 Not closely associated 
with the parties of the 1970s nor the first choice of the NSC (Özal 
had, in fact, resigned from the Evren government a year earlier)158 
and with a broad economy-based appeal, the MP gained 41 per cent 
of the vote and 211 seats making it the first single-party majority 
government in Turkey since 1969.159 Indeed, this remained the case 
until 1991 when the True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi - TPP), 
essentially a reformed JP under Demirel, organised a government in 
coalition with the SDPP. 160 
The MP's victory did not, however, mean the institutionalisation of 
an entirely civilian administration. "Far form returning to the 
barracks, the military retained considerable influence over 
governmental policymaking". 161 This was most apparent in the areas 
of higher education (through the central agency YÖK), 162 foreign 
affairs and, through their martial law administrators and associated 
system of military courts, tribunals and prosecutors. 163 The presence 
of the military was further reinforced in 1985 with the adoption of a 
Defence Industry Support Fund (DISF) which was "nearly exempt 
from Turkish accounting and bidding laws". 164 Despite the fact that 
the Defence Ministry budget already exceeded the combined 
allocations for Education and Health, the DISF, which was initially 
derived from a5 per cent levy on income tax, had reached a value of 
$1.5 billion by 1991. By this time revenue from its investment 
157 See Ergüder, Ü. (1991) pp 155-161. 
158 In fact, Henri Barkey argues that Özal was forced out by the pro-import 
substitution interests of the giant conglomerates of Koc and Sabanci holdings 
(1990a, p. 184). 
159 See Ergüder, Ü. & Hofferbert, R. (1987) pp 44-45. 
160 For a discussion of the gradual rise of the TPP, see Cizre-Sakalhoglu, Ü. (1996) 
passim. 
161 Evin, A. (1994) p. 25. 
162 See Szyliowicz, J (1994) passim. 
163 See Barkey, H. (1990) pas im. 
164 Giinhik-Sensen, G. (1995) p. 84. 
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interests had become of central importance. 165 This had two effects. 
The first was that it produced a much closer relationship between the 
military and capitalist elites. The particularly internationalist nature of 
the defence industry, coupled with the huge wealth accumulated by 
the AMAA and three other similarly constructed foundations 
(organised by the Navy, the Air Force and the Combined Land 
Forces), 166 have led the military increasingly to regard the private 
sector, and their representatives in government, "as a major referent 
with whom they have common interests". 167 The second was that it 
helped Turkey to become "the biggest single importer of American 
military hardware and thus the world's largest arms purchaser... all of 
which was eventually used on the Kurds". 168 
Table Fourteen: Civilian, PKK and Security Forces Casualties 1984- 
1995.169 
Civilians PKK Security Totals 
Forces 
1984-1991 1 278 1 444 846 3 568 
1992-1995 3 736 10102 2 775 16 613 
Total 5 014 11 546 3 621 20181 
Such a huge military expenditure programme has underpinned the 
perpetuation of the army's jurisprudence in south-east Anatolia 
through which authoritarian elements within the officer corps have 
retained an active political role unavailable to them in 1960 and 
1971.170 The declaration of a state of emergency in eight provinces in 
1987 - two more were added in 1990 - facilitated what Mann terms 
165 See Karaosmanoglu, A. (1993) p. 33. 
166 See Karasapan, 0. (1987) pp 29-30. 
167 Karaosmanoglu, A. (1993) p. 33. 
168 Jonathan Randal quoted in Chomsky, N. (2000) p. 42. 
169 Source: Kiri,; ci, K& Winrow, G. M. (1997) p. 126. 
170 Hakan Yavuz writes that "the blunt and incompetent counter-insurgency tactics 
of the Kenialist generals have... drained the economy of over $8bn a year" (1998, p. 
21). 
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`the politics of continuous revolution'. 171 In order to maintain the 
ideological momentum of the 1980 coup and avoid an antithetical 
`institutional compromise', the military revived the social engineering 
and radical reformism of Kemal's celebrated Kurdish campaigns 
during the Twenties and Thirties. To this end, an extreme programme 
of Turkification was embarked upon. 172 The region's print media 
were heavily circumscribed with only one Kurdish weekly, Walate Me, 
appearing on a regular basis, 173 the broadcast media were not 
permitted to schedule Kurdish language programmes and even the 
lyrics of popular or traditional Kurdish songs were seen as potential 
vehicles of information for the PKK and banned under the Article 8 
of the 1991 Anti-Terror Law. 174 Within the region's education system, 
which remains largely staffed by ethnically Turkish personnel, 
"teachers frequently only attend[ed] to Turkish speakers and 
apparently ignore[d] Kurdish speakers as unworthy of attention". 175 
Through the regional governor's right to "order the temporary or 
permanent evacuation of villages... [and] the resettlement or 
unification of inhabitants in such places" in excess of 2000 towns had 
been emptied and destroyed rendering more than 750,000 people 
homeless by 1994.176 Also by August 1994 around 60,000 men had 
been recruited into a state-sponsored, anti-PKK militia, the `village 
guards', which provoked an intense internecine conflict and greatly 
increased the militarisation of the region. 177 The results of this 
171 See Mann, M. (1997) pp 142-144. 
172 This has been compounded by recent trends in military recruitment. Despite the 
south-east making up 6.3 per cent of the population, it supplied only 1.8 per cent of 
army cadet intakes between 1982 and 1984. Amongst general staff officers (1984- 
1985), though, the figure was 10.6 per cent. See Brown, J. (1989) pp 395-397. 
173 Its future is unclear since its editor was sentenced to two years in prison for 
"instigating hostility in the population" (Kurdish Human Rights Project & Medico 
International, 1997, p. 26). 
174 This reads "No-one may engage in written and oral propaganda aimed at 
disrupting the indivisible integrity of the state... " (ibid. p. 10). 
175 Kurdish Human Rights Project (1996) p. 9. My parentheses. In response the 
PKK had, by 1995, murdered more than 150 teachers, forced the closure of 5,210 
schools and burnt down a further 192 (Mi14yet January 1995) 
176 See McDowall, D. (1992) p. 426. My parenthesis. 
177 Some traditional leaders prospered greatly from this arrangement. Sadun Seylan, 
the chief of the Alan tribe in Van, for example, fielded a force of 500 guards for 
which he received US$115 000 monthly - in 1989 the PKK murdered his son and 
two of his cousins. See Jacoby, T. (1998) pp 38-39. 
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instability were the displacement of more than three million people 
(mostly to the highly politicised gecekondu of Turkey's major cities) 
and, as Table Fourteen shows, the loss of over 20,000 lives. 178 
In Ankara, the MP, in keeping with the contradictory make-up of 
their membership, pursued a dual policy of promoting a pro-western 
cultural and economic discourse and attempting to incorporate 
Islamist sentiments into the state administration. '79 The latter was 
broadly supported by the military as "a means of de-politicising 
society with the aim of combating communist tendencies and 
undermining the growth of national awareness". 180 Özal, a high- 
ranking member of the Naqshbandi Sufi order who once stood for 
election in Izmir on an NSP ticket, began to attend Friday prayer with 
his ministers, undertook the Haj, placed other tariga members in 
charge of the Education and Information Ministries and, in 1990, 
announced a 237 per cent increase in the budget of the Religious 
Affairs Ministry. 181 This was also accompanied, however, by the arrest 
of 3,000 people for `anti-secular' activities in 1987, the dismissal of 
813 officers and cadets for "having ties with fundamentalist 
organisations" in 1990 and the institutionalised state invigilation of all 
Friday sermons. 182 As such, the "control of Islam became the main 
vehicle through which the state reshaped modernity in line with the 
ideology of marketisation while also resolving the problem of 
legitimacy". 183 This combination of religiosity and export-orientated 
economics attracted a significant proportion of the Anatolian petite- 
bourgeoisie some of whom formed a number of pro-Islamic co- 
178 See Kurdish Human Rights Project & Medico International (1996) passim. 
179 The so-called Turk-Islam' synthesis. See Szyliowicz, J. (2000) p. 376 and 
Genckaya, 0. (1997) p. 81. 
180 Laizer, S. (1996) p. 101 Although Evren thought that Özal underestimated the 
possibility that the Islamic movement might get out of hand. See Heper, M. & 
Güney, A. (1996) p. 624. 
181 See Ayata, S. (1996) pp 44-45. 
182 See Brown, J. (1988) p. 241 and Ayata, S. (1993) p. 64. 
183 Cizre-Sakalhoglu, Ü. (1996) p. 245. See also Birtek, F. & Toprak, B. (1993) p. 
196. It was also deployed with some effect in the south-east where the military 
adopted a policy of encouraging young people "to join government directed 
Hizbullah anti-PKK squads" (Laizer, S., 1996, p103). 
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operative firms with considerable success. 184 The result of this was 
that, under state tutelage, certain sections of the Islamist movement 
were able to move from the political periphery to the centre. 185 
The MP was not, however, an entirely ideologically satisfactory home 
for such interests. As part of a concerted effort by the government to 
de-bureaucratise its policy implementation structures, large numbers 
of unelected technocrats were brought in who often operated with 
the Prime Minister outside Cabinet influence. 186 Discomfiture over 
their Thatcherite and anti-populist vision of an economy without 
redistribution, coupled with the almost unmitigated assumption of 
cultural globalism, pushed the Islamists towards the xenophobes of 
the former NAP. 187 This was compounded by the very high debt 
dependency on the United States, particularly in military assistance, 
and the widespread perception that Özal would "do virtually anything 
in exchange for Western aid". 188 Furthermore the spectre of further 
military intervention, continually at Özal's side, helped to ostracise the 
religious wing of his party. 189 With the arrival of Mesut Yilmaz, a 
"convinced secularist", 190 at the helm of the MP following Üzal's 
election to the presidency and his government's decision to support 
the United States' military action in Iraq in 1990, the position of the 
Islamists became untenable. Many left to join Erbakan's reformed 
184 The biggest of which, MUSIAD (founded in 1990) had, by 1998, over 3000 
corporate members representing an annual revenue of $2.79 billion. See Narh, N. 
(1999) pp 3-4 and Öni;, Z. (1997) pp 757-761. 
185 See Göle, N. (1994) and (1997) passim. 
186 See Heper, M. (1990b) p. 610. Like the MP's attempt to control, and benefit 
from, civil religiosity, these changes in the state bureaucracy can be seen as a means 
of increasing governmental tutelage. See Kalaycioglu, E. (1994) pp 90-91 on Özal's 
so-called 'decentralisation' initiatives. 
187 For a related, but somewhat different, view see Kadioglu, A. (1996) pp 189-191 
and Tünay, M. (1993) pp 22-23. 
188 Ahmad, F. (1988) p. 767. Total grants and loans to Turkey amounted to 
approximately $750 million in 1986 - having peaked at about $900 million in 1984 - 
compared to around $175 million in 1977. Of this, the military component was 
between $700 and $600 million. See Aricanli, T. (1990) p. 245. 
189 Disagreements between the military and civilian elements of the government 
were particularly commonplace on issues related to religious expression. Whenever 
these made it to public attention, they were generally reported within the framework 
of a possible military intervention. See, for instance, Ahmed Evin's discussion of a 
1987 crisis provoked by a report on growing Islamic `fundamentalism' (1994, p. 31). 
190 See Cornell, S. (1999) p. 213. 
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NSP, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi - WP), which went on to 
become the largest parliamentary party in the elections of December 
1995.191 Following extended negotiations to return to an MP 
coalition, allegedly ended by the military, Refab was eventually 
excluded from government by an alliance between the two centre- 
right parties (the MP and the TPP). 192 The TPP, now under Tansu 
Ciller's leadership following Demirel's move to the presidency in 
1993, contained a number of eminent security officials including a 
former Chief-of-Staff and the retired head of emergency rule in the 
south-east. 193 For this reason, and to prevent a return to an Islamist 
influence within the MP, the TPP was permitted to form a coalition 
with Refah following their split with the MP amid a corruption scandal 
three months later. 194 
Erbakan immediately began to provide the military with a basis from 
which to undermine the coalition. In October 1996 he appeared on 
television in Muammar Qadaffi's tent as the Libyan leader accused 
Turkey of being virtually "under occupation" of NATO and the 
United States. 195 He also negotiated a $2 billion agreement with Iran 
against the wishes of the Pentagon and, in an echo of the events 
preceding the 1980 coup, invited their ambassador to a rally near 
Ankara at which the military were accused of "oppressing the 
people". 196 The military's response was, as Jeremy Salt notes in a 
publication for which he was to be dismissed from his post at Bilkent 
University in Ankara, on the one hand to launch a media campaign 
associating Islamism with terrorism and, on the other, to ignore the 
191 An important part of Rtfah's electoral base was the south-east. Huri Türsan 
writes that they were able to "gain the confidence of Kurdish voters who could not 
vote for the Kurdish Democracy Party" which was forced to withdraw after a state- 
led campaign of violence (1996, pp 224-225). 
192 Cornell, S. (1999) pp 211-212. 
193 See Pope, N. & Pope H. (1997) p. 313. 
194 Svante Cornell argues that the military additionally hoped that these allegations 
of corruption, also levelled at Erbakan, would end Refab's "untarnished" image 
(1999, p. 214). 
195 See Nathan, J. (1997) p. 24. 
196 See Couturier, K. (1996) p. A31 and Kalaycioglu, E. (1997) p. 8. 
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government wherever possible. "Over Erbakan's head", 197 the high 
command consolidated its relationship with Israel through a series of 
politically unauthorised visits and launched an anti-PKK incursion 
into northern Iraq of an unprecedented scale without informing the 
prime minister. 198 Having announced in February 1997 that Islamism 
had become a greater threat to the republic than the PKK, 199 the 
military appealed to the Constitutional Court to censure Refah on the 
grounds that the party had infringed the secular basis of Turkish state. 
This led to Erbakan's resignation in June, the closure of Refah the 
following January, the exclusion of the party leadership from 
organised politics for five years, innumerable arrests and the dismissal 
of over two hundred officials. As a result, "the military was able to 
enhance its autonomy to the point where it was able to form an 
investigative body, the Western Study Group, that is not legally 
accountable... [and whose aim] is to collect evidence on 
fundamentalists and other `public enemies" . 2Ö° 
Since the return of the military in 1960, and especially from 1980 
onwards, Turkey has taken on the characteristics of what T. L. Karl 
identifies (in his study of El Salvador) as a system of `imposed 
electoralism'. 201 This combines representative institutions and 
mechanisms with high levels of domestic repression, often selectively 
deployed against certain out-groups, and limits on legislative power. 
Given the corporatist nature of Turkish politics, such a brand of 
`democracy' has proven well suited to both the military and the 
capitalist elite. In this sense, the post-1980 era marks a departure from 
earlier periods. Rather than being restrained by the perpetual threat of 
military intervention, political liberalisation became appropriated by 
197 Salt, J. (1999) p. 75. 
198 See Jenkins, G. (1997) p. 5. 
199 The Commander of Naval Forces speaking in Miliyet February 25th 1997. 
200 Crandar, C. (1999) pp 131-132. My parenthesis. This was to complement the high 
command's virtually unfettered control over MIT whose extra-judicial violence 
(occasionally in collusion with Mossad) and criminality (which the notorious 
Susurluk incident reveals) had reached new heights. See The Economist January 3111 
1998 and The Independent January 24th 1998. 
201 Karl, T. (1986) p. 35. 
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the military. The imperatives of territorial and ideological integrity, 
apparently so threatened by the associated forces of Islamism and 
Kurdish/leftist insurgency, legitimated the high command's control 
over processes of social change. As Mark Muller points out, "since 
national security is equated with national unity, and national unity 
with Kemalist ideology, all political opposition to this ideology, in 
practice, falls within the ambit of this jurisdiction... [making the 
military] the arbiters of what constitutes legitimate political 
consent". 202 The dual nature of this ideology combined with the 
effects of industrial development has, in a reflection of the bifurcated 
structure Mann identifies as inherent to capitalist expansion, led to a 
twofold application of state repression. The south-eastern provinces 
have provided both an outlet for the authoritarian reformist wing of 
the military and, with the associated `evils' of Islamism and leftism, a 
means of legitimisation for the high command who, in true janissary 
tradition, have successfully prevented such peripheral forces from 
entering the core. 
Conclusion 
During this period the military has been able to secure an increasing 
amount of political power in Turkey. What emerged was an unstable 
amalgamation of three forms of regime strategy. Following the 1960 
intervention, the military elite established a blend of domestic 
repression and social representation broadly comparable to Mann's 
ideal-type of semi-authoritarian incorporation. Initially conceived as a 
return to power of the traditional state elite, the takeover was born of 
sentiments broadly unsympathetic to the rising levels of political 
expression afforded to the emerging capitalist class. In an echo of 
Bismarck's strategy of `negative integration', the 1961 constitution 
aimed to permit the existence of extensive networks of decentralised 
social organisation without allowing them access to the political 
centre. As in imperial Germany, geopolitical issues (Cyprus and 
202 Muller, M. (1996) pp 177-178. My parenthesis. 
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NATO) were deployed to distract attention from the domestic class 
struggle, social palliatives were introduced to incorporate bourgeois 
liberalism and socialists were vigorously repressed. Similarly, a key 
feature of this strategy was the existence of a powerful and highly 
autonomous military cadre within the state elite. 
As Mann points out, however, the durability of such autonomy within 
the military's domestic repression function tends to be limited. Post- 
World War Two industrialisation had produced greater social 
mobility, outlined in the previous chapter, and reduced the status of 
traditional roles, such as the armed forces, in favour of politically 
ascendant professional and mercantile associations. The RPP's 
movement leftwards and the JP's victory in the 1965 election 
provided an opportunity for the military elite to recruit a sympathetic 
referent group within these groups. Beneath the generals' gradual 
movement towards bourgeois capitalist affiliation with Demirel, 
however, the armed forces remained divided. Some senior officers 
found authoritarian expression in Maoist organisations and others in 
the modernist nationalism of the NAP. This and the more fundamental 
disjunction between constitutional and anti-democratic versions of 
Kemalism can be seen in the generals' reluctance to take a more 
prolonged interest in government following the 1970 intervention. 
Instead, they preferred to support covertly the activities of the NAP 
as a means of repressing decentralised left-wing groups. Nonetheless, 
once it became clear that these fractures threatened the traditional 
home of old regime power - their international economic linkages - 
military intervention was inevitable. 
Here, however, the perennial problem of how to keep the radical 
officers out of power appeared. Mahmud Sevket had found a partial 
solution in the First World War, Kemal in the War of Independence 
and Gürsel and Sunay in pre-emptive purges. Now, though, domestic 
and geopolitical conditions precluded both internal expulsions and 
external adventures. Group unity, first inside the armed forces then 
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within society as a whole, was to be established through the 
identification of an endogenous foe. For this reason, a bifurcated 
blend of social representation and domestic repression was 
institutionalised in Turkey during the 1980s. Outside the south-east, 
the policing of civil society did not, for the most part, escalate beyond 
the deployment of civilian forces. Within areas affected by Kurdish 
insurgency, however, regular troops were the backbone of the state's 
attempts to protect order and property. Coercive reforms such as the 
village clearance programme, the organisation of the village guard 
system and the close supervision of all expressions of non-Turkish 
identity were instigated with neither civilian input nor monitoring. In 
this way, the institutionalisation of a small oligarchy of military 
commanders in the south-east following the 1980 coup, unhindered 
by political restraints, provided a role for the authoritarian wing of the 
officer corps which had been lacking in the interventions of 1960 and 
1971. In other words, in establishing an `enemy of the people' who 
were prepared to engage the state violently, Kurdish activism offered 
modernist nationalists within Turkey an opponent for their dogma of 
civil war who were politically, ethnically and culturally identifiable. 
Consequently elements of capitalist-liberal and autocratic militarism were 
blended with the remiauthoritarian incorporation of the 1960s. While the 
1982 constitution institutionalised workers' rights, collective 
organisation remained extremely difficult to effect. Throughout 
Turkey the continuing influence of the military elite within civil 
politics, coupled with the very broad interpretation of what 
constituted a matter relating to national security, meant that the 
nominally independent judiciary could be deployed by the state to 
promote the interests of property and capital. In a manner 
comparable to the ways in which the United States controlled labour 
opposition to large-scale economic changes between the American 
Civil War and the First World War, these injunctions were particularly 
targeted at socialists and attempts to organise large-scale unions. In 
response, labour could do little. Since democratic party politics in 
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both the Turkish and the American assemblies were dominated by 
cross-class, local-regional and ethnic-religious coalitions, 
representatives of the proletariat were few. Although the presence of 
an semi-autonomous and permanent military cadre within the 
government ensured that the capitalist class did not entirely control 
domestic repression levels in the same way that Mann identifies as a 
feature of American social organisation, the gradual 
'bourgeoisification' of the general staff led to a considerable overlap 
in the two groups' interests. The military's investments and corporate 
position, both within the defence industry and in the private sector, 
and the DISF-led increases in state extraction generally furnished the 
high command with similar anti-labour incentives as the capitalist 
elite. 
This relationship between domestic repression and social 
representation in the south eastern provinces was more indicative of 
Mann's ideal-type, autocratic militarism. As in Tsarist Russia, state, and 
state-affiliated, elites ran the economy. These "responded to unions, 
strikes, and socialist parties as they did to all such manifestations of 
collective organisation. All were banned as a threat to public 
order' . 203 Unlike the Russian imperial state, however, military 
governors in the ten provinces covered by emergency legislation 
adopted strategies which incorporated certain elements within the 
social hierarchy they governed. These were pursued both through 
military recruitment incentives to combat the PKK and through 
economic development packages administered through GAP. By 
developing the village guard system the Turkish state was able to 
utilise traditional civil power structures to fracturing Kurdish 
allegiances and prevent the emergence of extensively-held notions of 
class consciousness. 204 It also sufficiently polarised Kurdish opinion 
to obviate the possibility of moderate civil response strategies. Amid 
high levels of internecine violence, the state's policy in the south-east 
203 Mann, M. (1993) pp 661-662. 
204 See Mann's IOTA model discussed in the previous chapter. 
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can be seen as an extension of Kemal's methods of institutionalising 
state links with a coterie of traditional leaders aimed at maintaining 
peripheral segmentalisation. This has served to hinder the spread of 
decentralised capitalist exchange thereby impeding the emergence of 




To conclude, this chapter will look at three inter-related areas. Firstly, 
Mann's framework of social power will be reconsidered. His system 
of four organisational networks will be traced over the 
Ottoman/Turkish pattern of change with particular reference to the 
different institutional attributes of each. The ways in which he 
accounts for the emergence of state centralisation will also be 
considered in relation to his five-phase account of nationalism. 
Secondly, key aspects of Mann's historiography will be compared to 
the account of Turkish social development presented in the preceding 
four chapters. This will aim to highlight deficiencies and strengths 
within Mann's narrative and to present the Turkish trajectory as a 
complement or counterpoint to his analysis of large-scale historical 
change in Europe. Finally, the concluding section of this chapter will 
comment on methodological issues pertinent to both this thesis and 
Mann's account of the past. It will also position this work within the 
tradition of historical sociology and re-examine the scholarly debate 
which surrounds the discipline as a whole. 
Power Structures 
This thesis has followed Mann's account of social power and 
combined both the `predatory' view of governance, as in Levi's 
analysis, and the collaborative system which Skocpol and others have 
emphasised. For instance, only at its most intensive and logistically 
narrow, can military power be organised without institutional 
reference to the ruled. In order to ensure compliance over a more 
extensive population, collaboration with local elites - apparent from 
Sargon's temple legislatures to the Turkish state's village guard system 
- has been imperative. Economically, too, maintaining control over 
the means of production has consistently necessitated devolving a 
degree of organisational power to institutionalise specialised functions 
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essential in the perpetuation of an elite's supervisory position. 
Similarly, ideological power can either be used collectively to reinforce 
extensive social identities by institutionalising a belief structure which 
transcends existing organisational forms or immanently to intensify 
the distributive power of an established elite. The state, as the primary 
organisational form of political power, also represents, on the one 
hand, a collective means of attaining extensively-held social goals and, 
on the other, a potential vehicle for elite domination. In this sense, 
states tend to act in a combination of two ways. Firstly, they attempt 
to extend their infra-structural power by institutionalising essentially 
collaborative linkages with civil groups. Secondly, they wield 
distributive forms of despotic power without reference to non-state 
actors. Since the emergence of statehood in Akkadian Mesopotamia, 
these two dimensions have combined in different ways to produce 
imperial, feudal, democratic and authoritarian forms of governance. 
Figure Six: Large Scale Change in the Development of the 
Ottoman/Turkish State (emboldened text represents the predominant 
power source of the period). 
Power source Politics Ideological Economic Military 
Social change 
Ottoman Decreasing Proto-Nationalism Rising Market Increasingly 
Change Elite Unity Forces Decentralised 
The End of Bureaucratic Secular Nationalism Corporatist Defensive 
Empire Ascendancy vs Theocracy Capitalism Modernisation 
Multi-Party Bureaucratic Industrial-Capitalist Elite Decline 
Politics Decline Nationalism Integration 
The Rise of Bifurcated dom- Modernist Nationalism Bourgeois Military-Industrial 
the Military estic repression Capitalism complex 
The primary motor of such historical dynamics is the ways in which 
the four sources of power have inter-related. Throughout the past, 
certain organisational networks, or combinations of networks, have 
been more influential in this struggle for power than others. Mann is 
correct in identifying political power as the fundamental 
organisational source in the establishment and maintenance of 
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imperial governance. The tension between centralising and 
decentralising forces was the predominant power structure during the 
period of imperial state development which culminated in the infra- 
structural extensiveness of the western Roman empire. As Figure One 
shows, the Ottoman empire was no exception. It, too, was largely 
defined by a fundamentally political divide between the askeri and the 
reaya which prevented civil groups from organising sufficient power 
resources to challenge its economic, military and ideological 
hegemony. As in Rome, the political position of the Ottoman 
imperial state was eventually challenged by highly extensive 
ideological networks of power leading to a decline in elite unity. In 
Mann's study of western Europe, these provided, in the form of the 
Christian Church, sufficient normative pacification to re-cohere 
feudal elites and to form the basis for an intensification of the 
declining empire's trading networks. In the eastern Mediterranean 
region, a combination of imperial contraction and colonial 
encroachment strengthened peripheral elites and ended the rigidity of 
the askeri/reaya axis. As a result, contention along ideological lines, 
particularly between the forces of proto-nationalism and theocratic 
traditionalism, began to predominate over other power networks. 
In both regions, such decentralised ideological networks were 
gradually absorbed by non-religious modes of social explication as 
emergent capitalism began to gain significant levels of extensiveness 
during the late medieval period. Mann argues that, in Europe, this 
economic preponderance had, by the late eighteenth century, been 
instrumental in empowering and infra-structurally organising the 
modern nation-state. Much later, in Turkey during the inter-war years 
of the twentieth century, an integrated elite of industrialists and large- 
estate farmers institutionalised close ties with the state bureaucracy, 
around which there coalesced an extensive, albeit regionally varied, 
penumbra of capitalist groups. From this basis, a reordering emerged 
from the Second World War which marked the beginning of a period 
of economic power contention as bourgeois interests challenged the 
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ideologically-legitimised administration. In Europe, Mann outlines a 
period of comparable middle-class ascendancy which he identifies as 
the locus for resistance to the rising power of military organisational 
networks during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. While the 
Turkish bourgeoisie did not become the basis of popular sovereignty 
with anything like the extensiveness of the European middle-classes, 
they did attempt to reduce the political power of the military high 
command. Eventually, though, capitalist and military elite interests 
conflated. This marked the beginning of a period of power 
contention between the state, as representatives of `the people', and 
various `internal enemies' which kept Turkish militarism away from 
the European focus on geopolitics and concentrated on 
organisational networks primarily aimed at domestic repression. 
e Politics of Empire 
As outlined in Chapters One and Two, the autonomy and power of a 
state, as the primary organisational form of political power in society, 
derives from the centralised regulation of social relations. As empires 
coalesced and expanded, he argues, alternative bases for social order - 
such as force, custom and exchange - could not govern social 
interaction as efficiently as an organised and centralised 
administration. Although the pattern of imperial development within 
these power networks makes up much of the first volume of The 
Sources of Social Power, Mann makes no mention of the Ottoman state. 
Neither is there a discussion of the ways in which the Eastern Roman 
Empire differed in its organisation of political power from the 
essentially unilinear account of western European development which 
Mann presents. As a result, Mann's narrative loses some of its 
comparative breadth and explanatory power. 
This is particularly apparent in Mann's treatment of imperial levels of 
infra-structural power. He is mistaken to claim that the Western 
Roman Empire possessed "about as high a level of intensity of 
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territorial control as could be attained within the logistical constraints 
imposed on all agrarian societies". ' In contrast to Rome's reliance on 
a universal ruling class, the Ottoman system of governance, as 
outlined in Chapter Three, eliminated the need for an intermediary, 
and potentially decentralising, social stratum. In contrast to Mann's 
analysis of Rome, where a "three-way power stand-off" between the 
state, an economically decentralised ruling class and the people 
prevailed, the Ottoman state maintained sufficient levels of infra- 
structural reach to prevent local elites from organising extensive, and 
thus potentially challenging, networks of power. Moreover, through 
the strict enforcement of a meritocratic system of appointments and 
promotion, the use of summary dismissals/transferrals, the seizure of 
private property and prohibitions on the inheritance of position or 
wealth, the capacity of state agents to decentralise power was also 
heavily circumscribed. Furthermore, within the non-clerical branches 
of the askeri, the widespread use of prisoners-of-war and indentured 
provincial recruits, many of whom were also prohibited from 
marrying until retirement, meant that they were, by and large, kept 
separate from social networks in civil society and from the masses in 
general. The result was that, unlike in Rome, the Ottoman state was 
not obliged to delegate authoritative power in order to rule. So 
instead of the multiple and cross-cutting social cleavages that 
developed in Western Europe, the Ottoman Empire, continued to be 
defined by a primary axis dividing the state from all social strata. 
This is not to say, however, that the Ottoman empire was not subject 
to constraints similar to those Mann identifies as a feature of other 
pre-modern systems. The fundamental problem for expanding states 
is that, as the number of their citizens increases, both the variety of 
actions which they can be compelled to undertake and the degree to 
which they can be coerced decreases. In other words, as power 
extensiveness grows, its comprehensiveness and intensity diminishes. 
In accordance with the arguments presented in Chapter One, this is 
I Mann, M. (1986) p. 250. 
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for three main reasons. Supervision becomes more difficult, 
decentralised challenges increase and the character of power-subjects 
diversify. In this sense, empires such as Rome and the Ottomans 
became victims of their own successful enlargement. According to 
Mann, Rome attempted to offset these perennial problems by 
empowering a gigantic common market which integrated a senatorial 
elite through which it ruled. The Ottomans, in contrast, governed 
through the greater infra-structural reach of an extensive and cohesive 
system of state agents. Both states were, however, unable to deal 
effectively with territorial stagnation which tended to undermine their 
capacity to organise political change. In this sense, Mann's elucidation 
of Roman political change offers a useful counterpoint to the greater 
infra-structural reach and political centrality of the Ottoman empire. 
Comparing the two systems helps to explain why western Europe 
eventually became dominated by a decentralised class of feudatories 
while the Turkish republic continued to be defined by a rigid 
state/subject divide. 
Similarly, Mann's account of the very early signs of what he calls 
`national crystallisation' also provides a fruitful means of examining 
late Ottoman political change. Of the five nationalist phases he 
identifies, the first two - religious and commercial-statist - are termed 
`proto' or pre-modern stages. The former initially emerged as a form 
of collective identity based on the Western Church's relationship with 
the European monarchies in the wake of the Roman collapse. Mann 
argues that the Roman senatorial classes were able to use the 
pacifying effects of the spread of Christianity to solidify their position 
in the post-imperial ecumenical order which emerged in western 
Europe. These decentralised and legally protected economic linkages 
eventually merged with the authoritative structures of the Papacy to 
organise power networks that were of sufficient extensiveness to 
form a basis for nascent notions of a `national' collective identity. The 
Ottoman polity, in contrast, was structured around a complex array of 
peripheral cleavages aimed at maintaining a segmentalised class 
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structure fundamentally divided by both religious affiliation and a 
centrally-controlled system of status allocation. This largely restricted 
collective perceptions of group identity to non-Muslim minority 
groups (millets) and inhibited the development of extensive `religious' 
proto-nationalist sentiments. 
Indeed, the empowerment of the Ottoman ulema meant that the 
limited forms of religious proto-nationalism that did emerge within 
the Muslim majority were much more multi-ethnic and universalist in 
character than in Europe. The clerics' role in connecting the masses 
to the global ummab through the traditional office of the Caliph, 
which guaranteed the looseness of the bond between the state and 
periphery, ensured that less centralised ideological networks remained 
localised and intensive. This emphasis on flexibility and diversity 
maintained a vertical loyalty to the centre quite unlike Mann's account 
of the horizontal homogeneity of Roman cultural expansion. The 
Ottoman state made few efforts to promote the diffusion of cultural 
ties to, and within, the periphery. Instead, a rarefied state vernacular, 
unintelligible to all but the higher echelons of officialdom, was 
maintained which excluded peripheral elites from the politics of the 
centre and prevented the organisation of decentralised power 
networks comparable to those within Rdine's ruling class culture. 
Reinforced by the verticality of state agency, this ensured that no 
extensive, and therefore potentially decentralising, perceptions of 
group identity took hold within the masses. As a result, the 
emergence of proto-nationalism in the Ottoman empire could not 
follow the same pattern as in Europe. 
Another reason for this was that, although the Christian Church 
shared the extensiveness of the ulema, it was more vulnerable to 
politicisation and thus less cohesive. As a result, the emergence of 
scientific rationalism tended to limit the clerics' exegetic legitimacy. 
The eventual effect was to exclude the Church from the political 
power networks of the centre which were, instead, utilised by secular 
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authorities to increase their infra-structural capacity to reach, and 
therefore tax, their citizens. Ultimately, this gave rise to a system of 
feudatories and monarchs which began to curtail the extensiveness of 
the relationship with the masses thereby institutionalising the 
beginnings of, what Mann terms, `commercial-statist' proto- 
nationalism. Within the Ottoman empire, however, the state had few 
organisational linkages with the masses outside the theocracy. The 
ulema's highly immanent role in transmitting messages from the centre 
to the periphery, combined with their well-entrenched tradition of 
political autonomy, meant that they were less susceptible to proto- 
nationalist absorption. The Ottoman state, with its rarefied position 
and intra-elite language, could neither dominate the ulema nor use it to 
increase its centralised control of civil society and thus it could not 
follow the European model of displacing peripheral identities in 
favour of more extensive notions of group consciousness. In all, 
rather than non-religious forces gradually absorbing ecumenical 
networks of power along the lines of the European monarchies, 
Ottoman commercial-statism emerged in parallel to the political infra- 
structure of the theocracy. 
This division was accentuated by the growing extensiveness of 
European channels of ideological power. The segmentalised nature of 
the Ottoman periphery left it particularly vulnerable to such cultural 
expansion. Within the diffuse economic networks of non-Muslim 
millets, modernist European thought immanently reinforced the 
position of ascendant mercantile elites providing, what Mann terms, 
normative pacification (or, in other words, a common set of 
authoritatively determined values offering a more cohesive basis for 
interaction than systems merely founded on exchange or coercion). 
Since the millet elites had enjoyed many centuries of institutionalised 
and often enforced ideological autonomy, Western notions of 
collective identity also proved to be a powerful basis for transcending 
the segmentalising effects of state policy. As a result, post- 
Enlightenment rational instrumentalism began to increase both the 
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intensiveness and extensiveness of proto-nationalist networks within 
the millets by challenging the ideologically-defined Ottoman super- 
structure. In this way, religious perceptions of group consciousness 
were eroded in favour of non-religious, or what Mann calls 
commercial statist, proto-nationalism. 
The Ideology of Modernism 
Indeed, according to Mann, a similar process had occurred in 
medieval Europe as the ideological structures that underpinned the 
organisational extensiveness of feudalism began to share power with 
the economic networks of emergent capitalism. Many commentators 
have, however, challenged Mann's account of the ecumene. They argue 
that it was the military power of the western European monarchs, 
rather than the normative pacification of the Papacy, which provided 
the authoritative basis for increasing trade. Here Mann's narrative is 
impaired by a lack of comparative breadth. By favouring a linear 
account of Western development, his claim that ideological networks, 
as a connection between the state with the masses, acquired causal 
powers that were intrinsically different from existent military and 
economic linkages, is considerably weakened. Significant support 
could have been found in an exploration of Ottoman methods of 
ideological organisation. There, Islam offered the state a highly 
immanent means of normative pacification largely independent of 
other power sources. Not only did the authoritative power of the 
ulema legitimise tributary systems of extraction, it also enforced the 
rule of the state through the rhariah and the &r, ( By immanently 
incorporating the theocracy's juridical infra-structure, the state was 
able to segmentalise economic networks within civil society, prevent 
ideological transcendentalism inside its armed forces, recruit jihadis 
and maintain its agents as the empire's only significant surplus- 
collecting social group. In contrast to the mercantile dominated 
commercial-statism of ecumenical Europe, Istanbul presided over an 
ideological regime that was fundamentally anti-entrepreneurial. The 
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ulema's highly centralised role controlling the education system and 
the judiciary, strengthened by its localised and autonomous 
recruitment and training system, acted as a hinge between the imperial 
centre and the Muslim periphery. Their network of judges and 
pedagogues permitted the state to maintain control over provincial 
cultural traditions and artisan exchange thus ensuring that potentially 
decentralising networks remained intensively organised. 
The centrality of the clerics' role in the Ottoman polity explains why 
non-religious modes of social explication imported from the West 
through the millets did not develop the extensiveness of the European 
commercial-statism. The ulema's greater capacity to resist the 
secularising influences of `modernism' largely restricted the spread of 
proto-nationalism to non-Muslim peripheral elites. The threat of 
federalism and the territorial losses of the early part of the nineteenth 
century, however, reinforced the need to develop close infra- 
structural ties between the state and the imperial periphery. As a 
result, Istanbul greatly expanded its bureaucracy by incorporating 
ever-greater number of provincial recruits. Many of these represented 
prosperous cyan families alarmed at the comparative advantage and 
proto-nationalist irredentism of the millets. Thus, the new bureaucratic 
schools emerged as a locus for Muslim commercial-statism. 
Nonetheless, the ulema continued to retain their autonomous power 
base and `modernist' thought remained restricted to a state elite 
largely excluded from the `people' that they claimed to represent. As a 
result, influences from Europe were generally institutionalised in 
parallel to clerical traditionalism, the resilience of which meant that 
bureaucratic reforms, which led to a significant growth in non-clerical 
state administrators, were based on European models of the rational 
state imposed by Istanbul and unsupported by organic changes in civil 
society. Without the support of a diffused capitalist class, however, 
these social networks lacked extensive links to the mass of civil 
society. As a result, no broadly-held notions of citizenship 
comparable to those of Europe could be institutionalised. 
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Another corollary of the lack of proto-nationalist extensiveness in the 
Ottoman empire was that the Porte remained highly autonomous 
Unlike in Europe, there emerged little resistance from the nascent 
Muslim middle-classes to the rise in state militarism during the 
nineteenth century. In much of the West, on the other hand, increases 
in state extraction to fund militarised geopolitical competition was, 
Mann suggests, regarded by much of the bourgeoisie as a process of 
retrogression thereby reinforcing nationalist sentiments. He argues 
that male, middle-class citizens from the dominant religious and 
ethnic groups, prompted by fears of populist radicalism in the wake 
of the French Revolution, began to define themselves as a nation to 
which the state should be coterminous. As a result, the trans-national 
trade-based elements of `commercial statism' were gradually 
diminished and its `proto-national' discursive media became imbued 
with, what Mann calls `militarist' nationalism. In contrast to the 
decentralised growth of notions of exclusive political citizenship 
based on civil perceptions of `the people' in western Europe, majority 
nationalism in the late Ottoman empire continued to be closely 
affiliated to the centrality of the state and its attempts to induce 
ideological change. Since both the late Ottoman empire and the early 
republic lacked comparable levels of capitalist diffusion, and thus the 
infra-structural means to connect the rural masses with the urban 
centre, entrepreneurial groups did not follow the Western model and 
seek greater power decentralisation and a more restricted economic 
role for the state. Instead, the centrism of western Anatolian 
mercantilism fused with the Istanbul intelligentsia to create an elite 
ideology that was largely unconnected to civil societal notions of 
popular sovereignty. 
The failure to extend commercial-statism beyond an alliance of 
western Anatolian provincial elites and a state-affiliated coterie of 
literati led to a radicalisation of its nationalistic elements and a 
strengthening of state powers. It also meant that, rather than being 
centred on geopolitical expansion, chauvinist conceptions of Turkish 
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nationhood were primarily aimed at increasing intra-state 
homogeneity. While European versions of militarist nationalism did 
contain notions of an internal threat, the more restricted progress of 
religious and commercial-statist proto-nationalism in the late 
Ottoman empire produced notions of militarist nationalism that were 
intensive rather than extensive. Thus, the modernising ideology and 
political growth of the inter-war republic was resisted in localised 
`pockets' which tended to polarise state/civil and centre/periphery 
divides in a way which the more outward-looking militarism of 
nineteenth century Europe did not. In this sense, the greater 
territorial uniformity of the Western nation-states not only produced 
a more populist form of militarist nationalism, it also weakened the 
political efficacy of the peoples' internal enemy. 
In the early years of the Turkish republic, on the other hand, the 
embattled defensiveness of the independence struggle, coupled with 
the ignominy of huge territorial loses, reinforced the need to 
institutionalise a more homogeneous polity. However, less 
mercantilist elites who had generally prospered little from European 
imperialism, continued to favour the loose political ties with the 
Ottoman centre which were embodied in the multi-ethnicity of the 
ummah-Caliph relationship. Therefore, Turkish militarist nationalism, 
unlike the old regime homogeneity of the nineteenth century 
European nation-state, was defined by an intra-elite conflict within 
both political and ideological power networks. As such, it became 
focused on institutionalising a wide-ranging programme of ideological 
reforms aimed at increasing the power of the state over decentralised 
organisational networks of theocratic traditionalism. Victory for 
Kemal, and the subsequent shift from religiously legitimised, multi- 
ethnic empire to secular, quasi-fascist republic through an enlarged 
network of state administrators, thus continued the Ottoman 
tradition of imposing political links upon the periphery from a 
despotic and highly autonomous core. The overall result was that, in 
contrast to Mann's Europe, Turkish militarist nationalism emerged as 
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an intensive, intra-national, authoritarian-statist ideology rather than 
an extensively-held, predominantly geopolitical form of populist anti- 
statism. 
e Economics of Liberalisation 
Centrally-planned economic development was a key area of the 
republican government's attempt to bring the masses closer to the 
power of the state. Here, Mann's account of late development and the 
institutionalisation of industrial-capitalist nationalism is particularly 
instructive. In common, with late nineteenth century policies in 
countries such as Sweden, Japan, Russia and Austria, Turkey 
established authoritative plans for greater industrialisation. During the 
1930s, an extensive programme of infra-structural projects was 
initiated in Turkey. These were, in a similar way to industrialising 
countries in late nineteenth century Europe, aimed at boosting 
capital-intensive sectors such as mineral extraction, engineering and 
railway construction. As in Europe, this resulted in the emergence of 
huge cartels who relied heavily on the civil bureaucracy for subsidies, 
favourable lending terms and strategic planning and were, as a result, 
closely affiliated to the economic infra-structure of the state. In the 
militarised environment of late nineteenth century Europe, however, 
there existed an obvious geopolitical aspect to this form of 
industrialisation. The defensive protectionism of Turkish industrial- 
capitalism during the 1930s had no such facet. As a result, emergent 
manufacturers, mostly from western Anatolia, remained, in the 
absence of significant international links, authoritatively connected to 
the nationalist ideology and political infra-structure of the state 
bureaucracy. 
As Mann points out, however, the long-term maintenance of such 
centralised power is extremely difficult to effect. Civil groups will, 
particularly through the more diffused networks of economic power, 
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tend to build decentralised organisational linkages beyond the control 
of even authoritarian levels of state infra-structure. During the inter- 
war period many large-estate farmers from western Anatolia became 
immensely wealthy and began to invest in urban centres. In doing so, 
they formed collective networks of power with occupational and 
professional groups originally developed by the state to support their 
bureaucracy's administration of the periphery. This eventually became 
the basis for integration with the industrial elite of western Anatolian 
cities. In keeping with Mann's account of European industrial- 
capitalist nationalism, this integrated elite also began to press for 
greater political representation within the centre, a decrease in military 
expenditure in favour of large-scale, state-led infra-structural 
enterprises, restraints upon the ever-growing bureaucracy's etatist 
controls and, primarily perhaps, greater international connections. 
Unlike in much of early-industrialising Europe, however, the 
subsequent growth in the state's civilian functions was not at the 
expense of local and regional identities. 
As in Russia and Austria, the continuing economic power of the 
agrarian elite and their opposition to liberalising land reforms in 
Turkey tended to increase social instability and obstruct territorial 
cohesion. The result was that the extensive narrowing of the 
rural/urban divide which Mann argues was so indicative of early 
industrial-capitalist development failed to occur in these countries. 
Rather than the fairly evenly diffused, commercialised civil societies, 
which Mann identifies in some late-developers (such as Sweden and 
Japan), capitalist growth did not lead to a reduction in provincial 
diversity. In Turkey, this was exacerbated by the 1929 crash which 
ended the western Anatolian peasantry's partial marketisation, 
widened social stratification within the agrarian sector and further 
enhanced the power of conservative large-estate interests. Thus, as in 
Mann's characterisation of Austria and Russia, Turkish smallholders 
did not become proletarianised and remained a huge (still more than 
forty per cent of the population in 1945) and disparate workforce 
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with little class consciousness. Moreover, unlike much of western 
Europe where a collective sense of citizenship produced mass 
political parties which obliged states to incorporate, however 
imperfectly, labour representation, Kemal's regime made no such 
acknowledgement. Instead, the republican state pursued the German 
imperial model of maintaining old regime rule through partial 
incorporation of the bourgeoisie. In all, the result was that neither 
within nor between non-elite Turkish agriculture and the urban 
workforce did there develop political links that could cohere class 
sentiment. 
So, rather than purely as a consequence of features within the 
relations of production themselves, the emergence of class 
consciousness in Turkey was primarily prevented by a combination of 
sectional and sectoral factions similar to those which Mann identifies 
as key features of European industrial relations. In the Turkish case, 
these were significantly compounded by the persistence of three age- 
old and fundamentally non-economic cleavages - the divisions 
between the political centre and the periphery, state-affiliated and 
non-state affiliated actors and the differing institutions and 
development of eastern and western Anatolia. In both Turkey and 
western Europe, industrial-capitalism created only the potential for 
extensive, political and dialectical classes. Compartmentalised 
perceptions of social unity, illustrated through Mann's IOTA model, 
were, in both regions, rare. Neither produced extensively held notions 
of shared `identity' nor of `opposition' to other class interests. 
Similarly, these two components seldom combined to produce a 
perceived `totality' that defined class members' social situation, nor 
did they generally offer an `alternative' to existing power relations. In 
Turkey, as Mann concludes of Europe, classes did not emerge as 
`pure' features of modernity. Instead, they were divided by other 
networks of social interaction, both from within the relations of 
production and through the influence of non-economic forces. The 
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difference in Turkey was that these non-economic forces had much 
greater divisive power. 
Not least was the growing differential between western and eastern 
Anatolia - especially the predominately Kurdish speaking south-east. 
As noted in Chapter Five, the peculiar artificiality of this area's border 
delimitation, its topography and its intensively localised culture made 
it particularly resistant to the political infra-structure of the centre. 
The result was that industrial-capitalism had little impact on the 
regions's local elites who continued, by and large, to maintain their 
position through a combination of traditional political power 
structures and corporatist links with the state. During the single-party 
period, the debilitating effects of the Sheikh Said rebellion and, in a 
reversal of Ottoman policies of state-imposed segmentalism, an 
extensive programme of state investment in the large agricultural 
estates of the Aegean and Mediterranean seaboards had exacerbated 
the west/east division still further. The result was that the emergence 
of industrial-capitalist nationalism failed to follow the more 
internationalist outlook of Sweden, Japan and the early developers. 
Only within the economic networks of the western Anatolian 
integrated elite, did such geopolitical concerns appear with any 
significant organisational power. Since, as Mann notes, industrial- 
capitalist advance, tends to empower the forces of political 
representation, this social group was, following its rise during the 
Second World War, successful in securing a process of political 
decentralisation by primarily citing the importance of joining the 
international order which emerged from Bretton Woods in 1944. 
In other ways, however, industrial capitalism continued to be 
determined by the intra-state focus of the previous militarist phase 
thereby intensifying Turkey's internal divisions. For much of the old 
regime of bureaucrats and soldiers who had been forced to share 
power with the economic technocrats of the post-war middle-class 
governments, the new order was a heretical departure from the statist 
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nationalism of Kemalist authoritarian dogma. For others, though, the 
advent of competitive politics and the arrival of the capitalist classes 
within the government of the republic was a natural continuation of 
Kemal's pro-Western populism. This cleavage ran right through the 
old regime. For the most part, the civil bureaucracy represented the 
former. They were largely divided between nationalist or pan- 
nationalist semi-religious authoritarianism -a partial reflection of 
Mann's characterisation of European state-affiliated rightism - and a 
more left-wing, reformist, yet equally anti-democratic, statism. The 
military, on the other hand, represented a wider spread of opinion, 
being ideologically unified only by a shared determination to improve 
their economic position. Within the officer corps, some welcomed 
the new bourgeois order as a means of organisationally outflanking 
leftist sentiment, `nationalising' the state in a less coercive, `Western' 
manner and endearing the republic to financial multi-laterals and their 
colleagues in NATO. Others, however, saw the presence of 
conservative farmers in government as an affront to their self- 
designated role as guardians of Kemalist reformism. 
The Military/Industrial Complex 
Parallels can be drawn between these fissures and Mann's account of 
the end of old regime preponderance following the First World War. 
He argues that, in countries which had institutionalised more 
authoritarian versions of industrial-capitalist nationalism, the pressure 
of growing civil demands for greater political representation, 
accentuated by the increasing organisational strength of decentralised 
economic networks, split the ruling classes into two factions - one 
conservatively committed to constitutional reform, the other 
advocating an anti-democratic, `modernist' nationalism. In Turkey, a 
similar process materialised. The integrated elite and their merchant 
and professional affiliates had been successful in considerably 
diminishing the economic role and status of the old regime 
bureaucracy. In doing so, though, they radicalised rightist sentiment 
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inside sections of the armed forces, especially within the field ranks of 
the officer corps. Thus, what Mann terns `aggressive' modernist 
nationalism (or, in other words, chauvinist, xenophobic and militarist 
notions of cultural identity) appeared in Turkey in state careerist 
sectors of the military and civil bureaucracy in similar ways to Europe. 
Moreover, as in Western versions of modernist nationalism, the 
intensity of such views declined as seniority within the bureaucratic 
hierarchy increased. In both regions the staff commanders of the 
armed forces, for instance, tended to be both more cautious in 
geopolitical terns and less inclined towards radical reformist than less 
secure and more state-sensitive mid-ranking officers or bureaucrats. 
Indeed, the Turkish high command's long-established propensity for 
centrist conservatism fitted well with the interests of the integrated 
economic elite. For their part, the industrialists were, by the late 
1950s, much less reliant on provincial links and were therefore largely 
indifferent to the bourgeois government's policy of pandering to the 
peasantry in order to secure re-election. The result was a divergence 
between political and economic elite networks and a growing 
connection between industrial-capitalist interests and a military elite 
keen to position themselves within the new bourgeois order. In this 
sense, what emerged from the 1960 coup was an uneasy 
accommodation between the generals and the capitalist elite. Through 
considerable investments in the private sector and through an 
increasing role in publicly-funded economic projects, the military elite 
were at the heart of what turned out to be record growth rates during 
the 1960s. Much of the urban proletariat was, however, excluded 
from this period of prosperity and burgeoning leftist disorder 
prompted a number of authoritarian revisions to the 1961 
constitution and an ever-closer relationship between the state and 
extreme right-wing activists. 
This prevented the decline in `aggressive' modernist nationalism 
apparent in most of Europe in the post-war era and maintained the 
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military elite's close involvement in civil politics. Moreover, the 
inability of both bureaucratic and class rule to extend social 
citizenship and economic development to much of eastern Anatolia 
meant that the diminutioin in militarism, which Mann argues tends to 
accompany areas of uniformly organised capitalist exchange, also 
failed to occur in Turkey. Instead, the 1960s led to a further 
institutionalisation of aggressive notions of modernist national 
identity. Through a collusive arrangement with the integrated 
economic elite, the Turkish armed forces perpetuated a super-strong 
executive in the tradition of Ottoman monarchic office and, by 
continuing to repress labour organisation and favour quasi-fascist 
groups, ensured that no liberalising challenge could emerge with 
sufficient power to threaten their role as self-appointed and sole 
guardians of the `organic' nation. While most European states 
experienced a considerable decline in domestic repression levels in the 
post-war era, militarised networks of political and ideological power 
within the Turkish state elite endured by accommodating dominant 
economic class ascendancy and institutionalising a semi-authoritarian, 
if highly volatile, version of what Mann identifies as a Bismarckian 
strategy of `negative integration'. This afforded a controlled level of 
political expression for the emerging capitalist classes while 
maintaining a permanent position for military interests within the 
heart of government. 
While liberal and totalitarian regimes tend to suffer from only limited 
levels of social conflict, being respectively inclusive and repressive 
enough to obviate rebellion, semi-authoritarian forms of 
incorporation are likely to be particularly prone to instability. This is 
because they are usually sufficiently exclusive to motivate challenges, 
but not despotic enough to suppress power-contentious 
organisations. By the end of the 1970s, it became clear in Turkey that 
a regime based on semi-authoritarian incorporation could not 
maintain organisational control over military power networks now 
much more decentralised, polarised by growing levels of violence and 
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overlaid with ethnic and religious cleavages. As Islamist, rightist and 
left-wing organisations led an increasingly militarised challenge to the 
pro-Western capitalist order, the state began to lose organisational 
control over political power networks and to become isolated, 
producing a social vacuum which destabilised constitutional politics 
and consolidated bourgeois support for the Turkish armed forces. 
When proletariat unrest took on international dimensions (particularly 
through Iranian and Soviet connections), which appeared to 
jeopardise the elite's geopolitical and economic alignment with the 
West, the high command, following a number of key meetings with 
senior American agents, stepped in. 
In this sense, the industrial/military cabal which assumed power in 
1980 did not, as some commentators have claimed, represent a return 
of the old regime akin to the intervention of 1960. Instead, the post- 
1980 administration was based on a new elite coalition born of the 
high command's position in the domestic and global economy. This 
political manifestation had two primary sources of social power. 
Firstly, in economic terms, an accommodation had been reached 
between emergent capitalism and the old regime in which military 
power filled the organisational space vacated by the collapse of both 
the civil bureaucracy and elected officialdom thereby becoming, in the 
minds of much of the bourgeoisie, the only basis for a politically 
stable future. This was supported by a shared commitment to a root 
and branch revision of the economy. IMF-based structural 
adjustments were made to the exchange rate, the trading regime, 
monetary controls, public spending and debt management. In 
response, the international banks delivered a financial package of 
hitherto unprecedented size. Thus, coupled with Turkey's almost 
unrivalled arms purchasing programme, the obfuscatory Defence 
Industry Support Fund and the enormous military assistance 
foundations, the high command was able to assume a new position at 
the centre of Turkey's economy. 
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Secondly, in ideological terms, a role had been found for the 
`aggressive' nationalism of the junior field ranks by institutionalising, 
in effect, two systems of government. Outside south-east Anatolia, 
the military-industrial complex consolidated their political position by 
blending elements of what Mann calls the `capitalist-liberal' regime 
strategy with the abiding semi-authoritarian techniques of 
incorporation still prevalent from the 1960s. As such, the vigorous 
promotion of free-market mercantilism was combined with 
moderately repressive measures against labour organisations and 
leftist groups. Legitimised through the pro-Western, classless ideology 
of Kemalism and the catch-all defence of national security and 
solidified by the growing embourgeoisment of the military elite, this 
combined structure became increasingly firmly embedded throughout 
the 1980s and 90s. In economic terms, a similar policy was pursued in 
the south-east through numerous state-led attempts to extend 
capitalist links into the region and encourage private capital - most 
notably through the huge GAP initiative. However, the failure of this 
project to institutionalise territorially uniform free-market capitalism 
surrendered centralised control over networks of political power to 
`aggressive' nationalists within the military hierarchy. The result was 
that over much of the ten predominantly Kurdish-speaking provinces 
of the south-east, a more autocratic regime emerged. Emergency 
legislation empowered an almost exclusively military system of 
governance in which nominally democratic institutions were rendered 
impotent by severe levels of domestic repression legitimised by 
threats to national security. Highly reformist assimilatory measures 
undertaken by field officers and irregular paramilitaries producing a 
regime quite different from the core areas of western Anatolia where 
the state deployed less coercive measures aimed at fragmenting 
potential class unity and promoting corporate interests. In this way, 
semi-authoritarian incorporation gave way to, what Mann terms, an 
`autocratic militarist' regime in the south-east. The 1980 intervention's 
institutionalisation of such a bifurcated system of government thus 
represented, on the one hand, a means of managing ideological 
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radicalism within the field ranks and, on the other, a way of 
establishing a thoroughly institutionalised collaboration between elite 
capital and high command conservatism. 
Conclusion 
In keeping with Mann's macro-historical rubric, outlined in Chapter 
Two, this thesis has thus presented an account of large-scale change 
in Ottoman/Turkish development with five primary objectives. 
Firstly, as set out in the opening section of this chapter, it has utilised 
an analysis of the past to consider more general propositions about 
social power and state-civil relations. Secondly, though the use of 
variant historical sources, it has constructed a causal analysis of the 
conditions which have given rise to modern institutions. Key areas of 
change have been summarised under four headings above. Thirdly, it 
has sought to understand the variation between Turkish and 
European social dynamics. A comparative analysis of this kind refines 
our understanding of large-scale change in the eastern Mediterranean 
in three ways. Firstly, in highlighting the commonalities which both 
regions possess, light can be cast on their shared socio-historical 
heritage. To this effect, the thesis has applied Mann's universal theory 
of power organisation and contention in order to elucidate social 
`crystallisations' such as nationalism, secularism, class and militarism 
and economic development which are of general relevance. Secondly, 
by looking at the significant areas of difference between the two 
evolutionary patterns, a greater understanding of Turkish specificity 
can be obtained. Not least amongst these has been the rapidity of 
social change and the persistence of social cleavages built around 
ethnicity, religiosity and social status. Thirdly, in bringing a new case 
to Mann's account of historical continuity, a refined comprehension 
of social power can be sought which better explains Turkish patterns 
of organisational development. Significant points of comparative 
continuity and change within these three areas have also been 
highlighted in the preceding sections of this chapter. 
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The fourth of the thesis' primary objectives has been to underline 
important areas of similarity and difference between Western and 
Eastern trajectories. As such, it attempts to rectify an omission in 
Mann's account and a Euro-centrism within macro-historical 
sociology generally. The fact that he fails to analyse both the differing 
imperial heritage of West and East and their contrasting 
institutionalisation of phenomena such as secularism, state 
centralisation and capitalism means that comparative aspects to his 
treatment of European social change are lost. Furthermore, he misses 
the opportunity to vary his historiographical argument with examples 
which might have reinforced his thesis on the specificity of north- 
west European development. This is a pity as a greater degree of 
contact with non-Western cases would have brought greater 
explanatory value to Mann's more general account of the emergence 
of the early nation-states. It would also have further allowed him to 
test his theoretical rubric and thus strengthen his claim upon general 
applicability. Nonetheless, Mann's analysis of European development 
offers the student of Middle Eastern history a useful scholarly tool. 
By selecting areas of both his theoretical and historiographic 
explication, insights into the emergence of Ottoman and Turkish 
social institutions can be obtained and, in the fifth and last of the 
thesis' objectives, Mann's contribution to historical sociology can be 
assessed. 
In particular, this application of a leading approach within macro- 
historical sociology offers support for the discipline as a whole. As 
with Mann's work, the thesis presented above seeks to adopt a 
holistic perspective without suggesting events have a teleological 
inevitability to them. Actors and their motives are linked to historical 
occurrences and processes both wittingly and as a result of 
unintended causes and consequences. Rather than referring to actors 
and events simply in terms of functional structures or role 
differentiation, this macro-historical approach emphasises the specific 
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cultural and temporal context in which, and through which, 
phenomena were reported. In this sense, both this thesis and Mann's 
encyclopaedic analysis attempt to balance theoretical generality and 
social context. Or, put another way, each adopts a structured 
combination of nomothetic sociology and idiographic historiography 
in order to offer an explanatory account of variance and continuity 
within a deliberate and explicit analytical framework. As a result, 
methodological progress is made through the reformulation of the 
relationship between data and theory and new insights are made into 
the study of the past. 
In seeking to advance a clearer understanding of long-term social 
transformations, macro-historical sociologists, like all scientists, are 
obliged to make extensive use of textual, or `secondary', sources. 
However, in ensuring that such material is analysed and cross-checked 
in a detached and rigorous manner, the dialectical relationship 
between theory and data within macro-historical sociology provides 
the investigator with a distinct advantage over more rigid 
methodological formulations. By constantly relating evidence to 
variant hypotheses, differing spatial or temporal contexts and the 
study's own explicitly-stated sociological framework (see Chapters 
One and Two), theoretical adjustments can be made that lead to new 
interpretative analyses and stronger epistemological positions. So in 
not sticking to formulaic versions of, what Mann calls, `the 
hypothetico-deductive sequence', historical sociologists can ask more 
general questions which, inherently, involve more approximate 
indicators and less comprehensive variables. Both Mann's account 
and this thesis have acknowledged these restraints and, in selecting 
the data which are presented, have outlined, or referenced, broader 
academic debates and returned to `primary' historical sources 
wherever possible. In doing so, such studies are, firstly, equally likely 
to produce original findings. For instance, the main claims to 
originality within this thesis can be summarised thus: 
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" There is currently no study of Turkish social development 
which seeks to trace large-scale changes in state power 
" No analysis of Turkish social change has attempted the 
comprehensive diachronic comparisons with Western 
development set out here 
" There has been no attempt to extend the theoretical 
components of macro-historical sociology to a specifically 
non-Western case 
" No analyses of Ottoman change have attempted to deploy 
and develop a Spencerian model of compulsory co- 
operation. In doing so, this study has offered a revision to 
the widely-held view that the Roman empire represented 
as high a level of infra-structural power as was possible 
within pre-modern constraints 
" In setting out a more complex theorisation of ideological 
power than is generally found in analyses of the modernist 
revolution in Turkey, this study has challenged the general 
opinion that the republican bureaucracy offered the state a 
means of developing a more cohesive polity 
" No study offers such a comprehensive account of the 
integration of Turkish capital interests and its political 
consequences 
" No study has argued that the post-1980 Kurdish issue in 
Turkey can be understood through an analysis of the 
internal dynamics of the military 
Secondly, macro-historical sociological studies are, in essence, no 
different from more idiographic judgements about the factuality of 
the past. All tend to accept, reject or revise data, sources and 
`secondary' interpretations according to the predominant social 
theories of the day. Rather than claiming a kind of positivist 
objectivity, or simply allowing these suppositions to lie implicitly 
within the analysis, however, macro-historical sociology generally sets 
out the assumptions upon which it proceeds through an explicit and 
comprehensive theoretical criterion. Thus, the thesis can be seen as a 
part of a broader return to a more ambitious approach to world issues 
over the last fifteen or so years. As Mann points out, the quest to 
understand "matters of nationalism and internationalism, 
authoritarianism and democracy, war and peace, and the peculiarities 
of states... [has] returned us to more macro traditions... [for] if we 
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do not think in macro-sociological terms, then our empirical work will 
produce the conventional theories of own socialisation experiences". 
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